# A Political and Social History of Modern Europe V.1.

Carlton J. H. Hayes

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A POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE
VOLUME I
1500−1815

# PREFACE

This book represents an attempt on the part of the author to satisfy a very real need of a textbook which will reach far enough back to afford secure foundations for a college course in modern European history.

The book is a long one, and purposely so. Not only does it undertake to deal with a period at once the most complicated and the most inherently interesting of any in the whole recorded history of mankind, but it aims to impart sufficiently detailed information about the various topics discussed to make the college student feel that he is advanced a grade beyond the student in secondary school. There is too often a tendency to underestimate the intellectual capabilities of the collegian and to feed him so simple and scanty a mental pabulum that he becomes as a child and thinks as a child. Of course the author appreciates the fact that most college instructors of history piece out the elementary textbooks by means of assignments of collateral reading in large standard treatises. All too frequently, however, such assignments, excellent in themselves, leave woeful gaps which a slender elementary manual is inadequate to fill. And the student becomes too painfully aware, for his own educational good, of a chasmal separation between his textbook and his collateral reading. The present manual is designed to supply a narrative of such proportions that the need of additional reading will be somewhat lessened, and at the same time it is provided with critical bibliographies and so arranged as to enable the judicious instructor more easily to make substitutions here and there from other works or to pass over this or that section entirely. Perhaps these considerations will commend to others the judgment of the author in writing a long book.

Nowadays prefaces to textbooks of modern history almost invariably proclaim their writers' intention to stress recent happenings or at least those events of the past which have had a direct bearing upon the present. An examination of the following pages will show that in the case of this book there is no discrepancy between such an intention on the part of the present writer and its achievement. Beginning with the sixteenth century, the story of the civilization of modern Europe is carried down the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries with constant *crescendo*. Of the total space devoted to the four hundred years under review, the last century fills half. And the greatest care has been taken to bring the story down to date and to indicate as clearly and calmly as possible the underlying causes of the vast contemporaneous European war, which has already put a new complexion on our old historical knowledge and made everything that went before seem part and parcel of an old regime.

As to why the author has preferred to begin the story of modern Europe with the sixteenth century, rather than with the thirteenth or with the French Revolution, the reader is specially referred to the *Introduction*. It has seemed to the author that particularly from the Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century dates the remarkable and steady evolution of that powerful middle class—the bourgeoisie— which has done more than all other classes put together to condition the progress of the several countries of modern Europe and to create the life and thought of the present generation throughout the world. The rise of the bourgeoisie is the great central theme of modern history; it is the great central theme of this book.

Not so very long ago distinguished historians were insisting that the state, as the highest expression of man's social instincts and as the immediate concern of all human beings, is the only fit subject of historical study, and that history, therefore, must be simply “past politics”; under their influence most textbooks became compendiums of data about kings and constitutions, about rebellions and battles. More recently historians of repute, as well as eminent economists, have given their attention and patronage to painstaking investigations of how, apart from state action, man in the past has toiled or traveled or done the other ordinary things of everyday life; and the influence of such scholars has served to provide us with a considerable number of convenient manuals on special phases of social history. Yet more recently several writers of textbooks have endeavored to combine the two tendencies and to present in a single volume both political and social facts, but it must be confessed that sometimes these writers have been content to tell the old political tale in orthodox manner and then to append a chapter or two of social miscellany, whose connection with the body of their book is seldom apparent to the student.

The present volume represents an effort really to combine political and social history in one synthesis: the author, quite convinced of the importance of the view that political activities constitute the most perfect

expression of man's social instincts and touch mankind most universally, has not neglected to treat of monarchs and parliaments, of democracy and nationalism; at the same time he has cordially accepted the opinion that political activities are determined largely by economic and social needs and ambitions; and accordingly he has undertaken not only to incorporate at fairly regular intervals such chapters as those on the Commercial Revolution, Society in the Eighteenth Century, the Industrial Revolution, and Social Factors, 1870−1914, but also to show in every part of the narrative the economic aspects of the chief political facts.

Despite the length of this book, critics will undoubtedly note omissions. Confronting the writer of every textbook of history is the eternal problem of selection—the choice of what is most pointedly significant from the sum total of man's thoughts, words, and deeds. It is a matter of personal judgment, and personal judgments are notoriously variant. Certainly there will be critics who will complain of the present author's failure to follow up his suggestions concerning sixteenth−century art and culture with a fuller account of the development of philosophy and literature from the seventeenth to the twentieth century; and the only rejoinders that the harassed author can make are the rather lame ones that a book, to be a book, must conform to the mechanical laws of space and dimension, and that a serious attempt on the part of the present writer to make a synthesis of social and political facts precludes no effort on the part of other and abler writers to synthesize all these facts with the phenomena which are conventionally assigned to the realm of “cultural” or “intellectual" history. In this, and in all other respects, the author trusts that his particular solution of the vexatious problem of selection will prove as generally acceptable as any.

In the all−important matter of accuracy, the author cannot hope to have escaped all the pitfalls that in a peculiarly broad and crowded field everywhere trip the feet of even the most wary and persistent searchers after truth. He has naturally been forced to rely for the truth of his statements chiefly upon numerous secondary works, of which some acknowledgment is made in the following *Note*, and upon the kindly criticisms of a number of his colleagues; in some instances, notably in parts of the chapters on the Protestant Revolt, the French Revolution, and developments since 1848 in Great Britain, France, and Germany, he has been able to draw on his own special studies of primary source material, and in certain of these instances he has ventured to dissent from opinions that have been copied unquestioningly from one work to another.

No period of history can be more interesting or illuminating than the period with which this book is concerned, especially now, when a war of tremendous magnitude and meaning is attracting the attention of the whole civilized world and arousing a desire in the minds of all intelligent persons to know something of the past that has produced it. The great basic causes of the present war the author has sought, not in the ambitions of a single power nor in an isolated outrage, but in the history of four hundred years. He has tried to write a book that would be suggestive and informing, not only to the ordinary college student, but to the more mature and thoughtful student of public affairs in the university of the world.

CARLTON J. H. HAYES. AFTON, NEW YORK, May, 1916.

# NOTE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author begs to acknowledge his general indebtedness to a veritable host of historical writers, of whose original researches or secondary compilations he has constantly and almost unblushingly made use in the preparation of this book. At the close of the *Introduction* will be found a list of the major works dealing with the whole period under review, or with the greater part of it, which have been drawn upon most heavily. And there is hardly a book cited in any of the special bibliographies following the several chapters that has not supplied some single fact or suggestion to the accompanying narrative.

For many of the general ideas set forth in this work as well as for painstaking assistance in reading manuscript and correcting errors of detail, the author confesses his debt to various colleagues in Columbia University and elsewhere. In particular, Professor R. L. Schuyler has helpfully read the chapters on English history; Professor James T. Shotwell, the chapter on the Commercial Revolution; Professor D. S. Muzzey, the chapters on the French Revolution, Napoleon, and Metternich; Professor William R. Shepherd, the chapters on “National Imperialism”; and Professor Edward B. Krehbiel of Leland Stanford Junior University, the chapter on recent international relations. Professor E. F. Humphrey of Trinity College (Connecticut) has given profitable criticism on the greater part of the text; and Professor Charles A. Beard of Columbia University, Professor Sidney B. Fay of Smith College, and Mr. Edward L. Durfee of Yale University, have read the whole work and suggested several valuable emendations. Three instructors in history at Columbia have been of marked service—Dr. Austin P. Evans, Mr. D. R. Fox, and Mr. Parker T. Moon. The last named devoted the chief part of two summers to the task of preparing notes for several chapters of the book and he has attended the author on the long dreary road of proof reading.

# INTRODUCTION

The story of modern times is but a small fraction of the long epic of human history. If, as seems highly probable, the conservative estimates of recent scientists that mankind has inhabited the earth more than fifty thousand years [Footnote: Professor James Geikie, of the University of Edinburgh, suggests, in his *Antiquity of Man in Europe* (1914), the possible existence of human beings on the earth more than 500,000 years ago!], are accurate, then the bare five hundred years which these volumes pass in review constitute, in time, less than a hundredth part of man's past. Certainly, thousands of years before our day there were empires and kingdoms and city−states, showing considerable advancement in those intellectual pursuits which we call civilization or culture,—that is, in religion, learning, literature, political organization, and business; and such basic institutions as the family, the state, and society go back even further, past our earliest records, until their origins are shrouded in deepest mystery. Despite its brevity, modern history is of supreme importance. Within its comparatively brief limits are set greater changes in human life and action than are to be found in the records of any earlier millennium. While the present is conditioned in part by the deeds and thoughts of our distant forbears who lived thousands of years ago, it has been influenced in a very special way by historical events of the last five hundred years. Let us see how this is true.

Suppose we ask ourselves in what important respects the year 1900 differed from the year 1400. In other words, what are the great distinguishing achievements of modern times? At least six may be noted:

(1) *Exploration and knowledge of the whole globe*. To our ancestors from time out of mind the civilized world was but the lands adjacent to the Mediterranean and, at most, vague stretches of Persia, India, and China. Not much over four hundred years ago was America discovered and the globe circumnavigated for the first time, and very recently has the use of steamship, telegraph, and railway served to bind together the uttermost parts of the world, thereby making it relatively smaller, less mysterious, and in culture more unified.

(2) *Higher standards of individual efficiency and comfort*. The physical welfare of the individual has been promoted to a greater degree, or at all events preached more eloquently, within the last few generations than ever before. This has doubtless been due to changes in the commonplace everyday life of all the people. It must be remembered that in the fifteenth century man did the ordinary things of life in much the same manner as did early Romans or Greeks or Egyptians, and that our present remarkable ways of living, of working, and of traveling are the direct outcome of the Commercial Revolution of the sixteenth century and of the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth.

(3) *Intensification of political organization, with attendant public guarantees of personal liberties*. The ideas of nationalism and of democracy are essentially modern in their expression. The notion that people who speak the same language and have a common culture should be organized as an independent state with uniform laws and customs was hardly held prior to the fifteenth century. The national states of England, France, and Spain did not appear unmistakably with their national boundaries, national consciousness, national literature, until the opening of the sixteenth century; and it was long afterwards that in Italy and Germany the national idea supplanted the older notions of world empire or of city−state or of feudalism. The national state has proved everywhere a far more powerful political organization than any other: its functions have steadily increased, now at the expense of feudalism, now at the expense of the church; and such increase has been as constant under industrial democracy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as under the benevolent despotism of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But in measure as government has enlarged its scope, the governed have worked out and applied protective principles of personal liberties. The Puritan Revolution, the French Revolution, the American Revolution, the uprisings of oppressed populations throughout the nineteenth century, would be quite inexplicable in other than modern times. In fact the whole political history of the last four centuries is in essence a series of compromises between the conflicting results of the modern exaltation of the state and the modern exaltation of the individual.

(4) *Replacement of the idea of the necessity of uniformity in a definite faith and religion by toleration of many faiths or even of no faith*. A great state religion, professed publicly, and financially supported by all the citizens, has been a distinguishing mark of every earlier age. Whatever else may be thought of the Protestant movement of

the sixteenth century, of the rise of deism and skepticism in the seventeenth and eighteenth, and of the existence of scientific rationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth, there can be little doubt that each of them has contributed its share to the prevalence of the idea that religion is essentially a private, not a public, affair and that friendly rivalry in good works is preferable to uniformity in faith.

(5) *Diffusion of learning*. The invention of printing towards the close of the fifteenth century gradually revolutionized the pursuit of knowledge and created a real democracy of letters. What learning might have lost in depth through its marvelous broadening has perhaps been compensated for by the application of the keenest minds in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to experimental science and in our own day to applied science.

(6) *Spirit of progress and decline of conservatism*. For better or for worse the modern man is intellectually more self−reliant than his ancestors, more prone to try new inventions and to profit by new discoveries, more conscious and therefore more critical of conditions about him, more convinced that he lives in a better world than did his fathers, and that his children who come after him should have a better chance than he has had. This is the modern spirit. It is the product of all the other elements of the history of five hundred years—the larger geographical horizon, the greater physical comfort, the revolutionized political institutions, the broader sympathies, the newer ideals of education. Springing thus from events of the past few centuries, the modern spirit nevertheless looks ever forward, not backward. A debtor to the past, it will be doubly creditor to the future. It will determine the type of individual and social betterment through coming centuries. Such an idea is implied in the phrase, “the continuity of history”—the ever−flowing stream of happenings that brings down to us the heritage of past ages and that carries on our richer legacies to generations yet unborn.

From such a conception of the continuity of history, the real significance of our study can be derived. It becomes perfectly clear that if we understand the present we shall be better prepared to face the problems and difficulties of the future. But to understand the present thoroughly, it becomes necessary not only to learn what are its great features and tendencies, but likewise how they have been evolved. Now, as we have already remarked, six most important characteristics of the present day have been developed within the last four or five centuries. To follow the history of this period, therefore, will tend to familiarize us both with present−day conditions and with future needs. This is the genuine justification for the study of the history of modern times.

Modern history may conveniently be defined as that part of history which deals with the origin and evolution of the great distinguishing characteristics of the present. No precise dates can be assigned to modern history as contrasted with what has commonly been called ancient or medieval. In a sense, any division of the historical stream into parts or periods is fundamentally fallacious: for example, inasmuch as the present generation owes to the Greeks of the fourth century before Christ many of its artistic models and philosophical ideas and very few of its political theories, the former might plausibly be embraced in the field of modern history, the latter excluded therefrom. But the problem before us is not so difficult as may seem on first thought. To all intents and purposes the development of the six characteristics that have been noted has taken place within five hundred years. The sixteenth century witnessed the true beginnings of the change in the extensive world discoveries, in the establishment of a recognized European state system, in the rise of Protestantism, and in the quickening of intellectual activity. It is the foundation of modern Europe.

The sixteenth century will therefore be the general subject of Part I of this volume. After reviewing the geography of Europe about the year 1500, we shall take up in turn the *four* factors of the century which have had a lasting influence upon us: (1) socially and economically—The Commercial Revolution; (2) politically—European Politics in the Sixteenth Century; (3) religiously and ecclesiastically—The Protestant Revolt; (4) intellectually—The Culture of the Sixteenth Century.

ADDITIONAL READING

THE STUDY OF HISTORY. On historical method: C. V. Langlois and Charles Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History,* trans. by G. G. Berry (1912); J. M. Vincent, *Historical Research: an Outline of Theory and Practice* (1911); H. B. George, *Historical Evidence* (1909); F. M. Fling, *Outline of Historical Method* (1899). Different views of history: J. H. Robinson, *The New History* (1912), a collection of stimulating essays; J. T. Shotwell, suggestive article *History* in 11th edition of *Encyclopaedia Britannica* ; T. B. Macaulay, essay on *History*; Thomas Carlyle, *Heroes and Hero Worship*; Karl Lamprecht, *What is History*? trans. by E. A. Andrews (1905). Also see Henry Johnson, *The Teaching of History* (1915); Eduard Fueter, *Geschichte der neueren Historiographie* (1911); Ernst Bernheim, *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode und der Geschichtsphilosophie,* 5th

ed. (1914); G. P. Gooch, *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century* (1913).

TEXTBOOKS AND MANUALS OF MODERN HISTORY. J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe*, 2 vols. (1907), a political and social narrative from the time of Louis XIV, and by the same authors, *Readings in Modern European History*, 2 vols. (1908−1909), an indispensable sourcebook, with critical bibliographies; Ferdinand Schevill, *A Political History of Modern Europe from the Reformation to the Present Day* (1907); T. H. Dyer, *A History of Modern Europe from the Fall of Constantinople*, 3d ed. revised and continued to the end of the nineteenth century by Arthur Hassall, 6 vols. (1901), somewhat antiquated but still valuable for its vast store of political facts; Victor Duruy, *History of Modern Times from the Fall of Constantinople to the French Revolution*, trans. by E. A. Grosvenor (1894), verbose and somewhat uncritical, but usable for French history. More up−to−date series of historical manuals are now appearing or are projected by Henry Holt and Company under the editorship of Professor C. H. Haskins, by The Century Company under Professor G. L. Burr, by Ginn and Company under Professor J. H. Robinson, and by Houghton Mifflin Company under Professor J. T. Shotwell: such of these volumes as have appeared are noted in the appropriate chapter bibliographies following. The Macmillan Company has published *Periods of European History*, 8 vols. (1893−1901), under the editorship of Arthur Hassall, of which the last five volumes treat of political Europe from 1494 to 1899; and a more elementary political series, *Six Ages of European History*, 6 vols. (1910), under the editorship of A. H. Johnson, of which the last three volumes cover the years from 1453 to 1878. Much additional information is obtainable from such popular series as *Story of the Nations* (1886 *sqq.*), *Heroes of the Nations* (1890 *sqq.*), and *Home University Library*, though the volumes in such series are of very unequal merit. Convenient chronological summaries are: G. P. and G. H. Putnam, *Tabular Views of Universal History* (1914); Carl Ploetz, *Manual of Universal History*, trans. and enlarged by W. H. Tillinghast, new edition (1915); *Haydn's Dictionary of Dates* , 25th ed. (1911); C. E. Little, *Cyclopaedia of Classified Dates* (1900); *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XIII (1911). The best atlas—a vitally necessary adjunct of historical study—is either that of W. R. Shepherd, *Historical Atlas* (1911), or that of Ramsay Muir, *Hammond's New Historical Atlas for Students*, 2d ed. (1915); a smaller historical atlas is that of E. W. Dow (1907), and longer ones are *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. XIV (1912) and, in German, Putzger, *Historischer Schulatlas*. Elaborate treatises on historical geography: Elisee Reclus, *The Universal Geography*, trans. and ed. by E. G. Ravenstein, 19 vols.; *Nouveau Dictionnaire de Geographie Universelle*, by Vivien de Saint−Martin and Louis Rousselet, 10 vols. See also H. B. George, *The Relations of Geography and History* (1910) and Ellen C. Semple, *The Influence of Geographic Environment* (1911).

STANDARD SECONDARY WORKS AND SETS ON MODERN HISTORY. *The Cambridge Modern History*, 12 vols. and 2 supplementary vols. (1902−1912), planned by Lord Acton, edited by A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero, and Stanley Leathes, written by English scholars, covering the period from 1450 to 1910, generally sound but rather narrowly political. Better balanced is the monumental work of a group of French scholars, *Histoire generale du IVe siecle a nos jours*, edited by Ernest Lavisse and Alfred Rambaud, 12 vols. (1894−1901), of which the last nine treat of the years from 1492 to 1900. For social history a series, *Histoire universelle du travail*, 12 vols., is projected under the editorship of Georges Renard. *The Encyclopaedia Britannica* , 11th ed. (1910−1911), is the work mainly of distinguished scholars and a storehouse of historical information, political, social, and intellectual. Also available in English is *History of All Nations* , 24 vols. (1902), the first nineteen based on translation of Theodor Flathe, *Allgemeine Weltgeschichte*,—Vols. X−XXIV dealing with modern history,—Vol. XX, on Europe, Asia, and Africa since 1871, by C. M. Andrews, and Vols. XXI−XXIII, on American history, by John Fiske; likewise H. F. Helmolt (editor), *Weltgeschichte*, trans. into English, 8 vols. (1902−1907). Sets and series in German: Wilhelm Oncken (editor), *Allgemeine Geschichte in Einzeldarstellungen*, 50 vols. (1879−1893); *Geschichte der europaeischen Staaten*, an enormous collection, appearing more or less constantly from 1829 to the present and edited successively by such famous scholars as A. H. L. Heeren, F. A. Ukert, Wilhelm von Giesebrecht, and Karl Lamprecht; G. von Below and F. Meinecke (editors), *Handbuch der mittel−alterlichen und neueren Geschichte*, a series begun in 1903 and planned, when completed, to comprise 40 vols.; Paul Hinneberg (editor), *Die Kultur der Gegenwart, ihre Entwicklung und ihre Ziele*, a remarkable series begun in 1906 and intended to explain in many volumes the civilization of the twentieth century in all its aspects; Erich Brandenburg (editor), *Bibliothek der Geschichtswissenschaft*, a series recently projected, the first volume appearing in 1912; J. von Pflugk−Harttung, *Weltgeschichte: die Entwicklung der*

*Menschheit in Staat und Gesellschaft, in Kultur und Geistesleben*, 6 vols. illust. (1908−1911); Theodor Lindner, *Weltgeschichte seit der Voelkerwanderung*, 8 vols. (1908−1914). Valuable contributions to general modern history occur in such monumental national histories as Karl Lamprecht, *Deutsche Geschichte*, 12 vols. in 16 (1891−1909), and, more particularly, Ernest Lavisse (editor), *Histoire de France depuis les origines jusqu'a la Revolution*, 9 double vols. (1900−1911).

BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARIES. General: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 11th ed., 29 vols. (1910−1911); *New International Encyclopedia*, 2d ed., 24 vols. (1914−1916); *Catholic Encyclopedia*, 15 vols. (1907−1912). Great Britain: Leslie Stephen and Sidney Lee (editors), *Dictionary of National Biography*, 72 vols. (1885−1913). France: Hoefer (editor), *Nouvelle biographie generale*, 46 vols. (1855−1866); *Dictionnaire de biographie francaise*, projected (1913) under editorship of Louis Didier, Albert Isnard, and Gabriel Ledos. Germany: Liliencron and Wegele (editors), *Allgemeine deutsche Biographie*, 54 vols. (1875 *sqq.*). Austria−Hungary: Wurzbach (editor), *Biographisches Lexikon des Kaiserthums Oesterreich*, 60 vols. (1856−1891). There is also a well−known French work—L. G. Michaud, *Biographie universelle ancienne et moderne*, 45 vols. (1880).

BIBLIOGRAPHY. Many of the works cited above and most of the works mentioned in the following chapter bibliographies contain convenient bibliographies on special topics. The best general guide to collections of source material and to the organization of historical study and research, though already somewhat out−of−date, is C. V. Langlois, *Manuel de bibliographie historique*, 2 vols. (1901−1904). See also C. M. Andrews, J. M. Gambrill, and Lida Tall, *A Bibliography of History for Schools and Libraries* (1910); and C. K. Adams, *A Manual of Historical Literature*, 3d ed. (1889). Specifically, for Great Britain: W. P. Courtney, *A Register of National Bibliography* , 3 vols. (1905− 1912); S. R. Gardiner and J. B. Mullinger, *Introduction to the Study of English History*, 4th ed. (1903); H. L. Cannon, *Reading References for English History* (1910); *Bibliography of Modern English History*, now (1916) in preparation under the auspices of English scholars and of the American Historical Association. For German bibliography: Dahlmann− Waitz, *Quellenkunde der deutschen Geschichte*, 8th ed. (1912); *Jahresberichte der Geschichtswissenschaft*, a valuable annual publication issued under the auspices of the Historical Association of Berlin. For French bibliography: Gabriel Monod, *Bibliographie de l'histoire de France* (1888), new ed. projected (1910) in 4 vols.; *Manuels de bibliographie historique* (1907−1916): Part II, 1494−1610, by Henri Hauser, *Part III, 1610−1715*, by Emile Bourgeois and Louis Andre; *Repertoire methodique de l'histoire moderne et contemporaine de la France*, an annual publication edited by Briere and Caron. For American bibliography: Edward Channing, A. B. Hart, and F. J. Turner, *Guide to the Study of American History* (1912). Among important historical periodicals, containing bibliographical notes and book reviews, are, *History Teacher's Magazine, The American Historical Review, The English Historical Review, Die historische Zeitschrift, Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, La revue historique*, and *La revue des questions historiques*. For periodical literature see *Poole's Index* (1802−1906) and *Readers' Guide* (1900 *sqq.* ). The most famous lists of published books are: *The American Catalogue* (1876 *sqq.*); the *English Catalogue* (1835 *sqq.*); C. G. Kayser, *Buecher−Lexikon* (1750 *sqq.*); Wilhelm Heinsius, *Buecher−Lexikon* (1700−1892); Otto Lorenz, *Catalogue general de la librarie francaise (1840 sqq.); and, for general comment, American Library Association, Index to General Literature (1893 sqq.).*

## PART I
## FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN EUROPE

# CHAPTER I. THE COUNTRIES OF EUROPE AT THE OPENING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

1. THE NEW NATIONAL MONARCHIES

[Sidenote: "National Monarchies" in 1500]

Before we can safely proceed with the story of European development during the past four hundred years, it is necessary to know what were the chief countries that existed at the beginning of our period and what were the distinctive political institutions of each.

A glance at the map of Europe in 1500 will show numerous unfamiliar divisions and names, especially in the central and eastern portions. Only in the extreme west, along the Atlantic seaboard, will the eye detect geographical boundaries which resemble those of the present day. There, England, France, Spain, and Portugal have already taken form. In each one of these countries is a real nation, with a single monarch, and with a distinctive literary language. These four states are the *national* states of the sixteenth century. They attract our immediate attention.

ENGLAND

[Sidenote: The English Monarchy]

In the year 1500 the English monarchy embraced little more than what on the map is now called "England." It is true that to the west the principality of Wales had been incorporated two hundred years earlier, but the clannish mountaineers and hardy lowlanders of the northern part of the island of Great Britain still preserved the independence of the kingdom of Scotland, while Irish princes and chieftains rendered English occupation of their island extremely precarious beyond the so−called Pale of Dublin which an English king had conquered in the twelfth century. Across the English Channel, on the Continent, the English monarchy retained after 1453, the date of the conclusion of the Hundred Years' War, only the town of Calais out of the many rich French provinces which ever since the time of William the Conqueror (1066−1087) had been a bone of contention between French and English rulers.

While the English monarchy was assuming its geographical form, peculiar national institutions were taking root in the country, and the English language, as a combination of earlier Anglo−Saxon and Norman−French, was being evolved. The Hundred Years' War with France, or rather its outcome, served to exalt the sense of English nationality and English patriotism, and to enable the king to devote his whole attention to the consolidation of his power in the British islands. For several years after the conclusion of peace on the Continent, England was harassed by bloody and confused struggles, known as the Wars of the Roses, between rival claimants to the throne, but at length, in 1485, Henry VII, the first of the Tudor dynasty, secured the crown and ushered in a new era of English history.

[Sidenote: Increase of Royal Power in England under Henry VII]

Henry VII (1485−1509) sought to create what has been termed a "strong monarchy." Traditionally the power of the king had been restricted by a Parliament, composed of a House of Lords and a House of Commons, and as the former was then far more influential than the latter, supreme political control had rested practically with the king and the members of the upper house—great land−holding nobles and the princes of the church. The Wars of the Roses had two effects which redounded to the advantage of the king: (1) the struggle, being really a contest of two factions of nobles, destroyed many noble families and enabled the crown to seize their estates, thereby lessening the influence of an ancient class; (2) the struggle, being long and disorderly, created in the middle class or "common people" a longing for peace and the conviction that order and security could be maintained only by repression of the nobility and the strengthening of monarchy. Henry took advantage of these circumstances to fix upon his country an absolutism, or one−man power in government, which was to endure throughout the sixteenth century, during the reigns of the four other members of the Tudor family, and, in fact, until a popular revolution in the seventeenth century.

Henry VII repressed disorder with a heavy hand and secured the establishment of an extraordinary court, afterwards called the "Court of Star Chamber," to hear cases, especially those affecting the nobles, which the ordinary courts had not been able to settle. Then, too, he was very economical: the public revenue was increased

by means of more careful attention to the cultivation of the crown lands and the collection of feudal dues, fines, benevolences [Footnote: “Benevolences” were sums of money extorted from the people in the guise of gifts. A celebrated minister of Henry VII collected a very large number of “benevolences” for his master. If a man lived economically, it was reasoned he was saving money and could afford a “present” for the king. If, on the contrary, he lived sumptuously, he was evidently wealthy and could likewise afford a “gift.”], import and export duties, and past parliamentary grants, while, by means of frugality and a foreign policy of peace, the expenditure was appreciably decreased. Henry VII was thereby freed in large measure from dependence on Parliament for grants of money, and the power of Parliament naturally declined. In fact, Parliament met only five times during his whole reign and only once during the last twelve years, and in all its actions was quite subservient to the royal desires.

[Sidenote: Foreign relations of England under Henry VII]

Henry VII refrained in general from foreign war, but sought by other means to promote the international welfare of his country. He negotiated several treaties by which English traders might buy and sell goods in other countries. One of the most famous of these commercial treaties was the *Intercursus Magnus* concluded in 1496 with the duke of Burgundy, admitting English goods into the Netherlands. He likewise encouraged English companies of merchants to engage in foreign trade and commissioned the explorations of John Cabot in the New World. Henry increased the prestige of his house by politic marital alliances. He arranged a marriage between the heir to his throne, Arthur, and Catherine, eldest daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Spanish sovereigns. Arthur died a few months after his wedding, but it was arranged that Catherine should remain in England as the bride of the king's second son, who subsequently became Henry VIII. The king's daughter Margaret was married to King James IV of Scotland, thereby paving the way much later for the union of the crowns of England and Scotland.

England in the year 1500 was a real national monarchy, and the power of the king appeared to be distinctly in the ascendant. Parliament was fast becoming a purely formal and perfunctory body.

FRANCE

[Sidenote: The French Monarchy]

By the year 1500 the French monarchy was largely consolidated territorially and politically. It had been a slow and painful process, for long ago in 987, when Hugh Capet came to the throne, the France of his day was hardly more than the neighborhood of Paris, and it had taken five full centuries to unite the petty feudal divisions of the country into the great centralized state which we call France. The Hundred Years' War had finally freed the western duchies and counties from English control. Just before the opening of the sixteenth century the wily and tactful Louis XI (1461−1483) had rounded out French territories: on the east he had occupied the powerful duchy of Burgundy; on the west and on the southeast he had possessed himself of most of the great inheritance of the Angevin branch of his own family, including Anjou, and Provence east of the Rhone; and on the south the French frontier had been carried to the Pyrenees. Finally, Louis's son, Charles VIII (1483−1498), by marrying the heiress of Brittany, had absorbed that western duchy into France.

[Sidenote: Steady Growth of Royal Power in France]

Meanwhile, centralized political institutions had been taking slow but tenacious root in the country. Of course, many local institutions and customs survived in the various states which had been gradually added to France, but the king was now recognized from Flanders to Spain and from the Rhone to the Ocean as the source of law, justice, and order. There was a uniform royal coinage and a standing army under the king's command. The monarchs had struggled valiantly against the disruptive tendencies of feudalism; they had been aided by the commoners or middle class; and the proof of their success was their comparative freedom from political checks. The Estates−General, to which French commoners had been admitted in 1302, resembled in certain externals the English Parliament,—for example, in comprising representatives of the clergy, nobles, and commons,—but it had never had final say in levying taxes or in authorizing expenditures or in trying royal officers. And unlike England, there was in France no live tradition of popular participation in government and no written guarantee of personal liberty.

[Sidenote: Foreign Relations of the French Kings about 1500]

Consolidated at home in territory and in government, Frenchmen began about the year 1500 to be attracted to questions of external policy. By attempting to enforce an inherited claim to the crown of Naples, Charles VIII in

1494 started that career of foreign war and aggrandizement which was to mark the history of France throughout following centuries. His efforts in Italy were far from successful, but his heir, Louis XII (1498−1515), continued to lay claim to Naples and to the duchy of Milan as well. In 1504 Louis was obliged to resign Naples to King Ferdinand of Aragon, in whose family it remained for two centuries, but about Milan continued a conflict, with varying fortunes, ultimately merging into the general struggle between Francis I (1515−1547) and the Emperor Charles V.

France in the year 1500 was a real national monarchy, with the beginnings of a national literature and with a national patriotism centering in the king. It was becoming self−conscious. Like England, France was on the road to one−man power, but unlike England, the way had been marked by no liberal or constitutional mile−posts.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

[Sidenote: Development of the Spanish and Portuguese Monarchies]

South of the Pyrenees were the Spanish and Portuguese monarchies, which, in a long process of unification, not only had to contend against the same disuniting tendencies as appeared in France and England, but also had to solve the problem of the existence side by side of two great rival religions—Christianity and Mohammedanism. Mohammedan invaders from Africa had secured political control of nearly the whole peninsula as early as the eighth century, but in course of time there appeared in the northern and western mountains several diminutive Christian states, of which the following may be mentioned: Barcelona, in the northeast, along the Mediterranean; Aragon, occupying the south−central portion of the Pyrenees and extending southward toward the Ebro River; Navarre, at the west of the Pyrenees, reaching northward into what is now France and southward into what is now Spain; Castile, west of Navarre, circling about the town of Burgos; Leon, in the northwestern corner of the peninsula; and Portugal, south of Leon, lying along the Atlantic coast. Little by little these Christian states extended their southern frontiers at the expense of the Mohammedan power and showed some disposition to combine. In the twelfth century Barcelona was united with the kingdom of Aragon, and a hundred years later Castile and Leon were finally joined. Thus, by the close of the thirteenth century, there were three important states in the peninsula —Aragon on the east, Castile in the center, and Portugal on the west— and two less important states—Christian Navarre in the extreme north, and Mohammedan Granada in the extreme south.

While Portugal acquired its full territorial extension in the peninsula by the year 1263, the unity of modern Spain was delayed until after the marriage of Ferdinand (1479−1516) and Isabella (1474−1504), sovereigns respectively of Aragon and Castile. Granada, the last foothold of the Mohammedans, fell in 1492, and in 1512 Ferdinand acquired that part of the ancient kingdom of Navarre which lay upon the southern slope of the Pyrenees. The peninsula was henceforth divided between the two modern states of Spain and Portugal.

[Sidenote: Portugal a Real National Monarchy in 1500]

Portugal, the older and smaller of the two states, had become a conspicuous member of the family of nations by the year 1500, thanks to a line of able kings and to the remarkable series of foreign discoveries that cluster about the name of Prince Henry the Navigator. Portugal possessed a distinctive language of Latin origin and already cherished a literature of no mean proportions. In harmony with the spirit of the age the monarchy was tending toward absolutism, and the parliament, called the Cortes, which had played an important part in earlier times, ceased to meet regularly after 1521. The Portuguese royal family were closely related to the Castilian line, and there were people in both kingdoms who hoped that one day the whole peninsula would be united under one sovereign.

[Sidenote: The Spanish Kingdom in 1500]

From several standpoints the Spanish monarchy was less unified in 1500 than England, France, or Portugal. The union of Castile and Aragon was, for over two centuries, hardly more than personal. Each retained its own customs, parliaments (Cortes), and separate administration. Each possessed a distinctive language, although Castilian gradually became the literary “Spanish,” while Catalan, the speech of Aragon, was reduced to the position of an inferior. Despite the continuance of excessive pride in local traditions and institutions, the cause of Spanish nationality received great impetus during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella. It was under them that territorial unity had been obtained. It was they who turned the attention of Spaniards to foreign and colonial enterprises. The year that marked the fall of Granada and the final extinction of Mohammedan power in Spain was likewise signalized by the first voyage of Christopher Columbus, which prefigured the establishment of a greater Spain beyond the seas. On the continent of Europe, Spain speedily acquired a commanding position in

international affairs, as the result largely of Ferdinand's ability. The royal house of Aragon had long held claims to the Neapolitan and Sicilian kingdoms and for two hundred years had freely mixed in the politics of Italy. Now, in 1504, Ferdinand definitely secured recognition from France of his rights in Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia. Spain was becoming the rival of Venice for the leadership of the Mediterranean.

[Sidenote: Increase of Royal Power in Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella]

While interfering very little with the forms of representative government in their respective kingdoms, Ferdinand and Isabella worked ever, in fact, toward uniformity and absolutism. They sought to ingratiate themselves with the middle class, to strip the nobility of its political influence, and to enlist the church in their service. The Cortes were more or less regularly convened, but their functions were almost imperceptibly transferred to royal commissions and officers of state. Privileges granted to towns in earlier times were now gradually revoked. The king, by becoming the head of the ancient military orders which had borne prominent part in the struggle against the Mohammedans, easily gained control of considerable treasure and of an effective fighting force. The sovereigns prevailed upon the pope to transfer control of the Inquisition, the medieval ecclesiastical tribunal for the trial of heretics, to the crown, so that the harsh penalties which were to be inflicted for many years upon dissenters from orthodox Christianity were due not only to religious bigotry but likewise to the desire for political uniformity.

In population and in domestic resources Spain was not so important as France, but the exploits of Ferdinand and Isabella, the great wealth which temporarily flowed to her from the colonies, the prestige which long attended her diplomacy and her armies, were to exalt the Spanish monarchy throughout the sixteenth century to a position quite out of keeping with her true importance.

2. THE OLD HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

[Sidenote: The Idea of an “Empire” Different in 1500 from that of a “National Monarchy"]

The national monarchies of western Europe—England, France, Spain, and Portugal—were political novelties in the year 1500: the idea of uniting the people of similar language and customs under a strongly centralized state had been slowly developing but had not reached fruition much before that date. On the other hand, in central Europe survived in weakness an entirely different kind of state, called an empire. The theory of an empire was a very ancient one—it meant a state which should embrace all peoples of whatsoever race or language, bound together in obedience to a common prince. Such, for example, had been the ideal of the old Roman Empire, under whose Caesars practically the whole civilized world had once been joined, so that the inhabitant of Egypt or Armenia united with the citizen of Britain or Spain in allegiance to the emperor. That empire retained its hold on portions of eastern Europe until its final conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, but a thousand years earlier it had lost control of the West because of external violence and internal weakness. So great, however, was the strength of the idea of an “empire,” even in the West, that Charlemagne about the year 800 temporarily united what are now France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium into what he persisted in styling the “Roman Empire.” Nearly two centuries later, Otto the Great, a famous prince in Germany, gave other form to the idea, in the “Holy Roman Empire” of which he became emperor. This form endured from 962 to 1806.

[Sidenote: The Holy Roman Empire; Its Mighty Claims in Theory and its Slight Power in Practice]

In theory, the Holy Roman Empire claimed supremacy over all Christian rulers and peoples of central and western Europe, and after the extinction of the eastern empire in 1453 it could insist that it was the sole secular heir to the ancient Roman tradition. But the greatness of the theoretical claim of the Holy Roman Empire was matched only by the insignificance of its practical acceptance. The feudal nobles of western Europe had never recognized it, and the national monarchs, though they might occasionally sport with its honors and titles, never admitted any real dependence upon it of England, France, Portugal, or Spain. In central Europe, it had to struggle against the anarchical tendencies of feudalism, against the rise of powerful and jealous city− states, and against a rival organization, the Catholic Church, which in its temporal affairs was at least as clearly an heir to the Roman tradition as was the Holy Roman Empire. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the conflict raged, with results important for all concerned,—results which were thoroughly obvious in the year 1500.

[Sidenote: The Holy Roman Empire practically Restricted by 1500 to the Germanies]

In the first place, the Holy Roman Empire was practically restricted to German−speaking peoples. The papacy and the Italian cities had been freed from imperial control, and both the Netherlands—that is, Holland and Belgium—and the Swiss cantons were only nominally connected. Over the Slavic people to the east—Russians,

Poles, etc.—or the Scandinavians to the north, the empire had secured comparatively small influence. By the year 1500 the words Empire and Germany had become virtually interchangeable terms.

Secondly, there was throughout central Europe no conspicuous desire for strong centralized national states, such as prevailed in western Europe.

[Sidenote: Internal Weakness of the Holy Roman Empire]

Separatism was the rule. In Italy and in the Netherlands the city−states were the political units. Within the Holy Roman Empire was a vast hodge−podge of city−states, and feudal survivals—arch−duchies, such as Austria; margravates, such as Brandenburg; duchies, like Saxony, Bavaria, and Wuerttemberg; counties like the Palatinate, and a host of free cities, baronies, and domains, some of them smaller than an American township. In all there were over three hundred states which collectively were called “the Germanies” and which were united only by the slender imperial thread. The idea of empire had not only been narrowed to one nation; it also, in its failure to overcome feudalism, had prevented the growth of a real national monarchy.

[Sidenote: Government of the Holy Roman Empire]

What was the nature of this slight tie that nominally held the Germanies together? There was the form of a central government with an emperor to execute laws and a Diet to make them. The emperor was not necessarily hereditary but was chosen by seven “electors,” who were the chief princes of the realm. These seven were the archbishops of Mainz (Mayence), of Cologne, and of Trier (Treves), the king of Bohemia, the duke of Saxony, the margrave of Brandenburg, and the count palatine of the Rhine. Not infrequently the electors used their position to extort concessions from the emperor elect which helped to destroy German unity and to promote the selfish interests of the princes. The imperial Diet was composed of the seven electors, the lesser princes (including the higher ecclesiastical dignitaries, such as bishops and abbots), and representatives of the free cities, grouped in three separate houses. The emperor was not supposed to perform any imperial act without the authorization of the Diet, and petty jealousies between its members or houses often prevented action in the Diet. The individual states, moreover, reserved to themselves the management of most affairs which in western Europe had been surrendered to the central national government. The Diet, and therefore the emperor, was without a treasury or an army, unless the individual states saw fit to act favorably upon its advice and furnish the requested quotas. The Diet resembled far more a congress of diplomats than a legislative body.

[Sidenote: The Habsburgs: Weak as Emperors but Strong as Rulers of Particular States within the Holy Roman Empire]

It will be readily perceived that under these circumstances the emperor as such could have little influence. Yet the fear of impending Slavic or Turkish attacks upon the eastern frontier, or other fears, frequently operated to secure the election of some prince who had sufficiently strong power of his own to stay the attack or remove the fear. In this way, Rudolph, count of Habsburg, had been chosen emperor in 1273, and in his family, with few interruptions, continued the imperial title, not only to 1500 but to the final extinction of the empire in 1806. Several of these Habsburg emperors were influential, but it must always be remembered that they owed their power not to the empire but to their own hereditary states.

Originally lords of a small district in Switzerland, the Habsburgs had gradually increased their holdings until at length in 1273 Rudolph, the maker of his family's real fortunes, had been chosen Holy Roman Emperor, and three years later had conquered the valuable archduchy of Austria with its capital of Vienna. The family subsequently became related by marriage to reigning families in Hungary and in Italy as well as in Bohemia and other states of the empire. In 1477 the Emperor Maximilian I (1493−1519) married Mary of Burgundy, daughter of Charles the Bold and heiress of the wealthy provinces of the Netherlands; and in 1496 his son Philip was united to Joanna, the daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella and heiress of the crowns of Castile and Aragon. The fortunes of the Habsburgs were decidedly auspicious.

[Sidenote: Vain Attempts to “Reform” the Holy Roman Empire]

Of course, signs were not wanting of some national life in the Germanies. Most of the people spoke a common language; a form of national unity existed in the Diet; and many patriots raised their voice in behalf of a stronger and more centralized government. In 1495 a Diet met at the city of Worms to discuss with Emperor Maximilian projects of reform. After protracted debates, it was agreed that private warfare, a survival of feudal days, should be abolished; a perpetual peace should be declared; and an imperial court should be established to settle all disputes between states within the empire. These efforts at reform, like many before and after, were largely

unfruitful, and, despite occasional protests, practical disunion prevailed in the Germanies of the sixteenth century, albeit under the high−sounding title of “Holy Roman Empire.”

3. THE CITY−STATES

[Sidenote: “City−States” in 1500]

Before the dawn of the Christian era the Greeks and Romans had entertained a general idea of political organization which would seem strange to most of us at the present time. They believed that every city with its outlying country should constitute an independent state, with its own particular law−making and governing bodies, army, coinage, and foreign relations. To them, the idea of an empire was intolerable and the concept of a national state, such as we commonly have to−day, unthinkable.

Now it so happened, as we shall see in the following chapter, that the commerce of the middle ages stimulated the growth of important trading towns in Italy, in Germany, and in the Netherlands. These towns, in one way or another, managed to secure a large measure of self−government, so that by the year 1500 they had become somewhat similar to the city− states of antiquity. In Germany, though they still maintained their local self−government, they were loosely attached to the Holy Roman Empire and were overshadowed in political influence by other states. In the case of Italy and of the Netherlands, however, it is impossible to understand the politics of those countries in the sixteenth century without paying some attention to city−states, which played leading roles in both.

[Sidenote: Italy in 1500 neither a National Monarchy not Attached to the Holy Roman Empire]

In the Italy of the year 1500 there was not even the semblance of national political unity. Despite the ardent longings of many Italian patriots [Footnote: Of such patriots was Machiavelli (see below, p. 194). Machiavelli wrote in *The Prince:* “Our country, left almost without life, still waits to know who it is that is to heal her bruises, to put an end to the devastation and plunder of Lombardy and to the exactions and imposts of Naples and Tuscany, and to stanch those wounds of hers which long neglect has changed into running sores. We see how she prays God to send some one to rescue her from these barbarous cruelties and oppressions. We see too how ready and eager she is to follow any standard, were there only some one to raise it.”], and the rise of a common language, which, under such masters as Dante and Petrarch, had become a great medium for literary expression, the people of the peninsula had not built up a national monarchy like those of western Europe nor had they even preserved the form of allegiance to the Holy Roman Empire. This was due to several significant events of earlier times. In the first place, the attempt of the medieval German emperors to gain control of Italy not only had signally failed but had left behind two contending factions throughout the whole country,—one, the Ghibellines, supporting the doctrine of maintaining the traditional connection with the Germanies; the other, the Guelphs, rejecting that doctrine. In the second place, the pope, who exercised extensive political as well as religious power, felt that his ecclesiastical influence would be seriously impaired by the creation of political unity in the country; a strong lay monarch with a solid Italy behind him would in time reduce the sovereign pontiff to a subservient position and diminish the prestige which the head of the church enjoyed in foreign lands; therefore the popes participated actively in the game of Italian politics, always endeavoring to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful. Thirdly, the comparatively early commercial prominence of the Italian towns had stimulated trade rivalries which tended to make each proud of its independence and wealth; and as the cities grew and prospered to an unwonted degree, it became increasingly difficult to join them together. Finally, the riches of the Italians, and the local jealousies and strife, to say nothing of the papal policy, marked the country as natural prey for foreign interference and conquest; and in this way the peninsula became a battleground for Spaniards, Frenchmen, and Germans.

Before reviewing the chief city−states of northern Italy, it will be well to say a word about two other political divisions of the country. The southern third of the peninsula comprised the ancient kingdom of Naples, which had grown up about the city of that name, and which together with the large island of Sicily, was called the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

[Sidenote: Southern Italy in 1500: the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies]

This state, having been first formed by Scandinavian adventurers in the eleventh century, had successively passed under papal suzerainty, under the domination of the German emperors, and at length in 1266 under French control. A revolt in Sicily in the year 1282, commonly called the Sicilian Vespers, had severed the relation between the island and the mainland, the former passing to the royal family of Aragon, and the latter troublously

remaining in French hands until 1442. The reunion of the Two Sicilies at that date under the crown of Aragon served to keep alive the quarrel between the French and the Spanish; and it was not until 1504 that the king of France definitely renounced his Neapolitan claims in favor of Ferdinand of Aragon. Socially and politically Naples was the most backward state in Italy.

[Sidenote: Italy in 1500: the Papal States]

About the city of Rome had grown up in the course of centuries the Papal States, or as they were officially styled, the Patrimony of St. Peter. It had early fallen to the lot of the bishop, as the most important person in the city, to exercise political power over Rome, when barbarian invasions no longer permitted the exercise of authority by Roman emperors; and control over neighboring districts, as well as over the city, had been expressly recognized and conferred upon the bishop by Charlemagne in the eighth century. This bishop of Rome was, of course, the pope; and the pope slowly extended his territories through central Italy from the Tiber to the Adriatic, long using them merely as a bulwark to his religious and ecclesiastical prerogatives. By the year 1500, however, the popes were becoming prone to regard themselves as Italian princes who might normally employ their states as so many pawns in the game of peninsular politics. The policy of the notorious Alexander VI (1492−1503) centered in his desire to establish his son, Cesare Borgia, as an Italian ruler; and Julius II (1503−1513) was famed more for statecraft and military prowess than for religious fervor.

[Sidenote: The City−States of Northern Italy in 1500]

North and west of the Papal States were the various city−states which were so thoroughly distinctive of Italian politics at the opening of the sixteenth century. Although these towns had probably reached a higher plane both of material prosperity and of intellectual culture than was to be found at that time in any other part of Europe, nevertheless they were deeply jealous of each other and carried on an interminable series of petty wars, the brunt of which was borne by professional hired soldiers and freebooters styled *condottieri*. Among the Italian city−states, the most famous in the year 1500 were Milan, Venice, Genoa, and Florence.

[Sidenote: Italian City−States: Milan Governed by Despots]

Of these cities, Milan was still in theory a ducal fief of the Holy Roman Empire, but had long been in fact the prize of despotic rulers who were descended from two famous families—the Visconti and the Sforza—and who combined the patronage of art with the fine political subtleties of Italian tyrants. The Visconti ruled Milan from the thirteenth century to the middle of the fifteenth, when a Sforza, a leader of *condottieri* established the supremacy of his own family. In 1499, however, King Louis XII of France, claiming the duchy as heir to the Visconti, seized Milan and held it until he was expelled in 1512 by the Holy League, composed of the pope, Venice, Spain, and England, and a Sforza was temporarily reinstated.

[Sidenote: Venice, a Type of the Commercial and Aristocratic Italian City−States]

As Milan was the type of Italian city ruled by a despot or tyrant, so Venice was a type of the commercial, oligarchical city−states. Venice was by far the most powerful state in the peninsula. Located on the islands and lagoons at the head of the Adriatic, she had profited greatly by the crusades to build up a maritime empire and an enviable trade on the eastern Mediterranean and had extended her sway over rich lands in the northeastern part of Italy. In the year 1500, Venice boasted 3000 ships, 300,000 sailors, a numerous and veteran army, famous factories of plate glass, silk stuffs, and gold and silver objects, and a singularly strong government. Nominally Venice was a republic, but actually an oligarchy. Political power was intrusted jointly to several agencies: (1) a grand council controlled by the commercial magnates; (2) a centralized committee of ten; (3) an elected doge, or duke; and (4), after 1454, three state inquisitors, henceforth the city's real masters. The inquisitors could pronounce sentence of death, dispose of the public funds, and enact statutes; they maintained a regular spy system; and trial, judgment, and execution were secret. The mouth of the lion of St. Mark received anonymous denunciations, and the waves which passed under the Bridge of Sighs carried away the corpses. To this regime Venice owed an internal peace which contrasted with the endless civil wars of the other Italian cities. Till the final destruction of the state in 1798 Venice knew no political revolution. In foreign affairs, also, Venice possessed considerable influence; she was the first European state to send regular envoys, or ambassadors, to other courts. It seemed in 1500 as if she were particularly wealthy and great, but already had been sowed the seed of her subsequent decline and humiliation. The advance of the Ottoman Turks threatened her position in eastern Europe, although she still held the Morea in Greece, Crete, Cyprus, and many Ionian and AEgean islands. The discovery of America and of a new route to India was destined to shake the very basis of her commercial supremacy. And

her unscrupulous policy toward her Italian rivals lost her friends to the west. So great was the enmity against Venice that the formidable League of Cambrai, entered into by the emperor, the pope, France, and Spain in 1508, wrung many concessions from her.

[Sidenote: Genoa]

Second only to Venice in commercial importance, Genoa, in marked contrast with her rival, passed through all manner of political vicissitudes until in 1499 she fell prey to the invasion of King Louis XII of France. Thereafter Genoa remained some years subject to the French, but in 1528 the resolution of an able citizen, Andrea Doria, freed the state from foreign invaders and restored to Genoa her republican institutions.

The famed city−state of Florence may be taken as the best type of the democratic community, controlled by a political leader. The city, as famous for its free institutions as for its art, in the first half of the fifteenth century had come under the tutelage of a family of traders and bankers, the wealthy Medici, who preserved the republican forms, and for a while, under Lorenzo de' Medici (1449−1492), surnamed the Magnificent, made Florence the center of Italian culture and civilization.

[Sidenote: Florence, a Type of the Cultured and Democratic Italian City−State]

Soon after the death of Lorenzo, a democratic reaction took place under an enthusiastic and puritanical monk, Savonarola, who welcomed the advent of the French king, Charles VIII, in 1494, and aided materially in the expulsion of the Medici. Savonarola soon fell a victim to the plots of his Florentine enemies and to the vengeance of the pope, whom Charles VIII had offended, and was put to death in 1498, The democracy managed to survive until 1512 when the Medici returned. The city−state of Florence subsequently became the grand−duchy of Tuscany.

[Sidenote: The Obscure Duchy of Savoy in 1500]

Before we take leave of the Italian states of the year 1500, mention should be made of the insignificant duchy of Savoy, tucked away in the fastnesses of the northwestern Alps, whose duke, after varying fortunes, was to become, in the nineteenth century, king of a united Italy.

[Sidenote: The City−States in the Netherlands]

The city−state was the dominant form of political organization not only in Italy but also in the Netherlands. The Netherlands, or the Low Countries, were seventeen provinces occupying the flat lowlands along the North Sea,—the Holland, Belgium, and northern France of our own day. Most of the inhabitants, Flemings and Dutch, spoke a language akin to German, but in the south the Walloons used a French dialect. At first the provinces had been mere feudal states at the mercy of various warring noblemen, but gradually in the course of the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth centuries, important towns had arisen so wealthy and populous that they were able to wrest charters from the lords. Thus arose a number of municipalities—practically self−governing republics—semi−independent vassals of feudal nobles; and in many cases the early oligarchic systems of municipal government speedily gave way to more democratic institutions. Remarkable in industry and prosperity were Ghent, Bruges, Antwerp, Brussels, Liege, Utrecht, Delft, Rotterdam, and many another.

[Sidenote: Relation of the City−Stats of the Netherlands to the Dukes of Burgundy]

Beginning in 1384 and continuing throughout the fifteenth century, the dukes of Burgundy, who as vassals of the French king had long held the duchy of that name in eastern France, succeeded by marriage, purchase, treachery, or force in bringing one by one the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands under their rule. This extension of dominion on the part of the dukes of Burgundy implied the establishment of a strong monarchical authority, which was supported by the nobility and clergy and opposed by the cities. In 1465 a common parliament, called the States General, was constituted at Brussels, containing deputies from each of the seventeen provinces; and eight years later a grand council was organized with supreme judicial and financial functions. Charles the Bold, who died in 1477, was prevented from constructing a great central kingdom between France and the Germanies only by the shrewdness of his implacable foe, King Louis XI of France. As we have seen, in another connection, Louis seized the duchy of Burgundy on the death of Charles the Bold, thereby extending the eastern frontier of France, but the duke's inheritance in the Netherlands passed to his daughter Mary. In 1477 Mary's marriage with Maximilian of Austria began the long domination of the Netherlands by the house of Habsburg.

Throughout these political changes, the towns of the Netherlands maintained many of their former privileges, and their prosperity steadily increased. The country became the richest in Europe, and the splendor of the ducal

court surpassed that of any contemporary sovereign. A permanent memorial of it remains in the celebrated Order of the Golden Fleece, which was instituted by the duke of Burgundy in the fifteenth century and was so named from the English wool, the raw material used in the Flemish looms and the very foundation of the country's fortunes.

4. NORTHERN AND EASTERN EUROPE IN THE YEAR 1500

[Sidenote: Northern and Eastern Europe of Small Importance in the Sixteenth Century, but of Great Importance Subsequently]

We have now reviewed the states that were to be the main factors in the historical events of the sixteenth century—the national monarchies of England, France, Portugal, and Spain; the Holy Roman Empire of the Germanies; and the city−states of Italy and the Netherlands. It may be well, however, to point out that in northern and eastern Europe other states had already come into existence, which subsequently were to affect in no small degree the history of modern times, such as the Scandinavian kingdoms, the tsardom of Muscovy, the feudal kingdoms of Poland and Hungary, and the empire of the Ottoman Turks.

[Sidenote: Northwestern Europe: the Scandinavian Countries]

In the early homes of those Northmen who had long before ravaged the coasts of England and France and southern Italy and had colonized Iceland and Greenland, were situated in 1500 three kingdoms, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, corresponding generally to the present−day states of those names. The three countries had many racial and social characteristics in common, and they had been politically joined under the king of Denmark by the Union of Calmar in 1397. This union never evoked any popularity among the Swedes, and after a series of revolts and disorders extending over fifty years, Gustavus Vasa (1523−1560) established the independence of Sweden. Norway remained under Danish kings until 1814.

[Sidenote: The Slavs in Central and Eastern Europe]

East of the Scandinavian peninsula and of the German−speaking population of central Europe, spread out like a great fan, are a variety of peoples who possess many common characteristics, including a group of closely related languages, which are called Slavic. These Slavs in the year 1500 included (1) the Russians, (2) the Poles and Lithuanians, (3) the Czechs, or natives of Bohemia, within the confines of the Holy Roman Empire, and (4) various nations in southeastern Europe, such as the Serbs and Bulgars.

[Sidenote: Russia in 1500]

The Russians in 1500 did not possess such a huge autocratic state as they do to−day. They were distributed among several principalities, the chief and center of which was the grand−duchy of Muscovy, with Moscow as its capital. Muscovy's reigning family was of Scandinavian extraction but what civilization and Christianity the principalities possessed had been brought by Greek missionaries from Constantinople. For two centuries, from the middle of the thirteenth to the middle of the fifteenth, the Russians paid tribute to Mongol [Footnote: The Mongols were a people of central Asia, whose famous leader, Jenghiz Khan (1162−1227), established an empire which stretched from the China Sea to the banks of the Dnieper. It was these Mongols who drove the Ottoman Turks from their original Asiatic home and thus precipitated the Turkish invasion of Europe. After the death of Jenghiz Khan the Mongol Empire was broken into a variety of “khanates,” all of which in course of time dwindled away. In the sixteenth century the Mongols north of the Black Sea succumbed to the Turks as well as to the Russians.] khans who had set up an Asiatic despotism north of the Black Sea. The beginnings of Russian greatness are traceable to Ivan III, the Great (1462−1505), [Footnote: Ivan IV (1533−1584), called “The Terrible,” a successor of Ivan III, assumed the title of “Tsar” in 1547.] who freed his people from Mongol domination, united the numerous principalities, conquered the important cities of Novgorod and Pskov, and extended his sway as far as the Arctic Ocean and the Ural Mountains. Russia, however, could hardly then be called a modern state, for the political and social life still smacked of Asia rather than of Europe, and the Russian Christianity, having been derived from Constantinople, differed from the Christianity of western Europe. Russia was not to appear as a conspicuous European state until the eighteenth century.

[Sidenote: Poland in 1500]

Southwest of the tsardom of Muscovy and east of the Holy Roman Empire was the kingdom of Poland, to which Lithuanians as well as Poles owed allegiance. Despite wide territories and a succession of able rulers, Poland was a weak monarchy. Lack of natural boundaries made national defense difficult. Civil war between the two peoples who composed the state and foreign war with the neighboring Germans worked havoc and distress.

An obstructive parliament of great lords rendered effective administration impossible. The nobles possessed the property and controlled politics; in their hands the king gradually became a puppet. Poland seemed committed to feudal society and feudal government at the very time when the countries of western Europe were ridding themselves of such checks upon the free growth of centralized national states.

[Sidenote: Hungary in 1500]

Somewhat similar to Poland in its feudal propensities was the kingdom of Hungary, which an invasion of Asiatic tribesmen [Footnote: Hungarians, or Magyars—different names for the same people.] in the tenth century had driven like a wedge between the Slavs of the Balkan peninsula and those of the north Poles and Russians. At first, the efforts of such kings as St. Stephen (997−1038) promised the development of a great state, but the weakness of the sovereigns in the thirteenth century, the infiltration of western feudalism, and the endless civil discords brought to the front a powerful and predatory class of barons who ultimately overshadowed the throne. The brilliant reign of Matthias Hunyadi (1458−1490) was but an exception to the general rule. Not only were the kings obliged to struggle against the nobles for their very existence—the crown was elective in Hungary—but no rulers had to contend with more or greater enemies on their frontiers. To the north there was perpetual conflict with the Habsburgs of German Austria and with the forces of the Holy Roman Empire; to the east there were spasmodic quarrels with the Vlachs, the natives of modern Rumania; to the south there was continual fighting, at first with the Greeks and the Slavs—Serbs and Bulgars, and later, most terrible of all, with the Ottoman Turks.

[Sidenote: The Ottoman Turks in 1500]

To the Eastern Roman Empire, with Constantinople as its capital, and with the Greeks as its dominant population, and to the medieval kingdoms of the Bulgars and Serbs, had succeeded by the year 1500 the empire of the Ottoman Turks. The Ottoman Turks were a tribe of Asiatic Mohammedans who took their name from a certain Othman (died 1326), under whom they had established themselves in Asia Minor, across the Bosphorus from Constantinople. Thence they rapidly extended their dominion over Syria, and over Greece and the Balkan peninsula, except the little mountain state of Montenegro, and in 1453 they captured Constantinople. The lands conquered by the arms of the Turks were divided into large estates for the military leaders, or else assigned to the maintenance of mosques and schools, or converted into common and pasturage lands; the conquered Christians were reduced to the payment of tribute and a life of serfdom. For two centuries the Turks were to remain a source of grave apprehension to Europe.

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# CHAPTER II. THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION

[Sidenote: Introductory]

Five hundred years ago a European could search in vain the map of “the world” for America, or Australia, or the Pacific Ocean. Experienced mariners, and even learned geographers, were quite unaware that beyond the Western Sea lay two great continents peopled by red men; of Africa they knew only the northern coast; and in respect of Asia a thousand absurd tales passed current. The unexplored waste of waters that constituted the Atlantic Ocean was, to many ignorant Europeans of the fifteenth century, a terrible region frequented by fierce and fantastic monsters. To the average European the countries surveyed in the preceding chapter, together with their Mohammedan neighbors across the Mediterranean, still comprised the entire known world.

Shortly before the close of the fifteenth century, daring captains began to direct long voyages on the high seas and to discover the existence of new lands; and from that time to the present, Europeans have been busily exploring and conquering—veritably “Europeanizing”— the whole globe. Although religion as well as commerce played an important role in promoting the process, the movement was attended from the very outset by so startling a transformation in the routes, methods, and commodities of trade that usually it has been styled the Commercial Revolution. By the close of the sixteenth century it had proceeded far enough to indicate that its results would rank among the most fateful events of all history.

It was in the commonplace affairs of everyday life that the Commercial Revolution was destined to produce its most far−reaching results. To appreciate, therefore, its true nature and significance, we must first turn aside to ascertain how our European ancestors actually lived about the year 1500, and what work they did to earn their living. Then, after recounting the story of foreign exploration and colonization, we shall be in a position to reappraise the domestic situation in town and on the farm.

## AGRICULTURE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: Differences between Sixteenth−century Farming and That of To−day]

Agriculture has always been the ultimate basis of society, but in the sixteenth century it was of greater relative importance than it is now. People then reckoned their wealth, not by the quantity of stocks and bonds they held, but by the extent of land they owned. Farming was still the occupation of the vast majority of the population of every European state, for the towns were as yet small in size and few in number. The “masses” lived in the country, not, as to−day, in the city.

A twentieth−century observer would be struck by other peculiarities of sixteenth−century agriculture. He would find a curious organization of rural society, strange theories of land−ownership, and most unfamiliar methods of tillage. He would discover, moreover, that practically each farm was self−sufficing, producing only what its own occupants could consume, and that consequently there was comparatively little external trade in farm produce. From these facts he would readily understand that the rural communities in the year 1500, numerous yet isolated, were invulnerable strongholds of conservatism and ignorance.

[Sidenote: Two Rural Classes: Nobility and Peasantry]

In certain respects a remarkable uniformity prevailed in rural districts throughout all Europe. Whether one visited Germany, Hungary, France, or England, one was sure to find the agricultural population sharply divided into two social classes—nobility and peasantry. There might be varying gradations of these classes in different regions, but certain general distinctions everywhere prevailed.

[Sidenote: The Nobility]

The nobility [Footnote: As a part of the nobility must be included at the opening of the sixteenth century many of the higher clergy of the Catholic Church—archbishops, bishops, and abbots—who owned large landed estates quite like their lay brethren.] comprised men who gained a living from the soil without manual labor. They held the land on feudal tenure, that is to say, they had a right to be supported by the peasants living on their estates, and, in return, they owed to some higher or wealthier nobleman or to the king certain duties, such as fighting for him, [Footnote: This obligation rested only upon lay noblemen, not upon ecclesiastics.] attending his court at specified times, and paying him various irregular taxes (the feudal dues). The estate of each nobleman might embrace a single farm, or “manor” as it was called, inclosing a petty hamlet, or village; or it might include dozens

of such manors; or, if the landlord were a particularly mighty magnate or powerful prelate, it might stretch over whole counties.

Each nobleman had his manor−house or, if he were rich enough, his castle, lording it over the humble thatch−roofed cottages of the villagers. In his stables were spirited horses and a carriage adorned with his family crest; he had servants and lackeys, a footman to open his carriage door, a game−warden to keep poachers from shooting his deer, and men−at−arms to quell disturbances, to aid him against quarrelsome neighbors, or to follow him to the wars. While he lived, he might occupy the best pew in the village church; when he died, he would be laid to rest within the church where only noblemen were buried.

[Sidenote: Reason for the Preeminence of the Nobility]

In earlier times, when feudal society was young, the nobility had performed a very real service as the defenders of the peasants against foreign enemies and likewise against marauders and bandits of whom the land had been full. Then fighting had been the profession of the nobility, And to enable them to possess the expensive accoutrements of fighting—horses, armor, swords, and lances—the kings and the peasants had assured them liberal incomes.

Now, however, at the opening of the sixteenth century, the palmy days of feudalism were past and gone. Later generations of noblemen, although they continued by right of inheritance to enjoy the financial income and the social prestige which their forbears had earned, no longer served king, country, or common people in the traditional manner. At least in the national monarchies it was the king who now had undertaken the defense of the land and the preservation of peace; and the nobleman, deprived of his old occupation, had little else to do than to hunt, or quarrel with other noblemen, or engage in political intrigues. More and more the nobility, especially in France, were attracted to a life of amusement and luxury in the royal court. The nobility already had outlived its usefulness, yet it retained its old−time privileges.

[Sidenote: The Peasantry]

In striking contrast to the nobility—the small minority of land−owning aristocrats—were the peasantry—the mass of the people. They were the human beings who had to toil for their bread in the sweat of their brows and who were deemed of ignoble birth, as social inferiors, and as stupid and rude. Actual farm work was “servile labor,” and between the man whose hands were stained by servile labor and the person of “gentle birth” a wide gulf was fixed.

[Sidenote: Serfdom and the Manorial System]

During the early middle ages most of the peasants throughout Europe were “serfs.” For various reasons, which we shall explain presently, serfdom had tended gradually to and the die out in western Europe, but at the opening of the sixteenth century most of the agricultural laborers in eastern and central Europe, and even a considerable number in France, were still serfs, living and working on nobles' manors in accordance with ancient customs which can be described collectively as the “manorial system.”

The serf occupied a position in rural society which it is difficult for us to understand. He was not a slave, such as was usual in the Southern States of the American Union before the Civil War; he was neither a hired man nor a rent−paying tenant−farmer, such as is common enough in all agricultural communities nowadays. The serf was not a slave, because he was free to work for himself at least part of the time; he could not be sold to another master; and he could not be deprived of the right to cultivate land for his own benefit. He was not a hired man, for he received no wages. And he was not a tenant−farmer, inasmuch as he was “attached to the soil,” that is, he was bound to stay and work on his land, unless he succeeded in running away or in purchasing complete freedom, in which case he would cease to be a serf and would become a freeman.

[Sidenote: Obligations of the Serf to the Lord]

To the lord of the manor the serf was under many and varied obligations, the most essential of which may be grouped conveniently as follows: (1) The serf had to work without pay two or three days in each week on the strips of land and the fields whose produce belonged exclusively to the nobleman. In the harvest season extra days, known as “boon−days,” were stipulated on which the serf must leave his own work in order to harvest for the lord. He also might be called upon in emergencies to draw a cord of wood from the forest to the great manor−house, or to work upon the highway (*corvee*). (2) The serf had to pay occasional dues, customarily “in kind.” Thus at certain feast−days he was expected to bring a dozen fat fowls or a bushel of grain to the pantry of the manor−house. (3) Ovens, wine−presses, gristmills, and bridges were usually owned solely by the nobleman,

and each time the peasant used them he was obliged to give one of his loaves of bread, a share of his wine, a bushel of his grain, or a toll−fee, as a kind of rent, or “banality” as it was euphoniously styled. (4) If the serf died without heirs, his holdings were transferred outright to the lord, and if he left heirs, the nobleman had the rights of “heriot,” that is, to appropriate the best animal owned by the deceased peasant, and of “relief,” that is, to oblige the designated heir to make a definite additional payment that was equivalent to a kind of inheritance tax.

[Sidenote: Free−Tenants]

As has been intimated, the manorial system was already on a steady decline, especially in western Europe, at the opening of the sixteenth century. A goodly number of peasants who had once been serfs were now free−tenants, lessees, or hired laborers. Of course rent of farm−land in our present sense—each owner of the land letting out his property to a tenant and, in return, exacting as large a monetary payment as possible—was then unknown. But there was a growing class of peasants who were spoken of as free−tenants to distinguish them from serf−tenants. These free−tenants, while paying regular dues, as did the others, were not compelled to work two or three days every week in the lord's fields, except occasionally in busy seasons such as harvest; they were free to leave the estate and to marry off their daughters or to sell their oxen without the consent of the lord; and they came to regard their customary payments to the lord not so much as his due for their protection as actual rent for their land.

[Sidenote: Hired Laborers]

While more prosperous peasants were becoming free−tenants, many of their poorer neighbors found it so difficult to gain a living as serfs that they were willing to surrender all claim to their own little strips of land on the manor and to devote their whole time to working for fixed wages on the fields which were cultivated for the nobleman himself, the so−called lord's demesne. Thus a body of hired laborers grew up claiming no land beyond that on which their miserable huts stood and possibly their small garden−plots.

[Sidenote: Metayers]

Besides hired laborers and free−tenants, a third group of peasants appeared in places where the noble proprietor did not care to superintend the cultivation of his own land. In this case he parceled it out among particular peasants, furnishing each with livestock and a plow and expecting in return a fixed proportion of the crops, which in France usually amounted to one−half. Peasants who made such a bargain were called in France *metayers*, and in England “stock−and−land lessees.” The arrangement was not different essentially from the familiar present−day practice of working a farm “on shares.”

[Sidenote: Steady Decline of Serfdom]

In France and in England the serfs had mostly become hired laborers, tenants, or *metayers* by the sixteenth century. The obligations of serfdom had proved too galling for the serf and too unprofitable for the lord. It was much easier and cheaper for the latter to hire men to work just when he needed them, than to bother with serfs, who could not be discharged readily for slackness, and who naturally worked for themselves far more zealously than for him. For this reason many landlords were glad to allow their serfs to make payments in money or in grain in lieu of the performance of customary labor. In England, moreover, many lords, finding it profitable to inclose [Footnote: There were no fences on the old manors. Inclosing a plot of ground meant fencing or hedging it in.] their land in order to utilize it as pasturage for sheep, voluntarily freed their serfs. The result was that serfdom virtually had disappeared in England before the sixteenth century. In France as early as the fourteenth century the bulk of the serfs had purchased their liberty, although in a few districts serfdom remained in its pristine vigor until the French Revolution.

In other countries agricultural conditions were more backward and serfdom longer survived. Prussian and Austrian landowners retained their serfs until the nineteenth century; the emancipation of Russian serfs on a large scale was not inaugurated until 1861. There are still survivals of serfdom in parts of eastern Europe.

[Sidenote: Survival of Servile Obligations after Decline of Serfdom]

Emancipation from serfdom by no means released the peasants from all the disabilities under which they labored as serfs. True, the freeman no longer had week−work to do, provided he could pay for his time, and in theory at least he could marry as he chose and move freely from place to place. But he might still be called upon for an occasional day's labor, he still was expected to work on the roads, and he still had to pay annoying fees for oven, mill, and wine−press. Then, too, his own crops might be eaten with impunity by doves from the noble dovecote or trampled underfoot by a merry hunting−party from the manor−house. The peasant himself ventured

not to hunt: he was precluded even from shooting the deer that devoured his garden. Certain other customs prevailed in various localities, conceived originally no doubt in a spirit of good−natured familiarity between noble and peasants, but now grown irritating if none the less humorous. It is said, for instance, that in some places newly married couples were compelled to vault the wall of the churchyard, and that on certain nights the peasants were obliged to beat the castle ditch in order to rest the lord's family from the dismal croaking of the frogs.

[Sidenote: Persistence of “Three−field System” of Agriculture]

In another important respect the manorial system survived long after serfdom had begun to decline. This was the method of doing farm work. A universal and insistent tradition had fixed agricultural method on the medieval manor and tended to preserve it unaltered well into modern times. The tradition was that of the “three−field system” of agriculture. The land of the manor, which might vary in amount from a few hundred to five thousand acres, was not divided up into farms of irregular shape and size, as it would be now. The waste−land, which could be used only for pasture, and the woodland on the outskirts of the clearing, were treated as “commons,” that is to say, each villager, as well as the lord of the manor, might freely gather fire−wood, or he might turn his swine loose to feed on the acorns in the forest and his cattle to graze over the entire pasture. The cultivable or arable land was divided into several—usually three—great grain fields. Ridges or “balks” of unplowed turf divided each field into long parallel strips, which were usually forty rods or a furlong (furrow−long) in length, and from one to four rods wide. Each peasant had exclusive right to one or more of these strips in each of the three great fields, making, say, thirty acres in all; [Footnote: In some localities it was usual to redistribute these strips every year. In that way the greater part of the manor was theoretically “common” land, and no peasant had a right of private ownership to any one strip.] the lord too had individual right to a number of strips in the great fields.

[Sidenote: Disadvantages of Three−field System of Agriculture]

This so−called three−field system of agriculture was distinctly disadvantageous in many ways. Much time was wasted in going back and forth between the scattered plots of land. The individual peasant, moreover, was bound by custom to cultivate his land precisely as his ancestors had done, without attempting to introduce improvements. He grew the same crops as his neighbors—usually wheat or rye in one field; beans or barley in the second; and nothing in the third. Little was known about preserving the fertility of the soil by artificial manuring or by rotation of crops; and, although every year one−third of the land was left “fallow” (uncultivated) in order to restore its fertility, the yield per acre was hardly a fourth as large as now. Farm implements were of the crudest kind; scythes and sickles did the work of mowing machines; plows were made of wood, occasionally shod with iron; and threshing was done with flails. After the grain had been harvested, cattle were turned out indiscriminately on the stubble, on the supposition that the fields were common property. It was useless to attempt to breed fine cattle when all were herded together. The breed deteriorated, and both cattle and sheep were undersized and poor. A full−grown ox was hardly larger than a good−sized calf of the present time. Moreover, there were no potatoes or turnips, and few farmers grew clover or other grasses for winter fodder. It was impossible, therefore, to keep many cattle through the winter; most of the animals were killed off in the autumn and salted down for the long winter months when it was impossible to secure fresh meat.

[Sidenote: Peasant Life on the Manor]

Crude farm−methods and the heavy dues exacted by the lord [Footnote: In addition to the dues paid to the lay lord, the peasants were under obligation to make a regular contribution to the church, which was called the “tithe” and amounted to a share, less than a tenth, of the annual crops.] of the manor must have left the poor man little for himself. Compared with the comfort of the farmer today, the poverty of sixteenth−century peasants must have been inexpressibly distressful. How keenly the cold pierced the dark huts of the poorest, is hard for us to imagine. The winter diet of salt meat, the lack of vegetables, the chronic filth and squalor, and the sorry ignorance of all laws of health opened the way to disease and contagion. And if the crops failed, famine was added to plague.

On the other hand we must not forget that the tenement−houses of our great cities have been crowded in the nineteenth century with people more miserable than ever was serf of the middle ages. The serf, at any rate, had the open air instead of a factory in which to work. When times were good, he had grain and meat in plenty, and possibly wine or cider, and he hardly envied the tapestried chambers, the bejeweled clothes, and the spiced foods of the nobility, for he looked upon them as belonging to a different world.

In one place nobleman and peasant met on a common footing—in the village church. There, on Sundays and feast−days, they came together as Christians to hear Mass; and afterwards, perhaps, holiday games and dancing

on the green, benignantly patronized by the lord's family, helped the common folk to forget their labors. The village priest, [Footnote: Usually very different from the higher clergy, who had large landed estates of their own, the parish priests had but modest incomes from the tithes of their parishioners and frequently eked out a living by toiling on allotted patches of ground. The monks too were ordinarily poor, although the monastery might be wealthy, and they likewise often tilled the fields.] himself often of humble birth, though the most learned man on the manor, was at once the friend and benefactor of the poor and the spiritual director of the lord. Occasionally a visit of the bishop to administer confirmation to the children, afforded an opportunity for gayety and universal festivity.

[Sidenote: Rural Isolation and Conservatism]

At other times there was little to disturb the monotony of village life and little to remind it of the outside world, except when a gossiping peddler chanced along, or when the squire rode away to court or to war. Intercourse with other villages was unnecessary, unless there were no blacksmith or miller on the spot. The roads were poor and in wet weather impassable. Travel was largely on horseback, and what few commodities were carried from place to place were transported by pack− horses. Only a few old soldiers, and possibly a priest, had traveled very much; they were the only geographies and the only books of travel which the village possessed, for few peasants could read or write.

Self−sufficient and secluded from the outer world, the rural village went on treasuring its traditions, keeping its old customs, century after century. The country instinctively distrusted all novelties; it always preferred old ways to new; it was heartily conservative. Country−folk did not discover America. It was the enterprise of the cities, with their growing industries and commerce, which brought about the Commercial Revolution; and to the development of commerce, industry, and the towns, we now must turn our attention.

TOWNS ON THE EVE OF THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION

[Sidenote: Trade and the Towns ]

Except for the wealthy Italian city−states and a few other cities which traced their history back to Roman times, most European towns, it must be remembered, dated only from the later middle ages. At first there was little excuse for their existence except to sell to farmers salt, fish, iron, and a few plows. But with the increase of commerce, which, as we shall see, especially marked the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries, more merchants traveled through the country, ways of spending money multiplied, and the little agricultural villages learned to look on the town as the place to buy not only luxuries but such tools, clothing, and shoes as could be manufactured more conveniently by skillful town artisans than by clumsy rustics. The towns, moreover, became exchanges where surplus farm products could be marketed, where wine could be bartered for wool, or wheat for flax. And as the towns grew in size, the prosperous citizens proved to be the best customers for foreign luxuries, and foreign trade grew apace. Town, trade, and industry thus worked together: trade stimulated industry, industry assisted trade, and the town profited by both. By the sixteenth century the towns had grown out of their infancy and were maintaining a great measure of political and economic freedom.

[Sidenote: Freedom of the Towns.] [Sidenote: Town Charters]

Originally many a town had belonged to some nobleman's extensive manor and its inhabitants had been under much the same servile obligations to the lord as were the strictly rural serfs. But with the lapse of time and the growth of the towns, the townsmen or burghers had begun a struggle for freedom from their feudal lords. They did not want to pay servile dues to a baron, but preferred to substitute a fixed annual payment for individual obligations; they besought the right to manage their market; they wished to have cases at law tried in a court of their own rather than in the feudal court over which the nobleman presided; and they demanded the right to pay all taxes in a lump sum for the town, themselves assessing and collecting the share of each citizen. These concessions they eventually had won, and each city had its charter, in which its privileges were enumerated and recognized by the authority of the nobleman, or of the king, to whom the city owed allegiance. In England these charters had been acquired generally by merchant gilds, upon payment of a substantial sum to the nobleman; in France frequently the townsmen had formed associations, called *communes*, and had rebelled successfully against their feudal lords; in Germany the cities had leagued together for mutual protection and for the acquisition of common privileges. Other towns, formerly founded by bishops, abbots, or counts, had received charters at the very outset.

[Sidenote: Merchant Gilds]

A peculiar outgrowth of the need for protection against oppressive feudal lords, as well as against thieves, swindlers, and dishonest workmen, had been the typically urban organization known as the merchant gild or the merchants' company. In the year 1500 the merchant gilds were everywhere on the decline, but they still preserved many of their earlier and more glorious traditions. At the time of their greatest importance they had embraced merchants, butchers, bakers, and candlestick−makers: in fact, all who bought or sold in the town were included in the gild. And the merchant gild had then possessed the widest functions.

[Sidenote: Earlier Functions of the Merchant Gild.] [Sidenote: Social]

Its social and religious functions, inherited from much earlier bodies, consisted in paying some special honor to a patron saint, in giving aid to members in sickness or misfortune, attending funerals, and also in the more enjoyable meetings when the freely flowing bowl enlivened the transaction of gild business.

[Sidenote: Protective]

As a protective organization, the gild had been particularly effective. Backed by the combined forces of all the gildsmen, it was able to assert itself against the lord who claimed manorial rights over the town, and to insist that a runaway serf who had lived in the town for a year and a day should not be dragged back to perform his servile labor on the manor, but should be recognized as a freeman. The protection of the gild was accorded also to townsmen on their travels. In those days all strangers were regarded as suspicious persons, and not infrequently when a merchant of the gild traveled to another town he would be set upon and robbed or cast into prison. In such cases it was necessary for the gild to ransom the imprisoned “brother” and, if possible, to punish the persons who had done the injury, so that thereafter the liberties of the gild members would be respected. That the business of the gild might be increased, it was often desirable to enter into special arrangements with neighboring cities whereby the rights, lives, and properties of gildsmen were guaranteed; and the gild as a whole was responsible for the debts of any of its members.

[Sidenote: Regulative]

The most important duty of the gild had been the regulation of the home market. Burdensome restrictions were laid upon the stranger who attempted to utilize the advantages of the market without sharing the expense of maintenance. No goods were allowed to be carried away from the city if the townsmen wished to buy; and a tax, called in France the *octroi*, was levied on goods brought into the town. [Footnote: The *octroi* is still collected in Paris.] Moreover, a conviction prevailed that the gild was morally bound to enforce honest straightforward methods of business; and the “wardens” appointed by the gild to supervise the market endeavored to prevent, as dishonest practices, “forestalling” (buying outside of the regular market), “engrossing” (cornering the market), [Footnote: The idea that “combinations in restraint of trade” are wrong quite possibly goes back to this abhorrence of engrossing.] and “regrating” (retailing at higher than market price). The dishonest green grocer was not allowed to use a peck−measure with false bottom, for weighing and measuring were done by officials. Cheats were fined heavily and, if they persisted in their evil ways, they might be expelled from the gild.

These merchant gilds, with their social, protective, and regulative functions, had first begun to be important in the eleventh century. In England, where their growth was most rapid, 82 out of the total of 102 towns had merchant gilds by the end of the thirteenth century. [Footnote: Several important places, such as London, Colchester, and Norwich, belonged to the small minority without merchant gilds.] On the Continent many towns, especially in Germany, had quite different arrangements, and where merchant gilds existed, they were often exclusive and selfish groups of merchants in a single branch of business.

[Sidenote: Decline of Merchant Guilds]

With the expansion of trade and industry in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the rule of the old merchant gilds, instead of keeping pace with the times, became oppressive, limited, or merely nominal. Where the merchant gilds became oppressive oligarchical associations, as they did in Germany and elsewhere on the Continent, they lost their power by the revolt of the more democratic “craft gilds.” In England specialized control of industry and trade by craft gilds, journeymen's gilds, and dealers' associations gradually took the place of the general supervision of the older merchant gild. After suffering the loss of its vital functions, the merchant gild by the sixteenth century either quietly succumbed or lived on with power in a limited branch of trade, or continued as an honorary organization with occasional feasts, or, and this was especially true in England, it became practically identical with the town corporation, from which originally it had been distinct.

[Sidenote: Industry: the Craft Guilds]

Alongside of the merchant gilds, which had been associated with the growth of commerce and the rise of towns, were other guilds connected with the growth of industry, which retained their importance long after 1500. These were the craft gilds. [Footnote: The craft gild was also called a company, or a mistery, or *metier* (French), or *Zunft* (German).] Springing into prominence in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the craft gild sometimes, as in Germany, voiced a popular revolt against corrupt and oligarchical merchant gilds, and sometimes most frequently so in England—worked quite harmoniously with the merchant gild, to which its own members belonged. In common with the merchant gild, the craft gild had religious and social aspects, and like the merchant gild it insisted on righteous dealings; but unlike the merchant gild it was composed of men in a single industry, and it controlled in detail the manufacture as well as the marketing of commodities. There were bakers' gilds, brewers' gilds, smiths' gilds, saddlers' gilds, shoemakers' gilds, weavers' gilds, tailors' gilds, tanners' gilds, even gilds of masters of arts who constituted the teaching staff of colleges and universities.

When to−day we speak of a boy “serving his apprenticeship” in a trade, we seldom reflect that the expression is derived from a practice of the medieval craft gilds, a practice which survived after the gilds were extinct. Apprenticeship was designed to make sure that recruits to the trade were properly trained. The apprentice was usually selected as a boy by a master−workman and indentured—that is, bound to work several years without wages, while living at the master's house. After the expiration of this period of apprenticeship, during which he had learned his trade thoroughly, the youth became a “journeyman,” and worked for wages, until he should finally receive admission to the gild as a master, with the right to set up his own little shop, with apprentices and journeymen of his own, and to sell his wares directly to those who used them.

This restriction of membership was not the only way in which the trade was supervised. The gild had rules specifying the quality of materials to be used and often, likewise, the methods of manufacture; it might prohibit night−work, and it usually fixed a “fair price” at which goods were to be sold. By means of such provisions, enforced by wardens or inspectors, the gild not only perpetuated the “good old way" of doing things, but guaranteed to the purchaser a thoroughly good article at a fair price.

[Sidenote: Partial Decay of Craft Gilds]

By the opening of the sixteenth century the craft gilds, though not so weakened as the merchant gilds, were suffering from various internal diseases which sapped their vitality. They tended to become exclusive and to direct their power and affluence in hereditary grooves. They steadily raised their entrance fees and qualifications. Struggles between gilds in allied trades, such as spinning, weaving, fulling, and dyeing, often resulted in the reduction of several gilds to a dependent position. The regulation of the processes of manufacture, once designed to keep up the standard of skill, came in time to be a powerful hindrance to technical improvements; and in the method as well as in the amount of his work, the enterprising master found himself handicapped. Even the old conscientiousness often gave way to greed, until in many places inferior workmanship received the approval of the gild.

Many craft gilds exhibited in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a tendency to split somewhat along the present lines of capital and labor. On the one hand the old gild organization would be usurped and controlled by the wealthier master−workmen, called “livery men,” because they wore rich uniforms, or a class of dealers would arise and organize a “merchants' company” to conduct a wholesale business in the products of a particular industry. Thus the rich drapers sold all the cloth, but did not help to make it. On the other hand it became increasingly difficult for journeymen and apprentices to rise to the station of masters; oftentimes they remained wage−earners for life. In order to better their condition they formed new associations, which in England were called journeymen's or yeomen's companies. These new organizations were symptomatic of injustice but otherwise unimportant. The craft gilds, with all their imperfections, were to continue in power awhile longer, slowly giving away as new trades arose outside of their control, gradually succumbing in competition with capitalists who refused to be bound by gild rules and who were to evolve a new “domestic system,” [Footnote: See Vol. II, ch xviii.] and slowly suffering diminution of prestige through royal interference.

[Sidenote: Life in the Towns]

In the year 1500 the European towns displayed little uniformity in government or in the amount of liberty they possessed. Some were petty republics subject only in a very vague way to an extraneous potentate; some merely paid annual tribute to a lord; some were administered by officers of a king or feudal magnate; others were controlled by oligarchical commercial associations. But of the general appearance and life of sixteenth−century

towns, it is possible to secure a more uniform notion.

It must be borne in mind that the towns were comparatively small, for the great bulk of people still lived in the country. A town of 5000 inhabitants was then accounted large; and even the largest places, like Nuremberg, Strassburg, London, Paris, and Bruges, would have been only small cities in our eyes. The approach to an ordinary city of the time lay through suburbs, farms, and garden−plots, for the townsman still supplemented industry with small−scale agriculture. Usually the town itself was inclosed by strong walls, and admission was to be gained only by passing through the gates, where one might be accosted by soldiers and forced to pay toll. Inside the walls were clustered houses of every description. Rising from the midst of tumble−down dwellings might stand a magnificent cathedral, town−hall, or gild building. Here and there a prosperous merchant would have his luxurious home, built in what we now call the Gothic style, with pointed windows and gables, and, to save space in a walled town, with the second story projecting out over the street.

The streets were usually in deplorable condition. There might be one or two broad highways, but the rest were mere alleys, devious, dark, and dirty. Often their narrowness made them impassable for wagons. In places the pedestrian waded gallantly through mud and garbage; pigs grunted ponderously as he pushed them aside; chickens ran under his feet; and occasionally a dead dog obstructed the way. There were no sidewalks, and only the main thoroughfares were paved. Dirt and filth and refuse were ordinarily disposed of only when a heaven−sent rain washed them down the open gutters constructed along the middle, or on each side, of a street. Not only was there no general sewerage for the town, but there was likewise no public water supply. In many of the garden plots at the rear of the low−roofed dwellings were dug wells which provided water for the family; and the visitor, before he left the town, would be likely to meet with water−sellers calling out their ware. To guard against the danger of fires, each municipality encouraged its citizens to build their houses of stone and to keep a tub full of water before every building; and in each district a special official was equipped with a proper hook and cord for pulling down houses on fire. At night respectable town−life was practically at a standstill: the gates were shut; the curfew sounded; no street−lamps dispelled the darkness, except possibly an occasional lantern which an altruistic or festive townsman might hang in his front−window; and no efficient police−force existed—merely a handful of townsmen were drafted from time to time as “watchmen” to preserve order, and the “night watch” was famed rather for its ability to sleep or to roister than to protect life or purse. Under these circumstances the citizen who would escape an assault by ruffians or thieves remained prudently indoors at night and retired early to bed. Picturesque and quaint the sixteenth−century town may have been; but it was also an uncomfortable and an unhealthful place in which to live.

TRADE PRIOR TO THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION

Just as agriculture is the ultimate basis of human society, so town−life has always been an index of culture and civilization. And the fortunes of town−life have ever depended upon the vicissitudes of trade and commerce. So the reviving commerce of the later middle ages between Europe and the East meant the growth of cities and betokened an advance in civilization.

[Sidenote: Revival of Trade with the East]

Trade between Europe and Asia, which had been a feature of the antique world of Greeks and Romans, had been very nearly destroyed by the barbarian invasions of the fifth century and by subsequent conflicts between Mohammedans and Christians, so that during several centuries the old trade−routes were traveled only by a few Jews and with the Syrians. In the tenth century, however, a group of towns in southern Italy—Brindisi, Bari, Taranto, and Amalfi—began to send ships to the eastern Mediterranean and were soon imitated by Venice and later by Genoa and Pisa.

This revival of intercourse between the East and the West was well under way before the first Crusade, but the Crusades (1095−1270) hastened the process. Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, on account of their convenient location, were called upon to furnish the crusaders with transportation and provisions, and their shrewd Italian citizens made certain that such services were well rewarded. Italian ships, plying to and from the Holy Land, gradually enriched their owners. Many Italian cities profited, but Venice secured the major share. It was during the Crusades that Venice gained numerous coastal districts and islands in the AEgean besides immunities and privileges in Constantinople, and thereby laid the foundation of her maritime empire.

The Crusades not only enabled Italian merchants to bring Eastern commodities to the West; they increased the demand for such commodities. Crusaders—pilgrims and adventurers—returned from the Holy Land with

astonishing tales of the luxury and opulence of the East. Not infrequently they had acquired a taste for Eastern silks or spices during their stay in Asia Minor or Palestine; or they brought curious jewels stripped from fallen infidels to awaken the envy of the stay−at−homes. Wealth was rapidly increasing in Europe at this time, and the many well−to−do people who were eager to affect magnificence provided a ready market for the wares imported by Italian merchants.

[Sidenote: Commodities of Eastern Trade]

It is desirable to note just what were these wares and why they were demanded so insistently. First were spices, far more important then than now. The diet of those times was simple and monotonous without our variety of vegetables and sauces and sweets, and the meat, if fresh, was likely to be tough in fiber and strong in flavor. Spices were the very thing to add zest to such a diet, and without them the epicure of the sixteenth century would have been truly miserable. Ale and wine, as well as meats, were spiced, and pepper was eaten separately as a delicacy. No wonder that, although the rich alone could buy it, the Venetians were able annually to dispose of 420,000 pounds of pepper, which they purchased from the sultan of Egypt, to whom it was brought, after a hazardous journey, from the pepper vines of Ceylon, Sumatra, or western India. From the same regions came cinnamon−bark; ginger was a product of Arabia, India, and China; and nutmegs, cloves, and allspice grew only in the far−off Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago.

Precious stones were then, as always, in demand for personal adornment as well as for the decoration of shrines and ecclesiastical vestments; and in the middle ages they were thought by many to possess magical qualities which rendered them doubly valuable. [Footnote: Medieval literature is full of this idea. Thus we read in the book of travel which has borne the name of Sir John Maundeville: “And if you wish to know the virtues of the diamond, I shall tell you, as they that are beyond the seas say and affirm, from whom all science and philosophy comes. He who carries the diamond upon him, it gives him hardiness and manhood, and it keeps the limbs of his body whole. It gives him victory over his enemies, in court and in war, if his cause be just; and it keeps him that bears it in good wit; and it keeps him from strife and riot, from sorrows and enchantments, and from fantasies and illusions of wicked spirits. ... [It] heals him that is lunatic, and those whom the fiend torments or pursues.”] The supply of diamonds, rubies, pearls, and other precious stones was then almost exclusively from Persia, India, and Ceylon.

Other miscellaneous products of the East were in great demand for various purposes: camphor and cubebs from Sumatra and Borneo; musk from China; cane−sugar from Arabia and Persia; indigo, sandal−wood, and aloes−wood from India; and alum from Asia Minor.

The East was not only a treasure−house of spices, jewels, valuable goods, and medicaments, but a factory of marvelously delicate goods and wares which the West could not rival—glass, porcelain, silks, satins, rugs, tapestries, and metal−work. The tradition of Asiatic supremacy in these manufactures has been preserved to our own day in such familiar names as damask linen, china−ware, japanned ware, Persian rugs, and cashmere shawls.

In exchange for the manifold products of the East, Europe had only rough woolen cloth, arsenic, antimony, quicksilver, tin, copper, lead, and coral to give; and a balance, therefore, always existed for the European merchant to pay in gold and silver, with the result that gold and silver coins grew scarce in the West. It is hard to say what would have happened had not a new supply of the precious metals been discovered in America. But we are anticipating our story.

[Sidenote: Oriental Trade−Routes]

Nature has rendered intercourse between Europe and Asia exceedingly difficult by reason of a vast stretch of almost impassable waste, extending from the bleak plains on either side of the Ural hills down across the steppes of Turkestan and the desert of Arabia to the great sandy Sahara. Through the few gaps in this desert barrier have led from early times the avenues of trade. In the fifteenth century three main trade−routes—a central, a southern, and a northern—precariously linked the two continents.

(1) The central trade−route utilized the valley of the Tigris River. Goods from China, from the Spice Islands, and from India were brought by odd native craft from point to point along the coast to Ormuz, an important city at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, thence to the mouth of the Tigris, and up the valley to Bagdad. From Bagdad caravans journeyed either to Aleppo and Antioch on the northeastern corner of the Mediterranean, or across the desert to Damascus and the ports on the Syrian coast. Occasionally caravans detoured southward to Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt. Whether at Antioch, Jaffa, or Alexandria, the caravans met the masters of Venetian ships

ready to carry the cargo to Europe.

(2) The southern route was by the Red Sea. Arabs sailed their ships from India and the Far East across the Indian Ocean and into the Red Sea, whence they transferred their cargoes to caravans which completed the trip to Cairo and Alexandria. By taking advantage of monsoons,—the favorable winds which blew steadily in certain seasons,—the skipper of a merchant vessel could make the voyage from India to Egypt in somewhat less than three months. It was often possible to shorten the time by landing the cargoes at Ormuz and thence dispatching them by caravan across the desert of Arabia to Mecca, and so to the Red Sea, but caravan travel was sometimes slower and always more hazardous than sailing.

(3) The so−called "northern route" was rather a system of routes leading in general from the "back doors" of India and China to the Black Sea. Caravans from India and China met at Samarkand and Bokhara, two famous cities on the western slope of the Tian−Shan Mountains. West of Bokhara the route branched out. Some caravans went north of the Caspian, through Russia to Novgorod and the Baltic. Other caravans passed through Astrakhan, at the mouth of the Volga River, and terminated in ports on the Sea of Azov. Still others skirted the shore of the Caspian Sea, passing through Tabriz and Armenia to Trebizond on the Black Sea.

The transportation of goods from the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean was largely in the hands of the Italian cities,[Footnote: In general, the journey from the Far East to the ports on the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean was performed by Arabs, although some of the more enterprising Italians pushed on from the European settlements, or *fondachi*, in ports like Cairo and Trebizond, and established *fondachi* in the inland cities of Asia Minor, Persia, and Russia.] especially Venice, Genoa, Pisa, and Florence, although Marseilles and Barcelona had a small share. From Italy trade−routes led through the passes of the Alps to all parts of Europe. German merchants from Nuremberg, Augsburg, Ulm, Regensburg, and Constance purchased Eastern commodities in the markets of Venice, and sent them back to the Germanies, to England, and to the Scandinavian countries. After the lapse of many months, and even years, since the time when spices had been packed first in the distant Moluccas, they would be exposed finally for sale at the European fairs or markets to which thousands of countryfolk resorted. There a nobleman's steward could lay in a year's supply of condiments, or a peddler could fill his pack with silks and ornaments to delight the eyes of the ladies in many a lonesome castle.

[Sidenote: Difficulties of European Commerce]

Within Europe commerce gradually extended its scope in spite of the almost insuperable difficulties. The roads were still so miserable that wares had to be carried on pack−horses instead of in wagons. Frequently the merchant had to risk spoiling his bales of silk in fording a stream, for bridges were few and usually in urgent need of repair. Travel not only was fraught with hardship; it was expensive. Feudal lords exacted heavy tolls from travelers on road, bridge, or river. Between Mainz and Cologne, on the Rhine, toll was levied in thirteen different places. The construction of shorter and better highways was blocked often by nobles who feared to lose their toll−rights on the old roads. So heavy was the burden of tolls on commerce that transportation from Nantes to Orleans, a short distance up the River Loire, doubled the price of goods. Besides the tolls, one had to pay for local market privileges; towns exacted taxes on imports; and the merchant in a strange city or village often found himself seriously handicapped by regulations against "foreigners," and by unfamiliar weights, measures, and coinage.

Most dreaded of all, however, and most injurious to trade were the robbers who infested the roads. Needy knights did not scruple to turn highwaymen. Cautious travelers carried arms and journeyed in bands, but even they were not wholly safe from the dashing "gentlemen of the road." On the seas there was still greater danger from pirates. Fleets of merchantmen, despite the fact that they were accompanied usually by a vessel of war, often were assailed by corsairs, defeated, robbed, and sold as prizes to the Mohammedans. The black flag of piracy flew over whole fleets in the Baltic and in the Mediterranean. The amateur pirate, if less formidable, was no less common, for many a vessel carrying brass cannon, ostensibly for protection, found it convenient to use them to attack foreign craft and more frequently "took" a cargo than purchased one.

[Sidenote: Venice]

These dangers and difficulties of commercial intercourse were due chiefly to the lack of any strong power to punish pirates or highwaymen, to maintain roads, or to check the exactions of toll−collectors. Each city attempted to protect its own commerce. A great city−state like Venice was well able to send out her galleys against Mediterranean pirates, to wage war against the rival city of Genoa, to make treaties with Oriental potentates, and

to build up a maritime empire. Smaller towns were helpless. But what, as in the case of the German towns, they could not do alone, was partially achieved by combination.

[Sidenote: The Hanseatic League. Towns in the Netherlands: Bruges]

The Hanse or the Hanseatic League, as the confederation of Cologne, Brunswick, Hamburg, Luebeck, Dantzig, Koenigsberg, and other German cities was called, waged war against the Baltic pirates, maintained its trade−routes, and negotiated with monarchs and municipalities in order to obtain exceptional privileges. From their Baltic stations,— Novgorod, Stockholm, Koenigsberg, etc.,—the Hanseatic merchants brought amber, wax, fish, furs, timber, and tar to sell in the markets of Bruges, London, and Venice; they returned with wheat, wine, salt, metals, cloth, and beer for their Scandinavian and Russian customers. The German trading post at Venice received metals, furs, leather goods, and woolen cloth from the North, and sent back spices, silks, and other commodities of the East, together with glassware, fine textiles, weapons, and paper of Venetian manufacture. Baltic and Venetian trade−routes crossed in the Netherlands, and during the fourteenth century Bruges became the trade−metropolis of western Europe, where met the raw wool from England and Spain, the manufactured woolen cloth of Flanders, clarets from France, sherry and port wines from the Iberian peninsula, pitch from Sweden, tallow from Norway, grain from France and Germany, and English tin, not to mention Eastern luxuries, Venetian manufactures, and the cunning carved−work of south−German artificers.

THE AGE OF EXPLORATION

[Sidenote: Desire of Spaniards and Portuguese for New Trade−Routes]

In the unprecedented commercial prosperity which marked the fifteenth century, two European peoples—the Portuguese and the Spanish—had little part. For purposes of general Continental trade they were not so conveniently situated as the peoples of Germany and the Netherlands; and the Venetians and other Italians had shut them off from direct trade with Asia. Yet Spanish and Portuguese had developed much the same taste for Oriental spices and wares as had the inhabitants of central Europe, and they begrudged the exorbitant prices which they were compelled to pay to Italian merchants. Moreover, their centuries−long crusades against Mohammedans in the Iberian peninsula and in northern Africa had bred in them a stern and zealous Christianity which urged them on to undertake missionary enterprises in distant pagan lands. This missionary spirit reenforced the desire they already entertained of finding new trade−routes to Asia untrammeled by rival and selfish Italians. In view of these circumstances it is not surprising that Spaniards and Portuguese sought eagerly in the fifteenth century to find new trade−routes to “the Indies.”

[Sidenote: Geographical Knowledge]

In their search for new trade−routes to the lands of silk and spice, these peoples of southwestern Europe were not as much in the dark as sometimes we are inclined to believe. Geographical knowledge, almost non−existent in the earlier middle ages, had been enriched by the Franciscan friars who had traversed central Asia to the court of the Mongol emperor as early as 1245, and by such merchants and travelers as Marco Polo, who had been attached to the court of Kublai Khan and who subsequently had described that potentate's realms and the wealth of “Cipangu” (Japan). These travels afforded at once information about Asia and enormous incentive to later explorers.

Popular notions that the waters of the tropics boiled, that demons and monsters awaited explorers to the westward, and that the earth was a great flat disk, did not pass current among well−informed geographers. Especially since the revival of Ptolemy's works in the fifteenth century, learned men asserted that the earth was spherical in shape, and they even calculated its circumference, erring only by two or three thousand miles. It was maintained repeatedly that the Indies formed the western boundary of the Atlantic Ocean, and that consequently they might be reached by sailing due west, as well as by traveling eastward; but at the same time it was believed that shorter routes might be found northeast of Europe, or southward around Africa.

[Sidenote: Navigation]

Along with this general knowledge of the situation of continents, the sailors of the fifteenth century had learned a good deal about navigation. The compass had been used first by Italian navigators in the thirteenth century, mounted on the compass card in the fourteenth. Latitude was determined with the aid of the astrolabe, a device for measuring the elevation of the pole star above the horizon. With maps and accurate sailing directions (*portolani*), seamen could lose sight of land and still feel confident of their whereabouts. Yet it undoubtedly took courage for the explorers of the fifteenth century to steer their frail sailing vessels either down the unexplored

African coast or across the uncharted Atlantic Ocean.

[Sidenote: The Portuguese Explorers]

In the series of world−discoveries which brought about the Commercial Revolution and which are often taken as the beginning of “modern history,” there is no name more illustrious than that of a Portuguese prince of the blood,—Prince Henry, the Navigator (1394−1460), who, with the support of two successive Portuguese kings, made the first systematic attempts to convert the theories of geographers into proved fact. A variety of motives were his: the stern zeal of the crusader against the infidel; the ardent proselyting spirit which already had sent Franciscan monks into the heart of Asia; the hope of reestablishing intercourse with “Prester John's” fabled Christian empire of the East; the love of exploration; and a desire to gain for Portugal a share of the Eastern trade.

To his naval training−station at Sagres and the neighboring port of Lagos, Prince Henry attracted the most skillful Italian navigators and the most learned geographers of the day. The expeditions which he sent out year after year rediscovered and colonized the Madeira and Azores Islands, and crept further and further down the unknown coast of the Dark Continent. When in the year 1445, a quarter of a century after the initial efforts of Prince Henry, Denis Diaz reached Cape Verde, he thought that the turning point was at hand; but four more weary decades were to elapse before Bartholomew Diaz, in 1488, attained the southernmost point of the African coast. What he then called the Cape of Storms, King John II of Portugal in a more optimistic vein rechristened the Cape of Good Hope. Following in the wake of Diaz, Vasco da Gama rounded the Cape in 1497, and then, continuing on his own way, he sailed up the east coast to Malindi, where he found a pilot able to guide his course eastward through the Indian Ocean to India. At Calicut Vasco da Gama landed in May, 1498, and there he erected a marble pillar as a monument of his discovery of a new route to the Indies.

[Sidenote: Occupation of Old Trade−Routes by the Turks]

While the Portuguese were discovering this new and all−water route to the Indies, the more ancient Mediterranean and overland routes, which had been of inestimable value to the Italians, were in process of occupation by the Routes by Ottoman Turks. [Footnote: Professor A. H. Lybyer has recently and ably contended that, contrary to a view which has often prevailed, the occupation of the medieval trade−routes by the Ottoman Turks was not the cause of the Portuguese and Spanish explorations which ushered in the Commercial Revolution. He has pointed out that prior to 1500 the prices of spices were not generally raised throughout western Europe, and that apparently before that date the Turks had not seriously increased the difficulties of Oriental trade. In confirmation of this opinion, it should be remembered that the Portuguese had begun their epochal explorations long before 1500 and that Christopher Columbus had already returned from “the Indies.”] These Turks, as we have seen, were a nomadic and warlike nation of the Mohammedan faith who “added to the Moslem contempt for the Christian, the warrior's contempt for the mere merchant.” Realizing that advantageous trade relations with such a people were next to impossible, the Italian merchants viewed with consternation the advance of the Turkish armies, as Asia Minor, Thrace, Macedonia, Greece, and the islands of the AEgean were rapidly overrun. Constantinople, the heart of the Eastern Empire, repeatedly repelled the Moslems, but in 1453 Emperor Constantine XI was defeated by Sultan Mohammed II, and the crescent replaced the Greek cross above the Church of Saint Sophia. Eight years later Trebizond, the terminal of the trade−route from Tabriz, was taken. In vain Venice attempted to defend her possessions in the Black Sea and in the AEgean; by the year 1500 most of her empire in the Levant was lost. The Turks, now in complete control of the northern route, proceeded to impose crushing burdens on the trade of the defeated Venetians. Florentines and other Italians who fared less hardly continued to frequent the Black Sea, but the entire trade suffered from Turkish exactions and from disturbing wars between the Turks and another Asiatic people—the Mongols.

[Sidenote: Loss to the Italians]

For some time the central and southern routes, terminating respectively in Syria and Egypt, exhibited increased activity, and by rich profits in Alexandria the Venetians were able to retrieve their losses in the Black Sea. But it was only a matter of time before the Turks, conquering Damascus in 1516 and Cairo in 1517, extended their burdensome restrictions and taxes over those regions likewise. Eastern luxuries, transported by caravan and caravel over thousands of miles, had been expensive and rare enough before; now the added peril of travel and the exactions of the Turks bade fair to deprive the Italians of the greater part of their Oriental trade. It was at this very moment that the Portuguese opened up independent routes to the East, lowered the prices of Asiatic commodities, and grasped the scepter of maritime and commercial power which was gradually slipping from the hands of the

Venetians. The misfortune of Venice was the real opportunity of Portugal.

[Sidenote: Columbus]

Meanwhile Spain had entered the field, and was meeting with cruel disappointment. A decade before Vasco da Gama's famous voyage, an Italian navigator, Christopher Columbus, had presented himself at the Spanish court with a scheme for sailing westward to the Indies. The Portuguese king, by whom Columbus formerly had been employed, already had refused to support the project, but after several vexatious rebuffs Columbus finally secured the aid of Ferdinand and Isabella, the Spanish monarchs who were at the time jubilant over their capture of Granada from the Mohammedans (January, 1492). In August, 1492, he sailed from Palos with 100 men in three small ships, the largest of which weighed only a hundred tons. After a tiresome voyage he landed (12 October, 1492) on “San Salvador,” one of the Bahama Islands. In that bold voyage across the trackless Atlantic lay the greatness of Columbus. He was not attempting to prove a theory that the earth was spherical—that was accepted generally by the well informed. Nor was he in search of a new continent. The realization that he had discovered not Asia, but a new world, would have been his bitterest disappointment. He was seeking merely another route to the spices and treasures of the East; and he bore with him a royal letter of introduction to the great Khan of Cathay (China). In his quest he failed, even though he returned in 1493, in 1498, and finally in 1502 and explored successively the Caribbean Sea, the coast of Venezuela, and Central America in a vain search for the island “Cipangu” and the realms of the “Great Khan.” He found only “lands of vanity and delusion as the miserable graves of Castilian gentlemen,” and he died ignorant of the magnitude of his real achievement.

[Sidenote: America]

Had Columbus perished in mid ocean, it is doubtful whether America would have remained long undiscovered. In 1497 John Cabot, an Italian in the service of Henry VII of England, reached the Canadian coast probably near Cape Breton Island. In 1500 Cabral with a Portuguese expedition bound for India was so far driven out of his course by equatorial currents that he came upon Brazil, which he claimed for the king of Portugal. Yet America was named for neither Columbus, Cabot, nor Cabral, but for another Italian, the Florentine Amerigo Vespucci, who, returning from voyages to Brazil (1499−1500), published a letter concerning what he called “the new world.” It was thought that he had discovered this new world, and so it was called after him,—America.

[Sidenote: First Circumnavigation of the Earth]

Very slowly the truth about America was borne in upon the people of Europe. They persisted in calling the newly discovered lands the “Indies,” and even after Balboa had discovered (1513) that another ocean lay beyond the Isthmus of Panama, it was thought that a few days' sail would bring one to the outlying possessions of the Great Khan. Not until Magellan, leaving Spain in 1519, passed through the straits that still bear his name and crossed the Pacific was this vain hope relinquished. Magellan was killed by the natives of the Philippine Islands, but one of his ships reached Seville in 1522 with the tale of the marvelous voyage.

Even after the circumnavigation of the world explorers looked for channels leading through or around the Americas. Such were the attempts of Verrazano (1524), Cartier (1534), Frobisher (1576−1578), Davis (1585−1587), and Henry Hudson in 1609.

ESTABLISHMENT OF COLONIAL EMPIRES

[Sidenote: Portugal]

When Vasco da Gama returned to Lisbon in 1499 with a cargo worth sixty times the cost of his expedition, the Portuguese knew that the wealth of the Indies was theirs. Cabral in 1500, and Albuquerque in 1503, followed the route of Da Gama, and thereafter Portuguese fleets rounded the Cape year by year to gain control of Goa (India), Ormuz, Diu (India), Ceylon, Malacca, and the Spice Islands, and to bring back from these places and from Sumatra, Java, Celebes, and Nanking (China) rich cargoes of “spicery.” After the Turkish conquest of Egypt in 1517 the bulk of commerce was carried on by way of the Cape of Good Hope, for it was cheaper to transport goods by sea than to pay taxes to the Turks in addition to caravan cartage. Lisbon rapidly gained prominence as a market for Eastern wares.

The Portuguese triumph was short−lived. Dominion over half the world— for Portugal claimed all Africa, southern Asia, and Brazil as hers by right of discovery—had been acquired by the wise policy of the Portuguese royal house, but Portugal had neither products of her own to ship to Asia, nor the might to defend her exclusive right to the carrying trade with the Indies. The annexation of Portugal to Spain (1580) by Philip II precipitated disaster. The port of Lisbon was closed to the French, English, and Dutch, with whom Philip was at war, and

much of the colonial empire of Portugal was conquered speedily by the Dutch.

[Sidenote: Spain]

On the first voyage of Columbus Spain based her claim to share the world with Portugal. In order that there might be perfect harmony between the rival explorers of the unknown seas, Pope Alexander VI issued on 4 May, 1493, the famous bull [Footnote: A bull was a solemn letter or edict issued by the pope.] attempting to divide the uncivilized parts of the world between Spain and Portugal by the “papal line of demarcation,” drawn from pole to pole, 100 leagues west of the Azores. A year later the line was shifted to about 360 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands. Portugal had the eastern half of modern Brazil, Africa, and all other heathen lands in that hemisphere; the rest comprised the share of Spain.

For a time the Spanish adventurers were disappointed tremendously to find neither spices nor silks and but little gold in the “Indies,” and Columbus was derisively dubbed the “Admiral of the Mosquitos.” In spite of failures the search for wealth was prosecuted with vigor. During the next half century Haiti, called Hispaniola (“Spanish Isle"), served as a starting point for the occupation of Puerto Rico, Cuba (1508), and other islands. An aged adventurer, Ponce de Leon, in search of a fountain of youth, explored the coast of Florida in 1513, and subsequent expeditions pushed on to the Mississippi, across the plain of Texas, and even to California.

Montezuma, ruler of the ancient Aztec [Footnote: The Aztec Indians of Mexico, like various other tribes in Central America and in Peru, had reached in many respects a high degree of civilization before the arrival of Europeans.] confederacy of Mexico, was overthrown in 1519 by the reckless Hernando Cortez with a small band of soldiers. Here at last the Spaniards found treasures of gold and silver, and more abundant yet were the stores of precious metal found by Pizarro in Peru (1531). Those were the days when a few score of brave men could capture kingdoms and carry away untold wealth.

In the next chapter we shall see how the Spanish monarchy, backed by the power of American riches, dazzled the eyes of Europe in the sixteenth century. Not content to see his standard waving over almost half of Europe, and all America (except Brazil), Philip II of Spain by conquering Portugal in 1580 added to his possessions the Portuguese empire in the Orient and in Brazil. The gold mines of America, the spices of Asia, and the busiest market of Europe—Antwerp—all paid tribute to his Catholic Majesty, Philip II of Spain.

By an unwise administration of this vast empire, Spain, in the course of time, killed the goose that laid the golden egg. The native Indians, enslaved and lashed to their work in Peruvian and Mexican silver mines, rapidly lost even their primitive civilization and died in alarming numbers. This in itself would not have weakened the monarchy greatly, but it appeared more serious when we remember that the high−handed and harassing regulations imposed by short−sighted or selfish officials had checked the growth of a healthy agricultural and industrial population in the colonies, and that the bulk of the silver was going to support the pride of grandees and to swell the fortunes of German speculators, rather than to fill the royal coffers. The taxes levied on trade with the colonies were so exorbitant that the commerce with America fell largely into the hands of English and Dutch smugglers. Under wise government the monopoly of the African trade−route might have proved extremely valuable, but Philip II, absorbed in other matters, allowed this, too, to slip from his fingers.

While the Spanish monarchy was thus reaping little benefit from its world−wide colonial possessions, it was neglecting to encourage prosperity at home. Trade and manufacture had expanded enormously in the sixteenth century in the hands of the Jews and Moors. Woolen manufactures supported nearly a third of the population. The silk manufacture had become important. It is recorded that salt−works of the region about Santa Maria often sent out fifty shiploads at a time.

These signs of growth soon gave way to signs of decay and depopulation. Chief among the causes of ruin were the taxes, increased enormously during the sixteenth century. Property taxes, said to have increased 30 per cent, ruined farmers, and the “alcabala,” or tax on commodities bought and sold, was increased until merchants went out of business, and many an industrial establishment closed its doors rather than pay the taxes. Industry and commerce, already diseased, were almost completely killed by the expulsion of the Jews (1492) and of the Moors (1609), who had been respectively the bankers and the manufacturers of Spain. Spanish gold now went to the English and Dutch smugglers who supplied the peninsula with manufactures, and German bankers became the financiers of the realm.

The crowning misfortune was the revolt of the Netherlands, the richest provinces of the whole empire. Some of the wealthiest cities of Europe were situated in the Netherlands. Bruges had once been a great city, and in 1566

was still able to buy nearly $2,000,000 worth of wool to feed its looms; but as a commercial and financial center, the Flemish city of Antwerp had taken first place. In 1566 it was said that 300 ships and as many wagons arrived daily with rich cargoes to be bought and sold by the thousand commercial houses of Antwerp. Antwerp was the heart through which the money of Europe flowed. Through the bankers of Antwerp a French king might borrow money of a Turkish pasha. Yet Antwerp was only the greatest among the many cities of the Netherlands.

Charles V, king of Spain during the first half of the sixteenth century, had found in the Netherlands his richest source of income, and had wisely done all in his power to preserve their prosperity. As we shall see in Chapter III, the governors appointed by King Philip II in the second half of the sixteenth century lost the love of the people by the harsh measures against the Protestants, and ruined commerce and industry by imposing taxes of 5 and 10 per cent on every sale of land or goods. In 1566 the Netherlands rose in revolt, and after many bloody battles, the northern or Dutch provinces succeeded in breaking away from Spanish rule.

Spain had not only lost the little Dutch provinces; Flanders was ruined: its fields lay waste, its weavers had emigrated to England, its commerce to Amsterdam. Commercial supremacy never returned to Antwerp after the "Spanish Fury" of 1576. Moreover, during the war Dutch sailors had captured most of the former possessions of Portugal, and English sea−power, beginning in mere piratical attacks on Spanish treasure−fleets, had become firmly established. The finest part of North America was claimed by the English and French. Of her world empire, Spain retained only Central and South America (except Brazil), Mexico, California, Florida, most of the West Indies, and in the East the Philippine Islands and part of Borneo.

[Sidenote: Dutch Sea Power]

The Dutch, driven to sea by the limited resources of their narrow strip of coastland, had begun their maritime career as fishermen "exchanging tons of herring for tons of gold." In the sixteenth century they had built up a considerable carrying trade, bringing cloth, tar, timber, and grain to Spain and France, and distributing to the Baltic countries the wines and liquors and other products of southwestern Europe, in addition to wares from the Portuguese East Indies.

The Dutch traders had purchased their Eastern wares largely from Portuguese merchants in the port of Lisbon. Two circumstances—the union of Spain with Portugal in 1580 and the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain—combined to give the Dutch their great opportunity. In 1594 the port of Lisbon was closed to Dutch merchants. The following year the Dutch made their first voyage to India, and, long jealous of the Portuguese colonial possessions, they began systematically to make the trade with the Spice Islands their own. By 1602, 65 Dutch ships had been to India. In the thirteen years—1602 to 1615—they captured 545 Portuguese and Spanish ships, seized ports on the coasts of Africa and India, and established themselves in the Spice Islands. In addition to most of the old Portuguese empire,—ports in Africa and India, Malacca, Oceanica, and Brazil, [Footnote: Brazil was more or less under Dutch control from 1624 until 1654, when, through an uprising of Portuguese colonists, the country was fully recovered by Portugal. Holland recognized the Portuguese ownership of Brazil by treaty of 1662, and thenceforth the Dutch retained in South America only a portion of Guiana (Surinam).]—the Dutch had acquired a foothold in North America by the discoveries of Henry Hudson in 1609 and by settlement in 1621. Their colonists along the Hudson River called the new territory New Netherland and the town on Manhattan island New Amsterdam, but when Charles II of England seized the land in 1664, he renamed it New York.

Thus the Dutch had succeeded to the colonial empire of the Portuguese. With their increased power they were able entirely to usurp the Baltic trade from the hands of the Hanseatic (German) merchants, who had incurred heavy losses by the injury to their interests in Antwerp during the sixteenth century. Throughout the seventeenth century the Dutch almost monopolized the carrying−trade from Asia and between southwestern Europe and the Baltic. The prosperity of the Dutch was the envy of all Europe.

[Sidenote: Beginnings of English and French Explorations]

It took the whole sixteenth century for the English and French to get thoroughly into the colonial contest. During that period the activities of the English were confined to exploration and piracy, with the exception of the ill−starred attempts of Gilbert and Raleigh to colonize Newfoundland and North Carolina. The voyages of the Anglo−Italian John Cabot in 1497−1498 were later to be the basis of British claims to North America. The search for a northwest passage drove Frobisher (1576−1578), Davis (1585−1587), Hudson (1610−1611), and Baffin (1616) to explore the northern extremity of North America, to leave the record of their exploits in names of bays,

islands, and straits, and to establish England's claim to northern Canada; while the search for a northeast passage enticed Willoughby and Chancellor (1553) around Lapland, and Jenkinson (1557−1558) to the icebound port of Archangel in northern Russia. Elizabethan England had neither silver mines nor spice islands, but the deficiency was never felt while British privateers sailed the seas. Hawkins, the great slaver, Drake, the second circumnavigator of the globe, Davis, and Cavendish were but four of the bold captains who towed home many a stately Spanish galleon laden with silver plate and with gold. As for spices, the English East India Company, chartered in 1600, was soon to build up an empire in the East in competition with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the French, but that story belongs to a later chapter.

France was less active. The rivalry of Francis I [Footnote: See below, pp. 77 ff.] with Charles I of Spain had extended even to the New World. Verrazano (1524) sailed the coast from Carolina to Labrador, and Cartier (1534−1535) pushed up the Saint Lawrence to Montreal, looking for a northwest passage, and demonstrating that France had no respect for the Spanish claim to all America. After 1535, however, nothing of permanence was done until the end of the century, and the founding of French colonies in India and along the Saint Lawrence and Mississippi rivers belongs rather to the history of the seventeenth century.

[Sidenote: Motives for Colonization]

One of the most amazing spectacles in history is the expansion of Europe since the sixteenth century. Not resting content with discovering the rest of the world, the European nations with sublime confidence pressed on to divide the new continents among them, to conquer, Christianize, and civilize the natives, and to send out millions of new emigrants to establish beyond the seas a New England, a New France, a New Spain, and a New Netherland. The Spaniards in Spain to−day are far outnumbered by the Spanish−speaking people in Argentina, Chili, Peru, Venezuela, Colombia, Central America, and the Philippine Islands.

[Sidenote: Religion]

It was not merely greed for gold and thirst for glory which inspired the colonizing movement. To the merchant's eager search for precious metals and costly spices, and to the adventurer's fierce delight in braving unknown dangers where white man never had ventured, the Portuguese and Spanish explorers added the inspiration of an ennobling missionary ideal. In the conquest of the New World priests and chapels were as important as soldiers and fortresses; and its settlements were named in honor of Saint Francis (San Francisco), Saint Augustine (St. Augustine), the Holy Saviour (San Salvador), the Holy Cross (Santa Cruz), or the Holy Faith (Santa Fe). Fearless priests penetrated the interior of America, preaching and baptizing as they went. Unfortunately some of the Spanish adventurers who came to make fortunes in the mines of America, and a great number of the non−Spanish foreigners who owned mines in the Spanish colonies, set gain before religion, and imposed crushing burdens on the natives who toiled as slaves in their mines. Cruelty and forced labor decimated the natives, but in the course of time this abuse was remedied, thanks largely to the Spanish bishop, Bartolome de las Casas, and instead of forming a miserable remnant of an almost extinct race, as they do in the United States, the Indians freely intermarried with the Spaniards, whom they always outnumbered. As a result, Latin America is peopled by nations which are predominantly Indian in blood, [Footnote: Except in the southern part of South America.] Spanish or Portuguese [Footnote: In Brazil.] in language, and Roman Catholic in religion.

The same religious zeal which had actuated Spanish missionary−explorers was manifested at a later date by the French Jesuit Fathers who penetrated North America in order to preach the Christian faith to the Indians. Quite different were the religious motives which in the seventeenth century inspired Protestant colonists in the New World. They came not as evangelists, but as religious outcasts fleeing from persecution, or as restless souls worsted at politics or unable to gain a living at home. This meant the dispossession and ultimate extinction rather than the conversion of the Indians.

[Sidenote: Decline of the Hanseatic League]

The stirring story of the colonial struggles which occupied the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries will be taken up in another chapter; at this point, therefore, we turn from the expanding nations on the Atlantic seaboard to note the mournful plight of the older commercial powers—the German and Italian city−states. As for the former, the Hanseatic League, despoiled of its Baltic commerce by enterprising Dutch and English merchants, its cities restless and rebellious, gradually broke up. In 1601 an Englishman metaphorically observed: “Most of their [the league's] teeth have fallen out, the rest sit but loosely in their head,”—and in fact all were soon lost except Luebeck, Bremen, and Hamburg.

[Sidenote: Decay of Venice]

Less rapid, but no less striking, was the decay of Venice and the other Italian cities. The first cargoes brought by the Portuguese from India caused the price of pepper and spices to fall to a degree which spelled ruin for the Venetians. The Turks continued to harry Italian traders in the Levant, and the Turkish sea−power grew to menacing proportions, until in 1571 Venice had to appeal to Spain for help. To the terror of the Turk was added the torment of the Barbary pirates, who from the northern coast of Africa frequently descended upon Italian seaports. The commerce of Venice was ruined. The brilliance of Venice in art and literature lasted through another century (the seventeenth), supported on the ruins of Venetian opulence; but the splendor of Venice was extinguished finally in the turbulent sea of political intrigue into which the rest of Italy had already sunk.

EFFECTS OF THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION

In a way, all of the colonizing movements, which we have been at pains to trace, might be regarded as the first and greatest result of the Commercial Revolution—that is, if by the Commercial Revolution one understands simply the discovery of new trade−routes; but, as it is difficult to separate explorations from colonization, we have used the term “Commercial Revolution” to include both. By the Commercial Revolution we mean that expansive movement by which European commerce escaped from the narrow confines of the Mediterranean and encompassed the whole world. We shall proceed now to consider that movement in its secondary aspects or effects.

One of the first in importance of these effects was the advent of a new politico−economic doctrine—mercantilism—the result of the transference of commercial supremacy from Italian and German city−states to national states.

[Sidenote: Nationalism in Commerce]

With the declining Italian and German commercial cities, the era of municipal commerce passed away forever. In the peoples of the Atlantic seaboard, who now became masters of the seas, national consciousness already was strongly developed, and centralized governments were perfected; these nations carried the national spirit into commerce. Portugal and Spain owed their colonial empires to the enterprise of their royal families; Holland gained a trade route as an incident of her struggle for national independence; England and France, which were to become the great commercial rivals of the eighteenth century, were the two strongest national monarchies.

[Sidenote: Mercantilism]

The new nations founded their power not on the fearlessness of their chevaliers, but on the extent of their financial resources. Wealth was needed to arm and to pay the soldiers, wealth to build warships, wealth to bribe diplomats. And since this wealth must come from the people by taxes, it was essential to have a people prosperous enough to pay taxes. The wealth of the nation must be the primary consideration of the legislators. In endeavoring to cultivate and preserve the wealth of their subjects, European monarchs proceeded upon the assumption that if a nation exported costly manufactures to its own colonies and imported cheap raw materials from them, the money paid into the home country for manufactures would more than counterbalance the money paid out for raw materials, and this “favorable balance of trade” would bring gold to the nation. This economic theory and the system based upon it are called mercantilism. In order to establish such a balance of trade, the government might either forbid or heavily tax the importation of manufactures from abroad, might prohibit the export of raw materials, might subsidize the export of manufactures, and might attempt by minute regulations to foster industry at home as well as to discourage competition in the colonies. Thus, intending to retain the profits of commerce for Englishmen, Cromwell and later rulers required that certain goods must be carried on English ships.

[Sidenote: Chartered Companies]

By far the most popular method of developing a lucrative colonial trade—especially towards the end of the sixteenth and throughout the seventeenth century—was by means of chartered commercial companies. England (in 1600), Holland (in 1602), France (in 1664), Sweden, Denmark, Scotland, and Prussia each chartered its own “East India Company.” The English possessions on the Atlantic coast of America were shared by the London and Plymouth Companies (1606). English companies for trade with Russia, Turkey, Morocco, Guiana, Bermuda, the Canaries, and Hudson Bay were organized and reorganized with bewildering activity. In France the crop of commercial companies was no less abundant.

To each of these companies was assigned the exclusive right to trade with and to govern the inhabitants of a

particular colony, with the privilege and duty of defending the same. Sometimes the companies were required to pay money into the royal treasury, or on the other hand, if the enterprise were a difficult one, a company might be supported by royal subsidies. The Dutch West India Company (1621) was authorized to build forts, maintain troops, and make war on land and sea; the government endowed the company with one million florins, sixteen ships, four yachts, and exemption from all tolls and license dues on its vessels. The English East India Company, first organized in 1600, conducted the conquest and government of India for more than two centuries, before its administrative power was taken away in 1858.

[Sidenote: Financial Methods.] [Sidenote: The “Regulated Company"]

The great commercial companies were a new departure in business method. In the middle ages business had been carried on mostly by individuals or by partnerships, the partners being, as a rule, members of the same family. After the expansion of commerce, trading with another country necessitated building forts and equipping fleets for protection against savages, pirates, or other nations. Since this could not be accomplished with the limited resources of a few individuals, it was necessary to form large companies in which many investors shared expense and risk. Some had been created for European trade, but the important growth of such companies was for distant trade. Their first form was the “regulated company.” Each member would contribute to the general fund for such expenses as building forts; and certain rules would be made for the governance of all. Subject to these rules, each merchant traded as he pleased, and there was no pooling of profits. The regulated company, the first form of the commercial company, was encouraged by the king. He could charter such a company, grant it a monopoly over a certain district, and trust it to develop the trade as no individual could, and there was no evasion of taxes as by independent merchants.

[Sidenote: The Joint−stock Company]

After a decade or so, many of the regulated companies found that their members often pursued individual advantage to the detriment of the company's interests, and it was thought that, taken altogether, profits would be greater and the risk less, if all should contribute to a common treasury, intrusting to the most able members the direction of the business for the benefit of all. Then each would receive a dividend or part of the profits proportional to his share in the general treasury or “joint stock.” The idea that while the company as a whole was permanent each individual could buy or sell “shares” in the joint stock, helped to make such “joint−stock” companies very popular after the opening of the seventeenth century. The English East India Company, organized as a regulated company in 1600, was reorganized piecemeal for half a century until it acquired the form of a joint−stock enterprise; most of the other chartered colonial companies followed the same plan. In these early stock−companies we find the germ of the most characteristic of present−day business institutions—the corporation. In the seventeenth century this form of business organization, then in its rudimentary stages, as yet had not been applied to industry, nor had sad experience yet revealed the lengths to which corrupt corporation directors might go.

[Sidenote: Banking]

The development of the joint−stock company was attended by increased activity in banking. In the early middle ages the lending of money for interest had been forbidden by the Catholic Church; in this as in other branches of business it was immoral to receive profit without giving work. The Jews, however, with no such scruples, had found money−lending very profitable, even though royal debtors occasionally refused to pay. As business developed in Italy, however, Christians lost their repugnance to interest−taking, and Italian (Lombard) and later French and German money−lenders and money−changers became famous. Since the coins minted by feudal lords and kings were hard to pass except in limited districts, and since the danger of counterfeit or light−weight coins was far greater than now, the “money−changers” who would buy and sell the coins of different countries did a thriving business at Antwerp in the early sixteenth century. Later, Amsterdam, London, Hamburg, and Frankfort took over the business of Antwerp and developed the institutions of finance to a higher degree. [Footnote: The gold of the New World and the larger scope of commercial enterprises had increased the scale of operations, as may be seen by comparing the fortunes of three great banking families: 1300—the Peruzzi's, $800,000; 1440—the Medici's, $7,500,000; 1546—the Fuggers', $40,000,000.] The money−lenders became bankers, paying interest on deposits and receiving higher interest on loans. Shares of the stock of commercial companies were bought and sold in exchanges, and as early as 1542 there were complaints about speculating on the rise and fall of stocks.

Within a comparatively short time the medieval merchants' gilds had given way to great stock−companies, and Jewish money−lenders to millionaire bankers and banking houses with many of our instruments of exchange such as the bill of exchange. Such was the revolution in business that attended, and that was partly caused, partly helped, by the changes in foreign trade, which we call the Commercial Revolution.

[Sidenote: New Commodities]

Not only was foreign trade changed from the south and east of Europe to the west, from the city−states to nations, from land−routes to ocean− routes; but the vessels which sailed the Atlantic were larger, stronger, and more numerous, and they sailed with amazing confidence and safety, as compared with the fragile caravels and galleys of a few centuries before. The cargoes they carried had changed too. The comparative cheapness of water−transportation had made it possible profitably to carry grain and meat, as well as costly luxuries of small bulk such as spices and silks. Manufactures were an important item. Moreover, new commodities came into commerce, such as tea and coffee. The Americas sent to Europe the potato, “Indian” corn, tobacco, cocoa, cane−sugar (hitherto scarce), molasses, rice, rum, fish, whale−oil and whalebone, dye−woods and timber and furs; Europe sent back manufactures, luxuries, and slaves.

[Sidenote: Slavery]

Slaves had been articles of commerce since time immemorial; at the end of the fifteenth century there were said to have been 3000 in Venice; and the Portuguese had enslaved some Africans before 1500. But the need for cheap labor in the mines and on the sugar and tobacco plantations of the New World gave the slave−trade a new and tremendous impetus. The Spaniards began early to enslave the natives of America, although the practice was opposed by the noble endeavors of the Dominican friar and bishop, Bartolome de las Casas. But the native population was not sufficient,—or, as in the English colonies, the Indians were exterminated rather than enslaved,—and in the sixteenth century it was deemed necessary to import negroes from Africa. The trade in African negroes was fathered by the English captain Hawkins, and fostered alike by English and Dutch. It proved highly lucrative, and it was long before the trade yielded to the better judgment of civilized nations, and still longer before the institution of slavery could be eradicated.

[Sidenote: Effects on Industry and Agriculture]

The expansion of trade was the strongest possible stimulus to agriculture and industry. New industries—such as the silk and cotton manufacture—grew up outside of the antiquated gild system. The old industries, especially the English woolen industry, grew to new importance and often came under the control of the newer and more powerful merchants who conducted a wholesale business in a single commodity, such as cloth. Capitalists had their agents buy wool, dole it out to spinners and weavers who were paid so much for a given amount of work, and then sell the finished product. This was called the “domestic system,” because the work was done at home, or “capitalistic,” because raw material and finished product were owned not by the man who worked them, but by a “capitalist” or rich merchant. How these changing conditions were dealt with by mercantilist statesmen, we shall see in later chapters.

The effect on agriculture had been less direct but no less real. The land had to be tilled with greater care to produce grain sufficient to support populous cities and to ship to foreign ports. Countries were now more inclined to specialize—France in wine, England in wool—and so certain branches of production grew more important. The introduction of new crops produced no more remarkable results than in Ireland where the potato, transplanted from America, became a staple in the Irish diet: “Irish potatoes” in common parlance attest the completeness of domestication.

[Sidenote: General Significance of Commercial Revolution]

In the preceding pages we have attempted to study particular effects of the Commercial Revolution (in the broad sense including the expansion of commerce as well as the change of trade−routes), such as the decline of Venice and of the Hanse, the formation of colonial empires, the rise of commercial companies, the expansion of banking, the introduction of new articles of commerce, and the development of agriculture and industry. In each particular the change was noticeable and important.

But the Commercial Revolution possesses a more general significance.

[Sidenote: Europeanization of the World]

(1) It was the Commercial Revolution that started Europe on her career of world conquest. The petty, quarrelsome feudal states of the smallest of five continents have become the Powers of to−day, dividing up

Africa, Asia, and America, founding empires greater and more lasting than that of Alexander. The colonists of Europe imparted their language to South America and made of North America a second Europe with a common cultural heritage. The explorers, missionaries, and merchants of Europe have penetrated all lands, bringing in their train European manners, dress, and institutions. They are still at work Europeanizing the world.

[Sidenote: 2. Increase of Wealth, Knowledge, and Comfort]

(2) The expansion of commerce meant the increase of wealth, knowledge, and comfort. All the continents heaped their treasures in the lap of Europe. Knowledge of the New World, with its many peoples, products, and peculiarities, tended to dispel the silly notions of medieval ignorance; and the goods of every land were brought for the comfort of the European—American timber for his house, Persian rugs for his floors, Indian ebony for his table, Irish linen to cover it, Peruvian silver for his fork, Chinese tea, sweetened with sugar from Cuba.

[Sidenote: 3. The Rise of the Bourgeoisie]

(3) This new comfort, knowledge, and wealth went not merely to nobles and prelates; it was noticeable most of all in a new class, the “bourgeoisie.” In the towns of Europe lived bankers, merchants, and shop−keepers,—intelligent, able, and wealthy enough to live like kings or princes. These bourgeois or townspeople (*bourg* = town) were to grow in intelligence, in wealth, and in political influence; they were destined to precipitate revolutions in industry and politics, thereby establishing their individual rule over factories, and their collective rule over legislatures.

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# CHAPTER III. EUROPEAN POLITICS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

THE EMPEROR CHARLES V

As we look back upon the confused sixteenth century, we are struck at once by two commanding figures,—the Emperor Charles V [Footnote: Charles I of Spain.] and his son Philip II,—about whom we may group most of the political events of the period. The father occupies the center of the stage during the first half of the century; the son, during the second half.

[Sidenote: Extensive Dominions of Charles]

At Ghent in the Netherlands, Charles was born in 1500 of illustrious parentage. His father was Philip of Habsburg, son of the Emperor Maximilian and Mary, duchess of Burgundy. His mother was the Infanta Joanna, daughter and heiress of Ferdinand of Aragon and Naples and Isabella of Castile and the Indies. The death of his father and the incapacity of his mother—she had become insane—left Charles at the tender age of six years an orphan under the guardianship of his grandfathers Maximilian and Ferdinand. The death of the latter in 1516 transferred the whole Spanish inheritance to Charles, and three years later, by the death of the former, he came into possession of the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs. Thus under a youth of nineteen years were grouped wider lands and greater populations than any Christian sovereign had ever ruled. Vienna, Amsterdam, Antwerp, Brussels, Milan, Naples, Madrid, Cadiz,—even the City of Mexico,—owed him allegiance. His titles alone would fill several pages.

Maximilian had intended not only that all these lands should pass into the hands of the Habsburg family, but also that his grandson should succeed him as head of the Holy Roman Empire. This ambition, however, was hard of fulfillment, because the French king, Francis I (1515− 1547), feared the encircling of his own country by a united German− Spanish−Italian state, and set himself to preserve what he called the “Balance of Power”—preventing the undue growth of one political power at the expense of others. It was only by means of appeal to national and family sentiment and the most wholesale bribery that Charles managed to secure a majority of the electors' votes against his French rival [Footnote: Henry VIII of England was also a candidate.] and thereby to acquire the coveted imperial title. He was crowned at Aix− la−Chapelle in his twenty−first year.

[Sidenote: Character of Charles]

Never have greater difficulties confronted a sovereign than those which Charles V was obliged to face throughout his reign; never did monarch lead a more strenuous life. He was the central figure in a very critical period of history: his own character as well as the painstaking education he had received in the Netherlands conferred upon him a lively appreciation of his position and a dogged pertinacity in discharging its obligations. Both in administering his extensive dominions and in dealing with foreign foes, Charles was a zealous, hard−working, and calculating prince, and the lack of success which attended many of his projects was due not to want of ability in the ruler but to the multiplicity of interests among the ruled. The emperor must do too many things to allow of his doing any one thing well.

[Sidenote: Difficulties Confronting Charles]

Suppose we turn over in our minds some of the chief problems of Charles V, for they will serve to explain much of the political history of the sixteenth century. In the first place, the emperor was confronted with extraordinary difficulties in governing his territories. Each one of the seventeen provinces of the Netherlands—the country which he always considered peculiarly his own—was a distinct political unit, for there existed only the rudiments of a central administration and a common representative system, while the county of Burgundy had a separate political organization. The crown of Castile brought with it the recently conquered kingdom of Granada, together with the new colonies in America and scattered posts in northern Africa. The crown of Aragon comprised the four distinct states of Aragon, Valencia, Catalonia, and Navarre, [Footnote: The part south of the Pyrenees. See above, p. 8.] and, in addition, the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, each with its own customs and government. At least eight independent cortes or parliaments existed in this Spanish−Italian group, adding greatly to the intricacy of administration. Much the same was true of that other Habsburg group of states,—Austria, Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, the Tyrol, etc., but Charles soon freed himself from immediate responsibility for their government by intrusting them (1521) to his younger brother, Ferdinand, who by his own

marriage and elections added the kingdoms of Bohemia [Footnote: Including the Bohemian crown lands of Moravia and Silesia.] and Hungary (1526) to the Habsburg dominions. The Empire afforded additional problems: it made serious demands upon the time, money, and energies of its ruler; in return, it gave little but glamour. In all these regions Charles had to do with financial, judicial, and ecclesiastical matters. He had to reconcile conflicting interests and appeal for popularity to many varied races. More than once during his reign he even had to repress rebellion. In Germany, from his very first Diet in 1521, he was face to face with rising Protestantism which seemed to him to blaspheme his altar and to assail his throne.

The emperor's overwhelming administrative difficulties were complicated at every turn by the intricacies of foreign politics. In the first place, Charles was obliged to wage war with France throughout the greater part of his reign; he had inherited a longstanding quarrel with the French kings, to which the rivalry of Francis I for the empire gave a personal aspect. In the second place, and almost as formidable, was the advance of the Turks up the Danube and the increase of Mohammedan naval power in the Mediterranean. Against Protestant Germany a Catholic monarch might hope to rely on papal assistance, and English support might conceivably be enlisted against France. But the popes, who usually disliked the emperor's Italian policy, were not of great aid to him elsewhere; and the English sovereigns had domestic reasons for developing hostility to Charles. A brief sketch of the foreign affairs of Charles may make the situation clear.

[Sidenote: Francis I of France and the Reasons for his Wars with the Emperor Charles V]

Six years older than Charles, Francis I had succeeded to the French throne in 1515, irresponsible, frivolous, and vain of military reputation. The general political situation of the time,—the gradual inclosure of the French monarchy by a string of Habsburg territories,— to say nothing of the remarkable contrast between the character of Francis and that of the persevering Charles, made a great conflict inevitable, and definite pretexts were not lacking for an early outbreak of hostilities. (1) Francis revived the claims of the French crown to Naples, although Louis XII had renounced them in 1504. (2) Francis, bent on regaining Milan, which his predecessor had lost in 1512, invaded the duchy and, after winning the brilliant victory of Marignano in the first year of his reign, occupied the city of Milan. Charles subsequently insisted, however, that the duchy was a fief of the Holy Roman Empire and that he was sworn by oath to recover it. (3) Francis asserted the claims of a kinsman to the little kingdom of Navarre, the greater part of which, it will be remembered, had recently [Footnote: In 1512. See above.] been forcibly annexed to Spain. (4) Francis desired to extend his sway over the rich French−speaking provinces of the Netherlands, while Charles was determined not only to prevent further aggressions but to recover the duchy of Burgundy of which his grandmother had been deprived by Louis XI. (5) The outcome of the contest for the imperial crown in 1519 virtually completed the breach between the two rivals. War broke out in 1521, and with few interruptions it was destined to outlast the lives of both Francis and Charles.

[Sidenote: The Italian Wars of Charles V and Francis I]

Italy was the main theater of the combat. In the first stage, the imperial forces, with the aid of a papal army, speedily drove the French garrison out of Milan. The Sforza family was duly invested with the duchy as a fief of the Empire, and the pope was compensated by the addition of Parma and Piacenza to the Patrimony of Saint Peter. The victorious Imperialists then pressed across the Alps and besieged Marseilles. Francis, who had been detained by domestic troubles in France, [Footnote: These troubles related to the disposition of the important landed estates of the Bourbon family. The duke of Bourbon, who was constable of France, felt himself injured by the king and accordingly deserted to the emperor.] now succeeded in raising the siege and pursued the retreating enemy to Milan. Instead of following up his advantage by promptly attacking the main army of the Imperialists, the French king dispatched a part of his force to Naples, and with the other turned aside to blockade the city of Pavia. This blunder enabled the Imperialists to reform their ranks and to march towards Pavia in order to join the besieged. Here on 24 February, 1525,—the emperor's twenty−fifth birthday,—the army of Charles won an overwhelming victory. Eight thousand French soldiers fell on the field that day, and Francis, who had been in the thick of the fight, was compelled to surrender. “No thing in the world is left me save my honor and my life,” wrote the king to his mother. Everything seemed auspicious for the cause of Charles. Francis, after a brief captivity in Spain, was released on condition that he would surrender all claims to Burgundy, the Netherlands, and Italy, and would marry the emperor's sister.

[Sidenote: The Sack of Rome, 1527]

Francis swore upon the Gospels and upon his knightly word that he would fulfill these conditions, but in his

own and contemporary opinion the compulsion exercised upon him absolved him from his oath. No sooner was he back in France than he declared the treaty null and void and proceeded to form alliances with all the Italian powers that had become alarmed by the sudden strengthening of the emperor's position in the peninsula,—the pope, Venice, Florence, and even the Sforza who owed everything to Charles. Upon the resumption of hostilities the league displayed the same want of agreement and energy which characterized every coalition of Italian city−states; and soon the Imperialists were able to possess themselves of much of the country. In 1527 occurred a famous episode—the sack of Rome. It was not displeasing to the emperor that the pope should be punished for giving aid to France, although Charles cannot be held altogether responsible for what befell. His army in Italy, composed largely of Spaniards and Germans, being short of food and money, and without orders, mutinied and marched upon the Eternal City, which was soon at their mercy. About four thousand people perished in the capture. The pillage lasted nine months, and the brigands were halted only by a frightful pestilence which decimated their numbers. Convents were forced, altars stripped, tombs profaned, the library of the Vatican sacked, and works of art torn down as monuments of idolatry. Pope Clement VII (1523−1534), a nephew of the other Medici pope, Leo X, had taken refuge in the impregnable castle of St. Angelo and was now obliged to make peace with the emperor.

[Sidenote: Peace of Cambrai, 1529]

The sack of Rome aroused bitter feelings throughout Catholic Europe, and Henry VIII of England, at that time still loyal to the pope, ostentatiously sent aid to Francis. But although the emperor made little headway against Francis, the French king, on account of strategic blunders and the disunion of the league, was unable to maintain a sure foothold in Italy. The peace of Cambrai (1529) provided that Francis should abandon Naples, Milan, and the Netherlands, but the cession of Burgundy was no longer insisted upon. Francis proceeded to celebrate his marriage with the emperor's sister.

[Sidenote: Habsburg Predominance in Italy]

Eight years of warfare had left Charles V and the Habsburg family unquestionable masters of Italy. Naples was under Charles's direct government. For Milan he received the homage of Sforza. The Medici pope, whose family he had restored in Florence, was now his ally. Charles visited Italy for the first time in 1529 to view his territories, and at Bologna (1530) received from the pope's hands the ancient iron crown of Lombard Italy and the imperial crown of Rome. It was the last papal coronation of a ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.

The peace of Cambrai proved but a truce, and war between Charles and Francis repeatedly blazed forth. Francis made strange alliances in order to create all possible trouble for the emperor,—Scotland, Sweden, Denmark, the Ottoman Turks, even the rebellious Protestant princes within the empire. There were spasmodic campaigns between 1536 and 1538 and between 1542 and 1544, and after the death of Francis and the abdication of Charles, the former's son, Henry II (1547−1559), continued the conflict, newly begun in 1552, until the conclusion of the treaty of Cateau−Cambresis in 1559, by which the Habsburgs retained their hold upon Italy, while France, by the occupation of the important bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, extended her northeastern frontier, at the expense of the empire, toward the Rhine River. [Footnote: It was during this war that in 1558 the French captured Calais from the English, and thus put an end to English territorial holdings on the Continent. The English Queen Mary was the wife of Philip II of Spain.]

[Sidenote: Results of the Wars between Charles V and Francis I]

Indirectly, the long wars occasioned by the personal rivalry of Charles and Francis had other results than Habsburg predominance in Italy and French expansion towards the Rhine. They preserved a “balance of power” and prevented the incorporation of the French monarchy into an obsolescent empire. They rendered easier the rise of the Ottoman power in eastern Europe; and French alliance with the Turks gave French trade and enterprise a decided lead in the Levant. They also permitted the comparatively free growth of Protestantism in Germany.

[Sidenote: The Turkish Peril]

More sinister to Charles V than his wars with the French was the advance of the Ottoman Turks. Under their greatest sultan, Suleiman II, the Magnificent (1520−1566), a contemporary of Charles, the Turks were rapidly extending their sway. The Black Sea was practically a Turkish lake; and the whole Euphrates valley, with Bagdad, had fallen into the sultan's power, now established on the Persian Gulf and in control of all of the ancient trade−routes to the East. The northern coasts of Africa from Egypt to Algeria acknowledged the supremacy of Suleiman, whose sea power in the Mediterranean had become a factor to be reckoned with in European politics,

threatening not only the islands but the great Christian countries of Italy and Spain. The Venetians were driven from the Morea and from the AEgean Islands; only Cyprus, Crete, and Malta survived in the Mediterranean as outposts of Christendom.

[Sidenote: Suleiman the Magnificent]

Suleiman devoted many years to the extension of his power in Europe, sometimes in alliance with the French king, sometimes upon his own initiative,—and with almost unbroken success. In 1521 he declared war against the king of Hungary on the pretext that he had received no Hungarian congratulations on his accession to the throne. He besieged and captured Belgrade, and in 1526 on the field of Mohacs his forces met and overwhelmed the Hungarians, whose king was killed with the flower of the Hungarian chivalry. The battle of Mohacs marked the extinction of an independent and united Hungarian state; Ferdinand of Habsburg, brother of Charles V, claimed the kingdom; Suleiman was in actual possession of fully a third of it. The sultan's army carried the war into Austria and in 1529 bombarded and invested Vienna, but so valiant was the resistance offered that after three weeks the siege was abandoned. Twelve years later the greater part of Hungary, including the city of Budapest, became a Turkish province, and in many places churches were turned into mosques. In 1547 Charles V and Ferdinand were compelled to recognize the Turkish conquests in Hungary, and the latter agreed to pay the sultan an annual tribute of 30,000 ducats. Suleiman not only thwarted every attempt of his rivals to recover their territories, but remained throughout his life a constant menace to the security of the hereditary dominions of the Habsburgs.

[Sidenote: Charles V and the Holy Roman Empire.] [Sidenote: Possibility of transforming the Empire into a National German Monarchy]

At the very time when Charles V was encountering these grave troubles in administering his scattered hereditary possessions and in waging war now with the French and now with the Mohammedans, he likewise was saddled with problems peculiar to the government of his empire. Had he been able to devote all his talent and energy to the domestic affairs of the Holy Roman Empire, he might have contributed potently to the establishment of a compact German state. It should be borne in mind that when Charles V was elected emperor in 1519 the Holy Roman Empire was virtually restricted to German−speaking peoples, and that the national unifications of England, France, and Spain, already far advanced, pointed the path to a similar political evolution for Germany. Why should not a modern German national state have been created coextensive with the medieval empire, a state which would have included not only the twentieth−century German Empire but Austria, Holland, and Belgium, and which, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic and from the English Channel to the Vistula, would have dominated the continent of Europe throughout the whole modern era? There were certainly grave difficulties in the way, but grave difficulties had also been encountered in consolidating France or Spain, and the difference was rather of degree than of kind. In every other case a strong monarch had overcome feudal princes and ambitious nobles, had deprived cities of many of their liberties, had trampled upon, or tampered with, the privileges of representative assemblies, and had enforced internal order and security. In every such case the monarch had commanded the support of important popular elements and had directed his major efforts to the realization of national aims.

National patriotism was not altogether lacking among Germans of the sixteenth century. They were conscious of a common language which was already becoming a vehicle of literary expression. They were conscious of a common tradition and of a common nationality. They recognized, in many cases, the absurdly antiquated character of their political institutions and ardently longed for reforms. In fact, the trouble with the Germans was not so much the lack of thought about political reform as the actual conflicts between various groups concerning the method and goal of reform. Germans despised the Holy Roman Empire, much as Frenchmen abhorred the memory of feudal society; but Germans were not as unanimous as Frenchmen in advocating the establishment of a strong national monarchy. In Germany were princes, free cities, and knights,— all nationalistic after a fashion, but all quarreling with each other and with their nominal sovereign.

[Sidenote: Charles V bent on Strengthening Monarchical Power though not on a National Basis]

The emperors themselves were the only sincere and consistent champions of centralized monarchical power, but the emperors were probably less patriotic than any one else in the Holy Roman Empire. Charles V would never abandon his pretensions to world power in order to become a strong monarch over a single nation. Early in his reign he declared that “no monarchy was comparable though not to the Roman Empire. This the whole world

had once obeyed, and Christ Himself had paid it honor and obedience. Unfortunately it was now only a shadow of what it had been, but he hoped, with the help of those powerful countries and alliances which God had granted him, to raise it to its ancient glory." Charles V labored for an increase of personal power not only in Germany but also in the Netherlands, in Spain, and in Italy; and with the vast imperial ambition of Charles the ideal of creating a national monarchy on a strictly German basis was in sharp conflict. Charles V could not, certainly would not, pose simply as a German king—a national leader.

[Sidenote: Nationalism among the German Princes]

Under these circumstances the powerful German princes, in defying the emperor's authority and in promoting disruptive tendencies in the Holy Roman Empire, were enabled to lay the blame at the feet of their unpatriotic sovereign and thereby arouse in their behalf a good deal of German national sentiment. In choosing Charles V to be their emperor, the princely electors in 1519 had demanded that German or Latin should be the official language of the Holy Roman Empire, that imperial offices should be open only to Germans, that the various princes should not be subject to any foreign political jurisdiction, that no foreign troops should serve in imperial wars without the approval of the Diet, and that Charles should confirm the sovereign rights of all the princes and appoint from their number a Council of Regency (*Reichsregiment* ) to share in his government.

[Sidenote: The Council of Regency, 1521−1531] [Sidenote: Its Failure to Unify Germany]

In accordance with an agreement reached by a Diet held at Worms in 1521, the Council of Regency was created. Most of its twenty−three members were named by, and represented the interests of, the German princes. Here might be the starting−point toward a closer political union of the German−speaking people, if only a certain amount of financial independence could be secured to the Council. The proposal on this score was a most promising one; it was to support the new imperial administration, not, as formerly, by levying more or less voluntary contributions on the various states, but by establishing a kind of customs−union (*Zollverein*) and imposing on foreign importations a tariff for revenue. This time, however, the German burghers raised angry protests; the merchants and traders of the Hanseatic towns insisted that the proposed financial burden would fall on them and destroy their business; and their protests were potent enough to bring to nought the princes' plan. Thus the government was forced again to resort to the levy of special financial contributions,—an expedient which usually put the emperor and the Council of Regency at the mercy of the most selfish and least patriotic of the German princes.

[Sidenote: Nationalism among the German Knights]

More truly patriotic as a class than German princes or German burghers were the German knights—those gentlemen of the hill−top and of the road, who, usually poor in pocket though stout of heart, looked down from their high−perched castles with badly disguised contempt upon the vulgar tradesmen of the town or beheld with anger and jealousy the encroachments of neighboring princes, lay and ecclesiastical, more wealthy and powerful than themselves. Especially against the princes the knights contended, sometimes under the forms of law, more often by force and violence and all the barbarous accompaniments of private warfare and personal feud. Some of the knights were well educated and some had literary and scholarly abilities; hardly any one of them was a friend of public order. Yet practically all the knights were intensely proud of their German nationality. It was the knights, who, under the leadership of such fiery patriots as Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen, had forcefully contributed in 1519 to the imperial election of Charles V, a German Habsburg, in preference to non−German candidates such as Francis I of France or Henry VIII of England. For a brief period Charles V leaned heavily upon the German knights for support in his struggle with princes and burghers; and at one time it looked as if the knights in union with the emperor would succeed in curbing the power of the princes and in laying the foundations of a strongly centralized national German monarchy.

[Sidenote: Rise of Lutheranism Favored by the Knights and Opposed by Charles V]

But at the critical moment Protestantism arose in Germany, marking a cleavage between the knightly leaders and the emperor. To knights like Ulrich von Hutten and Franz von Sickingen the final break in 1520 between Martin Luther and the pope seemed to assure a separation of Germany from Italy and the erection of a peculiar form of German Christianity about which a truly national state could be builded. As a class the knights applauded Luther and rejoiced at the rapid spread of his teachings throughout Germany. On the other hand, Charles V remained a Roman Catholic. Not only was he loyally attached to the religion of his fathers through personal training and belief, but he felt that the maintenance of what political authority he possessed was dependent largely

on the maintenance of the universal authority of the ancient Church, and practically he needed papal assistance for his many foreign projects. The same reasons that led many German princes to accept the Lutheran doctrines as a means of lessening imperial control caused Charles V to reject them. At the same Diet at Worms (1521), at which the Council of Regency had been created, Charles V prevailed upon the Germans present to condemn and outlaw Luther; and this action alienated the knights from the emperor.

[Sidenote: The Knights' War, 1522−1523]

Franz von Sickingen, a Rhenish knight and the ablest of his class, speedily took advantage of the emperor's absence from Germany in 1522 to precipitate a Knights' War. In supreme command of a motley army of fellow−knights, Franz made an energetic attack upon the rich landed estates of the Catholic prince−bishop of Trier. At this point, the German princes, lay as well as ecclesiastical, forgetting their religious predilections and mindful only of their common hatred of the knights, rushed to the defense of the bishop of Trier and drove off Sickingen, who, in April, 1523, died fighting before his own castle of Ebernburg. Ulrich von Hutten fled to Switzerland and perished miserably shortly afterwards. The knights' cause collapsed, and princes and burghers remained triumphant. [Footnote: The Knights' War was soon followed by the Peasants' Revolt, a social rather than a political movement. For an account of the Peasants' Revolt see pp. 133 ff.] It was the end of serious efforts in the sixteenth century to create a national German state.

[Sidenote: Failure of German Nationalism in the Sixteenth Century]

The Council of Regency lasted until 1531, though its inability to preserve domestic peace discredited it, and in its later years it enjoyed little authority. Left to themselves, many of the princes espoused Protestantism. In vain Charles V combated the new religious movement. In vain he proscribed it in several Diets after that of Worms. In vain he assailed its upholders in several military campaigns, such as those against the Schmalkaldic League, which will be treated more fully in another connection. But the long absences of Charles V from Germany and his absorption in a multitude of cares and worries, to say nothing of the spasmodic aid which Francis, the Catholic king of France, gave to the Protestants in Germany, contributed indirectly to the spread of Lutheranism. In the last year of Charles's rule (1555) the profession of the Lutheran faith on the part of German princes was placed by the peace of Augsburg [Footnote: See below, p. 136.] on an equal footing with that of the Catholic religion. Protestantism among the German princes proved a disintegrating, rather than a unifying, factor of national life. The rise of Protestantism was the last straw which broke German nationalism.

[Sidenote: Charles V and England]

With England the relations of Charles V were interesting but not so important as those already noted with the Germans, the Turks, and the French. At first in practical alliance with the impetuous self−willed Henry VIII (1509−1547), whose wife—Catherine of Aragon—was the emperor's aunt, Charles subsequently broke off friendly relations when the English sovereign asked the pope to declare his marriage null and void. Charles prevailed upon the pope to deny Henry's request, and the schism which Henry then created between the Catholic Church in England and the Roman See increased the emperor's bitterness. Towards the close of Henry's reign relations improved again, but it was not until the accession of Charles's cousin, Mary (1553−1558), to the English throne that really cordial friendship was restored. To this Queen Mary, Charles V married his son and successor Philip.

[Sidenote: Abdication of Charles V]

At length exhausted by his manifold labors, Charles V resolved to divide his dominions between his brother Ferdinand and his son Philip and to retire from government. In the hall of the Golden Fleece at Brussels on 25 October, 1555, he formally abdicated the sovereignty of his beloved Netherlands. Turning to the representatives, he said: “Gentlemen, you must not be astonished if, old and feeble as I am in all my members, and also from the love I bear you, I shed some tears.” At least in the Netherlands the love was reciprocal. In 1556 he resigned the Spanish and Italian crowns, [Footnote: He made over to his brother all his imperial authority, though he nominally retained the crown of the Holy Roman Empire until 1558] and spent his last years in preparation for a future world. He died in 1558. Personally, Charles V had a prominent lower jaw and a thin, pale face, relieved by a wide forehead and bright, flashing eyes. He was well formed and dignified in appearance. In character he was slow and at times both irresolute and obstinate, but he had a high sense of duty, honest intentions, good soldierly qualities, and a large amount of cold common sense. Though not highly educated, he was well read and genuinely appreciative of music and painting.

PHILIP II AND THE PREDOMINANCE OF SPAIN

For a century and a half after the retirement of Charles V in 1556, we hear of two branches of the Habsburg family—the Spanish Habsburgs and the Austrian Habsburgs, descended respectively from Philip II and Ferdinand. By the terms of the division, Ferdinand, the brother of Charles, received the compact family possessions in the East—Austria and its dependencies, Bohemia, that portion of Hungary not occupied by the Turks, and the title of Holy Roman Emperor,—while the remainder went to Charles's son, Philip II,—Spain, the Netherlands, Franche Comte (the eastern part of Burgundy), the Two Sicilies, Milan, and the American colonies.

Over the history of Ferdinand and his immediate successors, we need not tarry, because, aside from efforts to preserve religious peace and the family's political predominance within the empire and to recover Hungary from the Turks, it is hardly essential. But in western Europe Philip II for a variety of reasons became a figure of world−wide importance: we must examine his career.

[Sidenote: Character and policies of Philip II]

Few characters in history have elicited more widely contradictory estimates than Philip II. Represented by many Protestant writers as a villain, despot, and bigot, he has been extolled by patriotic Spaniards as Philip the Great, champion of religion and right. These conflicting opinions are derived from different views which may be taken of the value and inherent worth of Philip's policies and methods, but what those policies and methods were there can be no doubt. In the first place, Philip II prized Spain as his native country and his main possession—in marked contrast to his father, for he himself had been born in Spain and had resided there during almost all of his life—and he was determined to make Spain the greatest country in the world. In the second place, Philip II was sincerely and piously attached to Catholicism; he abhorred Protestantism as a blasphemous rending of the seamless garment of the Church; and he set his heart upon the universal triumph of his faith. If, by any chance, a question should arise between the advantage of Spain and the best interests of the Church, the former must be sacrificed relentlessly to the latter. Such was the sovereign's stern ideal. No seeming failure of his policies could shake his belief in their fundamental excellence. That whatever he did was done for the greater glory of God, that success or failure depended upon the inscrutable will of the Almighty and not upon himself, were his guiding convictions, which he transmitted to his Spanish successors. Not only was Philip a man of principles and ideals, but he was possessed of a boundless capacity for work and an indomitable will. He preferred tact and diplomacy to war and prowess of arms, though he was quite willing to order his troops to battle if the object, in his opinion, was right. He was personally less accustomed to the sword than to the pen, and no clerk ever toiled more industriously at his papers than did this king. From early morning until far into the night he bent over minutes and reports and other business of kingcraft. Naturally cautious and reserved, he was dignified and princely in public. In his private life, he was orderly and extremely affectionate to his family and servants. Loyalty was Philip's best attribute.

There was a less happy side to the character of Philip II. His free use of the Inquisition in order to extirpate heresy throughout his dominions has rendered him in modern eyes an embodiment of bigotry and intolerance, but it must be remembered that he lived in an essentially intolerant age, when religious persecution was stock in trade of Protestants no less than of Catholics. It is likewise true that he constantly employed craft and deceit and was ready to make use of assassination for political purposes, but this too was in accordance with the temper of the times: lawyers then taught, following the precepts of the famous historian and political philosopher, Machiavelli, that Christian morality is a guide for private conduct rather than for public business, and that “the Prince” may act above the laws in order to promote the public good, and even such famous Protestant leaders as Coligny and William the Silent entered into murder plots. But when all due allowances have been made, the student cannot help feeling that the purpose of Philip II would have been served better by the employment of means other than persecution and murder.

The reign of Philip II covered approximately the second half of the sixteenth century (1556−1598). In his efforts to make Spain the greatest power in the world and to restore the unity problems of Christendom, he was doomed to failure. The chief Confronting reason for the failure is simple—the number and [side note Problems Confronting Philip II] variety of the problems and projects with which Philip II was concerned. It was a case of the king putting a finger in too many pies—he was cruelly burned. Could Philip II have devoted all his energies to one thing at a time, he might conceivably have had greater success, but as it was, he must divide his attention between supervising the complex administration of his already wide dominions and annexing in addition the

monarchy and empire of Portugal, between promoting a vigorous commercial and colonial policy and suppressing a stubborn revolt in the Netherlands, between championing Catholicism in both England and France and protecting Christendom against the victorious Mohammedans. It was this multiplicity of interests that paralyzed the might of the Spanish monarch, yet each one of his foreign activities was epochal in the history of the country affected. We shall therefore briefly review Philip's activities in order.

[Sidenote: Spain under Philip II: Political]

As we have seen, Philip II inherited a number of states which had separate political institutions and customs. He believed in national unification, at least of Spain. National unification implied uniformity, and uniformity implied greater power of the crown. So Philip sought to further the work of his great−grandparents, Ferdinand and Isabella,—absolutism and uniformity became his watchwords in internal administration. Politically Philip made no pretense of consulting the Cortes on legislation, and, although he convoked them to vote new taxes, he established the rule that the old taxes were to be considered as granted in perpetuity and as constituting the ordinary revenue of the crown. He treated the nobles as ornamental rather than useful, retiring them from royal offices in favor of lawyers and other subservient members of the middle class. All business was conducted by correspondence and with a final reference to the king, and the natural result was endless delay.

[Sidenote: Spain under Philip II: Economic]

Financially and economically the period was unfortunate for Spain. The burden of the host of foreign enterprises fell with crushing weight upon the Spanish kingdom and particularly upon Castile. Aragon, which was poor and jealous of its own rights, would give little. The income from the Netherlands, at first large, was stopped by the revolt. The Italian states barely paid expenses. The revenue from the American mines, which has been greatly exaggerated, enriched the pockets of individuals rather than the treasury of the state. In Spain itself, the greater part of the land was owned by the ecclesiastical corporations and the nobles, who were exempt from taxation but were intermittently fleeced. Moreover, the 10 per cent tax on all sales—the alcabala [Footnote: See above, p. 57.]—gradually paralyzed all native industrial enterprise. And the persecution of wealthy and industrious Jews and Moors diminished the resources of the kingdom. Spain, at the close of the century, was on the verge of bankruptcy.

[Sidenote: Spain under Philip II: Religious]

In religious matters Philip II aimed at uniform adherence to the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church. He felt, like so many of his contemporaries, that disparity of belief among subjects would imperil a state. Both from political motives and from religious zeal Philip was a Catholic. He therefore advised the pope, watched with interest the proceedings of the great Council of Trent which was engaged with the reformation of the Church, [Footnote: See below, pp. 158 ff.] and labored for the triumph of his religion not only in his own dominions and in France, but also in Poland, in England, and even in Scandinavia. In Spain he strengthened the Inquisition and used it as a tool of royal despotism.

[Sidenote: Temporary Union of Spain and Portugal]

Territorially Philip II desired to complete political unity in the peninsula by combining the crown of Portugal with those of Castile and Aragon. He himself was closely related to the Portuguese royal family, and in 1580 he laid formal claim to that kingdom. The duke of Braganza, whose claim was better than Philip's, was bought off by immense grants and the country was overrun by Spanish troops. Philip endeavored to placate the Portuguese by full recognition of their constitutional rights and in particular by favoring the lesser nobility or country gentry. Although the monarchies and vast colonial possessions of Spain and Portugal were thus joined for sixty years under a common king, the arrangement never commanded any affection in Portugal, with the result that at the first opportunity, in 1640, Portuguese independence was restored under the leadership of the Braganza family.

[Sidenote: Rebellions Against Philip II in Spain]

The most serious domestic difficulty which Philip had to face was the revolt of the rich and populous Netherlands, which we shall discuss presently. But with other revolts the king had to contend. In his efforts to stamp out heresy and peculiar customs among the descendants of the Moors who still lived in the southern part of Spain, Philip aroused armed opposition. The Moriscos, as they were called, struggled desperately from 1568 to 1570 to reestablish the independence of Granada. This rebellion was suppressed with great cruelty, and the surviving Moriscos were forced to find new homes in less favored parts of Spain until their final expulsion from the country in 1609. A revolt of Aragon in 1591 was put down by a Castilian army; the constitutional rights of

Aragon were diminished and the kingdom was reduced to a greater measure of submission.

[Sidenote: Revolt of the Netherlands: The Causes]

The causes that led to the revolt of the Netherlands may be stated as fourfold. (1) Financial. The burdensome taxes which Charles V had laid upon the country were increased by Philip II and often applied to defray the expenses of other parts of the Spanish possessions. Furthermore, the restrictions which Philip imposed upon Dutch commerce in the interest of that of Spain threatened to interfere seriously with the wonted economic prosperity of the Netherlands. (2) Political. Philip II sought to centralize authority in the Netherlands and despotically deprived the cities and nobles of many of their traditional privileges. Philip never visited the country in person after 1559, and he intrusted his arbitrary government to regents and to Spaniards rather than to native leaders. The scions of the old and proud noble families of the Netherlands naturally resented being supplanted in lucrative and honorable public offices by persons whom they could regard only as upstarts. (3) Religious. Despite the rapid and universal spread of Calvinistic Protestantism throughout the northern provinces, Philip was resolved to force Catholicism upon all of his subjects. He increased the number of bishoprics, decreed acts of uniformity, and in a vigorous way utilized the Inquisition to carry his policy into effect. (4) Personal. The Dutch and Flemish loved Charles V because he had been born and reared among them and always considered their country as his native land. Philip II was born and brought up in Spain. He spoke a language foreign to the Netherlands, and by their inhabitants he was thought of as an alien.

[Sidenote: Margaret of Parma and the “Beggars"]

At first the opposition in the Netherlands was directed chiefly against the Inquisition and the presence of Spanish garrisons in the towns. The regent, Margaret of Parma, Philip's half−sister, endeavored to banish public discontent by a few concessions. The Spanish troops were withdrawn and certain unpopular officials were dismissed. But influential noblemen and burghers banded themselves together early in 1566 and presented to the regent Margaret a petition, in which, while protesting their loyalty, they expressed fear of a general revolt and begged that a special embassy be sent to Philip to urge upon him the necessity of abolishing the Inquisition and of redressing their other grievances. The regent, at first disquieted by the petitioners, was reassured by one of her advisers, who exclaimed, “What, Madam, is your Highness afraid of these beggars (*ces gueux*)?” Henceforth the chief opponents of Philip's policies in the Netherlands humorously labeled themselves “Beggars” and assumed the emblems of common begging, the wallet and the bowl. The fashion spread quickly, and the “Beggars'“ insignia were everywhere to be seen, worn as trinkets, especially in the large towns. In accordance with the “Beggars'“ petition, an embassy was dispatched to Spain to lay the grievances before Philip II.

[Sidenote: Duke of Alva in the Netherlands, 1567−1573]

Philip II at first promised to abolish the Inquisition in the Netherlands, but soon repented of his promise. For meanwhile mobs of fanatical Protestants, far more radical than the respectable “Beggars,” were rushing to arms, breaking into Catholic churches, wrecking the altars, smashing the images to pieces, profaning monasteries, and showing in their retaliation as much violence—as their enemies had shown cruelty in persecution. In August, 1566, this sacrilegious iconoclasm reached its climax in the irreparable ruin of the magnificent cathedral at Antwerp. Philip replied to these acts, which he interpreted as disloyalty, by sending (1567) his most famous general, the duke of Alva, into the Netherlands with a large army and with instructions to cow the people into submission. Alva proved himself quite capable of understanding and executing his master's wishes: one of his first acts was the creation of a “Council of Troubles,” an arbitrary tribunal which tried cases of treason and which operated so notoriously as to merit its popular appellation of the “Council of Blood.” During the duke's stay of six years, it has been estimated that eight thousand persons were executed, including the counts of Egmont and Horn, thirty thousand were despoiled of their property, and one hundred thousand quitted the country. Alva, moreover, levied an enormous tax of one−tenth upon the price of merchandise sold. As the tax was collected on several distinct processes, it absorbed at least seven−tenths of the value of certain goods—of cloth, for instance. The tax, together with the lawless confusion throughout the country, meant the destruction of Flemish manufactures and trade. It was, therefore, quite natural that the burgesses of the southern Netherlands, Catholic though most of them were, should unite with the nobles and with the Protestants of the North in opposing Spanish tyranny. The whole country was now called to arms.

[Sidenote: William the Silent, Prince of Orange]

One of the principal noblemen of the Netherlands was a German, William of Nassau, prince of

Orange.[Footnote: William (1533−1584), now commonly called “the Silent.” There appears to be no contemporaneous justification of the adjective as applied to him, but the misnomer, once adopted by later writers, has insistently clung to him.] He had been governing the provinces of Holland and Zeeland when Alva arrived, but as he was already at the point of accepting Protestantism he had prudently retired into Germany, leaving his estates to be confiscated by the Spanish governor. Certain trifling successes of the insurgents now called William back to head the popular movement. For many years he bore the brunt of the war and proved himself not only a resourceful general, but an able diplomat and a whole−souled patriot. He eventually gained the admiration and love of the whole Dutch people.

[Sidenote: The “Sea Beggars"]

The first armed forces of William of Orange were easily routed by Alva, but in 1569 a far more menacing situation was presented. In that year William began to charter corsairs and privateers to prey upon Spanish shipping. These “Sea Beggars,” as they were called, were mostly wild and lawless desperadoes who stopped at nothing in their hatred of Catholics and Spaniards: they early laid the foundations of Dutch maritime power and at the same time proved a constant torment to Alva. They made frequent incursions into the numerous waterways of the Netherlands and perpetually fanned the embers of revolt on land. Gradually William collected new armies, which more and more successfully defied Alva.

[Sidenote: The “Spanish Fury” and the Pacification of Ghent, 1576]

The harsh tactics of Alva had failed to restore the Netherlands to Philip's control, and in 1573 Alva was replaced in the regency by the more politic Requesens, who continued the struggle as best he could but with even less success than Alva. Soon after Requesens's death in 1576, the Spanish army in the Netherlands, left without pay or food, mutinied and inflicted such horrible indignities upon several cities, notably Antwerp, that the savage attack is called the “Spanish Fury.” Deputies of all the seventeen provinces at once concluded an agreement, termed the Pacification of Ghent (1576), by which they mutually guaranteed resistance to the Spanish until the king should abolish the Inquisition and restore their old−time liberties.

Then Philip II tried a policy of concession, but the new governor, the dashing Don John of Austria, fresh from a great naval victory over the Turks, soon discovered that it was too late to reconcile the Protestants. William the Silent was wary of the Spanish offers, and Don John died in 1578 without having achieved very much.

[Sidenote: Farnese, Duke of Parma] [Sidenote: The Treaty of Array and the Union of Utrecht (1579): the Permanent Division of the Netherlands]

But Philip II was not without some success in the Netherlands. He was fortunate in having a particularly determined and tactful governor in the country from 1578 to 1592 in the person of Alexander Farnese, duke of Parma. Skillfully mingling war and diplomacy, Farnese succeeded in sowing discord between the northern and southern provinces: the former were Dutch, Calvinist, and commercial; the latter were Flemish and Walloon, Catholic, and industrial. The ten southern provinces might eventually have more to fear from the North than from continued union with Spain; their representatives, therefore, signed a defensive league at Arras in 1579 for the protection of the Catholic religion and with the avowed purpose of effecting a reconciliation with Philip II. In the same year the northern provinces agreed to the Union of Utrecht, binding themselves together “as if they were one province” to maintain their rights and liberties “with life−blood and goods” against Spanish tyranny and to grant complete freedom of worship and of religious opinion throughout the confederation. In this way the Pacification of Ghent was nullified and the Netherlands were split into two parts, each going its own way, each developing its own history. The southern portion was to remain in Habsburg hands for over two centuries, being successively termed “Spanish Netherlands” and “Austrian Netherlands”— roughly speaking, it is what to−day we call Belgium. The northern portion was to become free and independent, and, as the “United Provinces” or simply “Holland,” to take its place among the nations of the world. For a considerable period of time Holland was destined to be more prosperous than Belgium. The latter suffered more grievously than the former from the actual hostilities; and the Dutch, by closing the River Scheldt and dominating the adjacent seas, dealt a mortal blow at the industrial and commercial supremacy of Antwerp and transferred the chief trade and business of all the Netherlands to their own city of Amsterdam.

[Sidenote: Reasons for the Success of the Dutch]

For many years the struggle dragged on. At times it seemed probable that Farnese and the Spaniards would overcome the North by force as they had obtained the South by diplomacy. But a variety of reasons explain the

ultimate success of the Dutch. The nature of the country rendered ordinary campaigning very difficult—the network of canals constituted natural lines of defense and the cutting of the dikes might easily imperil an invading army. Again, the seafaring propensities of the Dutch stimulated them to fit out an increasing number of privateers which constantly preyed upon Spanish commerce: it was not long before this traffic grew important and legitimate, so that in the following century Amsterdam became one of the greatest cities of the world, and Holland assumed a prominent place among commercial and colonial nations. Thirdly, the employment of foreign mercenaries in the army of defense enabled the native population to devote the more time to peaceful pursuits, and, despite the persistence of war, the Dutch provinces increased steadily in wealth and prosperity. Fourthly, the cautious Fabian policy of William the Silent prevented the Dutch from staking heavily upon battles in the open field. Fifthly, the Dutch received a good deal of assistance from Protestants of Germany, England, and France. Finally, Philip II pursued too many great projects at once to be able to bring a single one to a satisfactory conclusion: his war with Queen Elizabeth of England and his interference in the affairs of France inextricably complicated his plans in the Netherlands.

[Sidenote: Formal Declaration of Dutch Independence, 1581]

In 1581 Philip II published a ban against William of Orange, proclaiming him a traitor and an outlaw and offering a reward to any one who would take him dead or alive. William replied by his famous “Apology” to the charges against him; but his practical answer to the king was the Act of Abjuration, by which at his persuasion the representatives of the northern provinces, assembled at The Hague, solemnly proclaimed their separation from the crown of Spain, broke the royal seal of Philip II, and declared the king deprived of all authority over them. We should call this Act of 1581 the Dutch declaration of independence. It was an augury of the definitive result of the war.

[Sidenote: Recognition of Dutch Independence]

Although William the Silent was assassinated by an agent of Spain (1584), and Antwerp was captured from the Protestants in 1585, the ability and genius of Farnese did not avail to make further headway against the United Provinces; but Philip II, stubborn to the end, positively refused to recognize Dutch independence. In 1609 Philip III of Spain consented to a twelve years' truce with the States−General of The Hague. In the Thirty Years' War (1618−1648) the Dutch and Spaniards again became embroiled, and the freedom of the republic was not recognized officially by Spain till the general peace of Westphalia in 1648. [Footnote: See below, p. 229.]

The seven provinces, which had waged such long war with Spain, constituted, by mutual agreement, a confederacy, each preserving a distinct local government and administration, but all subject to a general parliament—the States−General—and to a stadtholder, or governor−general, an office which subsequently became hereditary in the Orange family. Between the States−General and the stadtholder, a constitutional conflict was carried on throughout the greater part of the seventeenth century—the former, supported by well−to−do burghers, favoring a greater measure of political democracy, the latter, upheld by aristocratically minded nobles, laboring for the development of monarchical institutions under the Orange family.

[Sidenote: Natural Opposition of England and France to the Policies of Philip II]

Not only his efforts in the Netherlands but many other projects of Philip II were frustrated by remarkable parallel developments in the two national monarchies of England and France. Both these countries were naturally jealous opposition and fearful of an undue expansion of Spain, which might upset the balance of power. Both states, from their geographical locations, would normally be inimical to Philip II: England would desire, from her island position, to destroy the monopoly which Spain claimed of the carrying trade of the seas; France, still encircled by Habsburg possessions in Spain, Italy, and the Netherlands, would adhere to her traditional policy of allying herself with every foe of the Spanish king. Then, too, the papal authority had been rejected in England and seriously questioned in France: Philip's crusading zeal made him the champion of the Church in those countries. For ecclesiastical as well as for economic and political purposes it seemed necessary to the Spanish king that he should bring France and England under his direct influence. On their side, patriotic French and English resented such foreign interest in their domestic affairs, and the eventual failure of Philip registered a wonderful growth of national feeling among the peoples who victoriously contended against him. The beginnings of the real modern greatness of France and England date from their struggle with Philip II.

[Sidenote: Philip II and Mary Tudor]

At the outset of his reign, Philip seemed quite successful in his foreign relations. As we have seen, he was in

alliance with England through his marriage with Queen Mary Tudor (1553−1558): she had temporarily restored the English Church to communion with the Holy See, and was conducting her foreign policy in harmony with Philip's—because of her husband she lost to the French the town of Calais, the last English possession on the Continent (1558). Likewise, as has been said, Philip II concluded with France in 1559 the advantageous treaty of Cateau−Cambresis. But during the ensuing thirty years the tables were completely turned. Both England and France ended by securing respite from Spanish interference.

[Sidenote: Philip II and Elizabeth]

Mary Tudor died unhappy and childless in 1558, and the succession of her sister Queen Elizabeth, daughter of Henry VIII and Anne Boleyn, altered the relations between the English and Spanish courts. Elizabeth (1558−1603) was possessed of an imperious, haughty, energetic character; she had remarkable intelligence and an absorbing patriotism. She inspired confidence in her advisers and respect among her people, so that she was commonly called “Good Queen Bess” despite the fact that her habits of deceit and double−dealing gave color to the French king's remark that she was the greatest liar in Christendom. This was the woman with whom Philip II had to deal; he tried many tactics in order to gain his ends,—all of them hopelessly unsuccessful.

Philip first proposed matrimony, but Elizabeth was very careful not to give herself, or England, such a master. Then when the queen declared herself a Protestant and showed no inclination to assist Philip in any of his enterprises, the Spanish king proceeded to plot against her throne. He subsidized Roman Catholic priests, especially Jesuits, who violated the laws of the land. He stirred up sedition and even went so far as to plan Elizabeth's assassination. Many conspiracies against the English queen centered in the person of the ill−starred Mary Stuart, [Footnote: Mary Stuart (1542−1587).] queen of Scotland, who was next in line of succession to the English throne and withal a Catholic.

[Sidenote: Mary Stuart]

Descended from the Stuart kings of Scotland and from Henry VII of England, related to the powerful family of Guise in France, Mary had been brought up at the French court and married to the short−lived French king, Francis II. Upon the death of the latter she returned in 1561 to Scotland, a young woman of but eighteen years, only to find that the government had fallen victim to the prevalent factional fights among the Scotch nobles and that in the preceding year the parliament had solemnly adopted a Calvinistic form of Protestantism. By means of tact and mildness, however, Mary won the respect of the nobles and the admiration of the people, until a series of marital troubles and blunders—her marriage with a worthless cousin, Henry Darnley, and then her scandalous marriage with Darnley's profligate murderer, the earl of Bothwell—alienated her people from her and drove her into exile. She abdicated the throne of Scotland in favor of her infant son, James VI, who was reared a Protestant and subsequently became King James I of England, and she then (1568) threw herself upon the mercy of Elizabeth. She thought she would find in England a haven of refuge; instead she found there a prison.

For the score of years during which she remained Elizabeth's prisoner, Mary Stuart was the object of many plots and conspiracies against the existing governments of both Scotland and England. In every such scheme were to be found the machinations and money of the Spanish king. In fact, as time went on, it seemed to a growing section of the English people as though the cause of Elizabeth was bound up with Protestantism and with national independence and prosperity just as certainly as the success of Mary would lead to the triumph of Catholicism, the political supremacy of Spain, and the commercial ruin of England. It was under these circumstances that Mary's fate was sealed. Because of a political situation over which she had slight control, the ex−queen of Scotland was beheaded by Elizabeth's orders in 1587.

[Sidenote: The Armada]

Philip II had now tried and failed in every expedient but one,—the employment of sheer force. Even this he attempted in order to avenge the death of Mary Stuart and to bring England, politically, religiously, and commercially, into harmony with his Spanish policies. The story of the preparation and the fate of the Invincible Armada is almost too well known to require repetition. It was in 1588 that there issued from the mouth of the Tagus River the most formidable fleet which up to that time Christendom had ever beheld—130 ships, 8000 seamen, 19,000 soldiers, the flower of the Spanish chivalry. In the Netherlands it was to be joined by Alexander Farnese with 33,000 veteran troops. But in one important respect Philip had underestimated his enemy: he had counted upon a divided country. Now the attack upon England was primarily national, rather than religious, and Catholics vied with Protestants in offering aid to the queen: it was a united rather than a divided nation which

Philip faced. The English fleet, composed of comparatively small and easily maneuvered vessels, worked great havoc upon the ponderous and slow−moving Spanish galleons, and the wreck of the Armada was completed by a furious gale which tossed ship after ship upon the rocks of northern Scotland. Less than a third of the original expedition ever returned to Spain.

Philip II had thus failed in his herculean effort against England. He continued in small ways to annoy and to irritate Elizabeth. He tried— without result—to incite the Catholics of Ireland against the queen. He exhausted his arsenals and his treasures in despairing attempts to equip a second and even a third Armada. But he was doomed to bitterest disappointment, for two years before his death an English fleet sacked his own great port of Cadiz. The war with England ruined the navy and the commerce of Spain. The defeat of the Armada was England's first title to commercial supremacy.

[Sidenote: Economic Benefits of the Period for England]

It was long maintained that the underlying causes of the conflict between England and Spain in the second half of the sixteenth century and its chief interest was religious—that it was part of an epic struggle between Protestantism and Catholicism. There may be a measure of truth in such an idea, but most recent writers believe that the chief motives for the conflict, as well as its important results, were essentially economic. From the beginning of Elizabeth's reign, English sailors and freebooters, such as Hawkins and Drake, took the offensive against Spanish trade and commerce; and many ships, laden with silver and goods from the New World and bound for Cadiz, were seized and towed into English harbors. The queen herself frequently received a share of the booty and therefore tended to encourage the practice. For nearly thirty years Philip put up with the capture of his treasure ships, the raiding of his colonies, and the open assistance rendered to his rebellious subjects. Only when he reached the conclusion that his power would never be secure in the Netherlands or in America did he dispatch the Armada. Its failure finally freed Holland and marked the collapse of the Spanish monopoly upon the high seas and in the New World.

[Sidenote: Affairs in France]

Before we can appreciate the motives and results of the interference of Philip II in French affairs, a few words must be said about what had happened in France since Francis I (1515−1547) and his son, Henry II (1547−1559), exalted the royal power in their country and not only preserved French independence of the surrounding empire of Charles V but also increased French prestige by means of a strong policy in Italy and by the extension of frontiers toward the Rhine. Henry II had married a member of the famous Florentine family of the Medici— Catherine de' Medici—a large and ugly woman, but ambitious, resourceful, and capable, who, by means of trickery and deceit, took an active part in French politics from the death of her husband, throughout the reigns of her feeble sons, Francis II (1559−1560), Charles IX (1560−1574), and Henry III (1574−1589). Catherine found her position and that of her royal children continually threatened by (1) the Protestants (Huguenots), (2) the great nobles, and (3) Philip II of Spain.

[Sidenote: Dangers to Royal Power in France: Protestantism]

French Protestantism had grown steadily during the first half of the sixteenth century until it was estimated that from a twentieth to a thirtieth of the nation had fallen away from the Catholic Church. The influence of the advocates of the new faith was, however, much greater than their number, because the Huguenots, as they were called, were recruited mainly from the prosperous, intelligent middle class,—the bourgeoisie,—who had been intrusted by preceding French kings with many important offices. The Huguenots represented, therefore, a powerful social class and likewise one that was opposed to the undue increase of royal power. They demanded, not only religious toleration for themselves, but also regular meetings of the Estates−General and control of the nation's representatives over financial matters. The kings, on their part, felt that political solidarity and their own personal rule were dependent upon the maintenance of religious uniformity in the nation and the consequent defeat of the pretensions of the Huguenots. Francis I and Henry II had persecuted the Protestants with bitterness. From 1562 to 1593 a series of so−called religious wars embroiled the whole country.

[Sidenote: Dangers to Royal Power in France: the Nobles]

French politics were further complicated during the second half of the sixteenth century by the recrudescence of the power of the nobles. The so−called religious wars were quite as much political as religious— they resulted from efforts of this or that faction of noblemen to dictate to a weak king. Two noble families particularly vied with each other for power,—the Bourbons and the Guises,—and the unqualified triumph of either would be

certain to bring calamity to the sons of Catherine de' Medici.

[Sidenote: The Bourbons]

The Bourbons bore the proud title of princes of the blood because they were direct descendants of a French king. Their descent, to be sure, was from Saint Louis, king in the thirteenth century, and they were now, therefore, only distant cousins of the reigning kings, but as the latter died off, one after another, leaving no direct successors, the Bourbons by the French law of strict male succession became heirs to the royal family. The head of the Bourbons, a certain Anthony, had married the queen of Navarre and had become thereby king of Navarre, although the greater part of that country—the region south of the Pyrenees—had been annexed to Spain in 1512. Anthony's brother Louis, prince of Conde, had a reputation for bravery, loyalty, and ability. Both Conde and the king of Navarre were Protestants.

[Sidenote: The Guise Family]

The Guise family was descended from a duke of Lorraine who had attached himself to the court of Francis I. It was really a foreign family, inasmuch as Lorraine was then a dependency of the Holy Roman Empire, but the patriotic exploits of the head of the family in defending Metz against the Emperor Charles V and in capturing Calais from the English endeared the Guises to a goodly part of the French nation. The duke of Guise remained a stanch Catholic, and his brother, called the Cardinal of Lorraine, was head of as many as twelve bishoprics, which gave him an enormous revenue and made him the most conspicuous churchman in France. During the reign of Henry II (1547−1559) the Guises were especially influential. They fought valiantly in foreign wars. They spurred on the king to a great persecution of the Huguenots. They increased their own landed estates. And they married one of their relatives—Mary, queen of Scots—to the heir to the throne. But after the brief reign of Mary's husband, Francis II (1559−1560), the Guise family encountered not only the active opposition of their chief noble rivals, the Bourbons, with their Huguenot allies, but likewise the jealousy and crafty intrigues of Catherine de' Medici.

[Sidenote: Religious Wars in France]

Catherine feared both the ambition of the powerful Guise family and the disruptive tendencies of Protestantism. The result was a long series of confused civil wars between the ardent followers, respectively Catholic and Protestant, of the Guise and Bourbon families, in which the queen−mother gave support first to one side and then to the other. There were no fewer than eight of these sanguinary conflicts, each one ending with the grant of slight concessions to the Huguenots and the maintenance of the weak kings upon the throne. The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day (1572) was a horrible incident of Catherine's policy of “trimming.” Fearing the undue influence over the king of Admiral de Coligny, an upright and able Huguenot leader, the queen−mother, with the aid of the Guises, prevailed upon the weak−minded Charles IX to authorize the wholesale assassination of Protestants. The signal was given by the ringing of a Parisian church−bell at two o'clock in the morning of 24 August, 1572, and the slaughter went on throughout the day in the capital and for several weeks in the provinces. Coligny was murdered; even women and children were not spared. It is estimated that in all at least three thousand—perhaps ten thousand—lost their lives.

[Sidenote: The “Politiques"]

The massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day did not destroy French Protestantism or render the Huguenot leaders more timid in asserting their claims. On the other hand, it brought into clear light a noteworthy division within the ranks of their Catholic opponents in France—on one side, the rigorous followers of the Guise family, who complained only that the massacre had not been sufficiently comprehensive, and, on the other side, a group of moderate Catholics, usually styled the “Politiques” who, while continuing to adhere to the Roman Church, and, when called upon, bearing arms on the side of the king, were strongly opposed to the employment of force or violence or persecution in matters of religion. The Politiques were particularly patriotic, and they blamed the religious wars and the intolerant policy of the Guises for the seeming weakness of the French monarchy. They thought the massacre of Saint Bartholomew's Day a blunder as well as a crime.

The emergence of the Politiques did not immediately make for peace; rather, it substituted a three−sided for a two−sided conflict.

[Sidenote: Philip II and the War of the Three Henries]

After many years, filled with disorder, it became apparent that the children of Catherine de' Medici would have no direct male heirs and that the crown would therefore legally devolve upon the son of Anthony of

Bourbon—Henry of Bourbon, king of Navarre and a Protestant. Such an outcome was naturally distasteful to the Guises and abhorrent to Philip II of Spain. In 1585 a definite league was formed between Henry, duke of Guise, and the Spanish king, whereby the latter undertook by military force to aid the former's family in seizing the throne: French politics in that event would be controlled by Spain, and Philip would secure valuable assistance in crushing the Netherlands and conquering England.[Footnote: At that very time, Mary, Queen of Scots, cousin of Henry, duke of Guise, was held a prisoner in England by Queen Elizabeth. See above, p. 99.] The immediate outcome of the agreement was the war of the three Henries—Henry III, son of Catherine de' Medici and king of France; Henry of Bourbon, king of Navarre and heir to the French throne; and Henry, duke of Guise, with the foreign support of Philip II of Spain. Henry of Guise represented the extreme Catholic party; Henry of Navarre, the Protestant faction; and Henry of France, the Catholic moderates—the Politiques—who wanted peace and were willing to grant a measure of toleration. The last two were upholders of French independence against the encroachments of Spain.

The king was speedily gotten into the power of the Guises, but little headway was made by the extreme Catholics against Henry of Navarre, who now received domestic aid from the *Politiques* and foreign assistance from Queen Elizabeth of England and who benefited by the continued misfortunes of Philip II. At no time was the Spanish king able to devote his whole attention and energy to the French war. At length in 1588 Henry III caused Henry of Guise to be assassinated. The king never had a real chance to prove whether he could become a national leader in expelling the foreigners and putting an end to civil war, for he himself was assassinated in 1589. With his dying breath he designated the king of Navarre as his successor.

[Sidenote: Henry of Navarre]

Henry of Navarre, the first of the Bourbon family upon the throne of France, took the title of Henry IV (1589−1610). [Footnote: It is a curious fact that Henry of Navarre, like Henry of Guise and Henry of France, died by the hand of an assassin.] For four years after his accession, Henry IV was obliged to continue the civil war, but his abjuration of Protestantism and his acceptance of Catholicism in 1593 removed the chief source of opposition to him within France, and the rebellion speedily collapsed. With the Spanish king, however, the struggle dragged on until the treaty of Vervins, which in the last year of Philip's life practically confirmed the peace of Cateau−Cambresis.

[Sidenote: Decline of Spain and Rise of France]

Thus Philip II had failed to conquer or to dismember France. He had been unable to harmonize French policies with those of his own in the Netherlands or in England. Despite his endeavors, the French crown was now on the head of one of his enemies, who, if something of a renegade Protestant himself, had nevertheless granted qualified toleration to heretics. Nor were these failures of Philip's political and religious policies mere negative results to France. The unsuccessful interference of the Spanish king contributed to the assurance of French independence, patriotism, and solidarity. France, not Spain, was to be the center of European politics during the succeeding century.

[Sidenote: Philip II and the Turks]

In concluding this chapter, a large section of which has been devoted to an account of the manifold failures of Philip II, a word should be added about one exploit that brought glory to the Spanish monarch. It was he who administered the first effective check to the advancing Ottoman Turks.

After the death of Suleiman the Magnificent (1566), the Turks continued to strengthen their hold upon Hungary and to fit out piratical expeditions in the Mediterranean. The latter repeatedly ravaged portions of Sicily, southern Italy, and even the Balearic Islands, and in 1570 an Ottoman fleet captured Cyprus from the Venetians. Malta and Crete remained as the only Christian outposts in the Mediterranean. In this extremity, a league was formed to save Italy. Its inspirer and preacher was Pope Pius V, but Genoa and Venice furnished the bulk of the fleet, while Philip II supplied the necessary additional ships and the commander−in−chief in the person of his half−brother, Don John of Austria. The expedition, which comprised 208 vessels, met the Ottoman fleet of 273 ships in the Gulf of Lepanto, off the coast of Greece, on 7 October, 1571, and inflicted upon it a crushing defeat. The Turkish warships were almost all sunk or driven ashore; it is estimated that 8000 Turks lost their lives. When news of the victory reached Rome, Pope Pius intoned the famous verse, “There was a man sent from God whose name was John.”

[Sidenote: Lepanto]

The battle of Lepanto was of great political importance. It gave the naval power of the Mohammedans a blow from which it never recovered and ended their aggressive warfare in the Mediterranean. It was, in reality, the last Crusade: Philip II was in his most becoming role as champion of church and pope; hardly a noble family in Spain or Italy was not represented in the battle; volunteers came from all parts of the world; the celebrated Spanish writer Cervantes lost an arm at Lepanto. Western Europe was henceforth to be comparatively free from the Ottoman peril.

[Illustration: THE HABSBURG FAMILY IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES]

[Illustration: THE VALOIS, BOURBON, AND GUISE FAMILIES, PHILIP OF SPAIN AND MARY, QUEEN OF SCOTS]

[Illustration: THE HOUSE OF TUDOR: SOVEREIGNS OF ENGLAND (1485−1603)]

ADDITIONAL READING

GENERAL, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE HABSBURG TERRITORIES. A. H. Johnson, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century, 1494−1598* (1897), ch. iii− ix, a political summary; Mary A. Hollings, *Renaissance and Reformation, 1453−1660* (1910), ch. vi, ix, x, a brief outline; E. M. Hulme, *Renaissance and Reformation*, 2d ed. (1915), ch. x, xiv, xxiv− xxviii, a brief and fragmentary account; T. H. Dyer, *A History of Modern Europe*, 3d ed., rev. by Arthur Hassall (1901), ch. ix, xi− xxvii, old but containing a multitude of political facts; *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. II (1904), ch. ii, iii, vii, viii, and Vol. III (1905), ch. xv, v; *History of All Nations*, Vol. XI and Vol. XII, ch. i−iii, by the German scholar on the period, Martin Philippson; *Histoire generale*, Vol. IV, ch. iii, ix, Vol. V, ch. ii−v, xv. Of the Emperor Charles V the old standard English biography by William Robertson, still readable, has now been largely superseded by that of Edward Armstrong, 2 vols. (1902); two important German works on Charles V are Baumgarten, *Geschichte Karls V*, 3 vols. (1885−1892), and Konrad Haebler, *Geschichte Spaniens unter den Habsburgen*, Vol. I (1907). Of Philip II the best brief biography in English is Martin Hume's (1902), which should be consulted, if possible, in connection with Charles Bratli, *Philippe II, Roi d'Espagne: Etude sur sa vie et son caractere*, new ed. (1912), an attempt to counteract traditional Protestant bias against the Spanish monarch. Also see M. A. S. Hume, *Spain, its Greatness and Decay, 1479−1788* (1898), ch. i−vi, for a general account of the reigns of Philip II and Philip III; and Paul Herre, *Papstium und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II* (1907) for a sympathetic treatment of Philip's relations with the papacy. For a proper understanding of sixteenth−century politics the student should read that all−important book, Machiavelli's *Prince*, the most convenient English edition of which is in “Everyman's Library.” For political events in the Germanies in the sixteenth century: E. F. Henderson, *A Short History of Germany*, 2 vols. in 1 (1902); Sidney Whitman, *Austria* (1899); Gustav Welf, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Gegenreformation* (1899), an elaborate study; Franz Krones, *Handbuch der Geschichte Oesterreichs von der aeltesten Zeit*, Vol. III (1877), Book XIII.

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(1906), ch. vi−xviii; A. F. Pollard, *History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth* (1910); J. A. Froude, *History of England from the Fall of Wolsey to the Defeat of the Spanish Armada*, 12 vols. (1870−1872), a masterpiece of prose−style but strongly biased in favor of Henry VIII and against anything connected with the Roman Church; E. P. Cheyney, *A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death of Elizabeth*, Vol. I (1914), scholarly and well−written. Also see Andrew Lang, *A History of Scotland*, 2d ed. (1901−1907), Vols. I and II; and P. H. Brown, *History of Scotland* (1899−1900), Vols. I and II. Important biographies: A. F. Pollard, *Henry VIII* (1905), the result of much research and distinctly favorable to Henry; E. L. Taunton, *Thomas Wolsey, Legate and Reformer* (1902), the careful estimate of a Catholic scholar; Mandell Creighton, *Cardinal Wolsey* (1888), a good clear account, rather favorable to the cardinal; J. M. Stone, *Mary the First, Queen of England* (1901), a sympathetic biography of Mary Tudor; Mandell Creighton, *Queen Elizabeth* (1909), the best biography of the Virgin Queen; E. S. Beesly, *Queen Elizabeth* (1892), another good biography. For Mary, Queen of Scots, see the histories of Scotland mentioned above and also Andrew Lang, *The Mystery of Mary Stuart* (1901); P. H. Brown, *Scotland in the Time of Queen Mary* (1904); and R. S. Rait, *Mary Queen of Scots*, 2d ed. (1899), containing important source−material concerning Mary. Walter Walsh, *The Jesuits in Great Britain* (1903), emphasizes their political opposition to Elizabeth. Martin Hume, *Two English Queens and Philip* (1908), valuable for the English relations of Philip II. For English maritime development see David Hannay, *A Short History of the English Navy* (1898); J. S. Corbett, *Drake and the Tudor Navy*, 2 vols. (1898), and, by the same author, *The Successors of Drake* (1900); J. A. Froude, *English Seamen in the Sixteenth Century* (1895).

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# CHAPTER IV. THE PROTESTANT REVOLT AND THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AT THE OPENING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: Differences between Religious Bodies in 1500 and Those in 1900]

Four hundred years ago, practically all people who lived in central or western Europe called themselves "Christians" and in common recognized allegiance to an ecclesiastical body which was called the "Catholic Church." This Catholic Church in 1500 differed from any present−day religious society in the following respects: (1) Every child was born into the Church as now he is born into the state; every person was expected to conform, at least outwardly, to the doctrines and practices of the Church; in other words the Catholic Church claimed a universal membership. (2) The Church was not supported by voluntary contributions as now, but by compulsory taxes; every person was compelled to assist in defraying the expenses of the official religion. (3) The state undertook to enforce obedience on the part of its subjects to the Church; a person attacking the authority of the Catholic Church would be liable to punishment by the state, and this held true in England and Germany as well as in Spain or Italy.

[Sidenote: Rise of Protestantism]

Then, within fifty years, between 1520 and 1570, a large number of Catholic Christians, particularly in Germany, Scandinavia, Scotland, and England, and a smaller number in the Low Countries and in France, broke off communion with the ancient Church and became known as Protestants. Before the year 1500 there were no Protestants; since the sixteenth century, the dominant Christianity of western and central Europe has been divided into two parts—Catholic and Protestant. It is important that we should know something of the origin and significance of this division, because the Christian religion and the Christian Church had long played very great roles in the evolution of European civilization and because ecclesiastical and religious questions have continued, since the division, to deserve general attention.

[Sidenote: "Catholic" Christianity]

Let us understand clearly what was meant in the year 1500 by the expression "Catholic Christianity." It embraced a belief in certain religious precepts which it was believed Jesus of Nazareth had taught at the beginning of the Christian era, the inculcation of certain moral teachings which were likewise derived from Jesus, and a definite organization—the Church—founded, it was assumed, by Jesus in order to teach and practice, till the end of time, His religious and moral doctrines. By means of the Church, man would know best how to order his life in this world and how to prepare his soul for everlasting happiness in the world to come.

[Sidenote: The Catholic Church]

The Catholic Church was, therefore, a vast human society, believed to be of divine foundation and sanction, and with a mission greater and more lofty than that of any other organization. Church and state had each its own sphere, but the Church had insisted for centuries that it was greater and more necessary than the state. The members of the Church were the sum−total of Christian believers who had been baptized —practically the population of western and central Europe—and its officers constituted a regular governing hierarchy.

[Sidenote: Head of the Church]

At the head of the hierarchy was the bishop of Rome, styled the pope or sovereign pontiff, who from the first had probably enjoyed a leading position in the Church as the successor of St. Peter, prince of the apostles, and whose claims to be the divinely appointed chief bishop had been generally recognized throughout western Europe as early as the third century—perhaps earlier. The bishop of Rome was elected for life by a group of clergymen, called cardinals, who originally had been in direct charge of the parish churches in the city of Rome, but who later were frequently selected by the pope from various countries because they were distinguished churchmen. The pope chose the cardinals; the cardinals elected the pope. Part of the cardinals resided in Rome, and in conjunction with a host of clerks, translators, lawyers, and special officials, constituted the *Curia*, or papal court, for the conduct of general church business.

[Sidenote: Local Administration of the Church] [Sidenote: Secular Clergy]

For the local administration of church affairs, the Catholic world was divided under the pope into several

territorial subdivisions, (1) The patriarchates had been under patriarchs who had their sees [Footnote: "See," so called from the Latin *sedes*, referring to their seat or chair of office. Similarly our word "cathedral" is derived from the Latin *cathedra*, the official chair which the bishop occupies in his own church.] in such ancient Christian centers as Rome. Jerusalem, Alexandria, Antioch. and Constantinople. (2) The provinces were divisions of the patriarchates and usually centered in the most important cities, such as Milan, Florence, Cologne, Upsala, Lyons, Seville, Lisbon, Canterbury, York; and the head of each was styled a metropolitan or archbishop. (3) The diocese—the most essential unit of local administration—was a subdivision of the province, commonly a city or a town, with a certain amount of surrounding country, under the immediate supervision of a bishop. (4) Smaller divisions, particularly parishes, were to be found in every diocese, embracing a village or a section of a city, and each parish had its church building and its priest. Thus the Catholic Church possessed a veritable army of officials from pope and cardinals down through patriarchs, archbishops, and bishops, to the parish priests and their assistants, the deacons. This hierarchy, because it labored *in the world* (*saeculo*), was called the "secular clergy."

[Sidenote: "Regular" Clergy]

Another variety of clergy—the "regulars"—supplemented the work of the seculars. The regulars were monks, [Footnote: The word "monk" is applied, of course, only to men; women who followed similar rules are commonly styled nuns.] that is, Christians who lived by a special *rule* (*regula*), who renounced the world, took vows of chastity, poverty, and obedience, and strove to imitate the life of Christ as literally as possible. The regular clergy were organized under their own abbots, priors, provincials, or generals, being usually exempt from secular jurisdiction, except that of the pope. The regulars were the great missionaries of the Church, and many charitable and educational institutions were in their hands. Among the various orders of monks which had grown up in the course of time, the following should be enumerated: (1) The monks who lived in fixed abodes, tilled the soil, copied manuscripts, and conducted local schools. Most of the monks of this kind followed a rule, or society by−laws, which had been prepared by the celebrated St. Benedict about the year 525: they were called therefore Benedictines. (2) The monks who organized crusades, often bore arms themselves, and tended the holy places connected with incidents in the life of Christ: such orders were the Knights Templars, the Knights Hospitalers of St. John and of Malta, and the Teutonic Knights who subsequently undertook the conversion of the Slavs. (3) The monks who were called the begging friars or mendicants because they had no fixed abode but wandered from place to place, preaching to the common people and dependent for their own living upon alms. These orders came into prominence in the thirteenth century and included, among others, the Franciscan, whose lovable founder Saint Francis of Assisi had urged humility and love of the poor as its distinguishing characteristics, and the Dominican, or Order of the Preachers, devoted by the precept of its practical founder, Saint Dominic, to missionary zeal. All the mendicant orders, as well as the Benedictine monasteries, became famous in the history of education, and the majority of the distinguished scholars of the middle ages were monks. It was not uncommon, moreover, for regulars to enter the secular hierarchy and thus become parish priests or bishops, or even popes.

[Sidenote: Church Councils] [Sidenote: Conciliar Movement]

The clergy—bishops, priests, and deacons—constituted, in popular belief, the divinely ordained administration of the Catholic Church. The legislative authority in the Church similarly was vested in the pope and in the general councils, neither of which, however, could set aside a law of God, as affirmed in the gospels, or establish a doctrine at variance with the tradition of the early Christian writers. The general councils were assemblies of prelates of the Catholic world, and there had been considerable discussion as to the relative authority of their decrees and the decisions and directions of the pope. [Footnote: Papal documents have been called by various names, such as decretals, bulls, or encyclicals.] General church councils held in eastern Europe from the fourth to the ninth centuries had issued important decrees or canons defining Christian dogmas and establishing ecclesiastical discipline, which had been subsequently ratified and promulgated by the pope as by other bishops and by the emperors; and several councils had been held in western Europe from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries under the direct supervision of the bishop of Rome, all the canons of which had been enacted in accordance with his wishes. But early in the fifteenth century a movement was inaugurated by certain Catholic bishops and scholars in favor of making the councils superior to the pope and a regular source of supreme legislation for the Church. In this way, the councils of Constance (1414−1418) and Basel (1431 ff.) had endeavored to introduce representative, if not democratic, government into the Church. The popes, however,

objected to this conciliar movement and managed to have it condemned by the Council of Ferrara−Florence (1438−1442). By the year 1512 the papal theory had triumphed and Catholics generally recognized again that the government of the Church was essentially monarchical. The laws of the Catholic Church were known as canons, and, of several codes of canon law which had been prepared, that of a monk named Gratian, compiled in the twelfth century, was the most widely used.

[Sidenote: The Pope and his Powers]

We are now in a position to summarize the claims and prerogatives of the bishop of Rome or pope. (1) He was the supreme lawgiver. He could issue decrees of his own, which might not be set aside by any other person. No council might enact canons without his approval. From any law, other than divine, he might dispense persons. (2) He was the supreme judge in Christendom. He claimed that appeals might be taken from decisions in foreign courts to his own Curia, as court of last resort. He himself frequently acted as arbitrator, as, for example, in the famous dispute between Spain and Portugal concerning the boundaries of their newly discovered possessions. (3) He was the supreme administrator. He claimed the right to supervise the general business of the whole Church. No archbishop might perform the functions of his office until he received his insignia—the pallium—from the pope. No bishop might be canonically installed until his election had been confirmed by the pope. The pope claimed the right to transfer a bishop from one diocese to another and to settle all disputed elections. He exercised immediate control over the regular clergy—the monks and nuns. He sent ambassadors, styled legates, to represent him at the various royal courts and to see that his instructions were obeyed. (4) He insisted upon certain temporal rights, as distinct from his directly religious prerogatives. He crowned the Holy Roman Emperor. He might depose an emperor or king and release a ruler's subjects from their oath of allegiance. He might declare null and void, and forbid the people to obey, a law of any state, if he thought it was injurious to the interests of the Church. He was temporal ruler of the city of Rome and the surrounding papal states, and over those territories he exercised a power similar to that of any duke or king. (5) He claimed financial powers. In order to defray the enormous expenses of his government, he charged fees for certain services at Rome, assessed the dioceses throughout the Catholic world, and levied a small tax—Peter's Pence—upon all Christian householders.

[Sidenote: Purpose of the Church]

So far we have concerned ourselves with the organization of the Catholic Church—its membership, its officers, the clergy, secular and regular, all culminating in the pope, the bishop of Rome. But why did this great institution exist? Why was it loved, venerated, and well served? The purpose of the Church, according to its own teaching, was to follow the instructions of its Divine Master, Jesus Christ, in saving souls. Only the Church might interpret those instructions; the Church alone might apply the means of salvation; outside the Church no one could be saved. [Footnote: Catholic theologians have recognized, however, the possibility of salvation of persons outside the visible Church. Thus, the catechism of Pope Pius X says: “Whoever, without any fault of his own, and in good faith, being outside the Church, happens to have been baptized or to have at least an implicit desire for baptism, and, furthermore, has been sincere in seeking to find the truth, and has done his best to do the will of God, such an one, although separated from the body of the Church, would still belong to her soul, and therefore be in the way of salvation.”] The salvation of souls for eternity was thus the supreme business of the Church.

[Sidenote: Theology]

This salvation of souls involved a theology and a sacramental system, which we shall proceed to explain. Theology was the study of God. It sought to explain how and why man was created, what were his actual and desirable relations with God, what would be the fate of man in a future life. The most famous theologians of the Catholic Church, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), studied carefully the teachings of Christ, the Bible, the early Christian writings, and the decrees of popes and councils, and drew therefrom elaborate explanations of Christian theology—the dogmas and faith of the Catholic Church.

[Sidenote: The Sacramental System]

The very center of Catholic theology was the sacramental system, for that was the means, and essentially the only means, of saving souls. It was, therefore, for the purpose of the sacramental system that the Church and its hierarchy existed. The sacraments were believed to have been instituted by Christ Himself, and were defined as “outward signs instituted by Christ to give grace.” The number generally accepted was seven: baptism, confirmation, holy eucharist, penance, extreme unction, holy orders, and matrimony. By means of the sacraments the Church accompanied the faithful throughout life. Baptism, the pouring of water, cleansed the child from

original sin and from all previous actual sins, and made him a Christian, a child of God, and an heir of heaven. The priest was the ordinary minister of baptism, but in case of necessity any one who had the use of reason might baptize. Confirmation, conferred usually by a bishop upon young persons by the laying on of hands and the anointing with oil, gave them the Holy Ghost to render them strong and perfect Christians and soldiers of Jesus Christ. Penance, one of the most important sacraments, was intended to forgive sins committed after baptism. To receive the sacrament of penance worthily it was necessary for the penitent (1) to examine his conscience, (2) to have sorrow for his sins, (3) to make a firm resolution never more to offend God, (4) to confess his mortal sins orally to a priest, (5) to receive absolution from the priest, (6) to accept the particular penance—visitation of churches, saying of certain prayers, or almsgiving—which the priest might enjoin. The holy eucharist was the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, the consecration of bread and wine by priest or bishop, its miraculous transformation (transubstantiation) at his word into the very Body and Blood of Christ, and its reception by the faithful. It was around the eucharist that the elaborate ritual and ceremonies of the Mass developed, that fine vestments and candles and incense and flowers were used, and that magnificent cathedrals were erected. Extreme unction was the anointing at the hands of a priest of the Christian who was in immediate danger of death, and it was supposed to give health and strength to the soul and sometimes to the body. By means of holy orders,—the special imposition of hands on the part of a bishop,—priests, bishops, and other ministers of the Church were ordained and received the power and grace to perform their sacred duties. Matrimony was the sacrament, held to be indissoluble by human power, by which man and woman were united in lawful Christian marriage.

Of the seven sacraments it will be noticed that two—baptism and penance—dealt with the forgiveness of sins, and that two—holy orders and matrimony—were received only by certain persons. Three—baptism, confirmation, and holy orders—could be received by a Christian only once. Two—confirmation and holy orders—required the ministry of a bishop; and all others, except baptism and possibly matrimony, required the ministry of at least a priest. The priesthood was, therefore, the absolutely indispensable agent of the Church in the administration of the sacramental system. It was the priesthood that absolved penitents from their sins, wrought the great daily miracle of transubstantiation, and offered to God the holy sacrifice of the Mass.

[Sidenote: Various Objections to the Church]

It must not be supposed that either the theology or the organization of the Catholic Church, as they existed in the year 1500, had been precisely the same throughout the Christian era. While educated Catholics insisted that Christ was indirectly the source of all faith and all practice, they were quite willing to admit that external changes and adaptations of institutions to varying conditions had taken place. Moreover, it must not be supposed that the proud eminence to which the Catholic Church had attained by 1500 in central and western Europe had been won easily or at that time was readily maintained. Throughout the whole course of Christian history there had been repeated objections to new definitions of dogma—many positively refused to accept the teaching of the Church as divine or infallible— and there had been likewise a good deal of opposition to the temporal claims of the Church, resulting in increasing friction between the clergy and the lay rulers. Thus it often transpired that the kings who vied with one another in recognizing the spiritual and religious headship of the pope and in burning heretics who denied doctrines of the Catholic Church, were the very kings who quarreled with the pope concerning the latter's civil jurisdiction and directed harsh laws against its exercise.

[Sidenote: Sources of Conflict between Church and State]

As strong national monarchies rose in western Europe, this friction became more acute. On one side the royal power was determined to exalt the state and to bring into subjection to it not only the nobles and common people but the clergy as well; the national state must manage absolutely every temporal affair. On the other side, the clergy stoutly defended the special powers that they had long enjoyed in various states and which they believed to be rightly theirs. There were *four* chief sources of conflict between the temporal and spiritual jurisdictions, (1) Appointments of bishops, abbots, and other high church officers. Inasmuch as these were usually foremost citizens of their native kingdom, holding large estates and actually participating in the conduct of government, the kings frequently claimed the right to dictate their election. On the other hand the popes insisted upon their rights in the matter and often “reserved” to themselves the appointment to certain valuable bishoprics. (2) Taxation of land and other property of the clergy. The clergy insisted that by right they were exempt from taxation and that in practice they had not been taxed since the first public recognition of Christianity in the fourth century. The kings pointed out that the wealth of the clergy and the needs of the state had increased along parallel lines, that the

clergy were citizens of the state and should pay a just share for its maintenance. (3) Ecclesiastical courts. For several centuries the Church had maintained its own courts for trying clerical offenders and for hearing certain cases, which nowadays are heard in state courts— probating of wills, the marriage relations, blasphemy, etc. From these local church courts, the pope insisted that appeals might be taken to the Roman Curia. On their side, the kings were resolved to substitute royal justice for that of both feudal and ecclesiastical courts: they diminished, therefore, the privileges of the local church courts and forbade the taking of appeals to Rome. (4) How far might the pope, as universally acknowledged head of the Church, interfere in the internal affairs of particular states? While the pope claimed to be the sole judge of his own rights and powers, several kings forbade the publication of papal documents within their states or the reception of papal legates unless the royal assent had been vouchsafed.

[Sidenote: Royal Restrictions on the Church]

Gradually the national monarchs secured at least a partial control over episcopal appointments, and in both England and France papal jurisdiction was seriously restricted in other ways. In England the power of the ecclesiastical courts had been reduced (1164); no property might be bestowed upon the Church without royal permission (1279); the pope might not make provision in England for his personal appointees to office (1351); and appeals to Rome had been forbidden (1392). [Footnote: All these anti−papal enactments were very poorly enforced.] In France the clergy had been taxed early in the fourteenth century, and the papacy, which had condemned such action, had been humiliated by a forced temporary removal from Rome to Avignon, where it was controlled by French rulers for nearly seventy years (1309−1377); and in 1438 the French king, Charles VII, in a document, styled the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, solemnly proclaimed the “liberties of the Gallican Church,” that a general council was superior to the pope, that the pope might not interfere in episcopal elections, that he might not levy taxes on French dioceses. The Pragmatic Sanction was condemned by the pope, but for three−quarters of a century after its issuance there were strained relations between the Church in France and the sovereign pontiff.

[Sidenote: Political Differences Distinct from Religious Differences]

Similar conflicts between spiritual and temporal jurisdictions were common to all Christian states, but the national strength and the patriotism of the western monarchies caused them to proceed further than any other state in restricting the papal privileges. Despite the conflict over temporal affairs, which at times was exceedingly bitter, the kings and rulers of England and France never appear to have seriously questioned the religious authority of the Church or the spiritual supremacy of the pope. Religiously, the Catholic Church seemed in 1500 to hold absolute sway over all central and western Europe.

[Sidenote: Religious Opposition to Catholicism]

Yet this very religious authority of the Catholic Church had been again and again brought into question and repeatedly rejected. Originally, a united Christianity had conquered western Asia, northern Africa, and eastern Europe; by 1500 nearly all these wide regions were lost to Catholic Christianity as that phrase was understood in western Europe. The loss was due to (1) the development of a great Christian schism, and (2) the rise of a new religion—Mohammedanism.

[Sidenote: The Schism between the East and the West]

Eastern Europe had been lost through an ever−widening breach in Christian practice from the fifth to the eleventh century. The Eastern Church used the Greek language in its liturgy; that of the West used the Latin language. The former remained more dependent upon the state; the latter grew less dependent. Minor differences of doctrine appeared. And the Eastern Christians thought the pope was usurping unwarrantable prerogatives, while the Western Christians accused the Oriental patriarchs of departing from their earlier loyalty to the pope and destroying the unity of Christendom. Several attempts had been made to reunite the Catholic Church of the West and the Orthodox Church of the East, but with slight success. In 1500, the Christians of Greece, the Balkan peninsula, and Russia were thought to be outside the Catholic Church and were defined, therefore, by the pope as schismatics.

[Sidenote: Mohammedanism]

Far more numerous and dangerous to Catholic Christianity than the schismatic Easterners were the Mohammedans. Mohammed himself had lived in Arabia in the early part the seventh century and had taught that he was the inspired prophet of the one true God. In a celebrated book,— the Koran,—which was compiled from the sayings of the prophet, are to be found the precepts and commandments of the Mohammedan religion.

Mohammedanism spread rapidly: within a hundred years of its founder's death it had conquered western Asia and northern Africa and had gained a temporary foothold in Spain; thenceforth it stretched eastward across Persia and Turkestan into India and southward into central Africa; and in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as we have seen, it possessed itself of Constantinople, the Balkans, Greece, and part of Hungary, and threatened Christendom in the Germanies and in the Mediterranean.

[Sidenote: Western Heresies]

Even in western Europe, the Catholic Church had had to encounter spasmodic opposition from “heretics,” as those persons were called who, although baptized as Christians, refused to accept all the dogmas of Catholic Christianity. Such were the Arian Christians, who in early times had been condemned for rejecting the doctrine of the divinity of Christ, and who had eventually been won back to Catholicism only with the greatest efforts. Then in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the Albigensian heretics in southern France had assailed the sacramental system and the organization of the Church and had been suppressed only by armed force. In the fourteenth century, John Wycliffe appeared in England and John Hus in Bohemia, both preaching that the individual Christian needs no priestly mediation between himself and God and that the very sacraments of the Church, however desirable, are not essentially necessary to salvation. The Lollards, as Wycliffe's English followers were called, were speedily extirpated by fire and sword, through the stern orthodoxy of an English king, but the Hussites long defied the pope and survivals of their heresy were to be found in 1500.

[Sidenote: Skeptics]

In addition to these heretics and the Jews, [Footnote: For detailed accounts of the Jews during the middle ages as well as in modern times, see the *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, ed. by Isidore Singer, 12 vols. (1901−1906).] many so−called skeptics no doubt existed. These were people who outwardly conformed to Catholicism but inwardly doubted and even scoffed at the very foundations of Christianity. They were essentially irreligious, but they seem to have suffered less from persecution than the heretics. Many of the Italian humanists, concerning whom we shall later say a word, [Footnote: See below] were in the fifteenth century more or less avowed skeptics.

## THE PROTESTANT REVOLT

[Sidenote: A Religious and Political Movement]

We have seen in the preceding pages that prior to 1500 there had been many conflicts between kings and popes concerning their respective temporal rights and likewise there had been serious doubts in the minds of various people as to the authority and teachings of the Catholic Church. But these two facts—political and religious—had never been united in a general revolt against the Church until the sixteenth century. Then it was that Christians of Germany, Scandinavia, Scotland, and England, even of the Low Countries and France, successfully revolted against the papal monarchy and set up establishments of their own, usually under the protection of their lay rulers, which became known as the Protestant churches. The movement is called, therefore, the Protestant Revolt. It was begun and practically completed between 1520 and 1570.

[Sidenote: Political Causes of Protestant Revolt]

In explaining this remarkable and sudden break with the religious and ecclesiastical development of a thousand years, it is well to bear in mind that its causes were at once political, economic, and religious. Politically, it was merely an accentuation of the conflict which had long been increasing in virulence between the spiritual and temporal authorities. It cannot be stated too emphatically that the Catholic Church during many centuries prior to the sixteenth had been not only a religious body, like a present−day church, but also a vast political power which readily found sources of friction with other political institutions. The Catholic Church, as we have seen, had its own elaborate organization in every country of western and central Europe; and its officials—pope, bishops, priests, and monks—denied allegiance to the secular government; the Church owned many valuable lands and estates, which normally were exempt from taxation and virtually outside the jurisdiction of the lay government; the Church had its own independent and compulsory income, and its own courts to try its own officers and certain kinds of cases for every one. Such political jurisdiction of the Church had been quite needful and satisfactory in the period—from the fifth to the twelfth century, let us say—when the secular governments were weak and the Church found itself the chief unifying force in Christendom, the veritable heir to the universal dominion of the ancient Roman Empire.

But gradually the temporal rulers themselves repressed feudalism. Political ambition increased in laymen, and local pride was exalted into patriotism. By the year 1200 was begun the growth of that notable idea of national

monarchy, the general outline of which we sketched in the opening chapter. We there indicated that at the commencement of the sixteenth century, England, France, Spain, and Portugal had become strong states, with well−organized lay governments under powerful kings, with patriotic populations, and with well−developed, distinctive languages and literatures. The one thing that seemed to be needed to complete this national sovereignty was to bring the Church entirely under royal control. The autocratic sovereigns desired to enlist the wealth and influence of the Church in their behalf; they coveted her lands, her taxes, and her courts. Although Italy, the Netherlands, and the Germanies were not yet developed as strong united monarchies, many of their patriotic leaders longed for such a development, worked for it, and believed that the principal obstacle to it was the great Christian Church with the pope at its head. Viewed from the political standpoint, the Protestant Revolt was caused by the rise of national feeling, which found itself in natural conflict with the older cosmopolitan or catholic idea of the Church. It was nationalism *versus* Catholicism.

[Sidenote: Economic Causes of Protestant Revolt]

Economically, the causes of the Protestant Revolt were twofold. In the first place, the Catholic Church had grown so wealthy that many people, particularly kings and princes, coveted her possessions. In the second place, financial abuses in ecclesiastical administration bore heavily upon the common people and created serious scandal. Let us say a word about each one of these difficulties.

At the opening of the sixteenth century, many bishops and abbots in wealth and power were not unlike great lay lords: they held vast fair dominions—in the Germanics a third of the whole country, in France a fifth, etc.—and they were attended by armies of retainers. Most of them were sons of noblemen who had had them consecrated bishops so as to insure them fine positions. Even the monks, who now often lived in rich monasteries as though they had never taken vows of poverty, were sometimes of noble birth and quite worldly in their lives. The large estates and vast revenues of Catholic ecclesiastics were thus at first the lure and then the prey of their royal and princely neighbors. The latter grew quite willing to utilize any favorable opportunity which might enable them to confiscate church property and add it to their own possessions. Later such confiscation was euphemistically styled “secularization.”

On the other hand, many plain people, such as peasants and artisans, begrudged the numerous and burdensome ecclesiastical taxes, and an increasing number felt that they were not getting the worth of their money. There was universal complaint, particularly in the Germanies, that the people were exploited by the Roman Curia. Each ecclesiastic, be he bishop, abbot, or priest, had right to a benefice, that is, to the revenue of a parcel of land attached to his post. When he took possession of a benefice, he paid the pope a special assessment, called the “annate,” amounting to a year's income—which of course came from the peasants living on the land. The pope likewise “reserved” to himself the right of naming the holders of certain benefices: these he gave preferably to Italians who drew the revenues but remained in their own country; the people thus supported foreign prelates in luxury and sometimes paid a second time in order to maintain resident ecclesiastics. The archbishops paid enormous sums to the pope for their badges of office (*pallia*). Fat fees for dispensations or for court trials found their way across the Alps. And the bulk of the burden ultimately rested upon the backs of the people. At least in the Germanics the idea became very prevalent that the pope and Curia were really robbing honest German Christians for the benefit of scandalously immoral Italians.

There were certainly grave financial abuses in church government in the fifteenth century and in the early part of the sixteenth. A project of German reform, drawn up in 1438, had declared: “It is a shame which cries to heaven, this oppression of tithes, dues, penalties, excommunication, and tolls of the peasant, on whose labor all men depend for their existence.” An “apocalyptic pamphlet of 1508 shows on its cover the Church upside down, with the peasant performing the services, while the priest guides the plow outside and a monk drives the horses.” It was, in fact, in the Germanics that all the social classes—princes, burghers, knights, and peasants—had special economic grievances against the Church, and in many places were ready to combine in rejecting papal claims.

This emphasis upon the political and particularly upon the economic causes need not belittle the strictly religious factor in the movement. The success of the revolt was due to the fact that many kings, nobles, and commoners, for financial and political advantages to themselves, became the valuable allies of real religious reformers. It required dogmatic differences as well as social grievances to destroy the dominion of the Church.

[Sidenote: Abuses in the Catholic Church]

Nearly all thoughtful men in the sixteenth century recognized the existence of abuses in the Catholic Church.

The scandals connected with the papal court at Rome were notorious at the opening of the century. Several of the the popes lived grossly immoral lives. Simony (the sale of church offices for money) and nepotism (favoritism shown by a pope to his relatives) were not rare. The most lucrative ecclesiastical positions throughout Europe were frequently conferred upon Italians who seldom discharged their duties. One person might be made bishop of several foreign dioceses and yet continue to reside in Rome. Leo X, who was pope when the Protestant Revolt began, and son of Lorenzo de' Medici, surnamed the Magnificent, had been ordained to the priesthood at the age of seven, named cardinal when he was thirteen, and speedily loaded with a multitude of rich benefices and preferments; this same pope, by his munificence and extravagance, was forced to resort to the most questionable means for raising money: he created many new offices and shamelessly sold them; he increased the revenue from indulgences, jubilees, and regular taxation; he pawned palace furniture, table plate, pontifical jewels, even statues of the apostles; several banking firms and many individual creditors were ruined by his death.

[Sidenote: Attacks on Immorality of Clergymen]

What immorality and worldliness prevailed at Rome was reflected in the lives of many lesser churchmen. To one of the popes of the fifteenth century, a distinguished cardinal represented the disorders of the clergy, especially in the Germanics. “These disorders,” he said, “excite the hatred of the people against all ecclesiastical order; if it is not corrected, it is to be feared that the laity, following the example of the Hussites, will attack the clergy as they now openly menace us with doing.” If the clergy of Germany were not reformed promptly, he predicted that after the Bohemian heresy was crushed another would speedily arise far more dangerous. “For they will say,” he continued, “that the clergy is incorrigible and is willing to apply no remedy to its disorders. They will attack us when they no longer have any hope of our correction. Men's minds are waiting for what shall be done; it seems as if shortly something tragic will be brought forth. The venom which they have against us is becoming evident; soon they will believe they are making a sacrifice agreeable to God by maltreating or despoiling the ecclesiastics as people odious to God and man and immersed to the utmost in evil. The little reverence still remaining for the sacred order will be destroyed. Responsibility for all these disorders will be charged upon the Roman Curia, which will be regarded as the cause of all these evils because it has neglected to apply the necessary remedy.” To many other thoughtful persons, a moral reformation in the head and members of the Church seemed vitally necessary.

Complaints against the evil lives of the clergy as well as against their ignorance and credulity were echoed by most of the great scholars and humanists of the time. The patriotic knight and vagabond scholar, Ulrich von Hutten (1488−1523), contributed to a clever series of satirical “Letters of Obscure Men,” which were read widely, and which poked fun at the lack of learning among the monks and the ease with which the papal court emptied German pockets.

[Sidenote: Ulrich von Hutten and Erasmus]

Then, too, the great Erasmus (1466−1536) employed all his wit and sarcasm, in his celebrated “Praise of Folly,” against the theologians and monks, complaining that the foolish people thought that religion consisted simply in pilgrimages, the invocation of saints, and the veneration of relics. Erasmus would have suppressed the monasteries, put an end to the domination of the clergy, and swept away scandalous abuses. He wanted Christianity to regain its early spiritual force, and largely for that purpose he published in 1516 the Greek text of the New Testament with a new Latin translation and with notes which mercilessly flayed hair−splitting theologians.

Thus throughout the fifteenth century and the early part of the sixteenth, much was heard from scholars, princes, and people, of the need for “reformation” of the Church. That did not signify a change of the old regulations but rather their restoration and enforcement. For a long time it was not a question of abolishing the authority of the pope, or altering ecclesiastical organization, or changing creeds. It was merely a question of reforming the lives of the clergy and of suppressing the means by which Italians drew money from other nations.

[Sidenote: Religious Causes of Protestant Revolt]

In the sixteenth century, however, a group of religious leaders, such as Luther, Cranmer, Zwingli, Calvin, and Knox, went much further than Erasmus and the majority of the humanists had gone: they applied the word “reformation” not only to a reform in morals but to an open break which they made with the government and doctrines of the Catholic Church. The new theology, which these reformers championed, was derived mainly from the teachings of such heretics as Wycliffe and Hus and was supposed to depend directly upon the Bible

rather than upon the Church. The religious causes of the Protestant Revolt accordingly may be summed up as: first, the existence of abuses within the Catholic Church; second, the attacks of distinguished men upon the immorality and worldliness of the Catholic clergy; and third, the substitution by certain religious leaders of new doctrines and practices, which were presumed to have been authorized by the Bible, but which were at variance with those of the medieval Church.

[Sidenote: Date and Extent of the Protestant Revolt]

For the great variety of reasons, which we have now indicated,— political, economic, and religious,—the peoples of northern Germany, Scandinavia, the Dutch Netherlands, most of Switzerland, Scotland, England, and a part of France and of Hungary, separated themselves, between the years 1520 and 1570, from the great religious and political body which had been known historically for over a thousand years as the Catholic Christian Church. The name “Protestant” was first applied exclusively to those followers of Martin Luther in the Holy Roman Empire who in 1529 protested against an attempt of the Diet of Speyer to prevent the introduction of religious novelties, but subsequently the word passed into common parlance among historians and the general reading public as betokening all Christians who rejected the papal supremacy and who were not in communion with the Orthodox Church of eastern Europe.

Of this Protestant Christianity three main forms appeared in the sixteenth century—Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism. Concerning the origin and development of each one of these major forms, a brief sketch must be given.

LUTHERANISM

[Sidenote: Martin Luther]

Lutheranism takes its name from its great apostle, Martin Luther. Luther was born in Eisleben in Germany in 1483 of a poor family whose ancestors had been peasants. Martin early showed himself bold, headstrong, willing to pit his own opinions against those of the world, but yet possessing ability, tact, and a love of sound knowledge. Educated at the university of Erfurt, where he became acquainted with the humanistic movement, young Martin entered one of the mendicant orders—the Augustinian—in 1505 and went to live in a monastery. In 1508 Luther was sent with some other monks to Wittenberg to assist a university which had been opened there recently by the elector of Saxony, and a few years later was appointed professor of theology in the institution.

[Sidenote: Justification by Faith]

While lecturing and preaching at Wittenberg, where he was very popular, Luther developed from the writings of St. Paul and St. Augustine an important doctrinal conviction which differed widely from the faith of the Catholic Church. It concerned the means of eternal salvation. The Church taught, as we have seen, that she possessed the sole means, and that every Christian must perform certain “good works" in order to secure salvation. Luther, on the other hand, became convinced that man was incapable, in the sight of God, of any good works whatsoever, and could be saved only by faith in God's promises. In other words, this monk placed his doctrine of “justification by faith” in opposition to the generally accepted belief in “justification by faith and works.”

[Sidenote: Tetzel's “Sale” of Indulgences]

So far, Luther certainly had no thought of revolting against the authority of the Church. In fact, when he visited Rome in 1511, it was as a pious pilgrim rather than as a carping critic. But a significant event in the year 1517 served to make clear a wide discrepancy between what he was teaching and what the Church taught. That year a certain papal agent, Tetzel by name, was disposing of indulgences in the great archbishopric of Mainz. An indulgence, according to Catholic theology, was a remission of the temporal punishment in purgatory due to sin, and could be granted only by authority of the Church; the grant of indulgences depended upon the contrition and confession of the applicant, and often at that time upon money−payments. Against what he believed was a corruption of Christian doctrine and a swindling of the poorer people, Luther protested in a series of ninety−five Theses which he posted on the church door in Wittenberg (31 October, 1517).

[Sidenote: The Ninety−five Theses]

The Theses had been written in Latin for the educated class but they were now speedily translated into German and spread like wildfire among all classes throughout the country. Luther's underlying principle of “salvation through simple faith” was in sharp contrast with the theory of “good works,” on which the indulgences rested. “The Christian who has true repentance,” wrote Luther, “has already received pardon from God altogether

apart from an indulgence, and does not need one; Christ demands this true repentance from every one." Luther's attitude provoked spirited discussion throughout the Germanics, and the more discussion, the more interest and excitement. The pope, who had dismissed the subject at first as a mere squabble among the monks, was moved at length to summon Luther to Rome to answer for the Theses, but the elector of Saxony intervened and prevailed upon the pope not to press the matter.

[Sidenote: Disputation at Leipzig, 1519]

The next important step in the development of Luther's religious ideas was a debate on the general question of papal supremacy, held at Leipzig in 1519, between himself and an eminent Catholic apologist, Johann Eck. Eck skillfully forced Luther to admit that certain views of his, especially those concerning man's direct relation with God, without the mediation of the Church, were the same as those which John Hus had held a century earlier and which had been condemned both by the pope and by the great general council of Constance. Luther thereby virtually admitted that a general council as well as a pope might err. For him, the divine authority of the Roman Catholic Church ceased to be.

[Sidenote: Separation of Luther from the Catholic Church]

Separation from the traditional Church was the only course now open to Luther and this was consummated in the year 1520. In a series of three bold pamphlets, he vigorously and definitely attacked the position of the Church. In the first—*An Address to the Nobility of the German Nation*—Luther stated that there was nothing inherently sacred about the Christian priesthood and that the clergy should be deprived immediately of their special privileges; he urged the German princes to free their country from foreign control and shrewdly called their attention to the wealth and power of the Church which they might justly appropriate to themselves. In the second—*On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church of God*—he assailed the papacy and the whole sacramental system. The third—*On the Freedom of a Christian Man*—contained the essence of Luther's new theology that salvation was not a painful *progress* toward a goal by means of sacraments and right conduct but a *condition* "in which man found himself so soon as he despaired absolutely of his own efforts and threw himself on God's assurances"; the author claimed that man's utter personal dependence on God's grace rendered the system of the Church superfluous.

In the midst of these attacks upon the Church, the pope excommunicated Luther, and in the following year (1521) influenced the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, assembled at Worms, to pronounce him an outlaw. But the rebel calmly burnt the papal bull and from the imperial ban he was protected by the elector of Saxony. He at once devoted himself to making a new German translation of the Bible, which became very popular and is still prized as a monument in the history of German literature. [Footnote: The first edition of the Bible in German had been printed as early as 1466. At least eighteen editions in German (including four Low German versions) had appeared before Luther issued his German New Testament in 1522.]

[Sidenote: Spread of Lutheranism]

Within the next few years the Lutheran teachings carried everything before them throughout the northern and central Germanies. Nor are the reasons for Luther's success in defying pope and emperor and for the rapid acceptance of his new theology hard to understand. The movement was essentially popular and national. It appealed to the pious−minded who desired a simplification of Christian dogma and a comprehensible method of salvation. It also appealed to the worldly minded who longed to seize ecclesiastical lands and revenues. Above all, it appealed to the patriots who were tired of foreign despotism and of abuses which they traced directly to the Roman Curia. Then, too, the Emperor Charles V, who remained a loyal Catholic, was too immersed in the difficulties of foreign war and in the manifold administrative problems of his huge dominions to be able to devote much time to the extirpation of heresy in the Germanies. Finally, the character of Luther contributed to effective leadership—he was tireless in flooding the country with pamphlets, letters, and inflammatory diatribes, tactful in keeping his party together, and always bold and courageous. Princes, burghers, artisans, and peasants joined hands in espousing the new cause.

[Sidenote: Luther and the German Peasants]

But the peasants espoused it in a manner altogether too logical and too violent to suit Luther or the desires of the princes. The German peasants had grievances against the old order compared with which those of the knights and towns−folk were imaginary. For at least a century several causes had contributed to make their lot worse and worse. While their taxes and other burdens were increasing, the ability of the emperor to protect them was

decreasing; they were plundered by every class in the community, especially by the higher clergy. Thus, under the influence of social and economic conditions, various uprisings of the peasants had taken place during the latter part of the fifteenth century. These insurrections became almost regular in the southwestern Germanies, and were called *Bundschuhe*, a shoe fastened upon the end of a pole serving as a standard of revolt. When Luther urged the princes to assail the ecclesiastics, to seize church lands, and to put an end to financial abuses, the peasants naturally listened to his words with open ears and proceeded with glad hearts to apply his advice themselves.

The new Lutheran theology may have been too refined for the peasants, but they imagined they understood its purport. And spurred on by fanatics, whom the religious ferment of the times produced in large numbers, [Footnote: Many of these radical religious leaders were more consistent and thoroughgoing than Luther in maintaining the right of each Christian to interpret the Scriptures for himself. Since they generally refused to recognize infant baptism as valid and insisted that baptism should be administered only to adults, they were subsequently often referred to as “Anabaptists.” Many of the “Anabaptists” condemned oaths and capital punishment; some advocated communism of worldly goods, in several instances even the community of women. Nicholas Storch (d. 1525), a weaver, and Thomas Munzer (d. 1525), a Lutheran preacher, spread these doctrines widely among the peasants. Luther vehemently denounced the “Anabaptists.”] the peasants again took arms against feudal oppression. That the peasants' demands were essentially moderate and involved no more than is granted everywhere to−day as a matter of course, may be inferred from their declaration of principles, the Twelve Articles, among which were: abolition of serfdom, free right of fishing and hunting, payment in wages for services rendered, and abolition of arbitrary punishment. So long as the peasants directed their efforts against the Catholic ecclesiastics, Luther expressed sympathy with them, but when the revolt, which broke out in 1524, became general all over central and southern Germany and was directed not only against the Catholic clergy but also against the lay lords,—many of whom were now Lutheran,—the religious leader foresaw a grave danger to his new religion in a split between peasants and nobles. Luther ended by taking strong sides with the nobles—he had most to expect from them. He was shocked by the excesses of the revolt, he said. Insisting upon toleration for his own revolt, he condemned the peasants to most horrible fates in this world and in the world hereafter. [Footnote: Although Luther was particularly bitter against the “Anabaptist” exhorters, upon whom he fastened responsibility for the Peasants' Revolt, and although many of them met death thereby, the “Anabaptists” were by no means exterminated. Largely through the activity of a certain Melchior Hofmann, a widely traveled furrier, “Anabaptist” doctrines were disseminated in northern Germany and the Netherlands. From 1533 to 1535 they reigned supreme, attended by much bloodshed and plenty of personal license, in the important city of Munster in western Germany. Subsequently, Carlstadt (1480−1541), an early associate of Luther, though his later antagonist, set forth Anabaptist views with greater moderation; and in course of time the sect became more or less tinged with Calvinistic theology.] He furiously begged the princes to put down the insurrection. “Whoever can, should smite, strangle, or stab, secretly or publicly!”

[Sidenote: The Peasants' Revolt]

The Peasants' Revolt was crushed in 1525 with utmost cruelty. Probably fifty thousand lost their lives in the vain effort. The general result was that the power of the territorial lords became greater than ever, although in a few cases, particularly in the Tyrol and in Baden, the condition of the peasants was slightly improved. Elsewhere, however, this was not the case; and the German peasants were assigned for over two centuries to a lot worse than that of almost any people in Europe. Another result was the decline of Luther's influence among the peasantry in southern and central Germany. They turned rapidly from one who, they believed, had betrayed them. On the other hand, many Catholic princes, who had been wavering in their religious support, now had before their eyes what they thought was an object lesson of the results of Luther's appeal to revolution, and so they cast their lot decisively with the ancient Church. The Peasants' Revolt registered a distinct check to the further spread of Lutheranism.

[Sidenote: Diets of Speyer 1526, 1529] [Sidenote: The Word “Protestant"]

The Diet of the Holy Roman Empire which assembled at Speyer in 1526 saw the German princes divided into a Lutheran and a Roman Catholic party, but left the legal status of the new faith still in doubt, contenting itself with the vague declaration that “each prince should so conduct himself as he could answer for his behavior to God and to the emperor.” But at the next Diet, held at the same place in 1529, the emperor directed that the edict against heretics should be enforced and that the old ecclesiastical revenues should not be appropriated for the new

worship. The Lutheran princes drafted a legal protest, in which they declared that they meant to abide by the law of 1526. From this protest came the name *Protestant*.

[Sidenote: Confession of Augsburg, 1530]

The next year, Luther's great friend, Melancthon, presented to the Diet of Augsburg an account of the beliefs of the German reformers, which later became known as the Confession of Augsburg and constitutes to the present day the distinctive creed of the Lutheran Church. The emperor was still unconvinced, however, of the truth or value of the reformed doctrine, and declared his intention of ending the heresy by force of arms.

[Sidenote: Religious Peace of Augsburg, 1555]

In this predicament, the Lutheran princes formed a league at Schmalkald for mutual protection (1531); and from 1546 to 1555 a desultory civil war was waged. The Protestants received some assistance from the French king, who, for political reasons, was bent on humiliating the emperor. The end of the religious conflict appeared to have been reached by the peace of Augsburg (1555), which contained the following provisions: (1) Each prince was to be free to dictate the religion of his subjects [Footnote: *Cuius regio eius religio*.]; (2) All church property appropriated by the Protestants before 1552 was to remain in their hands; (3) No form of Protestantism except Lutheranism was to be tolerated; (4) Lutheran subjects of ecclesiastical states were not to be obliged to renounce their faith; (5) By an “ecclesiastical reservation” any ecclesiastical prince on becoming a Protestant was to give up his see.

[Sidenote: Lutheranism in the Germanies]

Thus, between 1520 and 1555, Martin Luther [Footnote: He died in 1546, aged 62.] had preached his new theology at variance with the Catholic, and had found general acceptance for it throughout the northern half of the Germanies; its creed had been settled and defined in 1530, and its official toleration had been recognized in 1555. The toleration was limited, however, to princes, and for many years Lutheran rulers showed themselves quite as intolerant within their own dominions as did the Catholics.

[Sidenote: Lutheranism in Scandinavia]

The triumph of Lutheranism in the Scandinavian countries has been traced largely to political and economic causes. When Martin Luther broke with the Catholic Church, Christian II (1513−1523) was reigning as elected king over Denmark and Norway and had recently conquered Sweden by force of arms. The king encountered political difficulties with the Church although he maintained Catholic worship and doctrine and apparently recognized the spiritual supremacy of the pope. But Christian II had trouble with most of his subjects, especially the Swedes, who were conscious of separate nationality and desirous of political independence; and the king eventually lost his throne in a general uprising. The definite separation of Sweden from Denmark and Norway followed immediately. The Swedes chose the celebrated Gustavus Vasa (1523−1560) as their king, while the Danish and Norwegian crowns passed to the uncle of Christian II, who assumed the title of Frederick I (1523−1533).

[Sidenote: Denmark]

In Denmark, King Frederick was very desirous of increasing the royal power, and the subservient ecclesiastical organization which Martin Luther was advocating seemed to him for his purposes infinitely preferable to the ancient self−willed Church. But Frederick realized that the Catholic Church was deeply rooted in the affections of his people and that changes would have to be effected slowly and cautiously. He therefore collected around him Lutheran teachers from Germany and made his court the center of the propaganda of the new doctrine, and so well was the work of the new teachers done that the king was able in 1527 to put the two religions on an equal footing before the law. Upon Frederick's death in 1533, the Catholics made a determined effort to prevent the accession of his son, Christian III, who was not only an avowed Lutheran but was known to stand for absolutist principles in government.

The popular protest against royal despotism failed in Denmark and the triumph of Christian III in 1536 sealed the fate of Catholicism in that country and in Norway. It was promptly enacted that the Catholic bishops should forfeit their temporal and spiritual authority and all their property should be transferred to the crown “for the good of the commonwealth.” After discussions with Luther the new religion was definitely organized and declared the state religion in 1537. It might be added that Catholicism died with difficulty in Denmark,—many peasants as well as high churchmen resented the changes, and Helgesen, the foremost Scandinavian scholar and humanist of the time, protested vigorously against the new order. But the crown was growing powerful, and the crown

prevailed. The enormous increase of royal revenue, consequent upon the confiscation of the property of the Church, enabled the king to make Denmark the leading Scandinavian country throughout the second half of the sixteenth century and the first quarter of the seventeenth. In time national patriotism came to be intertwined with Lutheranism.

[Sidenote: Sweden]

In Sweden the success of the new religion was due to the crown quite as much as in Denmark and Norway. Gustavus Vasa had obtained the Swedish throne through the efforts of a nationalist party, but there was still a hostile faction, headed by the chief churchman, the archbishop of Upsala, who favored the maintenance of the union with Denmark. In order to deprive the unionists of their leader, Gustavus begged the pope to remove the rebellious archbishop and to appoint one in sympathy with the nationalist cause. This the pope peremptorily refused to do, and the breach with Rome began. Gustavus succeeded in suppressing the insurrection, and then persevered in introducing Protestantism. The introduction was very gradual, especially among the peasantry, and its eventual success was largely the result of the work of one strong man assisted by a subservient parliament.

At first Gustavus maintained Catholic worship and doctrines, contenting himself with the suppression of the monasteries, the seizure of two− thirds of the church tithes, and the circulation of a popular Swedish translation of the New Testament. In 1527 all ecclesiastical property was transferred to the crown and two Catholic bishops were cruelly put to death. Meanwhile Lutheran teachers were encouraged to take up their residence in Sweden and in 1531 the first Protestant archbishop of Upsala was chosen. Thenceforth, the progress of Lutheranism was more rapid, although a Catholic reaction was threatened several times in the second half of the sixteenth century. The Confession of Augsburg was adopted as the creed of the Swedish Church in 1593, and in 1604 Catholics were deprived of offices and estates and banished from the realm.

CALVINISM

The second general type of Protestantism which appeared in the sixteenth century was the immediate forerunner of the modern Presbyterian, Congregational, and Reformed Churches and at one time or another considerably affected the theology of the Episcopalians and Baptists and even of Lutherans. Taken as a group, it is usually called Calvinism. Of its rise and spread, some idea may be gained from brief accounts of the lives of two of its great apostles—Calvin and Knox. But first it will be necessary to say a few words concerning an older reformer, Zwingli by name, who prepared the way for Calvin's work in the Swiss cantons.

[Sidenote: Zwingli]

Switzerland comprised in the sixteenth century some thirteen cantons, all of which were technically under the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Empire, but constituted in practice so many independent republics, bound together only by a number of protective treaties. To the town of Einsiedeln in the canton of Schwyz came Huldreich Zwingli in the year 1516 as a Catholic priest. Slightly younger than Luther, he was well born, had received an excellent university education in Vienna and in Basel, and had now been in holy orders about ten years. He had shown for some time more interest in humanism than in the old−fashioned theology, but hardly any one would have suspected him of heresy, for it was well known that he was a regular pensioner of the pope.

Zwingli's opposition to the Roman Church seems to have been based at first largely on political grounds. He preached eloquently against the practice of hiring out Swiss troops to foreign rulers and abused the Church for its share in this shameless traffic in soldiers. Then he was led on to attack all manner of abuses in ecclesiastical organization, but it was not until he was installed in 1518 as preacher in the great cathedral at Zuerich that he clearly denied papal supremacy and proceeded to proclaim the Scriptures as the sole guide of faith and morals. He preached against fasting, the veneration of saints, and the celibacy of the clergy. Some of his hearers began to put his teachings into practice: church edifices were profaned, statues demolished, windows smashed, and relics burned. Zwingli himself took a wife.

[Sidenote: Zwinglian Revolt in Switzerland]

In 1523 a papal appeal to Zuerich to abandon Zwingli was answered by the canton's formal declaration of independence from the Catholic Church. Henceforth the revolt spread rapidly throughout Switzerland, except in the five forest cantons, the very heart of the country, where the ancient religion was still deeply intrenched. Serious efforts were made to join the followers of Zwingli with those of Luther, and thus to present a united front to the common enemy, but there seemed to be irreconcilable differences between Lutheranism and the views of Zwingli. The latter, which were succinctly expressed in sixty−seven Theses published at Zuerich in 1523, insisted

more firmly than the former on the supreme authority of Scripture, and broke more thoroughly and radically with the traditions of the Catholic Church. Zwingli aimed at a reformation of government and discipline as well as of theology, and entertained a notion of an ideal state in which the democracy would order human activities, whether political or religious. Zwingli differed essentially from Luther in never distrusting “the people.” Perhaps the most distinctive mark of the Swiss reformer's theology was his idea that the Lord's Supper is not a miracle but simply a symbol and a memorial.

In 1531 Zwingli urged the Protestant Swiss to convert the five forest cantons to the new religion by force of arms. In answer to his entreaties, civil war ensued, but the Catholic mountaineers won a great victory that very year and the reformer himself was killed. A truce was then arranged, the provisions of which foreshadowed the religious settlement in the Germanies—each canton was to be free to determine its own religion. Switzerland has remained to this day part Catholic and part Protestant.

[Sidenote: Calvin]

By the sudden death of Zwingli, Swiss Protestantism was left without a leader, but not for long, because the more celebrated Calvin took up his residence in Geneva in 1536. From that time until his death in 1564 Calvin was the center of a movement which, starting from these small Zwinglian beginnings among the Swiss mountains, speedily spread over more countries and affected more people than did Lutheranism. In Calvinism, Catholicism was to find her most implacable foe.

John Calvin, who, next to Martin Luther, was the most conspicuous Protestant leader of the sixteenth century, was a Frenchman. Born of middle−class parentage at Noyon in the province of Picardy in 1509, he was intended from an early age for an ecclesiastical career. A pension from the Catholic Church enabled him to study at Paris, where he displayed an aptitude for theology and literature. When he was nineteen years of age, however, his father advised him to abandon the idea of entering the priesthood in favor of becoming a lawyer—so young Calvin spent several years studying law.

[Sidenote: Calvin in France]

It was in 1529 that Calvin is said to have experienced a sudden “conversion.” Although as yet there had been no organized revolt in France against the Catholic Church, that country, like many others, was teeming with religious critics. Thousands of Frenchmen were in sympathy with any attempt to improve the Church by education, by purer morals, or by better preaching. Lutheranism was winning a few converts, and various evangelical sects were appearing in divers places. The chief problem was whether reform should be sought within the traditional Church or by rebellion against it. Calvin believed that his conversion was a divine call to forsake Roman Catholicism and to become the apostle of a purer life. His heart, he said, was “so subdued and reduced to docility that in comparison with his zeal for true piety he regarded all other studies with indifference, though not entirely abandoning them. Though himself a beginner, many flocked to him to learn the pure doctrine, and he began to seek some hiding−place and means of withdrawal from people.”

[Sidenote: “The Institutes"]

His search for a hiding−place was quickened by the announced determination of the French king, Francis I, to put an end to religious dissent among his subjects. Calvin abruptly left France and found an asylum in the Swiss town of Basel, where he became acquainted at first hand with the type of reformed religion which Zwingli had propagated and where he proceeded to write a full account of the Protestant position as contrasted with the Catholic. This exposition,—*The Institutes of the Christian Religion*,—which was published in 1536, was dedicated to King Francis I and was intended to influence him in favor of Protestantism.

Although the book failed of its immediate purpose, it speedily won a deservedly great reputation. It was a statement of Calvin's views, borrowed in part from Zwingli, and in part from Luther and other reformers. It was orderly and concise, and it did for Protestant theology what the medieval writers had done for Catholic theology. It contained the germ of all that subsequently developed as Calvinism.

[Sidenote: Calvin and Luther]

It seemed for some time as if the *Institutes* might provide a common religious rule and guide for all Christians who rebelled against Rome. But Calvin, in mind and nature, was quite different from Luther. The latter was impetuous, excitable, but very human; the former was ascetic, calm, and inhumanly logical. Then, too, Luther was quite willing to leave everything in the church which was not prohibited by Scripture; Calvin insisted that nothing should remain in the church which was not expressly authorized by Scripture. The *Institutes* had a tremendous

influence upon Protestantism but did not unite the followers of Calvin and Luther. Calvin's book seems all the more wonderful, when it is recalled that it was written when the author was but twenty−six years of age.

[Sidenote: Calvin at Geneva]

In 1536 Calvin went to Geneva, which was then in the throes of a revolution at once political and religious, for the townsfolk were freeing themselves from the feudal suzerainty of the duke of Savoy and banishing the Catholic Church, whose cause the duke championed. Calvin aided in the work and was rewarded by an appointment as chief pastor and preacher in the city. This position he continued to hold, except for a brief period when he was exiled, until his death in 1564. It proved to be a commanding position not only in ordering the affairs of the town, but also in giving form to an important branch of Protestant Christianity.

The government of Geneva under Calvin's regime was a curious theocracy of which Calvin himself was both religious leader and political “boss.” The minister of the reformed faith became God's mouthpiece upon earth and inculcated an unbending puritanism in daily life. “No more festivals, no more jovial reunions, no more theaters or society; the rigid monotony of an austere rule weighed upon life. A poet was decapitated because of his verses; Calvin wished adultery to be punished by death like heresy, and he had Michael Servetus [Footnote: A celebrated Spanish reformer.] burned for not entertaining the same opinions as himself upon the mystery of the Trinity.”

Under Calvin's theocratic despotism, Geneva became famous throughout Europe as the center of elaborate Protestant propaganda. Calvin, who set the example of stern simplicity and relentless activity, was sometimes styled the Protestant pope. He not only preached every day, wrote numerous theological treatises, and issued a French translation of the Bible, but he established important Protestant schools— including the University of Geneva—which attracted students from distant lands, and he conducted a correspondence with his disciples and would−be reformers in all points of Europe. His letters alone would fill thirty folio volumes.

[Sidenote: Diffusion of Calvinism]

Such activities account for the almost bewildering diffusion of Calvinism. French, Dutch, Germans, Scotch, and English flocked to Geneva to hear Calvin or to attend his schools, and when they returned to their own countries they were likely to be so many glowing sparks ready to start mighty conflagrations.

Calvinism was known by various names in the different countries which it entered. On the continent of Europe it was called the Reformed Faith, and in France its followers were styled Huguenots; in Scotland it became Presbyterianism; and in England, Puritanism. Its essential characteristics, however, remained the same wherever it was carried.

[Sidenote: Calvinism in Switzerland]

We have already noticed how Switzerland, except for the five forest cantons, had been converted to Protestantism by the preaching of Zwingli. Calvin was Zwingli's real theological successor, and the majority of the Swiss, especially those in the urban cantons of Zuerich and Bern as well as of Geneva, cheerfully accepted Calvinism.

[Sidenote: Calvinism in France: the Huguenots]

Calvinism also made converts in France. The doctrines and writings of Luther had there encountered small success. Many French reformers believed that greater good would eventually be achieved within the Catholic Church than without. There appeared to be fewer abuses among the French clergy than among the ecclesiastics of northern Europe, for they possessed less wealth and power. The French sovereign felt less prompted to lay his hand upon the dominions of the clergy, because a special agreement with the pope in 1516 bestowed upon the king the nomination of bishops and the disposition of benefices. For these reasons the bulk of the French people resisted Protestantism of every form and remained loyally Catholic.

What progress the new religion made in France was due to Calvin rather than to Luther. Calvin, as we have seen, was a Frenchman himself, and his teachings and logic appealed to a small but influential body of his fellow−countrymen. A considerable portion of the lower nobility, a few merchants and business men, and many magistrates conformed to Calvinism openly; the majority of great lawyers and men of learning adhered to it in public or in secret. Probably from a twentieth to a thirtieth of the total population embraced Calvinism. The movement was essentially confined to the middle−class or *bourgeoisie*, and almost from the outset it acquired a political as well as a religious significance. It represented among the lesser nobility an awakening of the aristocratic spirit and among the middle−class a reaction against the growing power of the king. The financial and moneyed interests of the country were largely attracted to French Calvinism. The Huguenots, as the French

Calvinists were called, were particularly strong in the law courts and in the Estates−General or parliament, and these had been the main checks upon royal despotism.

[Sidenote: Edict of Nantes]

The Huguenots were involved in sanguinary civil and religious wars which raged in France throughout the greater part of the sixteenth century and which have already been treated in their appropriate political aspect. The outcome was the settlement accorded by King Henry IV in the famous Edict of Nantes (1598), which contained the following provisions: (1) Private worship and liberty of conscience were allowed to the Calvinists throughout France; (2) Public Protestant worship might be held in 200 enumerated towns and over 3000 castles; (3) A financial grant was made to Protestant schools, and the publication of Calvinist books was legalized; (4) Huguenots received full civil rights, with admission to all public offices; (5) Huguenots were granted for eight years the political control of two hundred towns, the garrisons of which were to be maintained by the crown; and (6) Huguenots were accorded certain judicial privileges and the right of holding religious and political assemblies. For nearly a hundred years France practiced a religious toleration which was almost unique among European nations, and it was Calvinists who benefited.

[Sidenote: Calvinism in the Netherlands]

The Netherlands were too near the Germanies not to be affected by the Lutheran revolt against the Catholic Church. And the northern or Dutch provinces became quite thoroughly saturated with Lutheranism and also with the doctrines of various radical sects that from time to time were expelled from the German states. The Emperor Charles V tried to stamp out heresy by harsh action of the Inquisition, but succeeded only in changing its name and nature. Lutheranism disappeared from the Netherlands; but in its place came Calvinism, [Footnote: Many Anabaptist refugees from Germany had already sought refuge in the Netherlands: they naturally found the teachings of Zwingli and Calvin more radical, and therefore more appropriate to themselves, than the teachings of Luther. This fact also serves to explain the acceptance of Calvinism in regions of southern Germany where Lutheranism, since the Peasants' Revolt, had failed to take root.] descending from Geneva through Alsace and thence down the Rhine, or entering from Great Britain by means of the close commercial relations existing between those countries. While the southern Netherlands eventually were recovered for Catholicism, the protracted political and economic conflict which the northern Netherlands waged against the Catholic king of Spain contributed to a final fixing of Calvinism as the national religion of patriotic Dutchmen. Calvinism in Holland was known as the Dutch Reformed religion.

[Sidenote: Calvinism in Southern Germany]

We have already noted that southern Germany had rejected aristocratic Lutheranism, partially at least because of Luther's bitter words to the peasants. Catholicism, however, was not destined to have complete sway in those regions, for democratic Calvinism permeated Wuerttemberg, Baden, and the Rhenish provinces, and the Reformed doctrines gained numerous converts among the middle−class. The growth of Calvinism in Germany was seriously handicapped by the religious settlement of Augsburg in 1555 which officially tolerated only Catholicism and Lutheranism. It was not until after the close of the direful Thirty Years' War in the seventeenth century that German Calvinists received formal recognition.

[Sidenote: Scotland]

Scotland, like every other European country in the early part of the sixteenth century, had been a place of protest against moral and financial abuses in the Catholic Church, but the beginnings of ecclesiastical rebellion are to be traced rather to political causes. The kingdom had long been a prey to the bitter rivalry of great noble families, and the premature death of James V (1542), which left the throne to his ill−fated infant daughter, Mary Stuart, gave free rein to a feudal reaction against the crown. In general, the Catholic clergy sided with the royal cause, while the religious reformers egged on the nobles to champion Protestantism in order to deal an effective blow against the union of the altar and the throne. Thus Cardinal Beaton, head of the Catholic Church in Scotland, ordered numerous executions on the score of protecting religion and the authority of the queen−regent; on the other hand several noblemen, professing the new theology, assassinated the cardinal and hung his body on the battlements of the castle of St. Andrews (1546). Such was the general situation in Scotland when John Knox appeared upon the scene.

[Sidenote: John Knox]

Born of peasant parents about 1515, John Knox [Footnote: John Knox (c. 1515−1572).] had become a

Catholic priest, albeit in sympathy with many of the revolutionary ideas which were entering Scotland from the Continent and from England. In 1546 he openly rejected the authority of the Church and proceeded to preach “the Gospel” and a stern puritanical morality. “Others snipped the branches,” he said, “he struck at the root.” But the Catholic court was able to banish Knox from Scotland. After romantic imprisonment in France, Knox spent a few years in England, preaching an extreme puritanism, holding a chaplaincy under Edward VI (1547−1553), and exerting his influence to insure an indelibly Protestant character to the Anglican Church. Then upon the accession to the English throne of the Catholic Mary Tudor, Knox betook himself to Geneva where he made the acquaintance of Calvin and found himself in essential agreement with the teachings of the French reformer.

[Sidenote: Calvinism in Scotland]

After a stay of some five years on the Continent, Knox returned finally to Scotland and became the organizer and director of the “Lords of the Congregation,” a league of the chief Protestant noblemen for purposes of religious propaganda and political power. In 1560 he drew up the creed and discipline of the Presbyterian Church after the model of Calvin's church at Geneva; and in the same year with the support of the “Lords of the Congregation” and the troops of Queen Elizabeth of England, Knox effected a political and religious revolution in Scotland. The queen−regent was imprisoned and the subservient parliament abolished the papal supremacy and enacted the death penalty against any one who should even attend Catholic worship. John Knox had carried everything before him.

Mary Stuart, during her brief stay in Scotland (1561−1567), tried in vain to stem the tide. The jealous barons would brook no increase of royal authority. The austere Knox hounded the girl−queen in public sermons and fairly flayed her character. The queen's downfall and subsequent long imprisonment in England finally decided the ecclesiastical future of Scotland. Except in a few fastnesses in the northern highlands, where Catholicism survived among the clansmen, the whole country was committed to Calvinism.

[Sidenote: Calvinism in England]

Calvinism was not without influence in England. Introduced towards the close of the reign of Henry VIII, it gave rise to a number of small sects which troubled the king's Anglican Church almost as much as did the Roman Catholics. Under Edward VI (1547−1553), it considerably influenced the theology of the Anglican Church itself, but the moderate policies of Elizabeth (1558−1603) tended to fix an inseparable gulf between Anglicans and Calvinists. Thenceforth, Calvinism lived in England, in the forms of Presbyterianism, Independency, [Footnote: Among the “Independents” were the Baptists, a sect related not so immediately to Calvinism as to the radical Anabaptists of Germany. See above, pp. 134 f., 145, footnotes] and Puritanism, as the religion largely of the commercial middle class. It was treated with contempt, and even persecuted, by Anglicans, especially by the monarchs of the Stuart family. After a complete but temporary triumph under Cromwell, in the seventeenth century, it was at length legally tolerated in England after the settlement of 1689. It was from England that New England received the Calvinistic religion which dominated colonial forefathers of many present−day Americans.

ANGLICANISM

Anglicanism is the name frequently applied to that form of Protestantism which stamped the state church in England in the sixteenth century and which is now represented by the Episcopal Church in the United States as well as by the established Church of England. The Methodist churches are comparatively late off−shoots of Anglicanism.

The separation of England from the papacy was a more gradual and halting process than were the contemporary revolutions on the Continent; and the new Anglicanism was correspondingly more conservative than Lutheranism or Calvinism.

[Sidenote: English Catholicism in 1500] [Sidenote: Church of England]

At the opening of the sixteenth century, the word “Catholic” meant the same in England as in every other country of western or central Europe —belief in the seven sacraments, the sacrifice of the Mass, and the veneration of saints; acceptance of papal supremacy and support of monasticism and of other institutions and practices of the medieval Church. During several centuries it had been customary in legal documents to refer to the Catholic Church in England as the *Ecclesia Anglicana,* or Anglican Church, just as the popes in their letters repeatedly referred to the “Gallican Church,” the “Spanish Church,” the “Neapolitan Church,” or the “Hungarian Church.” But such phraseology did not imply a separation of any one national church from the common Catholic communion, and for nearly a thousand years—ever since there had been an *Ecclesia Anglicana*—the English had

recognized the bishop of Rome as the center of Catholic unity. In the course of the sixteenth century, however, the great majority of Englishmen changed their conception of the *Ecclesia Anglicana*, so that to them it continued to exist as the Church of England, but henceforth on a strictly national basis, in communion neither with the pope nor with the Orthodox Church of the East nor with the Lutherans or Calvinists, abandoning several doctrines that had been universally held in earlier times and substituting in their place beliefs and customs which were distinctively Protestant. This new conception of the Anglican Church— resulting from the revolution in the sixteenth century—is what we mean by Anglicanism as a form of Protestantism. It took shape in the eventful years between 1520 and 1570.

[Sidenote: Religious Opposition to the Roman Catholic Church in England]

In order to understand how this religious and ecclesiastical revolution was effected in England, we must appreciate the various elements distrustful of the Catholic Church in that country about the year 1525. In the first place, the Lutheran teachings were infiltrating into the country. As early as 1521 a small group at Cambridge had become interested in the new German theology, and thence the sect spread to Oxford, London, and other intellectual centers. It found its early converts chiefly among the lower clergy and the merchants of the large towns, but for several years it was not numerous.

In the second place, there was the same feeling in England as we have already noted throughout all Europe that the clergy needed reform in morals and in manners. This view was shared not only by the comparatively insignificant group of heretical Lutherans, but likewise by a large proportion of the leading men who accounted themselves orthodox members of the Catholic Church. The well−educated humanists were especially eloquent in preaching reform. The writings of Erasmus had great vogue in England. John Colet (1467?−1519), a famous dean of St. Paul's cathedral in London, was a keen reformer who disapproved of auricular confession and of the celibacy of the clergy. Sir Thomas More (1478−1535), one of the greatest minds of the century, thought the monks were lazy and indolent, and the whole body of churchmen in need of an intellectual betterment. But neither Colet nor More had any intention of breaking away from the Roman Church. To them, and to many like them, reform could be secured best within the traditional ecclesiastical body.

[Sidenote: Political Opposition to the Roman Catholic Church in England]

A third source of distrust of the Church was a purely political feeling against the papacy. As we have already seen, the English king and English parliament on several earlier occasions had sought to restrict the temporal and political jurisdiction of the pope in England, but each restriction had been imposed for political reasons and even then had represented the will of the monarch rather than that of the nation. In fact, the most striking limitations of the pope's political jurisdiction in the kingdom had been enacted during the early stages of the Hundred Years' War, when the papacy was under French influence, and had served, therefore, indirectly as political weapons against the French king. Before that war was over, the operation of the statutes had been relaxed, and for a century or more prior to 1525 little was heard of even a political feeling against the bishop of Rome.

Nevertheless an evolution in English government was in progress at that very time, which was bound sooner or later to create friction with the Holy See. On one hand, a sense of nationalism and of patriotism had been steadily growing in England, and it was at variance with the older cosmopolitan idea of Catholicism. On the other hand, a great increase of royal power had appeared in the fifteenth century, notably after the accession of the Tudor family in 1485. Henry VII (1485−1509) had subordinated to the crown both the nobility and the parliament, and the patriotic support of the middle class he had secured. And when his son, Henry VIII (1509−1547), came to the throne, the only serious obstacle which appeared to be left in the way of royal absolutism was the privileged independence of the Catholic Church.

[Sidenote: Early Loyalty of Henry VIII to the Roman Catholic Church]

Yet a number of years passed before Henry VIII laid violent hands upon the Church. In the meanwhile, he proved himself a devoted Roman Catholic. He scented the new Lutheran heresy and sought speedily to exterminate it. He even wrote in 1521 with his own royal pen a bitter arraignment of the new theology, and sent his book, which he called *The Defence of the Seven Sacraments*, with a delightful dedicatory epistle to the pope. For his prompt piety and filial orthodoxy, he received from the bishop of Rome the proud title of *Fidei Defensor* , or Defender of the Faith, a title which he jealously bore until his death, and which his successors, the sovereigns of Great Britain, with like humor have continued to bear ever since. He seemed not even to question the pope's political claims. He allied himself on several occasions with Leo X in the great game of European politics. His

chief minister and adviser in England for many years was Thomas Wolsey, the most conspicuous ecclesiastic in his kingdom and a cardinal of the Roman Church.

[Sidenote: The Marriage Difficulty of Henry VIII]

Under these circumstances it is difficult to see how the Anglican Church would have immediately broken away from Catholic unity had it not been for the peculiar marital troubles of Henry VIII. The king had been married eighteen years to Catherine of Aragon, and had been presented by her with six children (of whom only one daughter, the Princess Mary, had survived), when one day he informed her that they had been living all those years in mortal sin and that their union was not true marriage. The queen could hardly be expected to agree with such a definition, and there ensued a legal suit between the royal pair.

To Henry VIII the matter was really quite simple. Henry was tired of Catherine and wanted to get rid of her; he believed the queen could bear him no more children and yet he ardently desired a male heir; rumor reported that the susceptible king had recently been smitten by the brilliant black eyes of a certain Anne Boleyn, a maid−in−waiting at the court. The purpose of Henry was obvious; so was the means, he thought. For it had occurred to him that Catherine was his elder brother's widow, and, therefore, had no right, by church law, to marry him. To be sure, a papal dispensation had been obtained from Pope Julius II authorizing the marriage, but why not now obtain a revocation of that dispensation from the reigning Pope Clement VII? Thus the marriage with Catherine could be declared null and void, and Henry would be a bachelor, thirty−six years of age, free to wed some princess, or haply Anne Boleyn.

[Sidenote: Difficult Position of the Pope]

There was no doubt that Clement VII would like to do a favor for his great English champion, but two difficulties at once presented themselves. It would be a most dangerous precedent for the pope to reverse the decision of one of his predecessors. Worse still, the Emperor Charles V, the nephew of Queen Catherine, took up cudgels in his aunt's behalf and threatened Clement with dire penalties if he nullified the marriage. The pope complained truthfully that he was between the anvil and the hammer. There was little for him to do except to temporize and to delay decision as long as possible.

The protracted delay was very irritating to the impulsive English king, who was now really in love with Anne Boleyn. Gradually Henry's former effusive loyalty to the Roman See gave way to a settled conviction of the tyranny of the papal power, and there rushed to his mind the recollection of efforts of earlier English rulers to restrict that power. A few salutary enactments against the Church might compel a favorable decision from the pope.

Henry VIII seriously opened his campaign against the Roman Church in 1531, when he frightened the English clergy into paying a fine of over half a million dollars for violating an obsolete statute that had forbidden reception of papal legates without royal sanction, and in the same year he forced the clergy to recognize himself as supreme head of the Church “as far as that is permitted by the law of Christ.” His subservient Parliament then empowered him to stop the payment of annates and to appoint the bishops without recourse to the papacy. Without waiting longer for the papal decision, he had Cranmer, one of his own creatures, whom he had just named archbishop of Canterbury, declare his marriage with Catherine null and void and his union with Anne Boleyn canonical and legal. Pope Clement VII thereupon handed down his long−delayed decision favorable to Queen Catherine, and excommunicated Henry VIII for adultery.

[Sidenote: Separation of England from the Roman Catholic Church: the Act of Supremacy]

The formal breach between England and Rome occurred in 1534. Parliament passed a series of laws, one of which declared the king to be the “only supreme head in earth of the Church of England,” and others cut off all communication with the pope and inflicted the penalty of treason upon any one who should deny the king's ecclesiastical supremacy.

One step in the transition of the Church of England had now been taken. For centuries its members had recognized the pope as their ecclesiastical head; henceforth they were to own the ecclesiastical headship of their king. From the former Catholic standpoint, this might be schism but it was not necessarily heresy. Yet Henry VIII encountered considerable opposition from the higher clergy, from the monks, and from many intellectual leaders, as well as from large numbers of the lower classes. A popular uprising—the Pilgrimage of Grace—was sternly suppressed, and such men as the brilliant Sir Thomas More and John Fisher, the aged and saintly bishop of Rochester, were beheaded because they retained their former belief in papal supremacy. Tudor despotism

triumphed.

[Sidenote: The “Six Articles"]

The breach with Rome naturally encouraged the Lutherans and other heretics to think that England was on the point of becoming Protestant, but nothing was further from the king's mind. The assailant of Luther remained at least partially consistent. And the Six Articles (1539) reaffirmed the chief points in Catholic doctrine and practice and visited dissenters with horrible punishment. While separating England from the papacy, Henry was firmly resolved to maintain every other tenet of the Catholic faith as he had received it. His middle−of−the−road policy was enforced with much bloodshed. On one side, the Catholic who denied the royal supremacy was beheaded; on the other, the Protestant who denied transubstantiation was burned! It has been estimated that during the reign of Henry VIII the number of capital condemnations for politico−religious offenses ran into the thousands— an inquisition that in terror and bloodshed is comparable to that of Spain.

[Sidenote: Suppression of the Monasteries]

It was likewise during the reign of Henry VIII that one of the most important of all earlier Christian institutions—monasticism—came to an end in England. There were certainly grave abuses and scandals in some of the monasteries which dotted the country, and a good deal of popular sentiment had been aroused against the institution. Then, too the monks had generally opposed the royal pretensions to religious control and remained loyal to the pope. But the deciding factor in the suppression of the monasteries was undoubtedly economic. Henry, always in need of funds on account of his extravagances, appropriated part of the confiscated property for the benefit of the crown, and the rest he astutely distributed as gigantic bribes to the upper classes of the laity. The nobles who accepted the ecclesiastical wealth were thereby committed to the new anti−papal religious settlement in England.

[Sidenote: Protestantizing the Church of England: Edward VI]

The Church of England, separated from the papacy under Henry VIII, became Protestant under Edward VI (1547−1553). The young king's guardian tolerated all manner of reforming propaganda, and Calvinists as well as Lutherans preached their doctrines freely. Official articles of religion, which were drawn up for the Anglican Church, showed unmistakably Protestant influence. The Latin service books of the Catholic Church were translated into English, under Cranmer's auspices, and the edition of the *Book of Common Prayer*, published in 1552, made clear that the Eucharist was no longer to be regarded as a propitiatory sacrifice: the names “Holy Communion” and “Lord's Supper" were substituted for “Mass,” while the word “altar” was replaced by “table.” The old places of Catholic worship were changed to suit a new order: altars and images were taken down, the former service books destroyed, and stained−glass windows broken. Several peasant uprisings signified that the nation was not completely united upon a policy of religious change, but the reformers had their way, and Protestantism advanced.

[Sidenote: Temporary Roman Catholic Revival under Mary Tudor]

A temporary setback to the progress of the new Anglicanism was afforded by the reign of Mary Tudor (1553−1558), the daughter of Catherine of Aragon, and a devout Roman Catholic. She reinstated the bishops who had refused to take the oath of royal supremacy and punished those who had taken it. She prevailed upon Parliament to repeal the ecclesiastical legislation of both her father's and her brother's reigns and to reconcile England once more with the bishop of Rome. A papal legate, in the person of Cardinal Reginald Pole, sailed up the Thames with his cross gleaming from the prow of his barge, and in full Parliament administered the absolution which freed the kingdom from the guilt under Mary incurred by its schism and heresy. As an additional support to her policy of restoring the Catholic Church in England, Queen Mary married her cousin, Philip II of Spain, the great champion of Catholicism upon the Continent.

But events proved that despite outward appearances even the reign of Mary registered an advance of Protestantism. The new doctrines were zealously propagated by an ever−growing number of itinerant exhorters. The Spanish alliance was disastrous to English fortunes abroad and distasteful to all patriotic Englishmen at home. And finally, the violent means which the queen took to stamp out heresy gave her the unenviable surname of “Bloody” and reacted in the end in behalf of the views for which the victims sacrificed their lives. During her reign nearly three hundred reformers perished, many of them, including Archbishop Cranmer, by fire. The work of the queen was in vain. No heir was born to Philip and Mary, and the crown, therefore, passed to Elizabeth, the daughter of Anne Boleyn, a Protestant not so much from conviction as from circumstance.

[Sidenote: Definite Fashioning of Anglicanism: the Reign of Elizabeth]

It was in the reign of Elizabeth (1558−1603) that the Church of England assumed definitely the doctrines and practices which we now connect with the word “Anglicanism.” By act of Parliament, the English Church was again separated from the papacy, and placed under royal authority, Elizabeth assuming the title of “supreme governor.” The worship of the state church was to be in conformity with a slightly altered version of Cranmer's *Book of Common Prayer*. A uniform doctrine was likewise imposed by Parliament in the form of the *Thirty−nine Articles*, which set a distinctively Protestant mark upon the Anglican Church in its appeal to the Scriptures as the sole rule of faith, its insistence on justification by faith alone, its repudiation of the sacrifice of the Mass, and its definition of the Church. All the bishops who had been appointed under Mary, with one exception, refused to accept the changes, and were therefore deposed and imprisoned, but new bishops, Elizabeth's own appointees, were consecrated and the “succession of bishops” thereby maintained. Outwardly, the Church of England appeared to retain a corporate continuity throughout the sixteenth century; inwardly, a great revolution had changed it from Catholic to Protestant.

Harsh laws sought to oblige all Englishmen to conform to Elizabeth's religious settlement. Liberty of public worship was denied to any dissenter from Anglicanism. To be a “papist” or “hear Mass”—which were construed as the same thing—was punishable by death as high treason. A special ecclesiastical court—the Court of High Commission—was established under royal authority to search out heresy and to enforce uniformity; it served throughout Elizabeth's reign as a kind of Protestant Inquisition.

[Sidenote: English Dissent from Anglicanism]

While the large majority of the English nation gradually conformed to the official Anglican Church, a considerable number refused their allegiance. On one hand were the Roman Catholics, who still maintained the doctrine of papal supremacy and were usually derisively styled papists, and on the other hand were various Calvinistic sects, such as Presbyterians or Independents or Quakers, who went by the name of “Dissenters” or “Non−conformists.” In the course of time, the number of Roman Catholics tended to diminish, largely because, for political reasons which have been indicated in the preceding chapter, Protestantism in England became almost synonymous with English patriotism. But despite drastic laws and dreadful persecutions, Roman Catholicism survived in England among a conspicuous group of people. On the other hand, the Calvinists tended somewhat to increase their numbers so that in the seventeenth century they were able to precipitate a great political and ecclesiastical conflict with Anglicanism.

## THE CATHOLIC REFORMATION

We have now traced the origins of the Protestant Revolt against the Catholic Church, and have seen how, between 1520 and 1570, three major varieties of new theology—Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism—appeared on the scene and divided among themselves the nations of northern Europe. The story of how, during that critical half−century, the other civilized nations retained their loyalty to the Catholic Church virtually as it had existed throughout the middle ages, remains to be told. The preservation of the papal monarchy and Catholic doctrine in southern Europe was due alike to religious and to political circumstances.

It must not be supposed that pious critics of ecclesiastical abuses were confined to countries which subsequently became Protestant. There were many sincere Catholics in Italy, Austria, France, and Spain who complained of the scandals and worldliness that afflicted the Church at the opening of the sixteenth century: they demanded sweeping reforms in discipline and a return of the clergy to a simple apostolic life. They believed, however, that whatever change was desirable could best be achieved by means of a reformation within the Catholic Church—that is, without disturbing the unity of its organization or denying the validity of its dogmas—while the critics of northern Europe, as we have seen, preferred to put their reforms into practice by means of a revolution—an out−and−out break with century−old traditions of Catholic Christianity. Even in northern Europe some of the foremost scholars of that period desired an intellectual reformation within Catholicism rather than a dogmatic rebellion against it: with Luther's defiance of papal authority, the great Erasmus had small sympathy, and Sir Thomas More, the eminent English humanist, sacrificed his life for his belief in the divine sanction of the papal power.

Thus, while the religious energy of northern Europe went into Protestantism of various kinds, that of southern Europe fashioned a reformation of the Catholic system. And this Catholic reformation, on its religious side, was brought to a successful issue by means of the improved conditions in the papal court, the labors of a great church

council, and the activity of new monastic orders. A few words must be said about each one of these religious elements in the Catholic reformation.

[Sidenote: Reforming Popes]

Mention has been made of the corruption that prevailed in papal affairs in the fifteenth century, and of the Italian and family interests which obscured to the Medici pope, Leo X (1513−1521), the importance of the Lutheran movement in Germany. And Leo's nephew, who became Clement VII (1523−1534), continued to act too much as an Italian prince and too little as the moral and religious leader of Catholicism in the contest which under him was joined with Zwinglians and Anglicans as well as with Lutherans. But under Paul III (1534−1549), a new policy was inaugurated, by which men were appointed to high church offices for their virtue and learning rather than for family relationship or financial gain. This policy was maintained by a series of upright and far−sighted popes during the second half of the sixteenth century, so that by the year 1600 a remarkable reformation had been gradually wrought in the papacy, among the cardinals, down through the prelates, even to the parish priests and monks.

[Sidenote: The Council of Trent]

The reforming zeal of individual popes was stimulated and reinforced by the work of the Council of Trent (1545−1563). The idea of effecting a “reformation in head and members” by means of a general council of the Catholic Church had been invoked several times during the century that preceded the Protestant Revolt, but, before Luther, little had been accomplished in that way.

With the widening of the breach between Protestantism and the medieval Church, what had formerly been desirable now became imperative. It seemed to pious Catholics that every effort should be made to reconcile differences and to restore the unity of the Church. The errors of the manifold new theologies which now appeared might be refuted by a clear statement of Catholic doctrine, and a reformation of discipline and morals would deprive the innovators of one of their most telling weapons against the Church.

It was no easy task, in that troublous time, to hold an ecumenical council. There was mutual distrust between Catholics and Protestants. There was uncertainty as to the relative powers and prerogatives of council and pope. There were bitter national rivalries, especially between Italians and Germans. There was actual warfare between the two chief Catholic families—the Habsburgs of Germany and Spain and the royal house of France.

Yet despite these difficulties, which long postponed its convocation and repeatedly interrupted its labors, the Council of Trent [Footnote: Trent was selected largely by reason of its geographical location, being situated on the boundary between the German−speaking and Italian−speaking peoples.] consummated a great reform in the Church and contributed materially to the preservation of the Catholic faith. The Protestants, whom the pope invited to participate, absented themselves; yet such was the number and renown of the Catholic bishops who responded to the summons that the Council of Trent easily ranked with the eighteen oecumenical councils which had preceded it. [Footnote: Its decrees were signed at its close (1563) by 4 cardinal legates, 2 cardinals, 3 patriarchs, 25 archbishops, 167 bishops, 7 abbots, 7 generals of orders, and 19 proxies for 33 absent prelates.] The work of the council was twofold—dogmatic and reformatory.

Dogmatically, the fathers at Trent offered no compromise to the Protestants. They confirmed with inexorable frankness the main points in Catholic theology which had been worked out in the thirteenth century by Thomas Aquinas and which before the appearance of Protestantism had been received everywhere in central and western Europe. They declared that the tradition of the Church as well as the Bible was to be taken as the basis of the Christian religion, and that the interpretation of the Holy Scripture belonged only to the Church. The Protestant teachings about grace and justification by faith were condemned, and the seven sacraments were pronounced indispensable. The miraculous and sacrificial character of the Lord's Supper (Mass) was reaffirmed. Belief in the invocation of saints, in the veneration of images and of relics, in purgatory and indulgences was explicitly stated, but precautions were taken to clear some of the doctrines of the pernicious practices which at times had been connected with them. The spiritual authority of the Roman See was confirmed over all Catholicism: the pope was recognized as supreme interpreter of the canons and incontestable chief of bishops.

[Sidenote: Reformatory Canons of the Council of Trent ]

A volume of disciplinary statutes constituted the second achievement of the Tridentine Council. The sale of church offices was condemned. Bishops and other prelates were to reside in their respective dioceses, abandon worldly pursuits, and give themselves entirely to spiritual labors. Seminaries were to be established for the proper

education and training of priests.

While Latin was retained as the official and liturgical language, frequent sermons were to be preached in the vernacular. Indulgences were not to be issued for money, and no charge should be made for conferring the sacraments.

[Sidenote: Index and inquisition ]

The seed sown by the council bore abundant fruit during several succeeding pontificates. The central government was completely reorganized. A definite catechism was prepared at Rome and every layman instructed in the tenets and obligations of his religion. Revisions were made in the service books of the Church, and a new standard edition of the Latin Bible, the Vulgate, was issued. A list, called the Index, was prepared of dangerous and heretical books, which good Catholics were prohibited from reading. By these methods, discipline was in fact confirmed, morals purified, and the scandal of the immense riches and the worldly life of the clergy restrained. From an unusually strict law of faith and conduct, lapses were to be punishable by the ancient ecclesiastical court of the Inquisition, which now zealously redoubled its activity, especially in Italy and in Spain.

A very important factor in the Catholic revival—not only in preserving all southern Europe to the Church but also in preventing a complete triumph of Protestantism in the North—was the formation of several new religious orders, which sought to purify the life of the people and to bulwark the position of the Church. The most celebrated of these orders, both for its labors in the sixteenth century and for its subsequent history, is the Society of Jesus, whose members are known commonly as Jesuits. The society was founded by Ignatius Loyola [Footnote: Ignatius Loyola (1491−1556).] in 1534 and its constitution was formally approved by the pope six years later.

[Sidenote: Ignatius Loyola]

In his earlier years, Ignatius followed the profession of arms, and as a patriotic Spaniard fought valiantly in the armies of Emperor Charles V against the French. But while he was in a hospital, suffering from a wound, he chanced to read a Life of Christ and biographies of several saints, which, he tells us, worked a great change within him. From being a soldier of an earthly king, he would now become a knight of Christ and of the Church. Instead of fighting for the glory of Spain and of himself, he would henceforth strive for the greater glory of God. Thus in the very year in which the German monk, Martin Luther, became the leading and avowed adversary of the Catholic Church, this Spanish soldier was starting on that remarkable career which was to make him Catholicism's chief champion.

After a few years' trial of his new life and several rather footless efforts to serve the Church, Ignatius determined, at the age of thirty−three, to perfect his scanty education. It was while he was studying Latin, philosophy, and theology at the University of Paris that he made the acquaintance of the group of scholarly and saintly men who became the first members of the Society of Jesus. Intended at first primarily for missionary labors among the Mohammedans, the order was speedily turned to other and greater ends.

[Sidenote: The Jesuits]

The organization of the Jesuits showed the military instincts of their founder. To the three usual vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience, was added a fourth vow of special allegiance to the pope. The members were to be carefully trained during a long novitiate and were to be under the personal direction of a general, resident in Rome. Authority and obedience were stressed by the society. Then, too, St. Ignatius Loyola understood that the Church was now confronted with conditions of war rather than of peace: accordingly he directed that his brothers should not content themselves with prayer and works of peace, with charity and local benevolence, but should adapt themselves to new circumstances and should strive in a multiplicity of ways to restore all things in the Catholic Church.

Thus it happened that the Jesuits, from the very year of their establishment, rushed to the front in the religious conflict of the sixteenth century. In the first place, they sought to enlighten and educate the young. As schoolmasters they had no equals in Europe for many years. No less a scholar and scientist than Lord Francis Bacon said of the Jesuit teaching that “nothing better has been put in practice.” Again, by their wide learning and culture, no less than by the unimpeachable purity of their lives, they won back a considerable respect for the Catholic clergy. As preachers, too, they earned a high esteem by the clearness and simplicity of their sermons and instruction.

It was in the mission field, however, that the Jesuits achieved the most considerable results. They were mainly

responsible for the recovery of Poland after that country had almost become Lutheran. They similarly conserved the Catholic faith in Bavaria and in the southern Netherlands. They insured a respectable Catholic party in Bohemia and in Hungary. They aided considerably in maintaining Catholicism in Ireland. At the hourly risk of their lives, they ministered to their fellow−Catholics in England under Elizabeth and the Stuarts. And what the Catholic Church lost in numbers through the defection of the greater part of northern Europe was compensated for by Jesuit missions among the teeming millions in India and China, among the Huron and Iroquois tribes of North America, and among the aborigines of Brazil and Paraguay. No means of influence, no source of power, was neglected that would win men to religion and to the authority of the bishop of Rome. Politics and agriculture were utilized as well as literature and science. The Jesuits were confessors of kings in Europe and apostles of the faith in Asia and America.

[Sidenote: Political and Economic Factors in the Catholic Reformation]

It has been pointed out already that the rapid diffusion of Protestantism was due to economic and political causes as well as to those narrowly religious. It may be said with equal truth that political and economic causes co−operated with the religious developments that we have just noted in maintaining the supremacy of the Catholic Church in at least half the countries over which she had exercised her sway in 1500. For one thing, it is doubtful whether financial abuses had flourished as long or as vigorously in southern as in northern Europe. For another, the political conditions in the states of southern Europe help to explain the interesting situation.

[Sidebar: Italy]

In Italy was the pope's residence and See. He had bestowed many favors on important Italian families. He had often exploited foreign countries in behalf of Italian patronage. He had taken advantage of the political disunity of the peninsula to divide his local enemies and thereby to assure the victory of his own cause. Two popes of the sixteenth century belonged to the powerful Florentine family of the Medici—Florence remained loyal. The hearty support of the Emperor Charles V preserved the orthodoxy of Naples, and that of Philip II stamped out heresy in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

[Sidenote: France]

In France, the concordat of 1516 between pope and king had peacefully secured for the French monarch appointment of bishops and control of benefices within his country,—powers which the German princes and the English sovereigns secured by revolutionary change. Moreover, French Protestantism, by its political activities in behalf of effective checks upon the royal power, drove the king into Catholic arms: the cause of absolutism in France became the cause of Catholicism, and the latter was bound up with French patriotism to quite the same extent as English patriotism became linked with the fortunes of Anglicanism.

[Sidenote: Spain and Portugal]

In Spain and Portugal, the monarchs obtained concessions from the pope like those accorded the French sovereigns. They gained control of the Catholic Church within their countries and found it a most valuable ally in forwarding their absolutist tendencies. Moreover, the centuries−long struggle with Mohammedanism had endeared Catholic Christianity alike to Spaniards and to Portuguese and rendered it an integral part of their national life. Spain and Portugal now remained fiercely Catholic.

[Sidenote: Austria]

Somewhat similar was the case of Austria. Terrifying fear of the advancing Turk, joined with the political exigencies of the Habsburg rulers, threw that duchy with most of its dependencies into the hands of the pope. If the bishop of Rome, by favoring the Habsburgs, had lost England, he had at least saved Austria.

[Sidenote: Poland and Ireland]

Ireland and Poland—those two extreme outposts of the Roman Catholic Church in Europe—found their religion to be the most effectual safeguard of their nationality, the most valuable weapon against aggression or assimilation by powerful neighbors.

SUMMARY OF THE RELIGIOUS REVOLUTION IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

By the year 1570 the profound religious and ecclesiastical changes which we have been sketching had been made. For seventy−five years more a series of wars was to be waged in which the religious element was distinctly to enter. In fact these wars have often been called the Religious Wars—the ones connected with the career of Philip II of Spain as well as the subsequent dismal civil war in the Germanies—but in each one the political and economic factors predominated. Nor did the series of wars materially affect the strength or extent of the religions

implicated. It was prior to 1570 that the Protestant Revolt had been effected and the Catholic Reformation achieved.

[Sidenote: Geographical Extent of the Revolt]

In the year 1500, the Roman Catholic Church embraced central and western Europe; in the year 1600 nearly half of its former subjects— those throughout northern Europe—no longer recognized its authority or practiced its beliefs. There were left to the Roman Catholic Church at the close of the sixteenth century the Italian states, Spain, Portugal, most of France, the southern Netherlands, the forest cantons of Switzerland, the southern Germanies, Austria, Poland, Ireland, large followings in Bohemia and Hungary, and a straggling unimportant following in other countries.

Those who rejected the Roman Catholic Church in central and western Europe were collectively called Protestants, but they were divided into three major groups. Lutheranism was now the religion of the northern Germanies and the Scandinavian states of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Calvinism, under a bewildering variety of names, was the recognized faith of the majority of the cantons of Switzerland, of the northern Netherlands, and Scotland, and of important followings in Germany, Hungary, France, and England. Anglicanism was the established religion of England.

[Sidenote: Doctrines Held in Common by Catholics and Protestants]

The Protestants retained a large part of Catholic theology, so that all portions of western Christianity continued to have much in common. They still believed in the Trinity, in the divinity of Jesus Christ, in the sacredness of the Jewish scriptures and of the New Testament, the fall of man and his redemption through the sacrifice of the Cross, and in a future life of rewards and punishments. The Christian moralities and virtues continued to be inculcated by Protestants as well as by Catholics.

[Sidenote: Doctrines Held by all Protestants Apart from Catholics]

On the other hand, the Protestants held in common certain doctrines which separated all of them from Roman Catholicism. These were the distinguishing marks of Protestantism: (1) denial of the claims of the bishop of Rome and consequent rejection of the papal government and jurisdiction; (2) rejection of such doctrines as were supposed to have developed during the middle ages,—for example, purgatory, indulgences, invocation of saints, and veneration of relics,—together with important modifications in the sacramental system; (3) insistence upon the right of the individual to interpret the Bible, and recognition of the individual's ability to save himself without the interposition of ecclesiastics—hence to the Protestant, authority resided in individual interpretation of the Bible, while to the Catholic, it rested in a living institution or Church.

[Sidenote: Divisions among Protestants]

Now the Protestant idea of authority made it possible and essentially inevitable that its supporters should not agree on many things among themselves. There would be almost as many ways of interpreting the Scriptures as there were interested individuals. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the last Almanac some one hundred and sixty−four varieties or denominations of Protestants are listed in the United States alone. These divisions, however, are not so complex as at first might appear, because nearly all of them have come directly from the three main forms of Protestantism which appeared in the sixteenth century. Just how Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Anglicanism differed from each other may be gathered from a short summary.

(1) The Calvinists taught justification by election—that God determines, or *predestines*, who is to be saved and who is to be lost. The Lutherans were inclined to reject such doctrine, and to assure salvation to the mere believer. The Anglicans appeared to accept the Lutheran doctrine of justification by faith, although the Thirty−nine Articles might be likewise interpreted in harmony with the Calvinistic position.

(2) The Calvinists recognized only two sacraments—baptism and the Lord's Supper. Lutherans and Anglicans retained, in addition to the two sacraments, the rite of confirmation, and Anglicans also the rite of ordination. The official statement of Anglicanism that there are “two major sacraments” has made it possible for some Anglicans—the so−called High Church party—to hold the Catholic doctrine of seven sacraments.

(3) Various substitutes were made for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation, the idea that in the Lord's Supper the bread and wine by the word of the priest are actually changed into the Body and Blood of Christ. The Lutherans maintained what they called consubstantiation, that Christ was *with* and *in* the bread and wine, as fire is in a hot iron, to borrow the metaphor of Luther himself. The Calvinists, on the other hand, saw in the Eucharist, not the efficacious sacrifice of Christ, but a simple commemoration of the Last Supper; to them the bread and

wine were mere symbols of the Body and Blood. As to the Anglicans, their position was ambiguous, for their official confession of faith declared at once that the Supper is the communion of the Body and Blood of Jesus Christ but that the communicant receives Jesus Christ only spiritually: the present−day “Low Church” Anglicans incline to a Calvinistic interpretation, those of the “High Church” to the Catholic explanation.

(4) There were pronounced differences in ecclesiastical government. All the Protestants considerably modified the Catholic system of a divinely appointed clergy of bishops, priests, and deacons, under the supreme spiritual jurisdiction of the pope. The Anglicans rejected the papacy, although they retained the orders of bishop, priest, and deacon, and insisted that their hierarchy was the direct continuation of the medieval Church in England, and therefore that their organization was on the same footing as the Orthodox Church of eastern Europe. The Lutherans rejected the divinely ordained character of episcopacy, but retained bishops as convenient administrative officers. The Calvinists did away with bishops altogether and kept only one order of clergymen—the presbyters. Such Calvinistic churches as were governed by assemblies or synods of presbyters were called Presbyterian; those which subordinated the “minister” to the control of the people in each separate congregation were styled Independent, or Separatist, or Congregational. [Footnote: This latter type of church government was maintained also by the quasi−Calvinistic denomination of the Baptists.]

(5) In the ceremonies of public worship the Protestant churches differed. Anglicanism kept a good deal of the Catholic ritual although in the form of translation from Latin to English, together with several Catholic ceremonies, in some places even employing candles and incense. The Calvinists, on the other hand, worshiped with extreme simplicity: reading of the Bible, singing of hymns, extemporaneous prayer, and preaching constituted the usual service in church buildings that were without superfluous ornaments. Between Anglican formalism and Calvinistic austerity, the Lutherans presented a compromise: they devised no uniform liturgy, but showed some inclination to utilize forms and ceremonies.

[Sidenote: Significance of the Protestant Revolt]

Of the true significance of the great religious and ecclesiastical changes of the sixteenth century many estimates in the past have been made, varying with the point of view, or bias, of each author. Several results, however, now stand out clearly and are accepted generally by all scholars, regardless of religious affiliations. These results may be expressed as follows:

In the first place, the Catholic Church of the middle ages was disrupted and the medieval ideal of a universal theocracy under the bishop of Rome was rudely shocked.

In the second place, the Christian religion was largely nationalized. Protestantism was the religious aspect of nationalism; it naturally came into being as a protest against the cosmopolitan character of Catholicism; it received its support from *nations*; and it assumed everywhere a national form. The German states, the Scandinavian countries, Scotland, England, each had its established state religion. What remained to the Catholic Church, as we have seen, was essentially for national reasons and henceforth rested mainly on a national basis.

Thirdly, the whole movement tended to narrow the Catholic Church dogmatically. The exigencies of answering the Protestants called forth explicit definitions of belief. The Catholic Church was henceforth on the defensive, and among her members fewer differences of opinion were tolerated than formerly.

Fourthly, a great impetus to individual morality, as well as to theological study, was afforded by the reformation. Not only were many men's minds turned temporarily from other intellectual interests to religious controversy, but the individual faithful Catholic or Protestant was encouraged to vie with his neighbor in actually proving that his particular religion inculcated a higher moral standard than any other. It rendered the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries more earnest and serious and also more bigoted than the fifteenth.

Finally, the Protestant Revolution led immediately to important political and social changes. The power of secular rulers was immeasurably increased. By confiscation of church lands and control of the clergy, the Tudor sovereigns in England, the kings in Scandinavia, and the German princes were personally enriched and freed from fear of being hampered in absolutist tendencies by an independent ecclesiastical organization. Even in Catholic countries, the monarchs were able to wring such concessions from the pope as resulted in shackling the Church to the crown.

The wealth of the nobles was swelled, especially in Protestant countries, by seizure of the property of the Church either directly or by means of bribes tendered for aristocratic support of the royal confiscations. But despite such an access of wealth, the monarchs took pains to see that the nobility acquired no new political

influence.

In order to prevent the nobles from recovering political power, the absolutist monarchs enlisted the services of the faithful middle class, which speedily attained an enviable position in the principal European states. It is safe to say that the Protestant Revolution was one of many elements assisting in the development of this middle class.

For the peasantry—still the bulk of European population—the religious and ecclesiastical changes seem to have been peculiarly unfortunate. What they gained through a diminution of ecclesiastical dues and taxes was more than lost through the growth of royal despotism and the exactions of hard−hearted lay proprietors. The peasants had changed the names of their oppressors and found themselves in a worse condition than before. There is little doubt that, at least so far as the Germanies and the Scandinavian countries are concerned, the lot of the peasants was less favorable immediately after, than immediately before, the rise of Protestantism.

ADDITIONAL READING

GENERAL. Good brief accounts of the whole religious revolution of the sixteenth century: Frederic Seebohm, *The Era of the Protestant Revolution,* new ed. (1904); J. H. Robinson, *Reformation,* in "Encyclopaedia Britannica," 11th ed. (1911); A. H. Johnson, *Europe in the Sixteenth Century* (1897), ch. iii−v and pp. 272 ff.; E. M. Hulme, *Renaissance and Reformation,* 2d ed. (1915), ch. x−xviii, xxi−xxiii; Victor Duruy, *History of Modern Times,* trans. and rev. by E. A. Grosvenor (1894), ch. xiii, xiv. More detailed accounts are given in the *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. II (1904), and in the *Histoire generate,* Vol. IV, ch. x−xvii, and Vol. V, ch. i. All the standard general histories of the Christian Church contain accounts of the rise of Protestantism, naturally varying among themselves according to the religious convictions of their authors. Among the best Protestant histories may be cited: T. M. Lindsay, *A History of the Reformation,* 2 vols. (1906−1910); Wilhelm Moeller, *History of the Christian Church,* trans. and condensed by J. H. Freese, 3 vols. (1893−1900); Philip Schaff, *History of the Christian Church,* Vols. VI and VII; A. H. Newman, A Manual of Church History, Vol. II (1903), Period V; G. P. Fisher, *History of the Christian Church* (1887), Period VIII, ch. i− xii. From the Catholic standpoint the best ecclesiastical histories are: John Alzog, *Manual of Universal Church History,* trans. from 9th German edition (1903), Vol. II and Vol. Ill, Epoch I; and the histories in German by Joseph (Cardinal) Hergen−rother [ed. by J. P. Kirsch, 2 vols. (1902−1904)], by Alois Knopfler (5th ed., 1910) [based on the famous *Conciliengeschichte* of K. J. (Bishop) von Hefele], and by F. X. von Funk (5th ed., 1911); see, also, Alfred Baudrillart, *The Catholic Church, the Renaissance and Protestantism,* Eng. trans. by Mrs. Philip Gibbs (1908). Many pertinent articles are to be found in the scholarly *Catholic Encyclopedia,* 15 vols. (1907−1912), in the famous *Realencyklopaedie fuer protestantische Theologie und Kirche* , 3d ed., 24 vols. (1896−1913), and in the (Non−Catholic) *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics,* ed. by James Hastings and now (1916) in course of publication. For the popes of the period, see Ludwig Pastor, *The History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages,* the monumental work of a distinguished Catholic historian, the twelfth volume of which (coming down to 1549) was published in English translation in 1912; and the older but still useful (Protestant) *History of the Papacy from the Great Schism to the Sack of Rome* by Mandell Creighton, new ed. in 6 vols. (1899−1901), and *History of the Popes* by Leopold von Ranke, 3 vols. in the Bonn Library (1885). Heinrich Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum, et Declarationium de rebus fidei el morum,* 11nth ed. (1911), is a convenient collection of official pronouncements in Latin on the Catholic Faith. Philip Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom,* 3 vols. (1878), contains the chief Greek, Latin, and Protestant creeds in the original and usually also in English translation. Also useful is B. J. Kidd (editor), *Documents Illustrative of the Continental Reformation* (1911). For additional details of the relation of the Reformation to sixteenth−century politics, consult the bibliography appended to Chapter III, above.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE EARLY SIXTEENTH CENTURY. In the *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. I (1902), a severe indictment of the Church is presented (ch. xix) by H. C. Lea, and a defense is offered (ch. xviii) by William Barry. The former opinions are developed startlingly by H. C. Lea in Vol. I, ch. i, of his *History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages.* An old−fashioned, though still interesting, Protestant view is that of William Roscoe, *Life and Pontificate of Leo X,* 4 vols. (first pub. 1805−1806, many subsequent editions). For an excellent description of the organization of the Catholic Church, see Andre Mater, *L'eglise catholique, sa constitution, son administration* (1906). The best edition of the canon law is that of Friedberg, 2 vols. (1881). On the social work of the Church: E. L. Cutts, *Parish Priests and their People in the Middle Ages in England* (1898), and G. A. Prevost, *L'eglise et les campagnes au moyen age* (1892). The most recent and comprehensive study of the Catholic Church on the eve of the Protestant Revolt is that of Pierre Imbart de la Tour, *Les origines de la Reforme,* Vol. I, *La*

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# CHAPTER V. THE CULTURE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: “Culture"]

“Culture” is a word generally used to denote learning and refinement in manners and art. The development of culture—the acquisition of new knowledge and the creation of beautiful things—is ordinarily the work of a comparatively small number of scientists and artists. Now if in any particular period or among any special people, we find a relatively larger group of intellectual leaders who succeed in establishing an important educated class and in making permanent contributions to the civilization of posterity, then we say that it is a cultured century or a cultured nation.

[Sidenote: Greek Culture]

All races and all generations have had some kind of culture, but within the recorded history of humanity, certain peoples and certain centuries stand out most distinctly as influencing its evolution. Thus, the Greeks of the fourth and fifth centuries before Christ gathered together and handed down to us all manner of speculation about the nature of the universe, all manner of hypothetical answers to the eternal questions—Whence do we come, What are we doing, Where do we go?—and this was the foundation of modern philosophy and metaphysics. From the same Greeks came our geometry and the rudiments of our sciences of astronomy and medicine. It was they who gave us the model for nearly every form of literature—dramatic, epic, and lyric poetry, dialogues, oratory, history—and in their well−proportioned temples, in their balanced columns and elaborate friezes, in their marble chiselings of the perfect human form, they fashioned for us forever the classical expression of art.

[Sidenote: Roman Culture]

Still in ancient times, the Romans developed classical architecture in the great triumphal arches and in the high−domed public buildings which strewed their empire. They adapted the fine forms of Greek literature to their own more pompous, but less subtle, Latin language. They devised a code of law and a legal system which made them in a real sense the teachers of order and the founders of the modern study of law.

[Sidenote: Mohammedan Culture]

The Mohammedans, too, at the very time when the Christians of western Europe were neglecting much of the ancient heritage, kept alive the traditions of Greek philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, and medicine. From eastern Asia they borrowed algebra, the Arabic numerals, and the compass, and, in their own great cities of Bagdad, Damascus, and Cordova, they themselves developed the curiously woven curtains and rugs, the strangely wrought blades and metallic ornaments, the luxurious dwellings and graceful minarets which distinguish Arabic or Mohammedan art.

[Sidenote: Medieval Culture]

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries—the height of the middle ages —came a wonderful outburst of intellectual and artistic activity. Under the immediate auspices of the Catholic Church it brought forth abundantly a peculiarly Christian culture. Renewed acquaintance with Greek philosophy, especially with that of Aristotle, was joined with a lively religious faith to produce the so called scholastic philosophy and theology. Great institutions of higher learning—the universities— were now founded, in which centered the revived study not only of philosophy but of law and medicine as well, and over which appeared the first cloud−wrapped dawn of modern experimental science. And side by side with the sonorous Latin tongue, which long continued to be used by scholars, were formed the vernacular languages—German, English, French, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, etc.—that gave a wealth of variety to reviving popular literature. Majestic cathedrals with pointed arch and flying buttress, with lofty spire and delicate tracery, wonderful wood carvings, illuminated manuscripts, quaint gargoyles, myriad statues of saints and martyrs, delicately colored paintings of surpassing beauty—all betokened the great Christian, or Gothic, art of the middle ages.

[Sidenote: New Elements in Culture of Sixteenth Century]

The educated person of the sixteenth century was heir to all these cultural periods: intellectually and artistically he was descended from Greeks, Romans, Mohammedans, and his medieval Christian forbears. But the sixteenth century itself added cultural contributions to the original store, which help to explain not only the social, political, and ecclesiastical activities of that time but also many of our present−day actions and ideas. The

essentially new factors in sixteenth−century culture may be reckoned as (1) the diffusion of knowledge as a result of the invention of printing; (2) the development of literary criticism by means of humanism; (3) a golden age of painting and architecture; (4) the flowering of national literature; (5) the beginnings of modern natural science.

THE INVENTION OF PRINTING

The present day is notably distinguished by the prevalence of enormous numbers of printed books, periodicals, and newspapers. Yet this very printing, which seems so commonplace to us now, has had, in all, but a comparatively brief existence. From the earliest recorded history up to less than five hundred years ago every book in Europe [Footnote: For an account of early printing in China, Japan, and Korea, see the informing article "Typography" in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica,* 11th edition, Vol. XXVII, p. 510.] was laboriously written by hand, [Footnote: It is interesting to note the meaning of our present word "manuscript," which is derived from the Latin—*manu scriptum* ("written by hand").] and, although copyists acquired an astonishing swiftness in reproducing books, libraries of any size were the property exclusively of rich institutions or wealthy individuals. It was at the beginning of modern times that the invention of printing revolutionized intellectual history.

Printing is an extremely complicated process, and it is small wonder that centuries of human progress elapsed before its invention was complete. Among the most essential elements of the perfected process are *movable type* with which the impression is made, and *paper* , on which it is made. A few facts may be conveniently culled from the long involved story of the development of each of these elements.

[Sidenote: Development of paper]

For their manuscripts the Greeks and Romans had used papyrus, the prepared fiber of a tough reed which grew in the valley of the Nile River. This papyrus was very expensive and heavy, and not at all suitable for printing. Parchment, the dressed skins of certain animals, especially sheep, which became the standard material for the hand−written documents of the middle ages, was extremely durable, but like papyrus, it was costly, unwieldy, and ill adapted for printing.

The forerunner of modern European paper was probably that which the Chinese made from silk as early as the second century before Christ. For silk the Mohammedans at Mecca and Damascus in the middle of the eighth century appear to have substituted cotton, and this so−called Damascus paper was later imported into Greece and southern Italy and into Spain. In the latter country the native−grown hemp and flax were again substituted for cotton, and the resulting linen paper was used considerably in Castile in the thirteenth century and thence penetrated across the Pyrenees into France and gradually all over western and central Europe. Parchment, however, for a long time kept its preeminence over silk, cotton, or linen paper, because of its greater firmness and durability, and notaries were long forbidden to use any other substance in their official writings. Not until the second half of the fifteenth century was assured the triumph of modern paper, [Footnote: The word "paper" is derived from the ancient "papyrus."] as distinct from papyrus or parchment, when printing, then on the threshold of its career, demanded a substance of moderate price that would easily receive the impression of movable type.

[Sidenote: Development of Movable Type]

The idea of movable type was derived from an older practice of carving reverse letters or even whole inscriptions upon blocks of wood so that when they were inked and applied to writing material they would leave a clear impression. Medieval kings and princes frequently had their signatures cut on these blocks of wood or metal, in order to impress them on charters, and a kind of engraving was employed to reproduce pictures or written pages as early as the twelfth century.

It was a natural but slow evolution from block−impressing to the practice of casting individual letters in separate little pieces of metal, all of the same height and thickness, and then arranging them in any desired sequence for printing. The great advantage of movable type over the blocks was the infinite variety of work which could be done by simply setting and resetting the type.

The actual history of the transition from the use of blocks to movable type—the real invention of modern printing—is shrouded in a good deal of mystery and dispute. It now appears likely that by the year 1450, an obscure Lourens Coster of the Dutch town of Haarlem had devised movable type, that Coster's invention was being utilized by a certain Johan Gutenberg in the German city of Mainz, and that improvements were being added by various other contemporaries. Papal letters of indulgence and a version of the Bible, both printed in 1454, are the earliest monuments of the new art.

Slowly evolved, the marvelous art, once thoroughly developed, spread with almost lightning rapidity from

Mainz throughout the Germanics, the Italian states, France, and England,—in fact, throughout all Christian Europe. It was welcomed by scholars and applauded by popes. Printing presses were erected at Rome in 1466, and book−publishing speedily became an honorable and lucrative business in every large city. Thus, at the opening of the sixteenth century, the scholarly Aldus Manutius was operating in Venice the famous Aldine press, whose beautiful editions of the Greek and Latin classics are still esteemed as masterpieces of the printer's art.

The early printers fashioned the characters of their type after the letters that the scribes had used in long−hand writing. Different kinds of common hand−writing gave rise, therefore, to such varieties of type as the heavy black−faced Gothic that prevailed in the Germanics or the several adaptations of the clear, neat Roman characters which predominated in southern Europe and in England. The compressed “italic" type was devised in the Aldine press in Venice to enable the publisher to crowd more words upon a page.

[Sidenote: Results of Invention of Printing]

A constant development of the new art characterized the sixteenth century, and at least three remarkable results became evident. (1) There was an almost incalculable increase in the supply of books. Under earlier conditions, a skilled and conscientious copyist might, by prodigious toil, produce two books in a year. Now, in a single year of the sixteenth century, some 24,000 copies of one of Erasmus's books were struck off by one printing press.

(2) This indirectly increased the demand for books. By lessening the expense of books and enabling at least all members of the middle class, as well as nobles and princes, to possess private libraries, printing became the most powerful means of diffusing knowledge and broadening education.

(3) A greater degree of accuracy was guaranteed by printing than by manual copying. Before the invention of printing, it was well−nigh impossible to secure two copies of any work that would be exactly alike. Now, the constant proof−reading and the fact that an entire edition was printed from the same type were securities against the anciently recurring faults of forgery or of error.

HUMANISM

Printing, the invention of which has just been described, was the new vehicle of expression for the ideas of the sixteenth century. These ideas centered in something which commonly is called “humanism.” To appreciate precisely what humanism means—to understand the dominant intellectual interests of the educated people of the sixteenth century —it will be necessary first to turn back some two hundred years earlier and say a few words about the first great humanist, Francesco Petrarca, or, as he is known to us, Petrarch.

[Sidenote: Petrarch, “the Father of Humanism"]

The name of Petrarch, who flourished in the fourteenth century (1304− 1374), has been made familiar to most of us by sentimentalists or by literary scholars who in the one case have pitied his loves and his passions or in the other have admired the grace and form of his Italian sonnets. But to the student of history Petrarch has seemed even more important as the reflection, if not the source, of a brilliant intellectual movement, which, taking rise in his century, was to grow in brightness in the fifteenth and flood the sixteenth with resplendent light.

In some respects Petrarch was a typical product of the fourteenth century. He was in close touch with the great medieval Christian culture of his day. He held papal office at Avignon in France. He was pious and “old−fashioned” in many of his religious views, especially in his dislike for heretics. Moreover, he wrote what he professed to be his best work in Latin and expressed naught but contempt for the new Italian language, which, under the immortal Dante, had already acquired literary polish. [Footnote: Ironically enough, it was not his Latin writings but his beautiful Italian sonnets, of which he confessed to be ashamed, that have preserved the popular fame of Petrarch to the present day.] He showed no interest in natural science or in the physical world about him—no sympathy for any novelty.

Yet despite a good deal of natural conservatism, Petrarch added one significant element to the former medieval culture. That was an appreciation, amounting almost to worship, of the pagan Greek and Latin literature. Nor was he interested in antique things because they supported his theology or inculcated Christian morals; his fondness for them was simply and solely because they were inherently interesting. In a multitude of polished Latin letters and in many of his poems, as well as by daily example and precept to his admiring contemporaries, he preached the revival of the classics.

[Sidenote: Characteristics of Petrarch's Humanism]

This one obsessing idea of Petrarch carried with it several corollaries which constituted the essence of

humanism and profoundly affected European thought for several generations after the Italian poet. They may be enumerated as follows:

(1) Petrarch felt as no man had felt since pagan days the pleasure of mere human life,—the "joy of living." This, he believed, was not in opposition to the Christian religion, although it contradicted the basis of ascetic life. He remained a Catholic Christian, but he assailed the monks.

(2) Petrarch possessed a confidence in himself, which in the constant repetition in his writings of first−person pronouns partook of boastfulness. He replaced a reliance upon Divine Providence by a sense of his own human ability and power.

(3) Petrarch entertained a clear notion of a living bond between himself and men of like sort in the ancient world. Greek and Roman civilization was to him no dead and buried antiquity, but its poets and thinkers lived again as if they were his neighbors. His love for the past amounted almost to an ecstatic enthusiasm.

(4) Petrarch tremendously influenced his contemporaries. He was no local, or even national, figure. He was revered and respected as "the scholar of Europe." Kings vied with each other in heaping benefits upon him. The Venetian senate gave him the freedom of the city. Both the University of Paris and the municipality of Rome crowned him with laurel.

[Sidenote: "Humanism" and the "Humanities"; Definitions]

The admirers and disciples of Petrarch were attracted by the fresh and original human ideas of life with which such classical writers as Virgil, Horace, and Cicero overflowed. This new−found charm the scholars called humanity (*Humanitas*) and themselves they styled "humanists." Their studies, which comprised the Greek and Latin languages and literatures, and, incidentally, profane history, were the humanities or "letters" (*litterae humaniores*), and the pursuit of them was humanism.

Petrarch himself was a serious Latin scholar but knew Greek quite indifferently. About the close of his century, however, Greek teachers came in considerable numbers from Constantinople and Greece across the Adriatic to Italy, and a certain Chrysoloras set up an influential Greek school at Florence. [Footnote: This was before the capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453.] Thenceforth, the study of both Latin and Greek went on apace. Monasteries were searched for old manuscripts; libraries for the classics were established; many an ancient masterpiece, long lost, was now recovered and treasured as fine gold. [Footnote: It was during this time that long−lost writings of Tacitus, Cicero, Quintilian, Plautus, Lucretius, etc., were rediscovered.]

[Sidenote: Humanism and Christianity]

At first, humanism met with some opposition from ardent churchmen who feared that the revival of pagan literature might exert an unwholesome influence upon Christianity. But gradually the humanists came to be tolerated and even encourage, until several popes, notably Julius II and Leo X at the opening of the sixteenth century, themselves espoused the cause of humanism. The father of Leo X was the celebrated Lorenzo de' Medici, who subsidized humanists and established the great Florentine library of Greek and Latin classics; and the pope proved himself at once the patron and exemplar of the new learning: he enjoyed music and the theater, art and poetry, the masterpieces of the ancients and the creations of his humanistic contemporaries, the spiritual and the witty—life in every form.

[Sidenote: Spread of Humanism]

The zeal for humanism reached its highest pitch in Italy in the fifteenth century and the first half of the sixteenth, but it gradually gained entrance into other countries and at length became the intellectual spirit of sixteenth−century Europe. Greek was first taught both in England and in France about the middle of the fifteenth century. The Italian expeditions of the French kings Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I, 1494−1547, served to familiarize Frenchmen with humanism. And the rise of important new German universities called humanists to the Holy Roman Empire. As has been said, humanism dominated all Christian Europe in the sixteenth century.

[Sidenote: Erasmus, Chief Humanist of the Sixteenth Century]

Towering above all his contemporaries was Erasmus, the foremost humanist and the intellectual arbiter of the sixteenth century. Erasmus (1466−1536) was a native of Rotterdam in the Netherlands, but throughout a long and studious life he lived in Germany, France, England, Italy, and Switzerland. He took holy orders in the Church and secured the degree of doctor of sacred theology, but it was as a lover of books and a prolific writer that he earned his title to fame. Erasmus, to an even greater degree than Petrarch, became a great international figure—the scholar of Europe. He corresponded with every important writer of his generation, and he was on terms of

personal friendship with Aldus Manutius, the famous publisher of Venice, with Sir Thomas More, the distinguished statesman and scholar of England, with Pope Leo X, with Francis I of France, and with Henry VIII of England. For a time he presided at Paris over the new College of France.

A part of the work of Erasmus—his Greek edition of the New Testament and his *Praise of Folly*—has already been mentioned. In a series of satirical dialogues—the *Adages* and the *Colloquies*—he displayed a brilliant intellect and a sparkling wit. With quip and jest he made light of the ignorance and credulity of many clergymen, especially of the monks. He laughed at every one, himself included. “Literary people,” said he, “resemble the great figured tapestries of Flanders, which produce effect only when seen from the distance.”

[Sidenote: Humanism and Protestantism]

At first Erasmus was friendly with Luther, but as he strongly disapproved of rebellion against the Church, he subsequently assailed Luther and the whole Protestant movement. He remained outside the group of radical reformers, to the end devoted to his favorite authors, simply a lover of good Latin.

Perhaps the chief reason why Erasmus opposed Protestantism was because he imagined that the theological tempest which Luther aroused all over Catholic Europe would destroy fair−minded scholarship—the very essence of humanism. Be that as it may, the leading humanists of Europe—More in England, Helgesen in Denmark, and Erasmus himself—remained Catholic. And while many of the sixteenth−century humanists of Italy grew skeptical regarding all religion, their country, as we have seen, did not become Protestant but adhered to the Roman Church.

[Sidenote: Decline of Humanism]

Gradually, as the sixteenth century advanced, many persons who in an earlier generation would have applied their minds to the study of Latin or Greek, now devoted themselves to theological discussion or moral exposition. The religious differences between Catholics and Protestants, to say nothing of the refinements of dispute between Calvinists and Lutherans or Presbyterians and Congregationalists, absorbed much of the mental energy of the time and seriously distracted the humanists. In fact, we may say that, from the second half of the sixteenth century, humanism as an independent intellectual interest slowly but steadily declined. Nevertheless, it was not lost, for it was merged with other interests, and with them has been preserved ever since.

Humanism, whose seed was sown by Petrarch in the fourteenth century and whose fruit was plucked by Erasmus in the sixteenth, still lives in higher education throughout Europe and America. The historical “humanities”—Latin, Greek, and history—are still taught in college and in high school. They constitute the contribution of the dominant intellectual interest of the sixteenth century.

ART IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: Humanism and the Renaissance of Art]

The effect of the revived interest in Greek and Roman culture, which, as we have seen, dominated European thought from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century, was felt not only in literature and in the outward life of its devotees—in ransacking monasteries for lost manuscripts scripts, in critically studying ancient learning, and in consciously imitating antique behavior—but likewise in a marvelous and many−sided development of art.

The art of the middle ages had been essentially Christian—it sprang from the doctrine and devotions of the Catholic Church and was inextricably bound up with Christian life. The graceful Gothic cathedrals, pointing their roofs and airy spires in heavenly aspiration, the fantastic and mysterious carvings of wood or stone, the imaginative portraiture of saintly heroes and heroines as well as of the sublime story of the fall and redemption of the human race, the richly stained glass, and the spiritual organ music—all betokened the supreme thought of medieval Christianity. But humanism recalled to men's minds the previous existence of an art simpler and more restrained, if less ethereal. The reading of Greek and Latin writers heightened an esteem for pagan culture in all its phases.

Therefore, European art underwent a transformation in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While much of the distinctively medieval culture remained, civilization was enriched by a revival of classical art. The painters, the sculptors, and the architects now sought models not exclusively in their own Christian masters but in many cases in pagan Greek and Roman forms. Gradually the two lines of development were brought together, and the resulting union—the adaptation of classical art−forms to Christian uses—was marked by an unparalleled outburst of artistic energy.

From that period of exuberant art−expression in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, our present−day love of

beautiful things has come down in unbroken succession. With no exaggeration it may be said that the sixteenth century is as much the basis of our modern artistic life as it is the foundation of modern Protestantism or of modern world empire. The revolutions in commerce and religion synchronized with the beginning of a new era in art. All arts were affected—architecture, sculpture, painting, engraving, and music.

[Sidenote: Architecture]

In architecture, the severely straight and plain line of the ancient Greek temples or the elegant gentle curve of the Roman dome was substituted for the fanciful lofty Gothic. A rounded arch replaced the pointed. And the ancient Greek orders—Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian— were dragged from oblivion to embellish the simple symmetrical buildings. The newer architecture was used for ecclesiastical and other structures, reaching perhaps its highest expression in the vast cathedral of St. Peter, which was erected at Rome in the sixteenth century under the personal direction of great artists, among whom Raphael and Michelangelo are numbered.

[Sidenote: In Italy]

The revival of Greek and Roman architecture, like humanism, had its origin in Italy; and in the cities of the peninsula, under patronage of wealthy princes and noble families, it attained its most general acceptance. But, like humanism, it spread to other countries, which in turn it deeply affected. The chronic wars, in which the petty Italian states were engaged throughout the sixteenth century, were attended, as we have seen, by perpetual foreign interference. But Italy, vanquished in politics, became the victor in art. While her towns surrendered to foreign armies, her architects and builders subdued Europe and brought the Christian countries for a time under her artistic sway.

[Sidenote: In France]

Thus in France the revival was accelerated by the military campaigns of Charles VIII, Louis XII, and Francis I, which led to the revelation of the architectural triumphs in Italy, the result being the importation of great numbers of Italian designers and craftsmen. Architecture after the Greek or Roman manner at once became fashionable. Long, horizontal lines appeared in many public buildings, of which the celebrated palace of the Louvre, begun in the last year of the reign of Francis I (1546), and to−day the home of one of the world's greatest art collections, is a conspicuous example.

[Sidenote: In Other Countries]

In the second half of the sixteenth century, the new architecture similarly entered Spain and received encouragement from Philip II. About the same time it manifested itself in the Netherlands and in the Germanies. In England, its appearance hardly took place in the sixteenth century. it was not until 1619 that a famous architect, Inigo Jones (1573−1651), designed and reared the classical banqueting house in Whitehall, and not until the second half of the seventeenth century did Sir Christopher Wren (1632−1723), by means of the majestic St. Paul's cathedral in London, render the new architecture popular in England.

[Sidenote: Sculpture]

Sculpture is usually an attendant of architecture, and it is not surprising, therefore, that transformation of the one should be connected with change in the other. The new movement snowed itself in Italian sculpture as early as the fourteenth century, owing to the influence of the ancient monuments which still abounded throughout the peninsula and to which the humanists attracted attention. In the fifteenth century archaeological discoveries were made and a special interest fostered by the Florentine family of the Medici, who not only became enthusiastic collectors of ancient works of art but promoted the study of the antique figure. Sculpture followed more and more the Greek and Roman traditions in form and often in subject as well. The plastic art of Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was strikingly akin to that of Athens in the fifth or fourth centuries before Christ.

The first great apostle of the new sculpture was Lorenzo Ghiberti (1378−1455), whose marvelous doors on the baptistery at Florence elicited the comment of Michelangelo that they were “worthy of being placed at the entrance of paradise.” Slightly younger than Ghiberti was Donatello (1383−1466), who, among other triumphs, fashioned the realistic statue of St. Mark in Venice. Luca della Robbia (1400−1482), with a classic purity of style and simplicity of expression, founded a whole dynasty of sculptors in glazed terra−cotta. Elaborate tomb−monuments, the construction of which started in the fifteenth century, reached their highest magnificence in the gorgeous sixteenth−century tomb of Giovanni Galeazzo Visconti, the founder of the princely family of Visconti in Milan. Michelangelo himself was as famous for his sculpture as for his painting or his architecture; the heroic head of his David at Florence is a work of unrivaled dignity. As the style of classic sculpture became very

popular in the sixteenth century, the subjects were increasingly borrowed from pagan literature. Monuments were erected to illustrious men of ancient Rome, and Greek mythology was once more carved in stone.

The extension of the new sculpture beyond Italy was even more rapid than the spread of the new architecture. Henry VII invited Italian sculptors to England; Louis XII patronized the great Leonardo da Vinci, and Francis I brought him to France. The tomb of Ferdinand and Isabella in Spain was fashioned in classic form. The new sculpture was famous in Germany before Luther; in fact, it was to be found everywhere in sixteenth−century Europe.

[Sidenote: Painting]

Painting accompanied sculpture. Prior to the sixteenth century, most of the pictures were painted directly upon the plaster walls of churches or of sumptuous dwellings and were called frescoes, although a few were executed on wooden panels. In the sixteenth century, however, easel paintings—that is, detached pictures on canvas, wood, or other material—became common. The progress in painting was not so much an imitation of classical models as was the case with sculpture and architecture, for the reason that painting, being one of the most perishable of the arts, had preserved few of its ancient Greek or Roman examples. But the artists who were interested in architecture and sculpture were likewise naturally interested in painting; and painting, bound by fewer antique traditions, reached a higher degree of perfection in the sixteenth century than did any of its allied arts.

Modern painting was born in Italy. In Italy it found its four great masters—Leonardo da Vinci, Michelangelo, Raphael, and Titian. The first two acquired as great a fame in architecture and in sculpture as in painting; the last two were primarily painters.

Leonardo da Vinci (1452−1519), a Florentine by birth and training, was patronized in turn by the Sforza family of Milan, by the Medici of Florence, and by the French royal line. His great paintings—the Holy Supper and Madonna Lisa, usually called La Gioconda—carried to a high degree the art of composition and the science of light and shade and color. In fact, Leonardo was a scientific painter—he carefully studied the laws of perspective and painstakingly carried them into practice. He was also a remarkable sculptor, as is testified by his admirable horses in relief. As an engineer, too, he built a canal in northern Italy and constructed fortifications about Milan. He was a musician and a natural philosopher as well. This many−sided man liked to toy with mechanical devices. One day when Louis XII visited Milan, he was met by a large mechanical lion that roared and then reared itself upon its haunches, displaying upon its breast the coat−of−arms of France: it was the work of Leonardo da Vinci. Leonardo influenced his age perhaps more than any other artist. He wrote extensively. He gathered about himself a large group of disciples. And in his last years spent in France, as a pensioner of Francis I, he encouraged painting in that country as well as in Italy.

Michelangelo (1475−1564), Florentine like Leonardo, was probably the most wonderful of all these artists because of his triumphs in a vast variety of endeavors. It might almost be said of him that “jack of all trades, he was master of all.” He was a painter of the first rank, an incomparable sculptor, a great architect, an eminent engineer, a charming poet, and a profound scholar in anatomy and physiology. Dividing his time between Florence and Rome, he served the Medici family and a succession of art−loving popes. With his other qualities of genius he combined austerity in morals, uprightness in character, a lively patriotism for his native city and people, and a proud independence. To give any idea of his achievements is impossible in a book of this size. His tomb of Julius II in Rome and his colossal statue of David in Florence are examples of his sculpture; the cathedral of St. Peter, which he practically completed, is his most enduring monument; the mural decorations in the Sistine Chapel at Rome, telling on a grandiose scale the Biblical story from Creation to the Flood, are marvels of design; and his grand fresco of the Last Judgment is probably the most famous single painting in the world.

[Sidenote: Raphael]

Younger than Michelangelo and living only about half as long, Raphael (1483−1520), nevertheless, surpassed him in the harmonious composition and linear beauty of his painting. For ineffable charm of grace, “the divine” Raphael has always stood without a peer. Raphael lived the better part of his life at Rome under the patronage of Julius II and Leo X, and spent several years in decorating the papal palace of the Vatican. Although he was, for a time, architect of St. Peter's cathedral, and displayed some aptitude for sculpture and for the scholarly study of archaeeology, it is as the greatest of modern painters that he is now regarded. Raphael lived fortunately, always in favor, and rich, and bearing himself like a prince.

[Sidenote: Titian]

Titian (c. 1477−1576) was the typical representative of the Venetian school of painting which acquired great distinction in bright coloring. Official painter for the city of Venice and patronized both by the Emperor Charles V and by Philip II of Spain, he secured considerable wealth and fame. He was not a man of universal genius like Leonardo da Vinci or Michelangelo; his one great and supreme endowment was that of oil painting. In harmony, light, and color, his work has never been equaled. Titian's portrait of Philip II was sent to England and proved a potent auxiliary in the suit of the Spanish king for the hand of Mary Tudor. His celebrated picture of the Council of Trent was executed after the aged artist's visit to the council about 1555.

From Italy as a center, great painting became the heritage of all Europe. Italian painters were brought to France by Louis XII and Francis I, and French painters were subsidized to imitate them. Philip II proved himself a liberal patron of painting throughout his dominions.

[Sidenote: Duerer]

In Germany, painting was developed by Albrecht Duerer (1471−1528), a native of Nuremberg, who received a stimulus from Italian work and was royally patronized by the Emperor Maximilian. The career of Duerer was honored and fortunate: he was on terms of friendship with all the first masters of his age; he even visited and painted Erasmus. But it is as an etcher or engraver, rather than as a painter, that Duerer's reputation was earned. His greatest engravings—such as the Knight and Death, and St. Jerome in his Study—set a standard in a new art which has never been reached by his successors. The first considerable employment of engraving, one of the most useful of the arts, synchronized with the invention of printing. Just as books were a means of multiplying, cheapening, and disseminating ideas, so engravings on copper or wood were the means of multiplying, cheapening, and disseminating pictures which gave vividness to the ideas, or served in place of books for those who could not read.

The impetus afforded by this extraordinary development of painting continued to affect the sixteenth century and a greater part of the seventeenth. The scene shifted, however, from Italy to the Spanish possessions. And Spanish kings, the successors of Philip II, patronized such men as Rubens (1577−1640) and Van Dyck (1599−1641) in the Belgian Netherlands, or Velasquez (1590−1660) and Murillo (1617−1682) in Spain itself.

[Sidenote: Rubens and Van Dyck]

If the work of Rubens displayed little of the earlier Italian grace and refinement, it at any rate attained to distinction in the purely fanciful pictures which he painted in bewildering numbers, many of which, commissioned by Marie de' Medici and King Louis XIII of France, are now to be seen in the Louvre galleries in Paris. And Van Dyck raised portrait painting to unthought−of excellence: his portraits of the English royal children and of King Charles I are world−famous.

[Sidenote: Velasquez] [Sidenote: Murillo]

Within the last century, many connoisseurs of art have been led to believe that Velasquez formerly has been much underrated and that he deserves to rank with the foremost Italian masters. Certainly in all his work there is a dignity, power, and charm, especially in that well−known Maids of Honor, where a little Spanish princess is depicted holding her court, surrounded by her ladies−in−waiting, her dwarfs and her mastiff, while the artist himself stands at his easel. The last feat of Velasquez was to superintend the elaborate decorations in honor of the marriage of the Spanish Infanta with King Louis XIV of France. Murillo, the youngest of all these great painters, did most of his work for the Catholic Church and naturally dealt with ecclesiastical subjects.

A somewhat different type of painter is found in the Dutchman, Rembrandt (1606−1669), who lived a stormy and unhappy life in the towns of Leyden and Amsterdam. It must be remembered that Holland, while following her national career of independence, commerce, and colonial undertaking, had become stanchly Protestant. Neither the immoral paganism of antiquity nor the medieval legends of Catholicism would longer appeal to the Dutch people as fit subjects of art. Rembrandt, prototype of a new school, therefore painted the actual life of the people among whom he lived and the things which concerned them—lively portraits of contemporary burgomasters, happy pictures of popular amusements, stern scenes from the Old Testament. His Lesson in Anatomy and his Night Watch in their somber settings, are wonderfully realistic products of Rembrandt's mastery of the brush.

[Sidenote: Rembrandt] [Sidenote: Music]

Thus painting, like architecture and sculpture, was perfected in sixteenth−century Italy and speedily became the common property of Christian Europe. Music, too, the most primitive and universal of the arts, owes in its

modern form very much to the sixteenth century. During that period the barbarous and uncouth instruments of the middle ages were reformed. The rebeck, to whose loud and harsh strains the medieval rustic had danced, [Footnote: The rebeck probably had been borrowed from the Mohammedans.] by the addition of a fourth string and a few changes in form, became the sweet−toned violin, the most important and expressive instrument of the modern orchestra. As immediate forerunner of our present−day pianoforte, the harpsichord was invented with a keyboard carried to four octaves and the chords of each note doubled or quadrupled to obtain prolonged tones.

[Sidenote: Palestrina]

In the person of the papal organist and choir−master, Palestrina (1524− 1594), appeared the first master−composer. He is justly esteemed as the father of modern religious music and for four hundred years the Catholic Church has repeated his inspired accents. A pope of the twentieth century declared his music to be still unrivaled and directed its universal use. Palestrina directly influenced much of the Italian music of the seventeenth century and the classical German productions of the eighteenth.

NATIONAL LITERATURE OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: Latin and the Vernaculars]

Latin had been the learned language of the middle ages: it was used in the Church, in the universities, and in polite society. If a lecturer taught a class or an author wrote a book, Latin was usually employed. In those very middle ages, however, the nations of western Europe were developing spoken languages quite at variance with the classical, scholarly tongue. These so−called vernacular languages were not often written and remained a long time the exclusive means of expression of the lower classes—they consequently not only differed from each other but tended in each case to fall into a number of petty local dialects. So long as they were not largely written, they could achieve no fixity, and it was not until after the invention of printing that the national languages produced extensive national literatures.

Just when printing was invented, the humanists—the foremost scholars of Europe—were diligently engaged in strengthening the position of Latin by encouraging the study of the pagan classics. Virgil, Cicero, Caesar, Tacitus, and the comedies of Plautus and Terence were again read by educated people for their substance and for their style. Petrarch imitated the manner of Latin classics in his letters; Erasmus wrote his great works in Latin. The revival of Greek, which was also due to the humanists, added to the learning and to the literature of the cultured folk, but Greek, even more than Latin, was hardly understood or appreciated by the bulk of the people.

Then came the sixteenth century, with its artistic developments, its national rivalries, its far−away discoveries, its theological debates, and its social and religious unrest. The common people, especially the commercial middle class, clamored to understand: and the result was the appearance of national literatures on a large scale. Alongside of Latin, which was henceforth restricted to the liturgy of the Roman Catholic Church and to particularly learned treatises, there now emerged truly literary works in Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, German, English, etc. The printing of these works at once stereotyped their respective languages, so that since the sixteenth century the written forms of the vernacular tongues have been subject to relatively minor change. Speaking generally, the sixteenth century witnessed the fixing of our best known modern languages.

To review all the leading writers who employed the various vernaculars in the sixteenth century would encroach too much upon the province of professed histories of comparative literature, but a few references to certain figures that tower head and shoulders above all others in their respective countries may serve to call vividly to mind the importance of the period for national literatures.

[Sidenote: Italian Literature]

At the very outset, one important exception must be made in favor of Italy, whose poetry and prose had already been immortalized by Dante, Petrarch, and Boccaccio a hundred years and more before the opening of the sixteenth century. But that country, as we have already repeatedly observed in many kinds of art, anticipated all others in modern times. Italy, almost the last European land to be politically unified, was the first to develop a great national literature.

But Italian literature was broadened and popularized by several influential writers in the sixteenth century, among whom stand preeminent the Florentine diplomat Machiavelli (1469−1527), whose *Prince* really founded the modern science of politics, and who taught the dangerous doctrine that a ruler, bent on exercising a benevolent despotism, is justified in employing any means to achieve his purpose; Ariosto (1474−1533), whose great poem *Orlando Furioso* displayed a powerful imagination no less than a rare and cultivated taste; and the unhappy mad

Tasso (1544−1595), who in *Jerusalem Delivered* produced a bulky epic poem, adapting the manner of Virgil to a crusading subject, and in Aminta gave to his countrymen a delightful pastoral drama, the exquisite lyrics of which were long sung in opera.

[Sidenote: French literature]

French literature, like other French art, was encouraged by Francis I. He set up printing presses, established the College of France, and pensioned native writers. The most famous French author of the time was the sarcastic and clever Rabelais (c. 1490−1553), whose memorable *Gargantua* comprised a series of daring fanciful tales, told with humor of a rather vulgar sort. The language of *Gargantua* is somewhat archaic—perhaps the French version of Calvin's *Institutes* would be a better example of the French of the sixteenth century. But France, thus seriously beginning her national literature, was to wait for its supremacy until the seventeenth century—until the institution of the French Academy and the age of Louis XIV.

[Sidenote: Spanish Literature]

Spanish literature flourished in the golden era when Velasquez and Murillo were painting their masterpieces. The immortal *Don Quixote* , which was published in 1604, entitles its author, Cervantes (1547−1616), to rank with the greatest writers of all time. Lope de Vega (1562−1635), far−famed poet, virtually founded the Spanish theater and is said to have composed eighteen hundred dramatic pieces. Calderon (1600−1681), although less effective in his numerous dramas, wrote allegorical poems of unequaled merit. The printing of large cheap editions of many of these works made Spanish literature immediately popular.

[Sidenote: Portuguese Literature]

How closely the new vernacular literatures reflected significant elements in the national life is particularly observable in the case of Portugal. It was of the wonderful exploring voyages of Vasco da Gama that Camoens (1524−1580), prince of Portuguese poets, sang his stirring *Lusiads*.

[Sidenote: German Literature]

In the Germanies, the extraordinary influence of humanism at first militated against the development of literature in the vernacular, but the Protestant reformer, Martin Luther, in his desire to reach the ears of the common people, turned from Latin to German. Luther's translation of the Bible constitutes the greatest monument in the rise of modern German.

To speak of what our own English language and literature owe to the sixteenth century seems superfluous. The popular writings of Chaucer in the fourteenth century were historically important, but the presence of very many archaic words makes them now difficult to read. But in England, from the appearance in 1551 of the English version of Sir Thomas More's *Utopia*, [Footnote: Originally published in Latin in 1516.] a representation of an ideal state, to the publication of Milton's grandiose epic, *Paradise Lost*, in 1667, there was a continuity of great literature. There were Cranmer's Book of Common Prayer and the King James Version of the Bible; Edmund Spenser's graceful *Faerie Queene*; [Footnote: For its scenery and mechanism, the Orlando Furioso of Ariosto furnished the framework; and it similarly shows the influence of Tasso.] the supreme Shakespeare; Ben Jonson and Marlowe; Francis Bacon and Richard Hooker; Thomas Hobbes and Jeremy Taylor; and the somber Milton himself.

BEGINNINGS OF MODERN NATURAL SCIENCE

[Sidenote: Two−fold Development of Culture, Science and Art]

Human civilization, or culture, always depends upon progress in two directions—the reason, and the feelings or emotions. Art is the expression of the latter, and science of the former. Every great period in the world's history, therefore, is marked by a high appreciation of aesthetics and an advance in knowledge. To this general rule, the sixteenth century was no exception, for it was distinguished not only by a wonderful development of architecture, sculpture, painting, engraving, music, and literature,—whether Roman, Greek, or vernacular,—but it is the most obvious starting point of our modern ideas of natural and experimental science.

Nowadays, we believe that science is at once the legitimate means and the proper goal of the progress of the race, and we fill our school curricula with scientific studies. But this spirit is essentially modern: it owes its chief stimulus to important achievements in the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth.

[Sidenote: Characteristics of the Sixteenth Century]

Five elements contributed to impress the period that we are now reviewing with a scientific character. In the first place, the humanists encouraged a critical spirit in comparing and contrasting ancient manuscripts and in

investigating the history of the distant past; and their discovery and application of pagan writings served to bring clearly and abruptly before the educated people of the sixteenth century all that the Greeks and Romans had done in astronomy, physics, mathematics, and medicine, as well as in philosophy, art, and literature. Secondly, the invention of printing itself was a scientific feat, and its extended use enabled scientists, no less than artists, immediately to acquaint the whole civilized world with their ideas and demonstrations.

Thirdly, the marvelous maritime discoveries of new routes to India and of a new world, which revolutionized European commerce, added much to geographical knowledge and led to the construction of scientific maps of the earth's surface. Fourthly, the painstaking study of a small group of scholars afforded us our first glimpse of the real character of the vast universe about our own globe—the scientific basis of modern astronomy. Lastly, two profound thinkers, early in the seventeenth century,—Francis Bacon and Descartes,—pointed out new ways of using the reason—the method of modern science.

In an earlier chapter, an account has been given of the maritime discoveries of the sixteenth century and their immediate results in broadening intellectual interests. In this chapter, some attention already has been devoted to the rise of humanism and likewise to the invention of printing. It remains, therefore, to say a few words about the changes in astronomy and in scientific method that characterized the beginning of modern times.

[Side Note: Astronomy]

In the year 1500 the average European knew something about the universe of sun, moon, planets, and stars, but it was scarcely more than the ancient Greeks had known, and its chief use was to foretell the future. This practical aspect of astronomy was a curious ancient misconception, which now passes under the name of astrology. It was popularly believed prior to the sixteenth century that every heavenly body exerted a direct and arbitrary influence upon human character and events, [Footnote: Disease was attributed to planetary influence. This connection between medicine and astrology survives in the sign of Jupiter 4, which still heads medicinal prescriptions.] and that by casting “horoscopes,” showing just how the stars appeared at the birth of any person, the subsequent career of such an one might be foreseen. Many silly notions and superstitions grew up about astrology, yet the practice persisted. Charles V and Francis I, great rivals in war, vied with each other in securing the services of most eminent astrologers, and Catherine de' Medici never tired of reading horoscopes.

[Sidenote: “The Ptolemaic System"]

Throughout the middle ages the foremost scholars had continued to cherish the astronomical knowledge of the Greeks, which had been conveniently collected and systematized by a celebrated mathematician and scholar living in Egypt in the second century of the Christian era —Ptolemy by name. Among other theories and ideas, Ptolemy taught that the earth is the center of the universe, that revolving about it are the moon, Mercury, Venus, the sun, the other planets, and the fixed stars, and that the entire machine is turned with incredible velocity completely around every twenty−four hours. This so−called Ptolemaic system of astronomy fitted in very nicely with the language of the Bible and with the popular prejudice that the earth remains stationary while the heavenly bodies daily rise and set. It was natural that for many centuries the Christians should accept the views of Ptolemy as almost divinely inspired.

[Sidenote: “The Copernican System"]

However, a contradictory theory of the solar system was propounded and upheld in the sixteenth century, quite supplanting the Ptolemaic theory in the course of the seventeenth. The new system is called Copernican after its first modern exponent—and its general acceptance went far to annihilate astrology and to place astronomy upon a rational basis.

Copernicus [the Latin form of his real name, Koppernigk (1473−1543)] was a native of Poland, who divided his time between official work for the Catholic Church and private researches in astronomy. It was during a ten−year sojourn in Italy (1496−1505), studying canon law and medicine, and familiarizing himself, through humanistic teachers, with ancient Greek astronomers, that Copernicus was led seriously to question the Ptolemaic system and to cast about in search of a truthful substitute. Thenceforth for many years he studied and reflected, but it was not until the year of his death (1543) that his results were published to the world. His book—*On the Revolutions of the Celestial Bodies*, dedicated to Pope Paul III—offered the theory that the earth is not the center of the universe but simply one of a number of planets which revolve about the sun. The earth seemed much less important in the Copernican universe than in the Ptolemaic.

The Copernican thesis was supported and developed by two distinguished astronomers at the beginning of the

next century—Kepler (1571−1630) and Galileo (1564−1642), one a German, the other an Italian. Kepler taught astronomy for a number of years at Gratz and subsequently made his home in Prague, where he acquired a remarkable collection of instruments [Footnote: From Tycho Brahe, whose assistant he was in 1600−1601.] that enabled him to conduct numerous interesting experiments. While he entertained many fantastic and mystical theories of the "harmony of the spheres" and was not above casting horoscopes for the emperor and for Wallenstein, that soldier of fortune, [Footnote: See below, pp. 223, 226.] he nevertheless established several of the fundamental laws of modern astronomy, such as those governing the form and magnitude of the planetary orbits. It was Kepler who made clear that the planets revolve about the sun in elliptical rather than in strictly circular paths.

Galileo popularized the Copernican theory. [Footnote: Another "popularizer" was Giordano Bruno (c. 1548−1600).] His charming lectures in the university of Padua, where he taught from 1592 to 1610, were so largely attended that a hall seating 2000 had to be provided. In 1609 he perfected a telescope, which, although hardly more powerful than a present−day opera glass, showed unmistakably that the sun was turning on its axis, that Jupiter was attended by revolving moons, and that the essential truth of the Copernican system was established. Unfortunately for Galileo, his enthusiastic desire to convert the pope immediately to his own ideas got him into trouble with the Roman Curia and brought upon him a prohibition from further writing. Galileo submitted like a loyal Catholic to the papal decree, but had he lived another hundred years, he would have rejoiced that almost all men of learning—popes included—had come to accept his own conclusions. Thus modern astronomy was suggested by Copernicus, developed by Kepler, and popularized by Galileo.

The acquisition of sound knowledge in astronomy and likewise in every other science rests primarily upon the observation of natural facts or phenomena and then upon deducing rational conclusions from such observation. Yet this seemingly simple rule had not been continuously and effectively applied in any period of history prior to the sixteenth century. The scientific method of most of the medieval as well as of the ancient scholars was essentially that of Aristotle. [Footnote: Exception to this sweeping generalization must be made in favor of several medieval scientists and philosophers, including—Roger Bacon, a Franciscan friar of the thirteenth century.] This so−called deductive method of Aristotle assumed as a starting−point some general of principle as a premise or hypothesis and thence proceeded, by logical reasoning, to deduce concrete applications or consequences. It had been extremely valuable in stimulating the logical faculties and in showing men how to draw accurate conclusions, but it had shown a woeful inability to devise new general principles. It evolved an elaborate theology and a remarkable philosophy, but natural experimental science progressed relatively little until the deductive method of Aristotle was supplemented by the inductive method of Francis Bacon.

[Sidenote: Modern Method of Science: Introduction. Francis Bacon]

Aristotle was partially discredited by radical humanists, who made fun of the medieval scholars who had taken him most seriously, and by the Protestant reformers, who assailed the Catholic theology which had been carefully constructed by Aristotelian deduction. But it was reserved for Francis Bacon, known as Lord Bacon (1561−1626), to point out all the shortcomings of the ancient method and to propose a practicable supplement. A famous lawyer, lord chancellor of England under James I, a born scientist, a brilliant essayist, he wrote several philosophical works of first−rate importance, of which the *Advancement of Learning* (1604) and the *Novum Organum* (1620) are the most famous. It is in these works that he summed up the faults which the widening of knowledge in his own day was disclosing in ancient and medieval thought and set forth the necessity of slow laborious observation of facts as antecedent to the assumption of any general principle.

[Sidenote: Descartes]

What of scientific method occurred to Lord Bacon appealed even more to the intellectual genius of the Frenchman Descartes (1596−1660). A curious combination of sincere practicing Catholic and of original daring rationalist was this man, traveling all about Europe, serving as a soldier in the Netherlands, in Bavaria, in Hungary, living in Holland, dying in Sweden, with a mind as restless as his body. Now interested in mathematics, now in philosophy, presently absorbed in physics or in the proof of man's existence, throughout his whole career he held fast to the faith that science depends not upon the authority of books but upon the observation of facts. "Here are my books," he told a visitor, as he pointed to a basket of rabbits that he was about to dissect. The *Discourse on Method* (1637) and the *Principles of Philosophy* (1644), taken in conjunction with Bacon's work, ushered in a new scientific era, to some later phases of which we shall have occasion to refer in subsequent

chapters.

ADDITIONAL READING

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HUMANISM. The best description of the rise and spread of humanism is J. E. Sandys, *A History of Classical Scholarship*, Vol. II (1908). For the spirit of early humanism see H. C. Hollway−Calthrop, *Petrarch: his Life and Times* (1907); J. H. Robinson and H. W. Rolfe, *Petrarch, the First Modern Scholar and Man of Letters*, 2d ed. (1914), a selection from Petrarch's letters to Boccaccio and other contemporaries, translated into English, with a valuable introduction; Pierre de Nolhac, *Petrarque et l'humanisme*, 2d ed., 2 vols. in 1 (1907). Of the antecedents of humanism a convenient summary is presented by Louise Loomis, *Mediaeval Hellenism* (1906). A popular biography of Erasmus is that of Ephraim Emerton, *Desiderius Erasmus* (1899); the Latin *Letters of Erasmus* are now (1916) in course of publication by P. S. Allen; F. M. Nichols, *The Epistles of Erasmus*, 2 vols. (1901−1906), an excellent translation of letters written prior to 1517; Erasmus's *Praise of Folly*, in English translation, is obtainable in many editions. D. F. Strauss, *Ulrich von Hutten, his Life and Times*, trans. by Mrs. G. Sturge (1874), gives a good account of the whole humanistic movement and treats Hutten very sympathetically; *The Letters of Obscure Men*, to which Hutten contributed, were published, with English translation, by F. G. Stokes in 1909. An excellent edition of *The Utopia* of Sir Thomas More, the famous English humanist, is that of George Sampson (1910), containing also an English translation and the charming contemporary *Biography* by More's son−in−law, William Roper. The standard summary of the work of the humanists is the German writing of Georg Voigt, *Die Wiederbelebung des classischen Alterthums*, 3d ed., 2 vols. (1893). Interesting extracts from the writings of a considerable variety of humanists are translated by Merrick Whitcomb in his *Literary Source Books* of the Renaissance in Germany and in Italy (1898−1899).

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## PART II
## DYNASTIC AND COLONIAL RIVALRY

In the seventeenth century and in the greater part of the eighteenth, public attention was directed chiefly toward dynastic and colonial rivalries. In the European group of national states, France was the most important. Politically the French evolved a form of absolutist divine−right monarchy, which became the pattern of all European monarchies, that of England alone excepted. In international affairs the reigning family of France—the Bourbon dynasty after a long struggle succeeded in humiliating the rulers of Spain and of Austria— the Habsburg dynasty. The hegemony which, in the sixteenth century, Spain had exercised in the newly established state−system of Europe was now supplanted by that of France. Intellectually, too, Italian leadership yielded to French, until France set the fashion alike in manners, morals, and art. Only in the sphere of commerce and trade and exploitation of lands beyond the seas was French supremacy questioned, and there not by declining Portugal or Spain but by the vigorous English nation. France, victorious in her struggle for dynastic aggrandizement on the continent of Europe, was destined to suffer defeat in her efforts to secure colonies in Asia and America.

This period of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was marked likewise by the constant decay of old political and social institutions in Italy and in Germany, by the gradual decline of the might and prestige of the Ottoman Turks, and by the extinction of the ancient kingdom of Poland. In their place appeared as great world powers the northern monarchies of Prussia and Russia, whose royal lines— Hohenzollerns and Romanovs—were to vie in ambition and prowess, before the close of the period, with Habsburgs and Bourbons.

Socially, the influence of nobles and clergy steadily declined. As steadily arose the numbers, the ability, and the importance of the traders and commercial magnates, the moneyed people, all those who were identified with the new wealth that the Commercial Revolution was creating, the lawyers, the doctors, the professors, the merchants,—the so−called middle class, the *bourgeoisie*, who gradually grew discontented with the restrictive institutions of their time. Within the *bourgeoisie* was the seed of revolution: they would one day in their own interests overturn monarchy, nobility, the Church, the whole social fabric. That was to be the death−knell of the old regime—the annunciation of the nineteenth century.

# CHAPTER VI. THE GROWTH OF ABSOLUTISM IN FRANCE AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN BOURBONS AND HABSBURGS, 1589−1661

## GROWTH OF ABSOLUTISM IN FRANCE: HENRY IV, RICHELIEU, AND MAZARIN

For the first time in many years France in 1598 was at peace. The Edict of Nantes, which in that year accorded qualified religious toleration to the Huguenots, removed the most serious danger to internal order, and the treaty of Vervins, concluded in the same year with the king of Spain, put an end to a long and exhausting foreign war. Henry IV was now free to undertake the internal reformation of his country.

Sorry, indeed, was the plight of France at the close of the sixteenth century. Protracted civil and foreign wars had produced their inevitable consequences. The state was nearly bankrupt. Country districts lay largely uncultivated. Towns were burned or abandoned. Roads were rough and neglected, and bridges in ruins. Many of the discharged soldiers turned highwaymen, pillaged farmhouses, and robbed travelers. Trade was at a standstill and the artisans of the cities were out of work. During the wars, moreover, great noblemen had taken many rights into their own hands and had acquired a habit of not obeying the king. The French crown seemed to be in danger of losing what power it had gained in the fifteenth century.

That the seventeenth century was to witness not a diminution but a pronounced increase of royal power, was due to the character of the French king at this critical juncture. Henry IV (1589−1610) was strong and vivacious. With his high forehead, sparkling eyes, smiling mouth, and his neatly pointed beard (*Henri quatre*), he was prepossessing in looks, while his affability, simplicity, and constant expression of interest in the welfare of his subjects earned him the appellation of “Good King Henry.” His closest companions knew that he was selfish and avaricious, but that his quick decisions were likely to be good and certain to be put in force. Above all, Henry had soldierly qualities and would brook no disloyalty or disobedience.

[Sidenote: Sully]

Throughout his reign, Henry IV was well served by his chief minister, the duke of Sully, [Footnote: 1560−1641.] an able, loyal, upright Huguenot, though avaricious like the king and subject to furious fits of jealousy and temper. Appointed to the general oversight of financial affairs, Sully made a tour of inspection throughout the country and completely reformed the royal finances. He forbade provincial governors to raise money on their own authority, removed many abuses of tax− collecting, and by an honest, rigorous administration was able between 1600 and 1610 to save an average of a million livres a year. The king zealously upheld Sully's policy of retrenchment: he reduced the subsidies to artists and the grants to favorites, and retained only a small part of his army, sufficient to overawe rebellious nobles and to restore order and security throughout the realm. To promote and preserve universal peace, he even proposed the formation of a World Confederation—his so−called “Grand Design”—which, however, came to naught through the mutual jealousies and rival ambitions of the various European sovereigns. It proved to be much too early to talk convincingly of general pacifism and disarmament.

[Sidenote: Agricultural Development]

While domestic peace was being established and provision was being made for immediate financial contingencies, Henry IV and his great minister were both laboring to increase the resources of their country and thereby to promote the prosperity and contentment of the people. Sully believed that the true wealth of the nation lay in farming pursuits, and, therefore, agriculture should be encouraged even, if necessary, to the neglect of trade and industry. While the king allowed Sully to develop the farming interests, he himself encouraged the new commercial classes.

In order to promote agriculture, Sully urged the abolition of interior customs lines and the free circulation of grain, subsidized stock raising, forbade the destruction of the forests, drained swamps, rebuilt the roads and bridges, and planned a vast system of canals.

On his side, Henry IV was contributing to the wealth of the middle class. It was he who introduced silkworms and the mulberry trees, on which they feed, thereby giving an impetus to the industry which is now one of the most important in France. The beginnings of the industrial importance of Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles date from the reign of Henry IV.

The king likewise encouraged commerce. A French merchant marine was built up by means of royal bounties. A navy was started. Little by little the French began to compete for trade on the high seas at first with the Dutch, and subsequently with the English. French trading posts were established in India; and Champlain was dispatched to the New World to lay the foundations of a French empire in America. It was fortunate for France that she had two men like Henry IV and Sully, each supplementing the work of the other.

The assassination of Henry IV by a crazed fanatic in 1610 threatened for a time to nullify the effects of his labors, for supreme power passed to his widow, Marie de' Medici, an ambitious but incompetent woman, who dismissed Sully and undertook to act as regent for her nine−year−old son, Louis XIII. The queen−regent was surrounded by worthless favorites and was hated by the Huguenots, who feared her rigid Catholicism, and by the nobles, Catholic and Huguenot alike, who were determined to maintain their privileges and power.

The hard savings of Henry IV were quickly exhausted, and France once more faced a financial crisis. In this emergency the Estates−General was again convened (1614). Since the accession of Louis XI (1461), the French monarchs with their absolutist tendencies had endeavored to remove this ancient check upon their authority: they had convoked it only in times of public confusion or economic necessity. Had the Estates−General really been an effective body in 1614, it might have taken a position similar to that of the seventeenth−century Parliament in England and established constitutional government in France, but its organization and personnel militated against such heroic action. The three estates—clergy, nobles, and commoners (bourgeois)—sat separately in as many chambers; the clergy and nobles would neither tax themselves nor cooperate with the Third Estate; the commoners, many of whom were Huguenots, were disliked by the court, despised by the First and Second Estates, and quite out of sympathy with the peasants, the bulk of the French nation. It is not surprising, under the circumstances, that the session of 1614 lasted but three weeks and ended as a farce: the queen−regent locked up the halls and sent the representatives home—she needed the room for a dance, she said. It was not until the momentous year of 1789—after a lapse of 175 years—that the Estates−General again assembled.

After the fiasco of 1614, affairs went from bad to worse. Nobles and Huguenots contended between themselves, and both against the court favorites. As many as five distinct uprisings occurred. Marie de' Medici was forced to relinquish the government, but Louis XIII, on reaching maturity, gave evidence of little executive ability. The king was far more interested in music and hunting than in business of state. No improvement appeared until Cardinal Richelieu assumed the guidance of affairs of state in 1624. Henceforth, the royal power was exercised not so much by Louis XIII as by his great minister.

[Sidenote: Cardinal Richelieu]

Born of a noble family of Poitou, Armand de Richelieu (1585−1642), at the age of twenty−one had been appointed bishop of the small diocese of Lucon. His eloquence and ability as spokesman for the clergy in the fatuous Estates−General of 1614 attracted the notice of Marie de' Medici, who invited him to court, gave him a seat in the royal council, and secured his nomination as a cardinal of the Roman Church. From 1624 until his death in 1642, Richelieu was the most important man in France.

With undoubted loyalty and imperious will, with the most delicate diplomacy and all the blandishments of subtle court intrigue, sometimes with sternest and most merciless cruelty, Richelieu maintained his influence over the king and proceeded to destroy the enemies of the French crown.

[Sidenote: Richelieu's Policies]

Richelieu's policies were quite simple: (1) To make the royal power supreme in France; (2) to make France predominant in Europe. The first involved the removal of checks upon royal authority and the triumph of absolutism; the second meant a vigorous foreign policy, leading to the humiliation of the rival Habsburgs. In both these policies Richelieu was following the general traditions of the preceding century, essentially those of Henry IV, but to an exaggerated extent and with unparalleled success. Postponing consideration of general European affairs, let us first see what the great cardinal accomplished in France.

[Sidenote: Disappearance of Representative Government]

First of all, Richelieu disregarded the Estates−General. He was convinced of its futility and unhesitatingly declined to consult it. Gradually the idea became current that the Estates−General was an out−worn, medieval institution, totally unfit for modern purposes, and that official business could best—and therefore properly—be conducted, not by the representatives of the chief social classes in the nation, but by personal appointees of the king. Thus the royal council became the supreme lawmaking and administrative body in the country.

Local estates, or parliaments, continued to exist in certain of the most recently acquired provinces of France, such as Brittany, Provence, Burgundy, and Languedoc, but they had little influence except in apportioning taxes: Richelieu tampered with their privileges and vetoed many of their acts.

[Sidenote: The Royal Army]

The royal prerogative extended not only to matters of taxation and legislation, including the right to levy taxes and to make expenditures for any purpose without public accounting, but it was preserved and enforced by means of a large standing army, which received its pay and its orders exclusively from the crown. To the royal might, as well as to its right, Richelieu contributed. He energetically aided Louis XIII in organizing and equipping what proved to be the best army in Europe.

Two factions in the state aroused the cardinal's ire—one the Huguenots, and the other the nobles—for both threatened the autocracy which he was bent upon erecting. Both factions suffered defeat and humiliation at his hands.

Richelieu, though a cardinal of the Roman Church, was more politician and statesman than ecclesiastic; though living in an age of religious fanaticism, he was by no means a bigot. As we shall presently see, this Catholic cardinal actually gave military support to Protestants in Germany—for political purposes; it was similarly for political purposes that he attacked the Protestants in France.

As has already been pointed out, French Protestantism meant an influential political party as well as a religion. Since Henry IV had issued the Edict of Nantes, the Huguenots had had their own assemblies, officers, judges, and even certain fortified towns, all of which interfered with the sovereign authority and impaired that uniformity which thoughtful royalists believed to be the very cornerstone of absolutism. Richelieu had no desire to deprive the Huguenots of religious freedom, but he was resolved that in political matters they should obey the king. Consequently, when they revolted in 1625, he determined to crush them. In spite of the considerable aid which England endeavored to give them, the Huguenots were entirely subdued. Richelieu's long siege of La Rochelle, lasting nearly fifteen months, showed his forceful resolution. When the whole country had submitted, the Edict of Alais was published (1629), leaving to the Protestants freedom of conscience and of worship but depriving them of their fortifications and forbidding them to hold assemblies. Public office was still open to them and their representatives kept their judicial posts. “The honest Huguenot retained all that he would have been willing to protect with his life, while the factious and turbulent Huguenot was deprived of the means of embarrassing the government.”

The repression of the nobles was a similar statesmanlike achievement, and one made in the face of redoubtable opposition. It had long been customary to name noblemen as governors of the various provinces, but the governors had gradually become masters instead of administrators: they commanded detachments of the army; they claimed allegiance of the garrisons in their towns; they repeatedly and openly defied the royal will. The country, moreover, was sprinkled with noblemen's castles or *chateaux*, protected by fortifications and armed retainers, standing menaces to the prompt execution of the king's orders. Finally, the noblemen at court, jealous of the cardinal's advancement and spurred on by the intrigues of the disaffected Marie de' Medici or of the king's own brother, hampered the minister at every turn. Of such intolerable conditions, Richelieu determined to be quit.

Into the ranks of noble courtiers, Richelieu struck terror. By means of spies and trickery, he ferreted out conspiracies and arbitrarily put their leaders to death. Every attempt at rebellion was mercilessly punished, no matter how exalted in rank the rebel might be. Richelieu was never moved by entreaties or threats—he was as inexorable as fate itself.

[Sidenote: Demolition of Private Fortifications ]

The cardinal did not confine his attention to noblemen at court. As early as 1626 he published an edict ordering the immediate demolition of all fortified castles not needed for defense against foreign invasion. In carrying this edict into force, Richelieu found warm supporters in peasantry and townsfolk who had long suffered from the exactions and depredations of their noble but warlike neighbors. The ruins of many a *chateau* throughout modern France bear eloquent witness to the cardinal's activity.

[Sidenote: Centralization of Administration] [Sidenote: The Intendants]

Another enduring monument to Richelieu was the centralization of French administration. The great minister was tired of the proud, independent bearing of the noble governors. Without getting rid of them altogether, he checked these proud officials by transferring most of their powers to a new kind of royal officer, the intendant.

Appointed by the crown usually from among the intelligent, loyal middle class, each intendant had charge of a certain district, supervising therein the assessment and collection of royal taxes, the organization of local police or militia, the enforcement of order, and the conduct of courts. These intendants, with their wide powers of taxation, police, and justice, were later dubbed, from their approximate number, the “thirty tyrants” of France. But they owed their positions solely to the favor of the crown; they were drawn from a class whose economic interests were long and well served by the royal power; and their loyalty to the king, therefore, could be depended upon. The intendants constantly made reports to, and received orders from, the central government at Paris. They were so many eyes, all over the kingdom, for an ever−watchful Richelieu. And in measure as the power of the *bourgeois* intendants increased, that of the noble governors diminished, until, by the eighteenth century, the offices of the latter had become largely honorary though still richly remunerative. To keep the nobles amused and in money, and thereby out of mischief and politics, became, from Richelieu's time, a maxim of the royal policy in France.

[Side Note: Richelieu's Significance]

Such, in brief, was the work of this grim figure that moved across the stage at a critical period in French history. Richelieu, more than any other man, was responsible for the assurance of absolutism in his country at the very time when England, by means of revolution and bloodshed, was establishing parliamentary government; and, as we shall soon see, his foreign policy covered France with European glory and prestige.

In person, Richelieu was frail and sickly, yet when clothed in his cardinal's red robes he appeared distinguished and commanding. His pale, drawn face displayed a firm determination and an inflexible will. Unscrupulous, exacting, and without pity, he preserved to the end a proud faith in his moral strength and in his loyalty to country and to king.

Richelieu died in 1642, and the very next year the monarch whom he had served so gloriously followed him to the grave, leaving the crown to a boy of five years—Louis XIV.

[Side Note: Minority of Louis XIV] [Sidenote: Cardinal Mazarin]

The minority of Louis XIV might have been disastrous to France and to the royal power, had not the strong policies of Richelieu been exemplified and enforced by another remarkable minister and cardinal, Mazarin. Mazarin (1602−1661) was an Italian, born near Naples, educated for an ecclesiastical career at Rome and in Spain. In the discharge of several delicate diplomatic missions for the pope, he had acted as nuncio at Paris, where he so ingratiated himself in Richelieu's favor that he was invited to enter the service of the king of France, and in 1639 he became a naturalized Frenchman.

Despite his foreign birth and the fact that he never spoke French without a bad accent, he rose rapidly in public service. He was named cardinal and was recognized as Richelieu's disciple and imitator. From the death of the greater cardinal in 1642 to his own death in 1661, Mazarin actually governed France.

[Sidenote: Unrest of the Nobles]

Against the Habsburgs, Mazarin continued the great war which Richelieu had begun and brought it to a successful conclusion. In domestic affairs, he encountered greater troubles. The nobles had naturally taken umbrage at the vigorous policies of Richelieu, from which Mazarin seemed to have no thought of departing. They were strengthened, moreover, by a good deal of popular dislike of Mazarin's foreign birth, his avarice, his unscrupulous plundering of the revenues of the realm for the benefit of his own family, and his tricky double−dealing ways.

[Sidenote: The Fronde]

The result was the Fronde, [Footnote: Probably so called from the name of a street game played by Parisian children and often stopped by policemen.] the last attempt prior to the French Revolution to cast off royal absolutism in France. It was a vague popular protest coupled with a selfish reaction on the part of the influential nobles: the pretext was Mazarin's interference with the parlement of Paris.

[Sidenote: The Parlements]

The parlements were judicial bodies [Footnote: There were thirteen in the seventeenth century.] which tried important cases and heard appeals from lower courts. That of Paris, being the most eminent, had, in course of time, secured to itself the right of registering royal decrees—that is, of receiving the king's edicts in formal fashion and entering them upon the statute books so that the law of the land might be known generally. From making such a claim, it was only a step for the parlement of Paris to refuse to register certain new edicts on the

ground that the king was not well informed or that they were in conflict with older and more binding enactments. If these claims were substantiated, the royal will would be subjected to revision by the parlement of Paris. To prevent their substantiation, both Louis XIII and Louis XIV held “beds of justice”—that is, appeared in person before the parlement, and from their seat of cushions and pillows declared their will regarding the new edict and directed that it be promulgated. There were amusing scenes when the boy−king, at the direction of Mazarin, gave orders in his shrill treble to the learned lawyers and grave old judges.

Egged on by seeming popular sympathy and no doubt by the contemporaneous political revolution in England, the parlement of Paris at length defied the prime minister. It proclaimed its immunity from royal control; declared the illegality of any public tax which it had not freely and expressly authorized; ordered the abolition of the office of intendant; and protested against arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. To these demands, the people of Paris gave support— barricades were erected in the streets, and Mazarin, whose loyal army was still fighting in the Germanies, was obliged temporarily to recognize the new order. Within six months, however, sufficient troops had been collected to enable him to overawe Paris and to annul his concessions.

[Sidenote: Suppression of the Fronde] [Sidenote: Triumph of Absolutism in France]

Subsequent uprisings, engineered by prominent noblemen, were often more humorous than harmful. To be sure, no less a commander than the great Conde, one of the chief heroes of the Thirty Years' War, took arms against the Cardinalists, as Mazarin's party was called, but so slight was the aid which he received from the French people that he was speedily driven from his country and joined the Spanish army. The upshot of the Fronde was (1) the nobility were more discredited than ever; (2) the parlement was forbidden to devote attention to political or financial affairs; (3) Paris was disarmed and lost the right of electing its own municipal officers; (4) the royal authority was even stronger than under Richelieu because an unsuccessful attempt had been made to weaken it. Henry IV, Richelieu, and Mazarin had made straight the way for the despotism of Louis XIV.

STRUGGLE BETWEEN BOURBONS AND HABSBURGS THE THIRTY YEARS' WAR

[Sidenote: Dynastic Character of Wars in the Seventeenth Century.]

Every European country, except England, was marked in the seventeenth century by a continued growth of monarchical power. The kings were busily engaged in strengthening their hold upon their respective states and in reaching out for additional lands and wealth. International wars, therefore, assumed the character of struggles for dynastic aggrandizement. How might this or that royal family obtain wider territories and richer towns? There was certainly sufficient national life in western Europe to make the common people proud of their nationality; hence the kings could normally count upon popular support. But wars were undertaken upon the continent of Europe in the seventeenth century not primarily for national or patriotic motives, but for the exaltation of a particular royal family. Citizens of border provinces were treated like so many cattle or so much soil that might be conveniently bartered among the kings of France, Spain, or Sweden.

[Sidenote: Habsburg Dominions in 1600.]

This idea had been quite evident in the increase of the Habsburg power during the sixteenth century. In an earlier chapter we have noticed how that family had acquired one district after another until their property included: (1) Under the Spanish branch—Spain, the Two Sicilies, Milan, Franche Comte, the Belgian Netherlands, Portugal, and a huge colonial empire; (2) Under the Austrian branch—Austria and its dependencies, Hungary, Bohemia, and the title of Holy Roman Emperor. Despite the herculean labors of Philip II, France remained outside Habsburg influence, a big gap in what would otherwise have been a series of connected territories.

[Sidenote: Ambition of the Bourbons.]

In measure as the French kings—the Bourbons—strengthened their position in their own country, they looked abroad not merely to ward off foreign attacks but to add land at their neighbors' expense. Richelieu understood that his two policies went hand in glove—to make the Bourbons predominant in Europe was but a corollary to making the royal power supreme in France.

[Sidenote: The Thirty Years' War.]

The chief warfare of the seventeenth century centers, therefore, in the long, terrible conflict between the Habsburgs and the Bourbons. Of this struggle, the so−called Thirty Years' War (1618−1648) may be treated as the first stage. Let us endeavor to obtain a clear idea of the interests involved.

When Richelieu became the chief minister of Louis XIII (1624), he found the Habsburgs in serious trouble

and he resolved to take advantage of the situation to enhance the prestige of the Bourbons. The Austrian Habsburgs were facing a vast civil and religious war in the Germanies, and the Spanish Habsburgs were dispatching aid to their hard−pressed kinsmen.

The war, which proved momentous both to the Habsburgs and to their enemies, resulted from a variety of reasons—religious, economic, and political.

[Sidenote: The Thirty Years' War: Ecclesiastical Causes]

The peace of Augsburg (1555) had been expected to settle the religious question in the Germanies. But in practice it had failed to fix two important matters. In the first place, the provision forbidding further secularization of church property (“Ecclesiastical Reservation") was not carried out, nor could it be while human nature and human temptation remained. Every Catholic ecclesiastic who became Protestant would naturally endeavor to take his church lands with him. Then, in the second place, the peace had recognized only Catholics and Lutherans: meanwhile the Calvinists had increased their numbers, especially in southern and central Germany and in Bohemia, and demanded equal rights. In order to extort concessions from the emperor, a union of Protestant princes was formed, containing among its members the zealous young Calvinist prince of the Palatinate, Frederick, commonly called the Elector Palatine of the Rhine. The Catholics were in an equally belligerent frame of mind. Not only were they determined to prevent further secularization of church property, but, emboldened by the progress of the Catholic Reformation in the Germanies during the second half of the sixteenth century, they were now anxious to revise the earlier religious settlement in their own interest and to regain, if possible, the lands that had been lost by the Church to the Protestants. The Catholics relied for political and military support upon the Catholic Habsburg emperor and upon Maximilian, duke of Bavaria and head of the Catholic League of Princes. Religiously, the enemies of the Habsburgs were the German Protestants.

[Sidenote: The Thirty Years' War: Political Causes]

But a hardly less important cause of the Thirty Years' War lay in the politics of the Holy Roman Empire. The German princes had greatly increased their territories and their wealth during the Protestant Revolution. They aspired, each and all, to complete sovereignty. They would rid themselves of the outworn bonds of a medieval empire and assume their proper place among the independent and autocratic rulers of Europe. On his side, the emperor was insistent upon strengthening his position and securing a united powerful Germany under his personal control. Politically, the enemies of the Habsburgs were the German princes.

With the princes was almost invariably allied any European monarch who had anything to gain from dividing Germany or weakening Habsburg influence. In case of a civil war, the Habsburgs might reasonably expect to find enemies in Denmark, Sweden, and France.

[Sidenote: Four Periods in the Thirty Years' War]

The war naturally divides itself into four periods: (1) The Bohemian Revolt; (2) The Danish Period; (3) The Swedish Period; (4) The French or International Period.

[Sidenote: 1. The Bohemian Revolt]

The signal for the outbreak of hostilities in the Germanics was given by a rebellion in Bohemia against the Habsburgs. Following the death of Rudolph II (1576−1612), a narrow−minded, art−loving, and unbalanced recluse, his childless brother Matthias (1612−1619) had desired to secure the succession of a cousin, Ferdinand II (1619−1637), who, although a man of blameless life and resolute character, was known to be devoted to the cause of absolutism and fanatically loyal to the Catholic Church. Little opposition to this settlement was encountered in the various Habsburg Bohemian dominions, except in Bohemia. In that country, however, the nobles, many of whom were Calvinists, dreaded the prospective accession of Ferdinand, who would be likely to deprive them of their special privileges and to impede, if not to forbid, the exercise of the Protestant religion in their territories. Already there had been encroachments on their religious liberty.

One day in 1618, a group of Bohemian noblemen broke into the room where the imperial envoys were stopping and hurled them out of a window into a castle moat some sixty feet below. This so−called “defenestration” of Ferdinand's representatives was followed by the proclamation of the dethronement of the Habsburgs in Bohemia and the election to the kingship of Frederick, the Calvinistic Elector Palatine. Frederick was crowned at Prague and prepared to defend his new lands. Ferdinand II, raising a large army in his other possessions, and receiving assistance from Maximilian of Bavaria and the Catholic League as well as from Tuscany and the Spanish Habsburgs, intrusted the allied forces to an able veteran general, Count Tilly

(1559−1632). King Frederick had expected support from his father−in−law, James I of England, and from the Lutheran princes of northern Germany, but in both respects he was disappointed. What with parliamentary quarrels at home and a curiously mistaken foreign policy of a Spanish alliance, James confined his assistance to pompous advice and long words. Then, too, most of the Lutheran princes, led by the tactful John George, elector of Saxony, hoped by remaining neutral to obtain special concessions from the emperor.

Within a very brief period, Tilly subdued Bohemia, drove out Frederick, and reestablished the Habsburg power. Many rebellious nobles lost their property and lives, and the practice of the Protestant religion was again forbidden in Bohemia. Nor was that all. The victorious imperialists drove the fugitive Frederick, now derisively dubbed the “winter king,” out of his original wealthy possessions on the Rhine, into miserable exile, an outcast without land or money. The conquered Palatinate was turned over to Maximilian of Bavaria, who was further rewarded for his services by being recognized as an elector of the Holy Roman Empire in place of the deposed Frederick.

The first period of the war was thus favorable to the Habsburg and Catholic causes. Between 1618 and 1620, revolt had been suppressed in Bohemia and an influential Rhenish electorate had been transferred from Calvinist to Catholic hands.

Now, however, the northern Protestant princes took alarm. If they had viewed with composure the failure of Frederick's foolhardy efforts in Bohemia, they beheld with downright dismay the expansion of Bavaria and the destruction of a balance of power long maintained between Catholic and Protestant Germany. And so long as the ill−disciplined remnants of Frederick's armies were behaving like highwaymen, pillaging and burning throughout the Germanics, the emperor declined to consider the grant of any concessions.

[Sidenote: 2. Danish Intervention. Christian IV]

At this critical juncture, while the Protestant princes were wavering between obedience and rebellion, Christian IV of Denmark intervened and precipitated the second period of the war. Christian IV (1588−1648) was impulsive and ambitious: as duke of Holstein he was a member of the Holy Roman Empire and opposed to Habsburg domination; as king of Denmark and Norway he was anxious to extend his influence over the North Sea ports; and as a Lutheran, he sought to champion the rights of his German co−religionists and to help them retain the rich lands which they had appropriated from the Catholic Church. In 1625, therefore, Christian invaded Germany, supported by liberal grants of money from England and by the troops of many of the German princes, both Calvinist and Lutheran.

[Sidenote: Wallenstein]

Against the Danish invasion, Tilly unaided might have had difficulty to stand, but fortune seemed to have raised up a codefender of the imperialist cause in the person of an extraordinary adventurer, Wallenstein. This man had enriched himself enormously out of the recently confiscated estates of rebellious Bohemians, and now, in order to benefit himself still further, he secured permission from the Emperor Ferdinand II to raise an independent army of his own to restore order in the empire and to expel the Danes. By liberal promises of pay and plunder, the soldier of fortune soon recruited an army of some 50,000 men, and what a motley collection it was! Italian, Swiss, Spaniard, German, Pole, Englishman, and Scot,—Protestant was welcomed as heartily as Catholic,—any one who loved adventure or hoped for gain, all united by the single tie of loyalty and devotion to Wallenstein. The force was whipped into shape by the undoubted genius of its commander and at once became an effective machine of war. Yet the perpetual plundering of the land, on which it lived, was a constant source of reproach to the army of Wallenstein.

The campaigning of the second period of the war took place in North Germany. At Lutter, King Christian IV was defeated overwhelmingly by the combined forces of Tilly and Wallenstein, and the Lutheran states were left at the mercy of the Catholic League. Brandenburg openly espoused the imperialist cause and aided Ferdinand's generals in expelling the Danish king from German soil. Only the lack of naval control of the Baltic and North seas prevented the victors from seizing Denmark. The desperation of Christian and the growingly suspicious activity of Sweden resulted in the peace of Lubeck (1629), by which the king of Denmark was left in possession of Jutland, Schleswig, and Holstein, but deprived of the German bishoprics which various members of his family had taken from the Catholic Church.

Following up its successes, the Catholic League prevailed upon the Emperor Ferdinand II in the same year (1629) to sign the Edict of Restitution, restoring to the Church all the property that had been secularized in

violation of the peace of Augsburg of 1555. The edict was to be executed by imperial commissioners, all of whom were Catholics, and so well did they do their work that, within three years of the promulgation of the edict, Roman Catholicism in the Germanies had recovered five bishoprics, thirty Hanse towns, and nearly a hundred monasteries, to say nothing of parish churches of which the number can hardly be estimated.

So far, the religious and economic grievances against the Habsburgs had been confined mainly to Calvinists, but now the Lutheran princes were alarmed. The enforcement of the Edict of Restitution against all Protestants alike was the signal for an emphatic protest from Lutherans as well as from Calvinists. A favorable opportunity for intervention seemed to present itself to the foremost Lutheran power—Sweden. Not only were many Protestant princes in Germany in a mood to welcome foreign assistance against the Catholics, but the emperor was less able to resist invasion, since in 1630, yielding to the urgent entreaties of the Catholic League, he dismissed the plundering and ambitious Wallenstein from his service.

The king of Sweden at this time was Gustavus Adolphus (1611−1632), the grandson of that Gustavus Vasa who had established both the independence and the Lutheranism of his country. Gustavus Adolphus was one of the most attractive figures of his age—in the prime of life, tall, fair, and blue−eyed, well educated and versed in seven languages, fond of music and poetry, skilled and daring in war, impetuous, well balanced, and versatile. A rare combination of the idealist and the practical man of affairs, Gustavus Adolphus had dreamed of making Protestant Sweden the leading power in northern Europe and had vigorously set to work to achieve his ends. His determination to encircle the whole Baltic with his own territories—making it literally a Swedish lake—brought him first into conflict with Muscovy, or, as we call it today, Russia. Finland and Esthonia were occupied, and Russia agreed in 1617 to exclusion from the Baltic sea coast. Next a stubborn conflict with Poland (1621−1629) secured for Sweden the province of Livonia and the mouth of the Vistula River. Gustavus then turned his longing eyes to the Baltic coast of northern Germany, at the very time when the Edict of Restitution promised him aggrieved allies in that quarter.

[Sidenote: 3. Swedish Intervention: Gustavus Adolphus]

It was likewise at the very time when Cardinal Richelieu had crushed out all insurrection, whether Huguenot or noble, in France and was seeking some effective means of prolonging the war in the Germanies to the end that the rival Habsburgs might be irretrievably weakened and humiliated. He entered into definite alliance with Gustavus Adolphus and provided him arms and money, for the time asking only that the Protestant champion accord the liberty of Catholic worship in conquered districts.

[Sidenote: French Aid]

Gustavus Adolphus landed in Pomerania in 1630 and proceeded to occupy the chief northern fortresses and to treat for alliances with the influential Protestant electors of Brandenburg and Saxony. While Gustavus tarried at Potsdam, in protracted negotiation with the elector of Brandenburg, Tilly and the imperialists succeeded, after a long siege, in capturing the Lutheran stronghold of Magdeburg (May, 1631). The fall of the city was attended by a mad massacre of the garrison, and of armed and unarmed citizens, in streets, houses, and churches; at least 20,000 perished; wholesale plundering and a general conflagration completed the havoc. The sack of Magdeburg evoked the greatest indignation from the Lutherans. Gustavus Adolphus, now joined by the electors of Brandenburg and Saxony and by many other Protestant princes of northern Germany, advanced into Saxony, where, in September, 1631, he avenged the destruction of Magdeburg by defeating decisively the smaller army of Tilly on the Breitenfeld, near Leipzig. Then Gustavus turned southwestward, making for the Rhine valley, with the idea of forming a union with the Calvinist princes. Only the prompt protest of his powerful ally, Richelieu, prevented the rich archbishoprics of Cologne, Trier, and Mainz from passing immediately under Swedish control. Next Gustavus Adolphus turned east and invaded Bavaria. Tilly, who had reassembled his forces, failed to check the invasion and lost his life in a battle on the Lech (April, 1632). The victorious Swedish king now made ready to carry the war into the hereditary dominions of the Austrian Habsburgs. As a last resort to check the invader, the emperor recalled Wallenstein with full power over his freelance army. About the same time the emperor concluded a close alliance with his kinsman, the ambitious Philip IV of Spain.

The memorable contest between the two great generals—Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein—was brought to a tragic close in the late autumn of the same year on the fateful field of Luetzen. Wallenstein was defeated, but Gustavus was killed. Although the Swedes continued the struggle, they were comparatively few in numbers and possessed no such general as their fallen king. On the other side, Wallenstein's loyalty could not be depended

upon; rumors reached the ear of the emperor that his foremost general was negotiating with the Protestants to make peace on his own terms; and Wallenstein was assassinated in his camp by fanatical imperialists (February, 1634). The tragic removal of both Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus, the economic exhaustion of the whole empire, and the national desire on the part of many Protestant princes, as well as on the part of the Catholic emperor, to rid the Germanies of foreign soldiers and foreign influence—all these developments seemed to point to the possibility of concluding the third, or Swedish, period of the war, not perhaps as advantageously for the imperialist cause as had ended the Bohemian revolt or the Danish intervention, but at any rate in a spirit of reasonable compromise. In fact, in May, 1635, a treaty was signed at Prague between the emperor and such princes as were then willing to lay down their arms, whereby all the military forces in the empire were henceforth to be under the direct control of the emperor (with the exception of a contingent under the special command of the Lutheran elector of Saxony); all princely leagues within the empire were to be dissolved; mutual restoration of captured territory was to be made; and, as to the fundamental question of the ownership of ecclesiastical lands, it was settled that any such lands actually held in the year 1627, whether acquired before or after the religious peace of Augsburg of 1555, should continue so to be held for forty years or until in each case an amicable arrangement could be reached.

What wrecked the peace of Prague was not so much the disinclination of the Protestant princes of Germany to accept its terms as the policy of Cardinal Richelieu of France. Richelieu was convinced more than ever that French greatness depended upon Habsburg defeat; he would not suffer the princes to make peace with the emperor until the latter was soundly trounced and all Germany devastated; instead of supplying the Swedes and the German Protestants with assistance from behind the scenes, he now would come boldly upon the stage and engage the emperor in open combat.

[Sidenote: 4. French Intervention. Richelieu's Policy in the Germanies]

The final, or French, period of the Thirty Years' War lasted from 1635 to 1648—almost as long as the other three periods put together. Richelieu entered the war not only to humble the Austrian Habsburgs and, if possible, to wrest the valuable Rhenish province of Alsace from the Holy Roman Empire, but also to strike telling blows at the Continental supremacy of the Spanish Habsburgs, who, since 1632, had been actively helping their German kinsmen. The Spanish king, it will be remembered, still held the Belgian Netherlands, on the northern frontier of France, and Franche Comte on the east, while oft−contested Milan in northern Italy was a Spanish dependency. France was almost surrounded by Spanish possessions, and Richelieu naturally declared war against Spain as against the emperor. The wily French cardinal could count upon the Swedes and many of the German Protestants to keep the Austrian Habsburgs busily engaged and upon the assistance of the Dutch in humbling the Spaniard, for Spain had not yet formally recognized the independence of the Dutch Netherlands. Inasmuch as England was chiefly concerned with troublesome internal affairs, the enemies of France could hardly expect aid from across the Channel.

[Sidenote: Conde and Turenne]

At first, the French suffered a series of military reverses, due in large part to unpreparedness, incompetent commanders, and ill−disciplined troops. At one time it looked as if the Spaniards might capture Paris. But with unflagging zeal and patriotic devotion, Richelieu pressed on the war. He raised armies, drilled them, and dispatched them into the Netherlands, into Alsace, into Franche Comte, into northern Italy, and into Roussillon. He stirred up the Portuguese to revolt and recover their independence (1640). And Mazarin, who succeeded him in 1642, preserved his foreign policy intact. Young and brilliant generals now appeared at the head of the French forces, among whom were the dashing Prince of Conde (1621−1686), and the master strategist Turenne (1611−1675), the greatest soldier of his day. The former's victory of Rocroi (1643) dated the commencement of the supremacy of France in war, a supremacy which was retained for a century.

[Sidenote: Peace of Westphalia (1648)]

Finally, Turenne's masterly maneuvering against the Spaniards and his forcible detachment of Maximilian of Bavaria from the imperial alliance broke down effective opposition and ended the Thirty Years' War in the Germanies. The various treaties which were signed in 1648 constituted the peace of Westphalia.

The political clauses of the peace of Westphalia provided: (1) Each German state was free to make peace or war without consulting the emperor—each prince was invested with sovereign authority; (2) France received Alsace, except the free city of Strassburg, and was confirmed in the possession of the bishoprics of Metz, Toul,

and Verdun; (3) Sweden was given territory in Pomerania controlling the mouth of the Oder, and the secularized bishopric of Bremen, surrounding the city of that name and dominating the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser; (4) France and Sweden received votes in the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire, with implied rights to exercise an oversight of German affairs; (5) Brandenburg secured eastern Pomerania and several bishoprics, including Magdeburg; (6) The Palatinate was divided between Maximilian of Bavaria and the son of the deposed Frederick—each bearing the title of elector; (7) Switzerland and the United Provinces (Holland) were formally recognized as independent of the empire and of Spain respectively.

The religious difficulties were settled as follows: (1) Calvinists were to share all the privileges of their Lutheran fellow−Protestants; (2) All church property was to be secured in the possession of those, whether Catholics or Protestants, who held it on 1 January, 1624; (3) An equal number of Catholic and Protestant judges were to sit in the imperial courts. Inasmuch as after 1648 there was little relative change of religion in Germany, this religious settlement was practically permanent.

[Sidenote: Evil Effects of the Thirty Years' War on Germany]

One of the most striking results of the peace of Westphalia was the completion of a long process of political disruption in the Germanies. Only the form of the Holy Roman Empire survived. The already shadowy imperial power became a mere phantom, nor was a change destined to come until, centuries later, the Prussian Hohenzollerns should replace the Austrian Habsburgs. Meanwhile the weakness of Germany enabled France to extend her northern boundaries toward the Rhine.

Far more serious than her political losses were the economic results to Germany. The Thirty Years' War left Germany almost a desert. “About two−thirds of the total population had disappeared; the misery of those that survived was piteous in the extreme. Five−sixths of the villages in the empire had been destroyed. We read of one in the Palatinate that in two years had been plundered twenty−eight times. In Saxony, packs of wolves roamed about, for in the north quite one−third of the land had gone out of cultivation, and trade had drifted into the hands of the French or Dutch. Education had almost disappeared; and the moral decline of the people was seen in the coarsening of manners and the growth of superstition, as witnessed by frequent burning of witches.”

[Sidenote: Continuation of War between French Bourbons and Spanish Hapsburgs. Peace of the Pyrenees 1659]

The peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years' War in the Germanies, but it did not stop the bitter contest between France and Spain. Mazarin was determined to secure even greater territorial gains for his country, and, although Conde deserted to Spain, Turenne was more than a match for any commander whom the Spaniards could put in the field. Mazarin, moreover, by ceding the fortress of Dunkirk to the English, obtained aid from the veteran troops of Cromwell. It was not until 1659 that, in the celebrated treaty of the Pyrenees, peace was concluded between France and Spain. This provided: (1) France added the province of Roussillon on her southern frontier and that of Artois on the north; (2) France was recognized as protector of the duchy of Lorraine; (3) Conde was pardoned and reinstated in French service; (4) Maria Theresa, eldest daughter of the Spanish Habsburg king, Philip IV, was to marry the young French Bourbon king, Louis XIV, and, in consideration of the payment of a large dowry, was to renounce all claims to the Spanish dominions.

The treaty of the Pyrenees was the last important achievement of Cardinal Mazarin. But before he died in 1661 he had the satisfaction of seeing the triumph of those policies which he had adopted from Richelieu: the royal power firmly established within France; the Habsburgs, whether Austrian or Spanish, defeated and humiliated; the Bourbon king of France respected and feared throughout Europe.

[Sidenote: Development of International Law] [Sidenote: In Italy]

Not least among the results of the conflict between Habsburgs and Bourbons was the stimulus given to the acceptance of fixed principles of international law and of definite usages for international diplomacy. In ancient times the existence of the all−embracing Roman Empire had militated against the development of international relations as we know them to−day. In the early middle ages feudal society had left little room for diplomacy. Of course, both in ancient times and in the middle ages, there had been embassies and negotiations and treaties; but the embassies had been no more than temporary missions directed to a particular end, and there had been neither permanent diplomatic agents nor a professional diplomatic class. To the development of such a class the Italy of the fifteenth century had given the first impetus. Northern and central Italy was then filled, as we have discovered, with a large number of city−states, all struggling for political and economic mastery, all dependent for the

maintenance of a “balance of power” upon alliances and counter alliances, all employing diplomacy quite as much as war in the game of peninsular politics. It was in Italy that there grew up the institution of passports, the distinction between armed forces and civilians, international comity, and in fact the very notion that states have an interest in the observance of law and order among themselves. Of special importance, in this connection, was Venice, which gradually evolved a regular system of permanent diplomats, and incidentally obliged her ambassadors to present detailed reports on foreign affairs; and, because of their commercial preeminence in the Mediterranean, the Venetians contributed a good deal to the development of rules of the sea first in time of peace, and subsequently in time of war.

[Sidenote: In Europe in Sixteenth Century]

During the sixteenth century the Italian ideas of statecraft and inter− state relations, ably championed by Machiavelli, were communicated to the nations of western Europe. Permanent embassies were established in foreign countries by the kings of Spain, Portugal, France, and England. Customs of international intercourse grew up. Diplomacy became a recognized occupation of distinguished statesmen.

[Sidenote: Thirty Years' War and International Law]

Two institutions might have thwarted or retarded the development of international law: one was the Catholic Church with its international organization and its claim to universal spiritual supremacy; the other was the Holy Roman Empire, with its claim to temporal predominance and with its insistence upon the essential inequality between itself and all other states. But the Protestant Revolt in the sixteenth century dealt a severe blow to the claim and power of the Catholic Church. And the long struggle between Bourbons and Habsburgs, culminating in the Thirty Years' War, reduced the Holy Roman Empire to a position, in theory as well as in fact, certainly no higher than that of the national monarchies of France, England, and Spain, or that of the Dutch Republic.

From the treaties of Westphalia emerged a real state−system in Europe, based on the theory of the essential equality of independent sovereign states, though admitting of the fact that there were Great Powers. Henceforth the public law of Europe was to be made by diplomats and by congresses of ambassadors. Westphalia pointed the new path.

Another aspect of international relations was emphasized in the first half of the seventeenth century. It was the Thirty Years' War, with its revolting cruelty, which brought out the contrast between the more humane practice of war as an art in Italy and the savagery which disgraced the Germanies. The brutality of the struggle turned thinkers' attention to the need of formulating rules for the protection of non−combatants in time of war, the treatment of the sick and wounded, the prohibition of wanton pillage and other horrors which shocked the awakening conscience of seventeenth−century Europe. It was the starting−point of the publication of treatises on international law.

[Sidenote: Grotius]

The first effective work, the one which was destined long to influence sovereigns and diplomats, was Grotius's *On the Law of War and Peace*. Hugo Grotius (1583−1645) [Footnote: Known in his native country as Huig van Groot. The last years of his life he spent as ambassador of Sweden at the French court.] was a learned Dutch humanist, whose active participation in politics against the stadholder of the Netherlands and whose strong protests for religious toleration against the dominant orthodox Calvinists of his country combined to bring upon himself a sentence of life imprisonment. Immured in a Dutch fortress in 1619, he managed to escape and fled to Paris, where he prepared and in 1625 published his immortal work. *On the Law of War and Peace* is an exhaustive and masterly text−book—the first and one of the best of the systematic treatises on the fundamental principles of international law.

ADDITIONAL READING

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# CHAPTER VII. THE GROWTH OF ABSOLUTISM IN FRANCE AND THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN BOURBONS AND HABSBURGS, 1661−1743

## THE AGE OF LOUIS XIV

Upon the death of Cardinal Mazarin in 1661, the young king Louis XIV declared that he would assume personal charge of the domestic and foreign affairs of the French monarchy. From that date, throughout a long reign, Louis was in fact as well as in name ruler of the nation, and his rule, like that of Napoleon, stands out as a distinct epoch in French history.

[Sidenote: Louis XIV the Heir to Absolutist Tendencies]

Louis XIV profited by the earlier work of Henry IV, Sully, Richelieu, and Mazarin. He inherited a fairly compact state, the population of which was patriotic and loyal to the crown. Insurrections of Protestants or rebellions of the nobles were now things of the past. The Estates−General, the ancient form of representative government, had fallen into disuse and oblivion. Local administration was conducted by faithful middle−class officials, the intendants; and all powers of taxation, war, public improvements, police, and justice were centered in the hands of the king. Abroad, the rival Habsburgs had been humbled and French boundaries had been extended and French prestige heightened. Everything was in readiness for a great king to practice absolutism on a scale never before realized.

[Sidenote: Absolutism. Monarchy by Divine Right]

The theories of government upon which the absolutism of Louis XIV was based received a classic expression in a celebrated book written by Bossuet (1627−1704), a learned and upright bishop of the time. Government, according to Bossuet, [Footnote: The statements of the arguments in favor of monarchy by divine right are taken from Bossuet's famous book, *La politique tiree des propres paroles de l'Ecriture Sainte*.] is divinely ordained in order to enable mankind to satisfy the natural instincts of living together in organized society. Under God, monarchy is, of all forms of government, the most usual and the most ancient, and therefore the most natural: it is likewise the strongest and most efficient, therefore the best. It is analogous to the rule of a family by the father, and, like that rule, should be hereditary. Four qualities are referred by the eloquent bishop to such an hereditary monarch: (1) That he is sacred is attested by his anointing at the time of coronation by the priests of the Church—it is accordingly blasphemy and sacrilege to assail the person of the king or to conspire against him; (2) That he is to provide for the welfare of his people and watch over their every activity may be gathered from the fact that he is, in a very real sense, the father of his people, the paternal king; (3) His power is absolute and autocratic, and for its exercise he is accountable to God alone—no man on earth may rightfully resist the royal commands, and the only recourse for subjects against an evil king is to pray God that his heart be changed; (4) Greater reason is given to a king than to any one else—the king is an earthly image of God's majesty, and it is wrong, therefore, to look upon him as a mere man. The king is a public person and in him the whole nation is embodied. “As in God are united all perfection and every virtue, so all the power of all the individuals in a community is united in the person of the king.”

[Sidenote: Louis XIV]

Such was the theory of what is called divine−right monarchy or absolutism. It must be remembered that it had been gaining ground during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, until it was accepted practically by all the French people as well as by most of their Continental neighbors. Even in England, as we shall presently see,[Footnote: See below, pp. 263 ff.] the Stuart kings attempted, for a time with success, to assert and maintain the doctrine. It was a political idea as popular in the seventeenth century as that of democracy is to−day. And Louis XIV was its foremost personification. Suave, dignified, elegant in manners and speech, the French king played his part well; he appeared to have been born and divinely appointed to the kingly calling.

For a king, Louis worked hard. He was conscientious and painstaking. Day after day he reviewed the details of administration. Over all things he had a watchful eye. Systematically he practiced what he termed the “trade of a king.” “One reigns by work and for work,” he wrote his grandson.

No prince was more fortunate than Louis XIV in his personal advisers and lieutenants. Not only were his praises proclaimed by the silver−tongued Bossuet, but he was served by such men as Colbert, the financier and

reformer; Louvois, the military organizer; Vauban, the master builder of fortifications; Conde and Turenne, unconquerable generals; and by a host of literary lights, whom he patronized and pensioned, and who cast about his person a glamour of renown. Louis was hailed as the “Grand Monarch,” and his age was appropriately designated the Age of Louis the Fourteenth.

[Sidenote: Versailles and the Court of Louis XIV]

At Versailles, some twelve miles from Paris, in the midst of what had been a sandy waste, the Grand Monarch erected those stately palaces, with their lavish furnishings, and broad parks and great groves and myriads of delightful fountains, which became Europe's pleasure center. Thither were drawn the French nobility, who, if shorn of all political power, were now exempted from disagreeable taxes and exalted as essential parts of a magnificent social pageant. The king must have noblemen as *valets−de−chambre*, as masters of the wardrobe or of the chase or of the revels. Only a nobleman was fit to comb the royal hair or to dry off the king after a bath. The nobles became, like so many chandeliers, mere decorations for the palace. Thus, about Versailles gathered the court of France, and the leaders of fashion met those of brains.

[Sidenote: “The Age of Louis XIV"]

It was a time when French manners, dress, speech, art, literature, and science were adopted as the models and property of civilized Europe. Corneille (1606−1684), the father of the French stage; Moliere (1622− 1673), the greatest of French dramatists; Racine (1639−1699), the polished, formal playwright; Madame de Sevigne (1626−1696), the brilliant and witty authoress of memoirs; La Fontaine (1621−1695), the popular rhymer of whimsical fables and teller of scandalous tales; and many another graced the court of Versailles and tasted the royal bounty. French became the language of fashion as well as of diplomacy— a position it has ever since maintained.

[Sidenote: “Rule of the Robe"]

While the court of Louis XIV was thus the focal point of French—almost of European—life, the professional and mercantile classes, who constituted the Third Estate, enjoyed comparative security and prosperity and under the king held all of the important offices of actual administration. Because of the judicial offices which the middle class filled, the government was popularly styled the “rule of the robe.”

[Sidenote: “Colbert"]

Colbert (1619−1683), one of Louis's greatest ministers, was the son of a merchant, and was intensely interested in the welfare of the class to which he belonged. Installed in office through the favor of Mazarin, he was successively named, after the cardinal's death, superintendent of public works, controller−general of finances, minister of marine, of commerce and agriculture, and of the colonies. In short, until his death in 1683, he exerted power in every department of government except that of war. Although he never possessed the absolute personal authority which marked the ministries of Richelieu and Mazarin, being plainly subservient to the king's commands, nevertheless he enjoyed for many years the royal favor and by incessant toil succeeded in accomplishing a good deal for the material prosperity of France. In many respects his policies and achievements resembled Sully's.

[Sidenote: Attempted Financial Reform]

First, financial reform claimed all the energies of Colbert. Under the government of Richelieu, and more particularly under that of Mazarin, the hard savings of Sully had been squandered, enormous sums had been granted to favorites, and the ever−increasing noble class had been exempted from taxation, an evil system of tax−gathering, called “farming the taxes,” [Footnote: “Farming the taxes,” that is, intrusting the collection of taxes to individuals or corporations that squeezed as much money as they could from the taxpayers and kept for themselves what they collected over and above the lump sum due the government.] had grown up, and the weight of the financial burden had fallen almost exclusively upon the wretched peasantry. Colbert sternly and fearlessly set about his task. He appointed agents whose honesty he could trust and reformed many of the abuses in tax−collecting. While he was unable to impose the direct land tax—the *taille*—upon the privileged nobility, he stoutly resisted every attempt further to augment the number of exemptions, and actually lowered this direct tax upon the peasantry by substituting indirect taxes, or customs duties, which would in some degree affect all the people. To lighten the burden of the country−folk, he sought to promote agriculture. He provided that no farmers' tools might be seized for debt. He encouraged the breeding of horses and cattle. He improved the roads and other means of interior communication. The great canal of Languedoc, joining the Mediterranean with the Garonne

River and thence with the Atlantic, was planned and constructed under his patronage. As far as possible, the duties on the passage of agricultural produce from province to province were equalized.

[Sidenote: Colbert and French Merchantilism]

In forwarding what he believed to be his own class interests, Colbert was especially zealous. Manufactures and commerce were fostered in every way he could devise. New industries were established, inventors protected, workmen invited from foreign countries, native workmen prohibited to leave France. A heavy tariff was placed upon foreign imports in order to protect “infant industries” and increase the gain of French manufacturers and traders. Liberal bounties were allowed to French ships engaged in commerce, and foreign ships were compelled to pay heavy tonnage duties for using French ports. And along with the protective tariff and subsidizing of the merchant marine, went other pet policies of mercantilism, [Footnote: See above, pp. 63 f.] such as measures to prevent the exportation of precious metals from France, to encourage corporations and monopolies, and to extend minute governmental supervision over the manufacture, quality, quantity, and sale of all commodities. What advantages accrued from Colbert's efforts in this direction were more than offset by the unfortunate fact that the mercantile class was unduly enriched at the expense of other and numerically larger classes in the community, and that the centralized monarchy, in which the people had no part, proved itself unfit, in the long run, to oversee the details of business with wisdom or honesty.

[Sidenote: Colbert's “World Policy"]

Stimulation of industry and commerce has usually necessitated the creation of a protecting navy. Colbert appreciated the requirement and hastened to fulfill it. He reconstructed the docks and arsenal of Toulon and established great ship−yards at Rochefort, Calais, Brest, and Havre. He fitted out a large royal navy that could compare favorably with that of England or Spain or Holland. To supply it with recruits he drafted seamen from the maritime provinces and resorted to the use of criminals, who were often chained to the galleys like so many slaves of the new industry.

Likewise, the adoption of the mercantile policy seemed to demand the acquisition of a colonial empire, in which the mother−country should enjoy a trade monopoly. So Colbert became a vigorous colonial minister. He purchased Martinique and Guadeloupe in the West Indies, encouraged settlements in San Domingo, in Canada, and in Louisiana, and set up important posts in India, in Senegal, and in Madagascar. France, under Colbert, became a serious colonial competitor with her older European rivals.

Colbert was essentially a financier and economist. But to the arts of peace, which adorned the reign of Louis XIV, he was a potent contributor. He strengthened the French Academy, which had been founded by Richelieu, and himself established the Academy of Sciences, now called the Institute of France, and the great astronomical observatory at Paris. He pensioned many writers, and attracted foreign artists and scientists to France. Many buildings and triumphal arches were erected under his patronage.

[Sidenote: Louvois and French Militarism under Louis XIV]

In the arts of war, Louis XIV possessed an equally able and hard−working assistant. Louvois (1641−1691) was one of the greatest war ministers that the world has ever seen. He recruited and supported the largest and finest standing army of his day. He introduced severe regulations and discipline. He prescribed, for the first time in history, a distinctive military uniform and introduced the custom of marching in step. Under his supervision, camp life was placed upon a sanitary basis. And under his influence, promotion in the service no longer depended primarily on social position but upon merit as well. In Vauban (1633−1707), Louvois had the greatest military engineer in history—for it was Vauban who built those rows of superb fortifications on the northern and eastern frontiers of France. In Conde and Turenne, moreover, Louvois had first−class generals who could give immediate effect to his reforms and policies.

[Sidenote: Deceptive Character of the Glamour of the Age of Louis XIV]

Thus was the Grand Monarch well and faithfully served. Yet the outward show and glamour of his reign were very deceptive of the true internal conditions. Colbert tried to do too many things, with the result that his plans repeatedly miscarried. The nobles became more indolent, wasteful, and pleasure−loving, and the middle class more selfish and more devoted to their own class interests, while the lot of the peasantry,—the bulk of the nation,—despite the spasmodic efforts of the paternal government, steadily grew worse under the unrelieved burden of taxation. Then, too, the king was extravagant in maintaining his mistresses, his court, and his favorites. His excessive vanity had to be appeased by expensive entertainment and show. He preferred the spectacular but

woeful feats of arms to the less pretentious but more solid triumphs of peace. Indeed, in course of time, Colbert found his influence with the king waning before that of Louvois, and when he died it was with the bitter thought that his financial retrenchment had been in vain, that his husbanded resources were being rapidly dissipated in foreign war. It was Louis's wars that deprived his reign of true grandeur and paved the way for future disaster.

[Sidenote: Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685]

Before turning our attention to the foreign wars of Louis XIV, mention must be made of another blot on his reign. It was Louis XIV who renewed the persecution of the Protestants. He was moved alike by the absolutist's desire to secure complete uniformity throughout France and by the penitent's religious fervor to make amends for earlier scandals of his private life. For a time he contented himself with so−called dragonnades—quartering licentious soldiers upon the Huguenots—but at length in 1685 he formally revoked the Edict of Nantes. France, which for almost a century had led Europe in the principle and practice of religious toleration, was henceforth reactionary. Huguenots were still granted liberty of conscience, but were denied freedom of worship and deprived of all civil rights in the kingdom. The immediate effect of this arbitrary and mistaken action was the emigration of large numbers of industrious and valuable citizens, who added materially to the political and economic life of England, Holland, and Prussia, the chief Protestant foes of France.

EXTENSION OF FRENCH FRONTIERS

Louis XIV was not a soldier himself. He never appeared in military uniform or rode at the head of his troops. What he lacked, however, in personal genius as a great military commander, he compensated for in a genuine fondness for war and in remarkable personal gifts of diplomacy. He was one of the greatest diplomats of his age, and, as we have seen, he possessed large loyal armies and able generals that he could employ in prosecuting the traditional foreign policy of France.

[Sidenote: Traditional Foreign Policy of France]

This foreign policy, which had been pursued by Francis I, Henry II, Henry IV, Richelieu, and Mazarin, had for its goal the humiliation of the powerful Habsburgs, whether of Austria or of Spain. Although France had gained materially at their expense in the treaties of Westphalia and of the Pyrenees, much remained to be done by Louis XIV. When the Grand Monarch assumed direct control of affairs in 1661, the Spanish Habsburgs still ruled not only the peninsular kingdom south of France, but the Belgian Netherlands to the north, Franche Comte to the east, and Milan in northern Italy, while their kinsmen of Austria maintained shadowy imperial government over the rich Rhenish provinces on the northeastern boundary of France. France was still almost completely encircled by Habsburg holdings.

[Sidebar: Doctrine of “Natural Boundaries"]

To justify his subsequent aggressions, Louis XIV propounded the doctrine of “natural boundaries.” Every country, he maintained, should secure such frontiers as nature had obviously provided—mountains, lakes, or rivers; and France was naturally provided with the frontiers of ancient Gaul—the Pyrenees, the Alps, the Rhine River, and the Ocean. Any foreign monarch or state that claimed power within such frontiers was an interloper and should be expelled.

[Sidenote: The Wars of Louis XIV]

For many years, and in three great wars, Louis XIV endeavored, with some success, to reach the Rhine. These three wars—the War of Devolution, the Dutch War, and the War of the League of Augsburg—we shall now discuss. A fourth great war, directed toward the acquisition of the Spanish throne by the Bourbon family, will be treated separately on account of the wide and varied interests involved.

[Sidenote: The “War of Devolution"]

The War of Devolution was an attempt of Louis to gain the Spanish or Belgian Netherlands. It will be remembered that in accordance with the peace of the Pyrenees, Louis had married Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV of Spain. Now by a subsequent marriage Philip IV had had a son, a weak−bodied, half−witted prince, who came to the throne in 1665 as Charles II. Louis XIV at once took advantage of this turn of affairs to assert in behalf of his wife a claim to a portion of the Spanish inheritance. The claim was based on a curious custom which had prevailed in the inheritance of private property in the Netherlands, to the effect that children of a first marriage should inherit to the exclusion of those of a subsequent marriage. Louis insisted that this custom, called “devolution,” should be applied not only to private property but also to sovereignty and that his wife should be recognized, therefore, as sovereign of the Belgian Netherlands. In reality the claim was a pure

invention, but the French king thought it would be a sufficient apology for the robbery of a weak brother−in−law.

Before opening hostilities, Louis XIV made use of his diplomatic wiles in order to guard himself against assistance which other states might render to Spain. In the first place, he obtained promises of friendly neutrality from Holland, Sweden, and the Protestant states of Germany which had been allied with France during the Thirty Years' War. In the second place, he threatened to stir up another civil war in the Holy Roman Empire if the Austrian Habsburgs should help their Spanish kinsman. Finally, he had no fear of England because that country was in the midst of a peculiarly bitter trade war with the Dutch. [Footnote: It was on the eve of this second trade war between England and Holland (1665−1667) that the English took New Amsterdam from the Dutch (1664) and rechristened it New York, and during this struggle that the remarkable Dutch admiral, De Ruyter, burned the English fleet and shipping on the Thames (June, 1667).]

[Sidenote: The “Balance of Power"]

The War of Devolution lasted from 1667 to 1668. The well−disciplined and splendidly generaled armies of Louis XIV had no difficulty in occupying the border fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands. The whole territory would undoubtedly have fallen to France, had not a change unexpectedly occurred in international affairs. The trade war between England and Holland came to a speedy end, and the two former rivals now joined with Sweden in forming the Triple Alliance to arrest the war and to put a stop to the French advance. The “balance of power” demanded, said the allies, that the other European states should combine in order to prevent any one state from becoming too powerful. This plea for the “balance of power” was the reply to the French king's plea for “natural boundaries.”

[Sidenote: Treaty of Aix−la−Chapelle, 1668]

The threats of the Triple Alliance caused Louis XIV to negotiate the treaty of Aix−la−Chapelle, by which Spain surrendered to France an important section of territory in Flanders, including the fortified cities of Charleroi, Tournai, and Lille, but still retained the greater part of the Belgian Netherlands. The taste of the Grand Monarch was thereby whetted, but his appetite hardly appeased.

[Sidenote: Franco−Dutch Rivalry]

Louis blamed the Dutch for his rebuff. He was thoroughly alive to the fact that Holland would never take kindly to having powerful France as a near neighbor, and that French acquisition of the Belgian Netherlands, therefore, would always be opposed by the Dutch. Nor were wounded vanity and political considerations the only motives for the Grand Monarch's second war, that against the Dutch. France, as well as England, was now becoming a commercial and colonial rival of Holland, and it seemed both to Louis XIV and to Colbert that the French middle class would be greatly benefited by breaking the trade monopolies of the Dutch. Louis's second war was quite as much a trade war as a political conflict.

[Sidenote: Civil Strife in Holland]

First, Louis bent his energies to breaking up the Triple Alliance and isolating Holland. He took advantage of the political situation in England to arrange (1670) the secret treaty of Dover with Charles II, the king of that country: in return for a large pension, which should free him from reliance upon Parliament, the English king undertook to declare himself a Roman Catholic and to withdraw from the Triple Alliance. Liberal pensions likewise bought off the Swedish government. It seemed now as if Holland, alone and friendless, would have to endure a war with her powerful enemy. Nor was Holland in shape for a successful resistance. Ever since she had gained formal recognition of her independence (1648), she had been torn by civil strife. On one side, the head of the Orange family, who bore the title of stadholder, supported by the country districts, the nobles, the Calvinistic clergy, and the peasantry, hoped to consolidate the state and to establish an hereditary monarchy. On the other side, the aristocratic burghers and religious liberals, the townsfolk generally, found an able leader in the celebrated Grand Pensionary, John DeWitt (1625−1672), who sought to preserve the republic and the rights of the several provinces. For over twenty years, the latter party was in power, but as the young prince of Orange, William III, grew to maturity, signs were not lacking of a reaction in favor of his party.

[Sidenote: The Dutch War]

Under these circumstances, Louis XIV declared war against Holland in 1672. French troops at once occupied Lorraine on the pretext that its duke was plotting with the Dutch, and thence, proceeding down the Rhine, past Cologne, invaded Holland and threatened the prosperous city of Amsterdam. The Dutch people, in a frenzy of despair, murdered John DeWitt, whom they unjustly blamed for their reverses; and, at the order of the young

William III, who now assumed supreme command, they cut the dykes and flooded a large part of northern Holland. The same expedient which had enabled them to expel the Spaniards in the War of Independence now stayed the victorious advance of the French.

The refusal of Louis XIV to accept the advantageous terms of peace offered by the Dutch aroused general apprehension throughout Europe. The Emperor Leopold and the Great Elector of Brandenburg made an offensive alliance with Holland, which subsequently was joined by Spain and several German states. The general struggle, thus precipitated, continued indeed with success for France. Turenne, by a brilliant victory, compelled the Great Elector to make peace. The emperor was defeated. The war was carried into the Spanish Netherlands and Franche Comte.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Nijmwegen, 1678]

But when at length the English Parliament compelled Charles II to adhere to the general anti−French alliance, Louis XIV thought it was time to make peace. As events proved, it was not Holland but Spain that had to pay the penalties of Louis's second war. By the treaty of Nijmwegen, the former lost nothing, while the latter ceded to France the long−coveted province of Franche Comte and several strong fortresses in the Belgian Netherlands. France, moreover, continued to occupy the duchy of Lorraine.

[Sidenote: Effects of the Dutch War on France]

Thus, if Louis XIV had failed to punish the insolence of the Dutch, he had at least succeeded in extending the French frontiers one stage nearer the Rhine. He had become the greatest and most−feared monarch in Europe. Yet for these gains France paid heavily. The border provinces had been wasted by war. The treasury was empty, and the necessity of negotiating loans and increasing taxes put Colbert in despair. Turenne, the best general, had been killed late in the contest, and Conde, on account of ill health, was obliged to withdraw from active service.

Yet at the darker side of the picture, the Grand Monarch refused to look. He was puffed up with pride by his successes in war and diplomacy. Like many another vain, ambitious ruler, he felt that what economic grievances or social discontent might exist within his country could readily be forgotten or obscured in a blaze of foreign glory—in the splendor of ambassadors, the glint and din of arms, the grim shedding of human blood. Having picked the sanguinary path, and at first found pleasure therein, the Grand Monarch pursued it to an end bitter for his family and tragic for his people.

[Sidenote: The “Chambers of Reunion” and Further French Annexations]

No sooner was the Dutch War concluded than Louis XIV set out by a policy of trickery and diplomacy further to augment the French territories. The cessions, which the treaties of Westphalia and Nijmwegen guaranteed to France, had been made “with their dependencies.” It now occurred to Louis that doubtless in the old feudal days of the middle ages or early modern times some, if not all, of his new acquisitions had possessed feudal suzerainty over other towns or territories not yet incorporated into France. Although in most cases such ancient feudal ties had practically lapsed by the close of the seventeenth century, nevertheless the French king decided to reinvoke them in order, if possible, to add to his holdings. He accordingly constituted special courts, called “Chambers of Reunion,” composed of his own obedient judges, who were to decide what districts by right of ancient feudal usage should be annexed. So painstaking and minute were the investigations of these Chambers of Reunion that they adjudged to their own country, France, no less than twenty important towns of the Holy Roman Empire, including Luxemburg and Strassburg. Nothing seemed to prevent the prompt execution of these judgments by the French king. He had kept his army on a war footing. The king of England was again in his pay and his alliance. The emperor was hard pressed by an invasion of the Ottoman Turks. Armed imperial resistance at Strassburg was quickly overcome (1681), and Vauban, the great engineer, proceeded to make that city the chief French fortress upon the Rhine. A weak effort of the Spanish monarch to protect Luxemburg from French aggression was doomed to dismal failure (1684).

[Sidenote: War of the League of Augsburg or of the Palatinate]

Alarmed by the steady advance of French power, the Emperor Leopold in 1686 succeeded in forming the League of Augsburg with Spain, Sweden, and several German princes, in order to preserve the territorial integrity of the Holy Roman Empire. Nor was it long before the League of Augsburg was called upon to resist further encroachments of the French king. In 1688 Louis dispatched a large army into the Rhenish Palatinate to enforce a preposterous claim which he had advanced to that valuable district. The war which resulted was Louis's third struggle, and has been variously styled the War of the League of Augsburg or the War of the Palatinate. In

America, where it was to be paralleled by an opening conflict between French and English colonists, it has been known as King William's War.

[Sidenote: William III, Stadholder of Holland and King of England]

In his first two wars, Louis XIV could count upon the neutrality, if not the friendly aid, of the English. Their king was dependent upon him for financial support in maintaining an absolutist government. Their influential commercial and trading classes, who still suffered more from Dutch than from French rivalry, displayed no anxiety to mix unduly in the dynastic conflicts on the Continent. Louis had an idea that he could count upon the continuation of the same English policy; he was certainly on good terms with the English king, James II (1685−1688). But the deciding factor in England and in the war was destined to be not the subservient James II but the implacable William III. This William III, [Footnote: William III (1650−1702), Dutch stadholder in 1672 and British king in 1689.] as stadholder of Holland, had long been a stubborn opponent of Louis XIV on the Continent; he had repeatedly displayed his ability as a warrior and as a cool, crafty schemer. Through his marriage with the princess Mary, elder daughter of James II, he now managed adroitly to ingratiate himself with the Protestant, parliamentary, and commercial parties in England that were opposing the Catholic, absolutist, and tyrannical policies of James.

We shall presently see that the English Revolution of 1688, which drove James II into exile, was a decisive step in the establishment of constitutional government in England. It was likewise of supreme importance in its effects upon the foreign policy of Louis XIV, for it called to the English throne the son−in−law of James, William III, the stadholder of Holland and arch enemy of the French king.

[Sidenote: Beginning of a new Hundred Years' War between France and England]

England, under the guidance of her new sovereign, promptly joined the League of Augsburg, and declared war against France. Trade rivalries between Holland and England were in large part composed, and the colonial empires of the two states, now united under a joint ruler, naturally came into conflict with the colonial empire of France. Thus, in addition to the difficulties which the Bourbons encountered in promoting their dynastic interests on the continent of Europe, they were henceforth confronted by a vast colonial and commercial struggle with England. It was the beginning of a Hundred Years' War that was to be fought for the mastery of India and America.

Louis XIV never seemed to appreciate the importance of the colonial side of the contest. He was too much engrossed in his ambition of stretching French boundaries to the Rhine. So in discussing the War of the League of Augsburg as well as the subsequent War of the Spanish Succession, we shall devote our attention in this chapter primarily to the European and dynastic elements, reserving the account of the parallel colonial struggle to a later chapter on the “World Conflict of France and Great Britain.”

The War of the League of Augsburg, Louis' third war, lasted from 1689 to 1697. Notwithstanding the loss of Turenne and Conde, the splendidly organized French armies were able to hold the allies at bay and to save their country from invasion. They even won several victories on the frontier. But on the sea, the struggle was less successful for Louis, and a French expedition to Ireland in favor of James II proved disastrous. After many years of strife, ruinous to all the combatants, the Grand Monarch sued for peace.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of Ryswick, 1697]

By the treaty of Ryswick, which concluded the War of the League of Augsburg, Louis XIV (1) surrendered nearly all the places adjudged to him by the Chambers of Reunion, except Strassburg; (2) allowed the Dutch to garrison the chief fortresses in the Spanish Netherlands as a “barrier” against French aggression; (3) granted the Dutch a favorable commercial treaty; (4) restored Lorraine to its duke; (5) abandoned his claim to the Palatinate; (6) acknowledged William III as king of England and promised to support no attempt against his throne. Thus, the French king lost no territory,—in fact, he obtained full recognition of his ownership of the whole province of Alsace,—but his reputation and vanity had been uncomfortably wounded.

THE WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION

One of the main reasons that prompted Louis XIV to sue for peace and to abandon his claims on Lorraine and the Palatinate was the rapid physical decline of the inglorious Spanish monarch, Charles II, of whose enormous possessions the French king hoped by diplomacy and intrigue to secure valuable portions.

[Sidenote: The Spanish Inheritance]

Spain was still a great power. Under its crown were gathered not only the ancient kingdoms of Castile,

Aragon, and Navarre in the Spanish peninsula, but the greater part of the Belgian Netherlands, and in Italy the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, the duchy of Milan, and the control of Tuscany, as well as the huge colonial empire in America and the Philippines. At the time when kings were absolute rulers and reckoned their territories as personal possessions, much depended upon the royal succession.

[Sidenote: The Spanish Succession]

Now it happened that the Spanish Habsburgs were dying out in the male line. Charles II was himself without children or brothers. Of his sisters, the elder was the wife of Louis XIV and the younger was married to the Emperor Leopold, the heir of the Austrian Habsburgs. Louis XIV had renounced by the peace of the Pyrenees (1659) all claims to the Spanish throne on condition that a large dowry be paid him, but the impoverished state of the Spanish exchequer had prevented the payment of the dowry. Louis, therefore, might lay claim to the whole inheritance of Charles II and entertain the hope of seeing the Bourbons supplant the Habsburgs in some of the fairest lands of Christendom. In opposition to the French contention, the emperor was properly moved by family pride to put forth the claim of his wife and that of himself as the nearest male relative of the Spanish king. If the contention of Leopold were sustained, a single Habsburg ruler might once more unite an empire as vast as that which the Emperor Charles V had once ruled. On the other side, if the ambition of Louis XIV were realized, a new and formidable Bourbon empire would be erected. In either case the European “balance of power” would be destroyed.

[Sidenote: Commercial and Colonial Complications]

Bound up with the political problem in Europe were grave commercial and colonial questions. According to the mercantilist theories that flourished throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, every country which possessed colonies should reserve trade privileges with them exclusively to its own citizens. So long as France and Spain were separate and each was only moderately powerful, their commercial rivals, notably England and Holland, might hope to gain special trade−concessions from time to time in French or Spanish colonies. But once the colonial empires of France and Spain were united under a joint ruler, such a vast monopoly would be created as would effectually prevent the expansion of English or Dutch commerce while it heightened the economic prosperity of the Bourbon subjects.

[Sidenote: Attempts to Partition the Spanish Inheritance]

It was natural, therefore, that William III, as stadholder of Holland and king of England, should hold the balance of power between the Austrian Habsburgs and the French Bourbons. Both the claimants appreciated this fact and understood that neither would be allowed peacefully to appropriate the entire Spanish inheritance. In fact, several “partition treaties” were patched up between Louis and William III, with a view to maintaining the balance of power and preventing either France or Austria from unduly increasing its power. But flaws were repeatedly found in the treaties, and, as time went on, the problem grew more vexatious. After the conclusion of the peace of Ryswick, Louis XIV was absorbed in the game of dividing the property of the dying Spanish king. One of the very greatest triumphs of Louis' diplomatic art was the way in which he ingratiated himself in Spanish favor. It must be remembered that it was Spain which the Grand Monarch had attacked and despoiled in his earlier wars of aggrandizement, and neither the Spanish court nor the Spanish people could have many patriotic motives for loving him. Yet such was his tact and his finesse that within three years after the treaty of Ryswick he had secured the respect of the feeble Charles II and the gratitude of the Spanish people.

[Sidenote: Will of Charles II of Spain in Favor of the French Bourbons]

A month before his pitiful death (1700), Charles II, the last of the Spanish Habsburgs, summoned all his strength and dictated a will that awarded his whole inheritance to Philip of Anjou, the grandson of Louis XIV, with the resolute proviso that under no circumstances should the Spanish possessions be dismembered. When the news reached Versailles, the Grand Monarch hesitated. He knew that acceptance meant war at least with Austria, probably with England. Perhaps he thought of the wretched condition into which his other wars had plunged his people.

[Sidenote: Acceptance of the Will by Louis XIV]

Hesitation was but an interlude. Ambition triumphed over fear, and the glory of the royal family over the welfare of France. In the great hall of mirrors at Versailles, the Grand Monarch heralded his grandson as Philip V, the first Bourbon king of Spain. And when Philip, left for Madrid, his now aged grandfather kissed him, and the Spanish ambassador exultantly declared that “the Pyrenees no longer exist.”

Anticipating the inevitable outbreak of hostilities, Louis proceeded to violate the treaty of Ryswick by seizing the “barrier” fortresses from the Dutch and by recognizing the son of James II as king of England. He then made hasty alliances with Bavaria and Savoy, and called out the combined armies of France and Spain.

[Sidenote: The Grand Alliance against the Bourbons]

Meanwhile, William III and the Emperor Leopold formed the Grand Alliance, to which at first England, Holland, Austria, and the German electors of Brandenburg−Prussia, Hanover, and the Palatinate adhered. Subsequently, Portugal, by means of a favorable commercial treaty with England,[Footnote: The “Methuen Treaty” (1703).] was induced to join the alliance, and the duke of Savoy abandoned France in favor of Austria with the understanding that his country should be recognized as a kingdom. The allies demanded that the Spanish crown should pass to the Archduke Charles, the grandson of the emperor, that Spanish trade monopolies should be broken, and that the power of the French king should be curtailed.

[Sidenote: The War of the Spanish Succession]

The War of the Spanish Succession—the fourth and final war of Louis XIV—lasted from 1702 to 1713. Although William III died at its very commencement, he was certain that it would be vigorously pushed by the English government of his sister−in−law, Queen Anne (1702−1714). The bitter struggle on the high seas and in the colonies, where it was known as Queen Anne's War, will be treated in another place. [Footnote: See below, p. 308.] The military campaigns in Europe were on a larger scale than had hitherto been known. Fighting was carried on in the Netherlands, in the southern Germanies, in Italy, and in Spain.

The tide of war turned steadily for several years against the Bourbons. The allies possessed the ablest generals of the time in the duke of Marlborough (1650−1722), the conscientious self−possessed English commander, and in the skillful and daring Prince Eugene of Savoy (1663− 1736). The great battle of Blenheim (1704) drove the French from the Holy Roman Empire, and the capture of Gibraltar (1704) gave England a foothold in Spain and a naval base for the Mediterranean. Prince Eugene crowded the French out of Italy (1706); and by the victories of Ramillies (1706), Oudenarde (1708), and Malplaquet (1709), Marlborough cleared the Netherlands. On land and sea one reverse followed another. The allies at length were advancing on French soil. It appeared inevitable that they would settle peace at Paris on their own terms.

Then it was that Louis XIV displayed an energy and devotion worthy of a better cause. He appealed straight to the patriotism of his people. He set an example of untiring application to toil. Nor was he disappointed in his expectations. New recruits hurried to the front; rich and poor poured in their contributions; a supreme effort was made to stay the advancing enemy.

The fact that Louis XIV was not worse punished was due to this remarkable uprising of the French and Spanish nations and likewise to dissensions among the allies. A change of ministry in England led to the disgrace and retirement of the duke of Marlborough and made that country lukewarm in prosecuting the war. Then, too, the unexpected accession of the Archduke Charles to the imperial and Austrian thrones (1711) now rendered the claims of the allies' candidate for the Spanish throne as menacing to the European balance of power as would be the recognition of the French claimant, Philip of Bourbon.

These circumstances made possible the conclusion of the peace of Utrecht, with the following major provisions:

[Sidenote: The Peace of Utrecht 1713−1714]

(1) Philip V, grandson of Louis XIV, was acknowledged king of Spain and the Indies, on condition that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united. (2) The Austrian Habsburgs were indemnified by securing Naples, Sardinia, [Footnote: By the treaty of London (1720), Austria exchanged Sardinia for Sicily.] Milan, and the Belgian Netherlands. The last−named, which had been called the Spanish Netherlands since the days of Philip II, were henceforth for a century styled the Austrian Netherlands.

(3) England received the lion's share of the spoils. She obtained Newfoundland, Acadia (Nova Scotia), and Hudson Bay from France, and Gibraltar and Minorca from Spain. She also secured a preferential tariff for her imports into the great port of Cadiz, the monopoly of the slave trade, and the right of sending one ship of merchandise a year to the Spanish colonies. France promised not to assist the Stuarts in their attempts to regain the English throne.

(4) The Dutch recovered the “barrier” fortresses and for garrisoning them were promised financial aid by Austria. The Dutch were also allowed to establish a trade monopoly on the River Scheldt.

(5) The elector of Brandenburg was acknowledged king of Prussia, an important step In the fortunes of the Hohenzollern family which at the present time reigns in Germany.

(6) The duchy of Savoy was recognized similarly as a kingdom and was given the island of Sicily. [Footnote: The title of king was recognized by the emperor only in 1720, when Savoy exchanged Sicily for Sardinia. Henceforth the kingdom of Savoy was usually referred to as the kingdom of Sardinia.] From the house of Savoy has descended the reigning sovereign of present−day Italy.

[Sidenote: Significance of the Settlement of Utrecht]

The peace of Utrecht marked the cessation of a long conflict between Spanish Habsburgs and French Bourbons. For nearly a century thereafter both France and Spain pursued similar foreign policies for the common interests of the Bourbon family. Bourbon sovereigns have continued, with few interruptions, to reign in Spain to the present moment.

The Habsburg influence, however, remained paramount in Austria, in the Holy Roman Empire, in Italy, and in the Belgian Netherlands. It was against this predominance that the Bourbons were to direct their dynastic policies throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century.

The peace of Utrecht likewise marked the rise of English power upon the seas and the gradual elimination of France as a successful competitor in the race for colonial mastery. Two states also came into prominence upon the continent of Europe—Prussia and Savoy—about which the new German Empire and the unified Italian Kingdom were respectively to be builded.

[Sidenote: Last Years of the Grand Monarch]

While France was shorn of none of her European conquests, nevertheless the War of the Spanish Succession was exceedingly disastrous for that country. In its wake came famine and pestilence, excessive imposts and taxes, official debasement of the currency, and bankruptcy—a long line of social and economic disorders. Louis XIV survived the treaty of Utrecht but two years, and to such depths had his prestige and glory fallen among his own people, that his corpse, as it passed along the royal road to the stately tombs of the French kings at St. Denis, “was saluted by the curses of a noisy crowd sitting in the wine−rooms, celebrating his death by drinking more than their fill as a compensation for having suffered too much from hunger during his lifetime. Such was the coarse but true epitaph which popular opinion accorded to the Grand Monarch.”

[Sidenote: Misgovernment of France during Minority of Louis XV]

Nor had the immediate future much better things in store for exhausted France. The successor upon the absolutist throne was Louis XV, great− grandson of Louis XIV and a boy of five years of age, who did not undertake to exercise personal power until near the middle of the eighteenth century. In the meantime the country was governed for about eight years by the king's uncle, the duke of Orleans, and then for twenty years by Cardinal Fleury.

[Sidenote: John Law]

Orleans loved pleasure and gave himself to a life of debauchery; he cared little for the boy−king, whose education and training he grievously neglected. His foreign policy was weak and vacillating, and his several efforts to reform abuses in the political and economic institutions of Louis XIV invariably ended in failure. It was while experimenting with the disorganized finances that he was duped by a Scotch adventurer and promoter, a certain John Law (1671−1729). Law had an idea that a gigantic corporation might be formed for French colonial trade, [Footnote: Law's corporation was actually important in the development of Louisiana.] shares might be widely sold throughout the country, and the proceeds therefrom utilized to wipe out the public debt. Orleans accepted the scheme and for a while the country went mad with the fever of speculation. In due time, however, the stock was discovered to be worthless, the bubble burst, and a terrible panic ensued. The net result was increased misery for the nation.

[Sidenote: Fleury and the War of the Polish Election]

The little sense which Orleans possessed was sufficient to keep him out of foreign war [Footnote: France was at peace throughout his regency, except for a brief time (1719−1720) when Orleans joined the British government in preventing his Spanish cousin, Philip V, from upsetting the treaty of Utrecht.] but even that was lacking to his successor, Cardinal Fleury. Fleury was dragged into a war (1733−1738) with Austria and Russia over the election of a Polish king. The allies supported the elector of Saxony; France supported a Pole, the father−in−law of Louis XV, Stanislaus Leszczinski. France was defeated and Louis XV had to content himself with securing the duchy of

Lorraine for his father−in− law. Thus, family ambition merely added to the economic distress of the French people.

It was during the War of the Polish Election, however, that the Bourbon king of Spain, perceiving his rivals engaged elsewhere, seized the kingdom of the Two Sicilies from Austria and put a member of his own family on its throne. Thus, in the eighteenth century, the Bourbons dominated France, Spain, and southern Italy.

[Illustration: THE SPANISH SUCCESSION]

[Illustration: THE BOURBON FAMILY, 1589−1915 KINGS OF FRANCE, SPAIN, AND NAPLES]

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# CHAPTER VIII. THE TRIUMPH OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND

## CONFLICTING POLITICAL TENDENCIES IN ENGLAND: ABSOLUTISM *VERSUS* PARLIAMENTARIANISM

Through all the wars of dynastic rivalry which have been traced in the two preceding chapters, we have noticed the increasing prestige of the powerful French monarchy, culminating in the reign of Louis XIV. We now turn to a nation which played but a minor role in the international rivalries of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Later, from 1689 to 1763, England was to engage in a tremendous colonial struggle with France. But from 1560 to 1689 England for the most part held herself aloof from the continental rivalries of Bourbons and Habsburgs, and never fought in earnest except against Philip II of Spain, who threatened England's economic and political independence, and against the Dutch, who were England's commercial rivals. While the continental states were engaged in dynastic quarrels, England was absorbed in a conflict between rival principles of domestic government—between constitutional parliamentary government and unlimited royal power. To the triumph of the parliamentary principle in England we owe many of our modern ideas and practices of constitutional government.

[Sidenote: Absolutism of the Tudors, 1485−1603]

Absolutism had reached its high−water mark in England long before the power and prestige of the French monarchy had culminated in the person of Louis XIV. In the sixteenth century—the very century in which the French sovereigns faced constant foreign war and chronic civil commotion—the Tudor rulers of England were gradually freeing themselves from reliance upon Parliament and were commanding the united support of the English nation. From the accession of Henry VII in 1485 to the death of his grand−daughter Elizabeth in 1603, the practice of absolutism, though not the theory of divine−right monarchy, seemed ever to be gaining ground.

How Tudor despotism was established and maintained is explained in part by reference to the personality of Henry VII and to the circumstances that brought him to the throne. [Footnote: For the character and main achievements of Henry VII (1485−1500), see above, pp. 4 ff.] It is also explicable by reference to historical developments in England throughout the sixteenth century. [Footnote: For the reigns of Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, and Elizabeth, see above, pp. 86, 97 ff., 150 ff.] As Henry VII humbled the nobility, so Henry VIII and Elizabeth subordinated the Church to the crown. And all the Tudors asserted their supremacy in the sphere of industry and commerce. By a law of 1503, the craft gilds had been obliged to obtain the approval of royal officers for whatever new ordinances the gilds might wish to make. In the first year of the reign of Edward VI the gilds were crippled by the loss of part of their property, which was confiscated under the pretext of religious reform. Elizabeth's reign was notable for laws regulating apprenticeship, prescribing the terms of employment of laborers, providing that wages should be fixed by justices of the peace, and ordering vagabonds to be set to work. In the case of commerce, the royal power was exerted encouragingly, as when Henry VII negotiated the *Intercursus Magnus* with the duke of Burgundy to gain admittance for English goods into the Netherlands, or chartered the “Merchant Adventurers” to carry on trade in English woolen cloth, or sent John Cabot to seek an Atlantic route to Asia; or as when Elizabeth countenanced and abetted explorers and privateers and smugglers and slave−traders in extending her country's maritime power at the expense of Spain. All this meant that the strong hand of the English monarch had been laid upon commerce and industry as well as upon justice, finance, and religion.

The power of the Tudors had rested largely upon their popularity with the growing influential middle class. They had subdued sedition, had repelled the Armada, had fostered prosperity, and had been willing at times to cater to the whims of their subjects. They had faithfully personified national patriotism; and the English nation, in turn, had extolled them.

Yet despite this absolutist tradition of more than a century's duration, England was destined in the seventeenth century to witness a long bitter struggle between royal and parliamentary factions, the beheading of one king and the exiling of another, and in the end the irrevocable rejection of the theory and practice of absolutist divine−right monarchy, and this at the very time when Louis XIV was holding majestic court at Versailles and all the lesser princes on the Continent were zealously patterning their proud words and boastful deeds after the model of the Grand Monarch. In that day a mere parliament was to become dominant in England.

[Sidenote: Accession of the Stuarts: James I, 1603−1625]

The death of Elizabeth, the last of the Tudors, and the accession (1603) of her cousin James, the first of the Stuarts, marked the real beginning of the struggle. When he was but a year old, this James had acquired through the deposition of his unfortunate mother, Mary Stuart, the crown of Scotland (1567), and had been proclaimed James VI in that disorderly and distracted country. The boy who was whipped by his tutor and kidnapped by his barons and browbeaten by Presbyterian divines learned to rule Scotland with a rod of iron and incidentally acquired such astonishing erudition, especially in theology, that the clever King Henry IV of France called him "the wisest fool in Christendom." At the age of thirty−seven, this Scotchman succeeded to the throne of England as James I. "He was indeed," says Macaulay, "made up of two men—a witty, well−read scholar who wrote, disputed, and harangued, and a nervous, driveling idiot who acted."

[Sidenote: The Stuart Theory of Absolutist Divine−right Monarchy]

James was not content, like his Tudor predecessors, merely to be an absolute ruler in practice; he insisted also upon the theory of divine−right monarchy. Such a theory was carefully worked out by the pedantic Stuart king eighty years before Bishop Bossuet wrote his classic treatise on divine−right monarchy for the guidance of the young son of Louis XIV. To James it seemed quite clear that God had divinely ordained kings to rule, for had not Saul been anointed by Jehovah's prophet, had not Peter and Paul urged Christians to obey their masters, and had not Christ Himself said, "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's"? As the father corrects his children, so should the king correct his subjects. As the head directs the hands and feet, so must the king control the members of the body politic. Royal power was thus the most natural and the most effective instrument for suppressing anarchy and rebellion. James I summarized his idea of government in the famous Latin epigram, "*a deo rex, a rege lex*, "—"the king is from God, and law from the king."

[Sidenote: Stuart Theory Opposed to Medieval English Tradition]

It has been remarked already [Footnote: See above, pp. 4−7] that in one important respect the past governmental evolution of England differed from that of France. While both countries in the sixteenth century followed absolutist tendencies, in France the medieval tradition of constitutional limitations upon the power of the king was far weaker than in England, with the result that in the seventeenth century the French accepted and consecrated absolutism while the English gave new force and life to their medieval tradition and practice of constitutional government.

[Sidenote: Restrictions on Royal Power in England: Magna Carta]

The tradition of English restrictions upon royal power centered in the old document of *Magna Carta* and in an ancient institution called Parliament. *Magna Carta* dated back, almost four centuries before King James, to the year 1215 when King John had been compelled by his rebellious barons to sign a long list of promises; that list was the "long charter" or *Magna Carta*, [Footnote: *Magna Carta* was many times reissued after 1215.] and it was important in three respects. (1) It served as a constant reminder that "the people" of England had once risen in arms to defend their "rights" against a despotic king, although as a matter of fact *Magna Carta* was more concerned with the rights of the feudal nobles (the barons) and of the clergy than with the rights of the common people. (2) Its most important provisions, by which the king could not levy extraordinary taxes on the nobles without the consent of the Great Council, furnished something of a basis for the idea of self−taxation. (3) Clauses such as "To no man will we sell, or deny, or delay, right or justice," although never effectively enforced, established the idea that justice should not be sold, denied, or delayed.

[Sidenote: Parliament]

Parliament was a more or less representative assembly of clergy, nobility, and commoners, claiming to have powers of taxation and legislation. The beginnings of Parliament are traced back centuries before James I. There had been an advisory body of prelates and lords even before the Norman conquest (1066). After the conquest a somewhat similar assembly of the king's chief feudal vassals—lay and ecclesiastical—had been called the Great Council, and its right to resist unjust taxation had been recognized by *Magna Carta*. Henceforth it had steadily acquired power. The "Provisions of Oxford" (1258) had provided, in addition, for "twelve honest men" to represent the "commonalty" and to "treat of the wants of the king; and the commonalty shall hold as established that which these men shall do."

[Sidenote: House of Lords and House of Commons]

For the beginnings of the House of Commons we may go back to the thirteenth century. In 1254 the king

summoned to Parliament not only the bishops, abbots, earls, and barons, but also two knights from every shire. Then, in an irregular Parliament, convened in 1265 by Simon de Montfort, a great baronial leader against the king, two burgesses from each of twenty−one towns for the first time sat with the others and helped to decide how their liberties were to be protected. These knights and burgesses were the elements from which the House of Commons was subsequently to be formed. Similar bodies met repeatedly in the next thirty years, and in 1295 Edward I called a "model Parliament" of archbishops, bishops, abbots, representative clergy, earls, and barons, two knights from every shire, and two citizens from each privileged city or borough,—more than four hundred in all. For some time after 1295 the clergy, nobility, and commoners [Footnote: *I.e.*, the knights of the shires and the burgesses from the towns.] may have deliberated separately much as did the three "estates" in France. At any rate, early in the fourteenth century the lesser clergy dropped out, the greater prelates and nobles were fused into one body—the House of "Lords spiritual and temporal,"—and the knights joined the burgesses to form the House of Commons. Parliament was henceforth a bicameral body, consisting of a House of Commons and a House of Lords.

[Sidenote: Powers of Parliament: Taxation]

The primary function of Parliament was to give information to the king and to hear and grant his requests for new "subsidies" or direct taxes. The right to refuse grants was gradually assumed and legally recognized. As taxes on the middle class soon exceeded those on the clergy and nobility, it became customary in the fifteenth century for money bills to be introduced in the Commons, approved by the Lords, and signed by the king.

[Sidenote: Legislation]

The right to make laws had always been a royal prerogative, in theory at least. Parliament, however, soon utilized its financial control in order to obtain initiative in legislation. A threat of withholding subsidies had been an effective way of forcing Henry III to confirm *Magna Carta* in 1225; it proved no less effective in securing royal enactment of later "petitions" for laws. In the fifteenth century legislation by "petition" was supplanted by legislation by "bill," that is, introducing in either House of Parliament measures which, in form and language, were complete statutes and which became such by the united assent of Commons, Lords, and king. To this day English laws have continued to be made formally "by the King's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same."

[Sidenote: Influence on Administration]

The right to demand an account of expenditures, to cause the removal of royal officers, to request the king to abandon unpopular policies, or otherwise to control administrative affairs, had occasionally been asserted by Parliament, but not consistently maintained.

[Sidenote: Parliament under the Tudors]

From what has been said, it will now be clear that the fulcrum of parliamentary power was control of finance. What had enabled the Tudors to incline toward absolutism was the fact that for more than a hundred years they had made themselves fairly independent of Parliament in matters of finance; and this they had done by means of economy, by careful collection of taxes, by irregular expedients, by confiscation of religious property, and by tampering with the currency. Parliament still met, however, but irregularly, and during Elizabeth's reign it was in session on the average only three or four weeks of the year. Parliament still transacted business, but rarely differed with the monarch on matters of importance.

[Sidenote: James I and Parliament]

At the end of the Tudor period, then, we have an ancient tradition of constitutional, parliamentary government on the one hand, and a strong, practical, royal power on the other. The conflict between Parliament and king, which had been avoided by the tactful Tudors, soon began in earnest when James I ascended the throne in 1603, with his exaggerated notion of his own authority. James I was an extravagant monarch, and needed parliamentary subsidies, yet his own pedantic principles prevented him from humoring Parliament in any dream of power. The inevitable result was a conflict for political supremacy between Parliament and king. When Parliament refused him money, James resorted to the imposition of customs duties, grants of monopolies, sale of peerages, and the solicitation of "benevolences" (forced loans). Parliament promptly protested against such practices, as well as against his foreign and religious policies and against his absolute control of the appointment and operation of the judiciary. Parliament's protests only increased the wrath of the king. The noisiest parliamentarians were

imprisoned or sent home with royal scoldings. In 1621 the Commoners entered in their journal a “Great Protestation" against the king's interference with their free right to discuss the affairs of the realm. This so angered the king that he tore the Protestation out of the journal and presently dissolved the intractable Parliament; but the quarrel continued, and James's last Parliament had the audacity to impeach his lord treasurer.

[Sidenote: Political Dispute Complicated by Religious Difference] [Sidenote: Calvinists in England] [Sidenote: The “Puritans"]

The political dispute was made more bitter by the co−existence of a religious conflict. James, educated as a devout Anglican, was naturally inclined to continue to uphold the compromise by which the Tudors had severed the English Church from the Roman Catholic hierarchy, yet had retained many forms of the Catholic Church and the episcopal organization by means of which the sovereign was able to control the Church. During Elizabeth's reign, however, a large part of the middle class—the townsmen especially—and many of the lower clergy had come under the influence of Calvinistic teaching. [Footnote: On the doctrines of Calvinism, see above, pp. 139 ff., 156, 164 ff.] The movement was marked (1) by a virulent hatred for even the most trivial forms reminiscent of “popery,” as the Roman Catholic religion was called; and (2) by a tendency to place emphasis upon the spirit of the Old Testament as well as upon the precepts of the New. Along with austerity of manner, speech, dress, and fast−day observance, they revived much of the mercilessness with which the Israelites had conquered Canaan. The same men who held it a deadly sin to dance round a may−pole or to hang out holly on Christmas were later to experience a fierce and exalted pleasure in conquering New England from the heathen Indians. They knew neither self−indulgence nor compassion. Little wonder that Elizabeth feared men of such mold and used the episcopal administration of the Anglican Church to restrain them. Many of these so−called Puritans remained members of the Anglican Church and sought to reform it from within. But restraint only caused the more radical to condemn altogether the fabric of bishops and archbishops, and to advocate a presbyterian church. Others went still further and wished to separate from the Established Anglican Church into independent religious groups, and were therefore called Independents or Separatists.

[Sidenote: Hostility of James I to the Puritans]

These religious radicals, often grouped together as “Puritans,” were continually working against Elizabeth's strict enforcement of Anglican orthodoxy. The accession of James was seized by them as an occasion for the presentation of a great petition for a modification of church government and ritual. The petition bore no fruit, however, and in a religious debate at Hampton Court in 1604 James made a brusque declaration that bishops like kings were set over the multitude by the hand of God, and, as for these Puritans who would do away with bishops, he would make them conform or “harry them out of the land.” From this time forth he insisted on conformity, and deprived many clergymen of their offices for refusing to subscribe to the regulations framed in 1604.

[Sidenote: Hatred of the Puritans for James I]

The hard rule of this monarch who claimed to govern by the will of God was rendered even more abhorrent to the stern Puritan moralists by reports of “drunken orgies” and horrible vices which made the royal court appear to be a veritable den of Satan. But worst of all was his suspected leaning towards “popery.” The Puritans had a passionate hatred for anything that even remotely suggested Roman Catholicism. Consequently it was not with extreme pleasure that they welcomed a king whose mother had been a Catholic, whose wife was suspected of harboring a priest, a ruler who at times openly exerted himself to obtain greater toleration for Roman Catholics and to maintain the Anglican ritual against Puritan modification. With growing alarm and resentment they learned that Catholic conspirators had plotted to blow up the houses of Parliament, and that in his foreign policy James was decidedly friendly to Catholic princes.

The cardinal points of James's foreign policy,—union with Scotland, peace, and a Spanish alliance,—were all calculated to arouse antagonism. The English, having for centuries nourished enmity for their northern neighbors and perceiving no apparent advantage in close union, defeated the project of amalgamating the two kingdoms of England and Scotland. James's policy of non−intervention in the Thirty Years' War evoked bitter criticism; he was accused of favoring the Catholics and of deserting his son−in−law, the Protestant elector of the Palatinate. The most hotly contested point was, however, the Spanish policy. Time and time again, Parliament protested, but James pursued his plans, making peace with Spain, and negotiating for a marriage between his son Charles and the Infanta of Spain, and Prince Charles actually went to Spain to court the daughter of Philip III.

[Sidenote: Interconnection of Puritanism, Commercialism, and Parliamentarianism]

It was essentially the Puritan middle classes who were antagonized by the king. The strength of the Puritans rested in the middle class of merchants, seamen, and squires. It was this class which had profited by the war with Spain in the days of “good Queen Bess” when many a Spanish prize, laden with silver and dye woods, had been towed into Plymouth harbor. Their dreams of erecting an English colonial and commercial empire on the ruins of Spain's were rudely shattered by James. It was to this Puritan middle class that papist and Spaniard were bywords for assassin and enemy. By his Spanish policy, as well as by his irregular methods of taxation, James had touched the Puritans in their pocketbooks. The Puritans, too, were grieved to see so sinful a man sit on the throne of England, and so wasteful a man squander their money. They were even hindered in the exercise of their religious convictions. Every fiber in them rebelled.

Puritans throughout the country looked to the large Puritan majority in the House of Commons to redress their grievances. The parliamentary struggle became then not only a defense of abstract ideals of democracy but also a bitter battle in defense of class interests. Parliamentary traditions were weapons against an oppressive monarch; religious scruples gave divine sanction to an attack on royalist bishops; consciousness of being God's elect gave confidence in assailing the aristocracy of land and birth. For the present, the class interests of the Puritans were to be defended best by the constitutional limitation of royal power, and in their struggle with James's son and successor, Charles I (1625−1649), they represent by chance the forces of democracy.

[Sidenote: Charles I, 1625−1649] [Sidenote: A True Stuart in Devotion to Absolutism]

For a time it appeared as if the second Stuart king would be very popular. Unlike his father, Charles seemed thoroughly English; and his athletic frame, his dignified manners, and his purity of life contrasted most favorably with James's deformities in character and physique. Two years before his father's death Charles had been jilted by his Spanish fiancee and had returned to England amid wild rejoicing to aid Parliament in demanding war with Spain. He had again rejoiced the bulk of the English nation by solemnly assuring Parliament on the occasion of his marriage contract with Henrietta Maria, sister of Louis XIII of France, that he would grant no concessions to Roman Catholics in England. As a matter of fact, Charles simultaneously but secretly assured the French government not only that he would allow the queen the free exercise of her religion but that he would make general concessions to Roman Catholics in England. This duplicity on the part of the young king, which augured ill for the harmony of future relations between himself and Parliament, throws a flood of light upon his character and policies. Though Charles was sincerely religious and well−intentioned, he was as devoted to the theory of divine−right monarchy as his father had been; and as to the means which he might employ in order to establish absolutism upon a firm foundation he honestly believed himself responsible only to God and to his own conscience, certainly not to Parliament. This fact, together with a certain inherent aptitude for shirking the settlement of difficulties, explains in large part the faults which historians have usually ascribed to him—his meanness and ingratitude toward his most devoted followers, his chronic obstinacy which only feigned compliance, and his incurable untruthfulness.

Just before Charles came to the throne, Parliament granted subsidies in expectation of a war against Spain, but, when he had used up the war− money without showing any serious inclination to open hostilities with Spain, and had then demanded additional grants, Parliament gave evidence of its growing distrust by limiting a levy of customs duties to one year, instead of granting them as usual for the whole reign. In view of the increasingly obstinate temper manifested by the House of Commons in withholding subsidies and in assailing his worthless favorite, the Duke of Buckingham, Charles angrily dissolved his first Parliament.

[Sidenote: Continued Conflict between King and Parliament] [Sidenote: The Petition of Right, 1628]

The difficulties of the administration were augmented not only by this arbitrary treatment of Parliament but also by the miserable failure of an English fleet sent against Cadiz, and by the humiliating result of an attempt to relieve the French Huguenots. Meanwhile, a second Parliament, more intractable even than its predecessor, had been dissolved for its insistence on the impeachment of Buckingham. Attempts to raise money by forced loans in place of taxes failed to remove the financial distress into which Charles had fallen, and consequently, in 1628, he consented to summon a third Parliament. In return for grants of subsidies, he signed the *Petition of Right* (1628), prepared by the two houses. By it he promised not to levy taxes without consent of Parliament, not to quarter soldiers in private houses, not to establish martial law in time of peace, not to order arbitrary imprisonment.

Even these concessions were not enough. Parliament again demanded the removal of Buckingham, and only the assassination of the unpopular minister obviated prolonged dispute on that matter. The Commoners next

attempted to check the unauthorized collection of customs duties, which produced as much as one−fourth of the total royal revenue, and to prevent the introduction of “popish” innovations in religion, but for this trouble they were sent home.

[Sidenote: “Personal” Rule of Charles I, 1629−1640]

Charles was now so thoroughly disgusted with the members of Parliament that he determined to rule without them, and for eleven years (1629− 1640) he successfully carried on a “personal” as distinct from a parliamentary government, in spite of financial and religious difficulties.

Without the consent of Parliament, Charles was bound not to levy direct taxes. During the period of his personal rule, therefore, he was compelled to adopt all sorts of expedients to replenish his treasury. He revived old feudal laws and collected fines for their infraction. A sum of one hundred thousand pounds was gained by fines on suburban householders who had disobeyed a proclamation of James I forbidding the extension of London. The courts levied enormous fines merely for the sake of revenue. Monopolies of wine, salt, soap, and other articles were sold to companies for large sums of money; but the high prices charged by the companies caused much popular discontent.

[Sidenote: “Personal” Rule of Charles I, 1629−1640] [Sidenote: “Ship money"]

The most obnoxious of all devices for raising money were the levies of “ship−money.” Claiming that it had always been the duty of seaboard towns to equip ships for the defense of the country, Charles demanded that since they no longer built ships, the towns should contribute money for the maintenance of the navy. In 1634, therefore, each town was ordered to pay a specified amount of “ship−money” into the royal treasury, and the next year the tax was extended to inland towns and counties. [Footnote: The first writ of ship−money yielded L100,000 (Cunningham).] To test the legality of this exaction, a certain John Hampden refused to pay his twenty shillings ship−money, and took the matter to court, claiming that ship−money was illegal taxation. The majority of the judges, who held office during the king's pleasure and were therefore strictly under royal influence, upheld the legality of ship−money and even went so far as to assert that in times of emergency the king's prerogative was unlimited, but the country rang with protests and Hampden was hailed as a hero.

[Sidenote: Devotion of Charles I to the Anglican Church: Archbishop Laud] [Sidenote: Puritan Opposition]

Opposition to financial exactions went hand in hand with bitter religious disputes. Charles had intrusted the control of religious affairs to William Laud, whom he named archbishop of Canterbury, and showed favor to other clergymen of marked Catholic leanings. The laws against Roman Catholics were relaxed, and the restrictions on Puritans increased. It seemed as if Charles and his bishops were bent upon goading the Puritans to fury, at the very time when one by one the practices, the vestments, and even the dogmas of the Catholic Church were being reintroduced into the Anglican Church, when the tyrannical King James was declared to have been divinely inspired, and when Puritan divines were forced to read from their pulpits a royal declaration permitting the “sinful” practices of dancing on the green or shooting at the butts (targets) on the Sabbath. [Footnote: It is an interesting if not a significant fact that the Puritans with their austere views about observance of the Sabbath not only decreased the number of holidays for workingmen, but interfered with innocent recreation on the remaining day of rest. One aspect of the resulting monotonous life of the laborer was, according to Cunningham, the remarkable increase of drunkenness at this period.] So hard was the lot of the extreme Protestants in England that thousands fled the country and established themselves in America. [Footnote: In the decade 1630−1640 some 20,000 Englishmen sailed for the colonies. Many of these, however, emigrated by reason of strictly economic distress.]

[Sidenote: The Scotch Covenant, and Beginnings of Armed Opposition to the King] [Sidenote: Convocation of the Long Parliament, 1640]

In his Scotch policy Charles overreached himself. With the zealous cooeperation of Archbishop Laud, imprudently attempted to strengthen the episcopacy (system of bishops) in the northern kingdom, and likewise to introduce an un−Calvinistic order of public worship. Thereupon the angry Scotch Presbyterians signed a great Covenant, swearing to defend their religion (1638); they deposed the bishops set over them by the king and rose in revolt. Failing in a first effort to crush the Scotch rebellion, the king summoned a Parliament in order to secure financial support for an adequate royal army. This Parliament—the so−called Short Parliament—was dissolved, however, after some three weeks of bootless wrangling. Now unable to check the advance of the rebellious Scotch forces into northern England, Charles in desperation convoked (1640) a new Parliament, which, by reason of its

extended duration (1640−1660), has been commonly called the Long Parliament. In England and Scotland divine−right monarchy had failed.

THE PURITAN REVOLUTION

[Sidenote: Reforms of the Long Parliament]

Confident that Charles could neither fight nor buy off the Scotch without parliamentary subsidies, the Long Parliament showed a decidedly stubborn spirit. Its leader, John Pym, a country gentleman already famous for speeches against despotism, openly maintained that in the House of Commons resided supreme authority to disregard ill−advised acts of the Upper House or of the king. Hardly less radical were the views of John Hampden and of Oliver Cromwell, the future dictator of England.

The right of the Commons to impeach ministers of state, asserted under James I, was now used to send to the Tower both Archbishop Laud and Thomas Wentworth, earl of Strafford, who, since 1629, had been the king's most valued and enthusiastically loyal minister. [Footnote: Strafford was accused of treason, but was executed in 1641 in accordance with a special “bill of attainder” enacted by Parliament. Laud was put to death in 1645.] The special tribunals—the Court of High Commission, the Court of Star Chamber, and others—which had served to convict important ecclesiastical and political offenders were abolished. No more irregular financial expedients, such as the imposition of ship−money, were to be adopted, except by the consent of Parliament. As if this were not enough to put the king under the thumb of his Parliament, the royal prerogative of dissolving that body was abrogated, and meetings at least every three years were provided for by a “Triennial Act.”

[Sidenote: Violation of Parliamentary Privileges: Attempted Seizure by Charles of the Five Members]
[Sidenote: The Great Rebellion, 1642−1646]

All the contested points of government had been decided adversely to the king. But his position was now somewhat stronger. He had been able to raise money, the Scotch invaders had turned back, and the House of Commons had shown itself to be badly divided on the question of church reform and in its debates on the publication of a “Grand Remonstrance" —a document exposing the grievances of the nation and apologizing for the acts of Parliament. Moreover, a rebellion had broken out in Ireland and Charles expected to be put at the head of an army for its suppression. With this much in his favor, the king in person entered the House of Commons and attempted to arrest five of its leaders, but his dismal failure only further antagonized the Commons, who now proceeded to pass ordinances without the royal seal, and to issue a call to arms. The levy of troops contrary to the king's will was an act of rebellion; Charles, therefore, raised the royal standard at Nottingham and called his loyal subjects to suppress the Great Rebellion (1642−1646).

[Sidenote: The Parties to the Civil War: “Cavaliers” and “Roundheads"]

To the king's standard rallied the bulk of the nobles, high churchmen, and Roman Catholics, the country “squires,” and all those who disliked the austere moral code of the Puritans. In opposition to him a few great earls led the middle classes—small land−holders, merchants, manufacturers, shop−keepers, especially in London and other busy towns throughout the south and east of England. The close−cropped heads of these “God−fearing” tradesmen won them the nickname “Roundheads,” while the royalist upper classes, not thinking it a sinful vanity to wear their hair in long curls, were called “Cavaliers.”

[Sidenote: Parliament and the Presbyterians]

In the Long Parliament there was a predominance of the Presbyterians— that class of Puritans midway between the reforming Episcopalians and the radical Independents. Accordingly a “solemn league and covenant” was formed (1643) with the Scotch Presbyterians for the establishment of religious uniformity on a Presbyterian basis in England and Ireland as well as in Scotland. After the defeat of Charles at Marston Moor (1644) the Presbyterians abolished the office of bishop, removed altars and communion rails from the churches, and smashed crucifixes, images, and stained−glass windows. Presbyterianism became a more intolerant state religion than Anglicanism had been. Satisfied with their work, the Presbyterian majority in Parliament were now willing to restore the king, provided he would give permanence to their religious settlement.

[Sidenote: The Army and the Independents: Oliver Cromwell]

The Independent army, however, was growing restive. Oliver Cromwell, an Independent, had organized a cavalry regiment of “honest sober Christians” who were fined 12 pence if they swore, who charged in battle while “singing psalms,” and who went about the business of killing their enemies in a pious and prayerful, but withal a highly effective, manner. Indeed, so successful were Cromwell's “Ironsides" that a considerable part of the

Parliamentary army was reorganized on his plan. The “New Model” army, as it was termed, was Independent in sympathy, that is to say, it wished to carry on the war, and to overthrow the tyranny of the Presbyterians as well as that of the Anglicans.

[Sidenote: Cromwell's Army Defeats the King and Dominates Parliament] [Sidenote: The “Rump Parliament"]

The “New Model” army, under the command of Fairfax and Cromwell, defeated Charles and forced him to surrender in 1646. For almost two years the Presbyterian Parliament negotiated for the restoration of the king and at last would have made peace with the royalists, had not the army, which still remembered Charles's schemes to bring Irish and foreign “papists” to fight Englishmen, now taken a hand in affairs. Colonel Pride, stationed with his soldiers at the door of the House of Commons, arrested the 143 Presbyterian Commoners, and left the Independents—some sixty strong—to deliberate alone upon the nation's weal (1648). This “Rump” or sitting part of Parliament, acting on its own authority, appointed a “High Court of justice” by whose sentence Charles I was beheaded, 30 January, 1649. It then decreed England to be a Commonwealth with neither king nor House of Lords.

[Sidenote: The Commonwealth, 1649−1660]

The executive functions, hitherto exercised by the king, were intrusted to a Council of State, of whose forty−one members thirty were members of the House. The Rump Parliament, instead of calling for new elections, as had been expected, continued to sit as the “representatives of the people,” although they represented the sentiments of only a small fraction of the people. England was in the hands of an oligarchy whose sole support was the vigorous army of Cromwell.

Menacing conditions confronted the newly born Commonwealth. War with Scotland and with Holland was imminent; mutiny and unrest showed that the execution of Charles had infused new life into the royalists; Catholic−royalist rebels mastered all of Ireland except Dublin. Under these circumstances, the Commonwealth would have perished but for three sources of strength: (1) Its financial resources proved adequate: customs duties were collected, excise taxes on drinks and food were levied, and confiscated royalist estates were sold; (2) its enemies had no well−drilled armies; and (3) its own army was remarkably powerful.

[Sidenote: Cromwell and the Restoration of Order]

Cromwell, victor in a series of bloody engagements in Ireland, after butchering thousands of the defeated royalists and shipping others as slaves to Barbados, was able to return to London in 1650, declaring, “I am persuaded that this is a righteous judgment of God upon these barbarous wretches [the Irish] who have imbrued their hands in so much innocent blood, and that it will tend to prevent the effusion of blood for the future.” The next movement of Cromwell, as Parliamentary commander−in−chief, was against the Scotch, who had declared for Charles II, the son of Charles I. The Scotch armies were annihilated, and Prince Charles fled in disguise to France.

[Sidenote: Navigation Act, 1651]

Meanwhile the members of the Rump, still the nominal rulers of England, finding opportunity for profit in the sale of royalist lands and in the administration of finance, had exasperated Cromwell by their maladministration and neglect of the public welfare. The life of the Rump was temporarily prolonged, however, by the popularity of its legislation against the Dutch, at this time the rivals of England on the seas and in the colonies. In 1651 the Rump passed the first Navigation Act, forbidding the importation of goods from Asia, Africa, or America, except in English or colonial ships, and providing that commodities of European production should be imported only in vessels of England or of the producing country. The framers of the Navigation Act intended thereby to exclude Dutch vessels from trading between England and other lands. The next year a commercial and naval war (1652−1654) broke out between England and Holland, leading to no decisive result, but, on the whole, increasing the prestige of the English navy. With renewed confidence the Rump contemplated perpetuating its narrow oligarchy, but Cromwell's patience was exhausted, and in 1653 he turned Parliament out of doors, declaring, “Your hour is come, the Lord hath done with you!” Cromwell remained as military and religious dictator.

[Sidenote: Oliver Cromwell]

Oliver Cromwell (1599−1658) is the most interesting figure in seventeenth−century England. Belonging by birth to the class of country gentlemen, his first appearance in public life was in the Parliament of 1628 as a pleader for the liberty of Puritan preaching. When the Long Parliament met in 1640, Cromwell, now forty−one

years of age, assumed a conspicuous place. His clothes were cheap and homely, “his countenance swollen and reddish, his voice sharp and untuneable,” nevertheless his fervid eloquence and energy soon made him “very much hearkened unto.” From the Civil War, as we know, Cromwell emerged as an unequaled military leader, the idol of his soldiers, fearing God but not man. His frequent use of Biblical phrases in ordinary conversation and his manifest confidence that he was performing God's work flowed from an intense religious zeal. He belonged, properly speaking, to the Independents, who believed that each local congregation of Christians should be practically free, excepting that “prelacy” (*i.e.*, the episcopal form of church government) and “popery” (*i.e.*, Roman Catholic Christianity) were not to be tolerated. In private life Cromwell was fond of “honest sport,” of music and art. It is said that his gayety when he had “drunken a cup of wine too much” and his taste in statuary shocked his more austere fellow−Puritans. In public life he was a man of great forcefulness, occasionally giving way to violent temper; he was a statesman of signal ability, aiming to secure good government and economic prosperity for England and religious freedom for Protestant Dissenters.

[Sidenote: Radical Experiments under Cromwell]

After arbitrarily dissolving the Rump of the Long Parliament (1653), Cromwell and his Council of State broke with tradition entirely by selecting 140 men to constitute a legislative body or convention. This body speedily received the popular appellation of “Barebone's Parliament” after one of its members, a certain leather merchant, who bore the descriptive Puritan name of Praisegod Barebone. The new legislators were good Independents—“faithful, fearing God, and hating covetousness.” Recommended by Independent ministers, they felt that God had called them to rule in righteousness. Their zeal for reform found expression in the reduction of public expenditure, in the equalization of taxes, and in the compilation of a single code of laws; but their radical proposals for civil marriage and for the abolition of tithes startled the clergy and elicited from the larger landowners the cry of “confiscation!” Before much was accomplished, however, the more conservative members of “Barebone's Parliament” voted to “deliver up unto the Lord−General [Cromwell] the powers we received from him.”

[Sidenote: The Protectorate, 1653−1659]

Upon the failure of this experiment, Cromwell's supporters in the army prepared an “Instrument of Government,” or constitution. By this Instrument of Government—the first written constitution in modern times—a “Protectorate” was established, which was a constitutional monarchy in all but name. Oliver Cromwell, who became “Lord Protector" for life, was to govern with the aid of a small Council of State. Parliaments, meeting at least every three years, were to make laws and levy taxes, the Protector possessing the right to delay, but not to veto, legislation. Puritanism was made the state religion.

[Sidenote: Parliament under the Protectorate]

The first Parliament under the Protectorate was important for three reasons. (1) It consisted of only one House; (2) it was the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland rather than of England alone; (3) its members were elected on a reformed basis of representation,—that is, the right of representation had been taken from many small places and transferred to more important towns.

[Sidenote: Practical Dictatorship of Cromwell, 1655−1658]

Although royalists were excluded from the polls, the Independents were unable to control a majority in the general election, for, it must be remembered, they formed a very small, though a powerful, minority of the population. The Presbyterians in the new Parliament, with characteristic stubbornness, quarreled with Cromwell, until he abruptly dismissed them (1655). Thenceforth Cromwell governed as a military dictator, placing England under the rule of his generals, and quarreling with his Parliaments. To raise money he obliged all those who had borne arms for the king to pay him 10 per cent of their rental. While permitting his office to be made hereditary, he refused to accept the title of king, but no Stuart monarch had ruled with such absolute power, nor was there much to choose between James's “*a deo rex, a rege lex*” and Cromwell's, “If my calling be from God and my testimony from the people, God and the people shall take it from me, else I will not part from it.”

The question is often raised, how Cromwell, representing the numerically insignificant Independents, contrived to maintain himself as absolute ruler of the British Isles. Three circumstances may have contributed to his strength. (1) He was the beloved leader of an army respected for its rigid discipline and feared for its grim mercilessness. (2) Under his strict enforcement of law and order, trade and industry brought domestic prosperity. (3) His conduct of foreign affairs was both satisfactory to English patriotism and profitable to English purses.

Advantageous commercial treaties were made with the Dutch and the French. Industrious Jews were allowed to enter England. Barbary pirates were chastised. In a war against Spain, the army won Dunkirk; and the navy, now becoming truly powerful, sank a Spanish fleet, wrested Jamaica from Spain, and brought home ship−loads of Spanish silver.

The weakness of Cromwell's position, however, was obvious. Cavaliers were openly hostile to a regime of religious zealots; moderate Anglicans would suffer the despotism of Cromwell only as long as it promoted prosperity; Presbyterians were anxious to end the toleration which was accorded to all Puritan sects; radicals and republicans were eager to try new experiments.

[Sidenote: Disorganization following the Death of Oliver Cromwell]

The death of Cromwell (1658) left the army without a master and the country without a government. True, Oliver's son, Richard Cromwell (1626−1712), attempted for a time to fill his father's place, but soon abdicated after having lost control of both army and Parliament. Army officers restored the Rump of the Long Parliament, dissolved it, set it up again, and forced it to recall the Presbyterian members who had been expelled in 1648, and ended by obliging the reconstituted Long Parliament to convoke a new and freely elected “Convention Parliament.” Meanwhile, General Monck opened negotiations for the return of Charles II.

THE RESTORATION: THE REIGN OF CHARLES II

[Sidenote: Popular Grievances against the Protectorate]

The widespread and exuberant enthusiasm which restored the Stuarts was not entirely without causes, social and religious, as well as political. The grievances and ideals which had inspired the Great Rebellion were being forgotten, and a new generation was finding fault with the Protectorate. The simple country folk longed for their may−poles, their dances, and games on the green; only fear compelled them to bear with the tyranny of the sanctimonious soldiers who broke the windows in their churches. Especially hard was the lot of tenants and laborers on the many estates purchased or seized by Puritans during the Rebellion. Many townsmen, too, excluded from the ruling oligarchy, found the Puritan government as oppressive and arbitrary as that of Charles I.

[Sidenote: Opposition to Puritanism]

The religious situation was especially favorable for Charles II. The outrages committed by Cromwell's soldiery had caused the Independents to be looked upon as terrible fanatics, Even the Presbyterians were willing to yield some points to the king, if only Independency could be overthrown; and many who had been inclined to Puritanism were now unwavering in loyalty to the Anglican Church. Orthodox Anglicanism, from its origin, had been bound up with the monarchy, and it now consistently expected a double triumph of the “divine−right” of kings and of bishops. Most bitter of all against the Cromwellian regime were the Roman Catholics in Ireland. Though Cromwell as Lord Protector had favored toleration for Protestants, it would be long before Catholics could forget the Irish priests whom Cromwell's soldiery had brutally knocked on the head, or the thousands of Catholic girls and boys whom Cromwell's agents had sold into horrible slavery in the West Indies.

[Sidenote: Royalist Reaction]

This strong royalist undercurrent, flowing from religious and social conditions, makes more comprehensible the ease with which England drifted back into the Stuart monarchy. The younger generation, with no memory of Stuart despotism, and with a keen dislike for the confusion in which no constitutional form was proof against military tyranny, gave ready credence to Prince Charles's promises of constitutional government. There seemed to be little probability that the young monarch would attempt that arbitrary rule which had brought his father's head to the block.

[Sidenote: Charles II, 1660−1685]

The experiment in Puritan republicanism had resulted only in convincing the majority of the people that “the government is, and ought to be, by King, Lords, and Commons.” The people merely asked for some assurances against despotism,—and when a throne was thus to be purchased with promises, Charles II was a ready buyer. He swore to observe *Magna Carta* and the “Petition of Right,” to respect Parliament, not to interfere with its religious policy, nor to levy illegal taxes. Bound by these promises, he was welcomed back to England in 1660 and crowned the following year. The reinstatement of the king was accompanied by a general resumption by bishops and royalist nobles of their offices and lands: things seemed to slip back into the old grooves. Charles II dated his reign not from his actual accession but from his father's death, and his first Parliament declared invalid all those acts and ordinances passed since 1642 which it did not specifically confirm.

The history of constitutional government under the restored Stuarts is a history of renewed financial and religious disputes. Charles II and his younger brother and heir, Prince James, duke of York, alike adhered to the political faith of their Stuart father and grandfather. Cousins on their mother's side of Louis XIV of France, in whose court they had been reared, they were more used to the practices of French absolutism than to the peculiar customs of parliamentary government in England. Unlike their father, who had been most upright in private life and most loyal to the Anglican Church, both Charles and James had acquired from their foreign environment at once a taste for vicious living and a strong attachment to the Roman Catholic Church. In these two Stuarts Catholicism was combined with absolutism; and the Englishmen represented in Parliament were therefore brought face to face not only with a revival of the earlier Stuart theory of divine−right monarchy but with a new and far more hateful possibility of the royal establishment of Roman Catholicism in England. Charles II did not publicly confess his conversion to Catholicism until his deathbed, but James became a zealous convert in 1672.

That Charles II was able to round out a reign of twenty−five years and die a natural death as king of England was due not so much to his virtues as to his faults. He was so hypocritical that his real aims were usually successfully concealed. He was so indolent that with some show of right he could blame his ministers and advisers for his own mistakes and misdeeds. He was so selfish that he would make concessions here and there rather than “embark again upon his travels.” In fact, pure selfishness was the basis of his policy in domestic and foreign affairs, but it was always a selfishness veiled in wit, good humor, and captivating affability.

[Sidenote: Renewal of Financial Disputes between King and Parliament]

At the beginning of the reign of Charles II, the country gentlemen were astute enough to secure the abolition of the surviving feudal rights by which the king might demand certain specified services from them and certain sums of money when an heiress married or a minor inherited an estate. This action, seemingly insignificant, was in reality of the greatest importance, for it indicated the abandonment in England of the feudal theory that land is held by nobles in return for military service, and at the same time it consecrated the newer principle that the land should be owned freely and personally—a principle which has since been fully recognized in the United States and other modern countries as well as in England. The extinction of feudal prerogatives in the early days of the Stuart Restoration benefited the landlords primarily, but the annual lump sum of L100,000 which Charles II was given in return, was voted by Parliament and was paid by all classes in the form of excise taxes on alcoholic drinks. Customs duties of L4 10_s. on every tun of wine and 5 per cent *ad valorem* on other imports, hearth−money (a tax on houses), and profits on the post office contributed to make up the royal revenue of somewhat less than L1,200,000. This was intended to defray the ordinary expenses of court and government but seemed insufficient to Charles, who was not only extravagantly luxurious, but desirous of increasing his power by bribing members of Parliament and by maintaining a standing army. The country squires who had sold their plate for the royalist cause back in the 'forties and were now suffering from hard times, thought the court was too extravagant; to this feeling was added fear that Charles might hire foreign soldiers to oppress Englishmen. Consequently Parliament grew more parsimonious, and in 1665−1667 claimed a new and important privilege—that of devoting its grants to specific objects and demanding an account of expenditures.

Charles, however, was determined to have money by fair means or foul. A group of London goldsmiths had loaned more than a million and a quarter pounds sterling to the government. In 1672 Charles announced that instead of paying the money back, he would consider it a permanent loan. Two years earlier he had signed the secret treaty of Dover (1670) with Louis XIV, by which Louis promised him an annual subsidy of L200,000 and troops in case of rebellion, while Charles was openly to join the Roman Catholic Church and to aid Louis in his French wars against Spain and Holland.

[Sidenote: Continued Religious Complications] [Sidenote: Legislation against Protestant Dissenters]

In his ambition to reestablish Catholicism in England, Charles underestimated the intense hostility of the bulk of the English squires to any religious innovation. During the first decade of the Restoration, Puritanism had been most feared. Some two thousand clergymen, mostly Presbyterian, had been deprived of their offices by an Act of Uniformity (1662), requiring their assent to the Anglican prayer−book; these dissenting clergymen might not return within five miles of their old churches unless they renounced the “Solemn League and Covenant” and swore loyalty to the king (Five−mile Act, 1665); for repeated attendance at their meetings (conventicles) Dissenters might be condemned to penal servitude in the West Indies against (Conventicle Act, 1664); and the Corporation Act of 1661 excluded Dissenters from town offices.

[Sidenote: Leanings of Charles II toward Roman Catholicism]

As the danger from Puritanism disappeared, the Catholic cloud darkened the horizon. In 1672 Prince James, the heir to the throne, embraced Catholicism; and in the same year Charles II issued a “Declaration of Indulgence,” suspending the laws which oppressed Roman Catholics and incidentally the Dissenters likewise. The Declaration threw England into paroxysms of fear; it was believed that the Catholic monarch of France was about to aid in the subversion of the Anglican Church.

[Sidenote: Leanings of Charles II toward Roman Catholicism] [Sidenote: The Exclusion Bill]

Parliament, already somewhat distrustful of Charles's foreign policy, and fearful of his leanings toward Roman Catholicism, found in the Declaration of Indulgence a serious infraction of parliamentary authority. The royal right to “suspend” laws upon occasion had undoubtedly been exercised before, but Parliament was now strong enough to insist upon the binding force of its enactments and to oblige Charles to withdraw his Indulgence. The fear of Catholicism ever increased; gentlemen who at other times were quite rational gave unhesitating credence to wild tales of a “Popish Plot” (1678). In 1679 an Exclusion Bill was brought forward which would debar Prince James from the throne, because of his conversion to Roman Catholicism.

[Sidenote: The “Whigs"]

In the excitement over this latest assertion of parliamentary power, [Footnote: In the course of the debate over Exclusion, the parliamentary party won an important concession—the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, which was designed to prevent arbitrary imprisonment.] two great factions were formed. The supporters of Exclusion were led by certain great nobles who were jealous of the royal power, and were recruited from merchants and shop−keepers who looked to Parliament to protect their economic interests. Since many of the adherents of this political group were Dissenters, whose dislike of Anglicanism was exceeded only by their hatred of “popery,” the whole party was called by a nickname—“Whig”—which had formerly been applied to rebellious Presbyterians in Scotland.

[Sidenote: The “Tories"]

Opposed to the Whigs were the “Tories” [Footnote: Tory, a name applied to “popish” outlaws in Ireland.]—squires and country clergymen and all others of an essentially conservative turn of mind. They were anxious to preserve the Church and state alike from Puritans and from “papists,” but most of all to prevent a recurrence of civil war. In the opinion of the Tories, the best and most effective safeguard against quarreling earls and insolent tradesmen was the hereditary monarchy. Better submit to a Roman Catholic sovereign, they said, than invite civil war by disturbing the regular succession. In the contest over the Exclusion Bill, the Tories finally carried the day, for, although the bill was passed by the Commons (1680), it was rejected by the House of Lords.

[Sidenote: Temporary Success of the Tories]

In the last few years of Charles's reign the cause of the Whigs was discredited. Rumors got abroad that they were plotting to assassinate the king and it was said that the Whiggish nobles who brought armed retainers to Parliament were planning to use force to establish Charles's illegitimate son—the duke of Monmouth—on the throne. These and similar accusations hurt the Whigs tremendously, and help explain the violent Tory reaction which enabled Charles to rule without Parliament from 1681 to his death in 1685. As had been feared, upon the death of Charles II, the duke of Monmouth organized a revolt, but this, together with a simultaneous insurrection in Scotland, was easily crushed, and James II was securely seated on the throne.

## THE “GLORIOUS REVOLUTION” AND THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN

[Sidenote: James II (1685−1688): His Futile Combination of Absolutism and Roman Catholicism]

In his short reign of three years James II (1685−1688) succeeded in stirring up opposition on all sides. The Tories, the party most favorable to the royal prerogative, upon whom he might have relied, were shocked by his attempts to create a standing army commanded by Catholics, for such an army might prove as disastrous to their liberties as Cromwell's “New Model”; and the Whigs, too, were driven from sullenness to desperation by James's religious policy and despotic government. James, like his brother, claiming the right to “suspend" the laws and statutes which Parliament had enacted against Roman Catholics and Dissenters, issued a Declaration of Indulgence in 1687, which exempted Catholics and Dissenters from punishment for infractions of these laws. Furthermore, he appointed Roman Catholics to office in the army and in the civil government. In spite of protests, he issued a second Declaration of Indulgence in 1688 and ordered it to be read in all Anglican churches, and,

when seven bishops remonstrated, he accused them of seditious libel. No jury would convict the seven bishops, however, for James had alienated every class, and they were acquitted. The Tories were estranged by what seemed to be a deliberate attack on the Anglican Church and by fear of a standing army. The arbitrary disregard of parliamentary legislation, and the favor shown to Roman Catholics, goaded the Whigs into fury.

[Sidenote: The “Glorious Revolution” (1688): Dethronement of James II]

So long as Whigs and Tories alike could expect the accession on the death of James II of one of his Protestant daughters—Mary or Anne— they continued to acquiesce in his arbitrary government. But the outlook became gloomier when on 10 June, 1688, a son was born to James II by his second wife, a Catholic. Most Protestants believed that the prince was not really James's son; politicians prophesied that he would be educated in his father's “popish” and absolutist doctrines, and that thus England would continue to be ruled by papist despots. Even those who professed to believe in the divine right of kings and had denied the right of Parliament to alter the succession were dejected at this prospect, and many of them were willing to join with the Whigs in inviting a Protestant to take the throne. The next in line of succession after the infant prince was Mary, the elder of James's two daughters, wife of William of Orange, [Footnote: See above, pp. 245, 248] and an Anglican. Upon the invitation of Whig and Tory leaders, William crossed over to England with an army and entered London without opposition (1688). Deserted even by his army James fled to France. [Footnote: Risings in favor of James were suppressed in Ireland and in Scotland. In Ireland the famous battle of the Boyne (1 July, 1690) was decisive.]

[Sidenote: Accession of William and Mary, 1689] [Sidenote: Constitutional Settlement: the Bill of Rights (1689) and Triumph of Parliament] [Sidenote: The Mutiny Act]

A bloodless revolution was now accomplished and the crown was formally presented to William and Mary by an irregular Parliament, which also declared that James II, having endeavored to subvert the constitution and having fled the kingdom, had vacated the throne. In offering the crown to William and Mary, Parliament was very careful to safeguard its own power and the Protestant religion by issuing a Declaration of Rights (13 February, 1689), which was enacted as the Bill of Rights, 16 December, 1689. This act decreed that the sovereign must henceforth belong to the Anglican Church, thereby debarring the Catholic son of James II. The act also denied the power of a king to “suspend” laws or to “dispense” subjects from obeying the laws, to levy money, or to maintain an army without consent of Parliament; asserted that neither the free election nor the free speech and proceedings of members of Parliament should be interfered with; affirmed the right of subjects to petition the sovereign; and demanded impartial juries and frequent Parliaments. The Bill of Rights, far more important in English history than the Petition of Right (1628), inasmuch as Parliament was now powerful enough to maintain as well as to define its rights, was supplemented by the practice, begun in the same year, 1689, of granting taxes and making appropriations for the army for one year only. Unless Parliament were called every year to pass a Mutiny Act (provision for the army), the soldiers would receive no pay and in case of mutiny would not be punishable by court martial.

[Sidenote: Measures Favorable to Landlords] [Sidenote: Religious Toleration for Protestant Dissenters: Continued Persecution of Roman Catholics]

Both Whigs and Tories had participated in the Revolution, and both reaped rewards. The Tories were especially pleased with the army laws and with an arrangement by which farmers were given a “bounty” or money premium for every bushel of grain exported. [Footnote: That is, when wheat was selling for less than 6s. a bushel.] The Whigs, having played a more prominent part in the deposition of James II, were able to secure the long−coveted political supremacy of Parliament, and religious toleration of Dissenters. The Toleration Act of 1689 did not go as far as the Dissenters might have desired, but it gave them the legal right to worship in public, while their enemies, the Roman Catholics, remained under the ban.

[Sidenote: Commercial Gains for England] [Sidenote: Union of England and Scotland: the Kingdom of Great Britain, 1707]

In the foreign policy of the reigns of William (1689−1702) and Mary, and of Anne (1702−1714), Whiggish policies generally predominated. The merchants and shippers who formed an important wing of the Whig party were highly gratified by the Wars of the League of Augsburg and the Spanish Succession, [Footnote: See above, pp. 248 ff., and below, pp. 306 ff.] in which England fought at once against France, her commercial and colonial rival, and against Louis XIV, the friend of the Catholic Stuart pretenders to the English throne. [Footnote: Louis XIV openly supported the pretensions of James (III), the “Old Pretender.”] The Methuen Treaty (1703) was also

advantageous: it allowed English merchants to sell their manufactures in Portugal without hindrance; in return for this concession England lowered the duties on Portuguese wines, and “Port” supplanted “Burgundy” on the tables of English gentlemen. The Act of Union of 1707 was not unfavorable either, for it established common trade regulations, customs, and excise in England and in Scotland. To the merely personal union between the crowns of England and Scotland which had been inaugurated (1603) by the first of the Stuart monarchs of England now succeeded under the last of the Stuart sovereigns a corporate union of the two monarchies under the title of the Kingdom of Great Britain (1707).

[Sidenote: Accession of the Hanoverians (1714); Continued Decline of Royal Power]

Upon the death of Anne (1714), the crown passed [Footnote: In accordance with the Act of Settlement (1701).] to her cousin, the son of Sophia of Hanover, George I (1714−1727). The new king, unable even to speak the English language, much less to understand the complicated traditions of parliamentary government, was neither able nor anxious to rule, but was content merely to reign. The business of administration, therefore, was handed over to a group of ministers who strove not only to please their royal master but to retain the good−will of the predominant party in Parliament.

[Sidenote: Rise of the Cabinet]

Since this practice, with the many customs which have grown up about it, has become a most essential part of the government of the United Kingdom today, and has been copied in recent times by many other countries, it is important to understand its early history. Even before the accession of the Tudors, the Great Council of nobles and prelates which had advised and assisted early kings in matters of administration had surrendered most of its actual functions to a score or so of “Privy Councilors.” The Privy Council in turn became unwieldy, and allowed an inner circle or “cabal” of its most energetic members to direct the conduct of affairs. This inner circle was called a cabinet or cabinet council, because it conferred with the king in a small private room (cabinet), and under the restored Stuarts it was extremely unpopular.

William III, more interested in getting money and troops to defend his native Holland against Louis XIV than in governing England, allowed his ministers free rein in most matters. So long as the Whigs held a majority of the seats in the Commons, William found that the wheels of government turned smoothly if all his ministers were Whigs. On the other hand, when the Tories gained a preponderance in the Commons, the Whig ministers were so distasteful to the new majority of the Commons that it was necessary to replace them with Tories. Queen Anne, although her sincere devotion to Anglicanism inclined her to the Tories, was forced to appoint Whig ministers. Only toward the close of her reign (1710) did Anne venture to dismiss the Whigs.

[Sidenote: Era of Whig Domination, 1714−1761] [Sidenote: Robert Walpole and his Policies]

Under George I (1714−1727) it became customary for the king to absent himself from cabinet−meetings. (It will be remembered that George could not speak English.) This tended to make the cabinet even more independent of the sovereign, as shown by the fact that Anne was the last to use her prerogative to veto bills. From 1714 to 1761 was the great era of Whig domination. Both George I and George II naturally favored the Whigs, because the Tories were supposed to desire a second restoration of the Stuarts. Certainly many of the Tories had participated in the vain attempt of the “Old Pretender” in 1715 to seat himself on the British throne as James III, and again in 1745 extreme Tories took part in the insurrection in Scotland, gallantly led by the Young Pretender, “Prince Charlie” the grandson of James II. Under these circumstances practically all classes rallied to the support of the Whigs, who stood for the Protestant monarchy. Great Whig landowners controlled the rural districts, and the aristocracy of the towns was won by the Whiggish policy of devotion to public credit and the protection of commerce. The extensive and continued power of the Whigs made it possible for Sir Robert Walpole, [Footnote: Created earl of Orford in 1742.] a great Whig leader, to hold office for twenty−one years (1721−1742), jealously watching and maintaining his supremacy under two sovereigns—George I (1714−1727) and George II (1727−1760). Though disclaiming the title, he was recognized by every one as the “prime minister”—prime in importance, prime in power. The other ministers, nominally appointed by the sovereign, were in point of fact dependent upon him for office, and he, though nominally appointed by the crown, was really dependent only upon the support of a Whig majority in the Commons.

[Sidenote: William Pitt, Earl of Chatham]

Walpole's power was based on policy and political manipulation. His policy was twofold, the maintenance of peace and of prosperity. We shall see elsewhere how he kept England clear of costly Continental wars. [Footnote:

See above, p. 256, and below, pp. 309 ff., 324 f.] His policy of prosperity was based on mercantilist ideas and consisted in strict attention to business methods in public finance, [Footnote: Walpole was called the “best master of figures of any man of his time.”] the removal of duties on imported raw materials, and on exported manufactures. In spite of the great prosperity of the period, there was considerable criticism of Walpole's policy, and “politics" alone enabled him to persevere in it. By skillful partisan patronage, by bestowal of state offices and pensions upon members of Parliament, by open bribery, and by electioneering, he secured his ends and maintained his majority in the House of Commons.

Walpole's successors,—Henry Pelham and the duke of Newcastle,—like him represented the oligarchy of Whig nobles and millionaires, and even outdid him in corrupt methods. Another section of the Whig party under the leadership of William Pitt the elder (the earl of Chatham) won great popularity by its condemnation of political “graft.” Pitt's fiery demands for war first against Spain (1739−1748) and then against France (1756−1763) were echoed by patriotic squires and by the merchants who wished to ruin French commerce and to throw off the restrictions laid by Spain on American commerce. Pitt had his way until George III, a monarch determined to destroy the power of the Whigs, appointed Tory ministers, such as Lord Bute and Lord North. The attempt of George III to regain the power his great−grandfather had lost, to rule as well as to reign, was in the end a failure, and later Hanoverians might well have joined George II in declaring that “ministers are kings in this country.”

[Sidenote: Significance of English Constitutional Development in the Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth Centuries]

This indeed is the salient fact in the evolution of constitutional government in England. While in other countries late in the eighteenth century monarchs still ruled by divine right, in England Parliament and ministers were the real rulers, and, in theory at least, they ruled by the will of the people. That England was able to develop this form of government may have been due in part to her insular position, her constitutional traditions, and the ill−advised conduct of the Stuart kings, but most of all it was due to the great commercial and industrial development which made her merchant class rich and powerful enough to demand and secure a share in government.

[Sidenote: Great Britain Parliamentarian but not Democratic]

In their admiration for the English government, many popular writers have fallen into the error of confounding the struggle for parliamentary supremacy with the struggle for democracy. Nothing could be more misleading. The “Glorious Revolution” of 1689 was a *coup d'etat* engineered by the upper classes, and the liberty it preserved was the liberty of nobles, squires, and merchants—not the political liberty of the common people.

[Sidenote: The Unreformed Parliament]

The House of Commons was essentially undemocratic. Only one man in every ten had even the nominal right to vote. It is estimated that from 1760 to 1832 nearly one−half of the members owed their seats to patrons, and the reformed representatives of large towns were frequently chosen by a handful of rich merchants. In fact, the government was controlled by the upper class of society, and by only a part of that. No representatives sat for the numerous manufacturing towns which had sprung into importance during the last few decades, and rich manufacturers everywhere complained that the country was being ruined by the selfish administration of great landowners and commercial aristocrats.

Certain it is that the Parliament of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, while wonderfully earnest and successful in enriching England's landlords and in demolishing every obstacle to British commerce, at the same time either willfully neglected or woefully failed to do away with intolerance in the Church and injustice in the courts, or to defend the great majority of the people from the greed of landlords and the avarice of employers.

Designed as it was for the protection of selfish class interests, the English government was nevertheless a step in the direction of democracy. The idea of representative government as expressed by Parliament and cabinet was as yet very narrow, but it was capable of being expanded without violent revolution, slowly but inevitably, so as to include the whole people.

[Illustration: THE HOUSE OF STUART]

[Illustration: THE HANOVERIAN SOVEREIGNS OF GREAT BRITAIN (1714−1915)]

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# CHAPTER IX. THE WORLD CONFLICT OF FRANCE AND GREAT BRITAIN

FRENCH AND ENGLISH COLONIES IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

In the sixteenth century, while Spain and Portugal were carving out vast empires beyond the seas, the sovereigns of France and England, distracted by religious dissensions or absorbed in European politics, did little more than to send out a few privateers and explorers. But in the seventeenth century the England of the Stuarts and the France of the Bourbons found in colonies a refuge for their discontented or venturesome subjects, a source of profit for their merchants, a field for the exercise of religious zeal, or gratification for national pride. Everywhere were commerce and colonization growing apace, and especially were they beginning to play a large part in the national life of England and of France. We have already noticed how the Dutch, themselves the despoilers of Portugal [Footnote: See above, pp. 58f] in the first half of the seventeenth century, were in turn attacked by the English in a series of commercial wars [Footnote: The Dutch Wars of 1652−1654, 1665−1667, and 1672−1674. See above pp. 59, 243, 278.] during the second half of the seventeenth century. By 1688 the period of active growth was past for the colonial empires of Holland, Portugal, and Spain; but England and France, beginning to realize the possibilities for power in North America, in India, and on the high seas, were just on the verge of a world conflict, which, after raging intermittently for more than a hundred years, was to leave Great Britain the “mistress of the seas.”

[Sidenote: Relative Position of the Rivals in 1688. In North America]

Before plunging into the struggle itself, let us review the position of the two rivals in 1688: first, their claims and possessions in the New World and in the Old; secondly, their comparative resources and policies. It will be remembered that the voyage of John Cabot (1497) gave England a claim to the mainland of North America. The Tudors (1485−1603), however, could not occupy so vast a territory, nor were there any fences for the exclusion of intruders. Consequently the actual English settlements in North America, made wholly under the Stuarts, [Footnote: However much modern Englishmen may condemn the efforts of the Stuart sovereigns to establish political absolutism at home, they can well afford to praise these same royal Stuarts for contributing powerfully to the foundations of England's commercial and colonial greatness abroad.] were confined to Newfoundland, to a few fur depots in the region of Hudson Bay, and to a strip of coastland from Maine to South Carolina; while the French not only had sent Verrazano (1524), who explored the coast of North America, and Cartier (1534−1536), who sailed up the St. Lawrence, but by virtue of voyages of discovery and exploration, especially that of La Salle (1682), laid claim to the whole interior of the Continent.

Of all the North American colonies, the most populous were those which later became the United States. In the year 1688 there were ten of these colonies. The oldest one, Virginia, had been settled in 1607 by the London Company under a charter from King James I. Plymouth, founded in 1620 by the Pilgrims (Separatists or Independents driven from England by the enforcement of religious conformity to the Anglican Church), was presently to be merged with the neighboring Puritan colony of Massachusetts. Near these first, New England settlements had grown up the colonies of Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New Hampshire: Maine was then a part of Massachusetts. Just as New England was the Puritans' refuge, so Maryland, granted to Lord Baltimore in 1632, was a haven for the persecuted Roman Catholics. A large tract south of Virginia, known as Carolina, had been granted to eight nobles in 1663; but it was prospering so poorly that its proprietors were willing to sell it to the king in 1729 for a mere L50,000. The capture of the Dutch colony of New Netherland [Footnote: Rechristened New York. It included New Jersey also.] in 1664, and the settlement of Pennsylvania (1681) by William Penn and his fellow Quakers [Footnote: The Swedish colony on the Delaware was temporarily merged with Pennsylvania.] at last filled up the gap between the North and the South.

Numerous causes had contributed to the growth of the British colonies in America. Religious intolerance had driven Puritans to New England and Roman Catholics to Maryland; the success of the Puritan Revolution had sent Cavaliers to Virginia; thousands of others had come merely to acquire wealth or to escape starvation. And America seemed a place wherein to mend broken fortunes. Upon the estates (plantations) of southern gentlemen negro slaves toiled without pay in the tobacco fields. [Footnote: Subsequently, rice and cotton became important products of Southern agriculture.] New England was less fertile, but shrewd Yankees found wealth in fish,

lumber, and trade. No wonder, then, that the colonies grew in wealth and in population until in 1688 there were nearly three hundred thousand English subjects in the New World.

The French settlers were far less numerous [Footnote: Probably not more than 20,000 Frenchmen were residing in the New World in 1688. By 1750 their number had increased perhaps to 60,000.] but more widespread. From their first posts in Acadia (1604) and Quebec (1608) they had pushed on up the St. Lawrence. Jesuit and other Roman Catholic missionaries had led the way from Montreal westward to Lake Superior and southward to the Ohio River. In 1682 the Sieur de La Salle, after paddling down the Mississippi, laid claim to the whole basin of that mighty stream, and named the region Louisiana in honor of Louis XIV of France. Nominally, at least, this territory was claimed by the English, for in most of the colonial charters emanating from the English crown in the seventeenth century were clauses which granted lands "from sea to sea"—that is, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The heart of "New France" remained on the St. Lawrence, but, despite English claims, French forts were commencing to mark the trails of French fur−traders down into the "Louisiana," and it was clear that whenever the English colonists should cross the Appalachian Mountains to the westward they would have to fight the French.

[Sidenote: In West Indies]

French and English were neighbors also in the West Indies. Martinique and Guadeloupe acknowledged French sovereignty, while Jamaica, Barbados, and the Bahamas were English.[Footnote: The following West Indies were also English: Nevis, Montserrat, Antigua, Honduras, St. Lucia, Virgin Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands. St. Kitts was divided between England and France; and the western part of Haiti, already visited by French buccaneers, was definitely annexed to France in 1697. The Bermudas, lying outside the "West Indies," were already English.] These holdings in the West Indies were valuable not only for their sugar plantations, but for their convenience as stations for trade with Mexico and South America.

[Sidenote: In Africa]

In Africa the French had made settlements in Madagascar, at Goree, and at the mouth of the Senegal River, and the English had established themselves in Gambia and on the Gold Coast, but as yet the African posts were mere stations for trade in gold−dust,[Footnote: Gold coins are still often called "guineas" in England, from the fact that a good deal of gold used to come from the Guinea coast of Africa. ] ivory, wax, or slaves. The real struggle for Africa was not to come until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

[Sidenote: In India]

Of far greater importance was Asiatic India, which, unlike America or even Africa, offered a field favorable for commerce rather than for conquest or for colonization. For it happened that the fertility and extent of India—its area was half as large as that of Europe—were taxed to their uttermost to support a population of probably two hundred millions; and all, therefore, which Europeans desired was an opportunity to buy Indian products, such as cotton, indigo, Spices, dyes, drugs, silk, precious stones, and peculiar manufactures.

In the seventeenth century India was ruled by a dynasty of Mohammedan emperors called Moguls,[Footnote: So called because racially they were falsely supposed to be Mongols or Moguls.] who had entered the peninsula as conquerors in the previous century and had established a splendid court in the city of Delhi on a branch of the Ganges. The bulk of the people, however, maintained their ancient "Hindu" religion with their social ranks or "castes" and preserved their distinctive speech and customs. Over a country like India, broken up into many sections by physical features, climate, industries, and language, the Mohammedan conquerors,—the "Great Mogul" and his viceroys, called nawabs, [Footnote: More popularly "nabobs."]—found it impossible to establish more than a loose sovereignty, many of the native princes or "rajas" still being allowed to rule with considerable independence, and the millions of Hindus feeling little love or loyalty for their emperor. It was this fatal weakness of the Great Mogul which enabled the European traders, who in the seventeenth century besought his favor and protection, to set themselves up in the eighteenth as his masters.

It will be remembered that after the voyage of Vasco da Gama the Portuguese had monopolized the trade with India and the East until they had been attacked by the Dutch toward the close of the sixteenth century. This was the very time when the English were making their first voyages [Footnote: Actually the first English voyage to the East Indies was made between 1591 and 1594, almost a century after the first Portuguese voyage.] to the East and were taking advantage of their own war with Philip II to attack his Portuguese possessions. The first English trading stations were opened at Masulipatam (1611) and at Surat (1612). In the latter year and again in 1615

Portuguese fleets were defeated, and in 1622 the Portuguese were driven out of the important Persian city of Ormuz. By 1688 the English had acquired three important points in India, (1) Calcutta in the delta of the Ganges had been occupied in 1686, but it was yet uncertain whether the English could hold it against the will of the Mogul emperor. (2) At Madras, further south, Sir Francis Day had built Fort St. George (1640). (3) On the western coast, the trading station of Surat was now surpassed in value by Bombay, the dowry of Catherine of Braganza, a Portuguese princess, who had married King Charles II (1662).

The first French Company for Eastern trade had been formed only four years [Footnote: Charters to French companies had been granted in 1604 and in 1615. The *Compagnie des Indes* was formed in 1642, and reconstructed in 1664.] after the English East India Company, but the first French factory in India—at Surat—was not established until 1668 and the French did not seriously compete with the English and Dutch in India until the close of the seventeenth century. However, their post at Chandarnagar (1672), in dangerous proximity to Calcutta, and their thriving station at Pondicherry (1674), within a hundred miles of Madras, augured ill for the future harmony of French and English in India.

[Sidenote: Comparative Resources of France and England]

From the foregoing brief review of the respective colonial possessions of Great Britain and France in the year 1688, it must now be clear that although France had entered the colonial competition tardily, she had succeeded remarkably well in becoming a formidable rival of the English. The great struggle for supremacy was to be decided, nevertheless, not by priority of settlement or validity of claim, but by the fighting power of the contestants. Strange as it may seem, France, a larger, more populous, and richer country than England, able then single−handed to keep the rest of Europe at bay, was to prove the weaker of the two in the struggle for world empire.

In the first place, England's maritime power was increasing more irresistibly than that of France. Although Richelieu (1624−1642) had recognized the need for a French navy and had given a great impetus to ship−building, France had become inextricably entangled in European politics, and the navy was half forgotten in the ambitious land wars of Louis XIV. The English, on the other hand, were predisposed to the sea by the very fact of their insularity, and since the days of the great Armada, their most patriotic boast had been of the deeds of mariners. In the commercial wars with Holland, the first great English admiral— Robert Blake—had won glorious victories.

Then, too, the Navigation Acts (1651, 1660), by excluding foreign ships from trade between Great Britain and the colonies, may have lessened the volume of trade, but they resulted in undoubted prosperity for English shippers. English shipbuilders, encouraged by bounties, learned to build stronger and more powerful vessels than those of other nations. Whether capturing galleons on the “Spanish main” or defeating Portuguese fleets in the Far East, English pirates, slavers, and merchantmen were not to be encountered without fear or envy. English commerce and industry, springing up under the protection and encouragement of the Tudors, had given birth, as we have seen, to a middle class powerful enough to secure special rights and privileges through Parliament.

The French, on the other hand, labored under most serious commercial handicaps. Local tolls and internal customs−duties hindered traffic; and the medieval gild system had retained in France its power to hamper industry with absurd regulations. The long civil and religious wars, which called workmen from their benches and endangered the property and lives of merchants, had resulted in reducing French commerce to a shadow before 1600. Under Henry IV prosperity revived, but the growth of royal power made it impossible for the Huguenot merchants in France to achieve political power comparable with that which the Puritans won in England. Consequently the mercantile classes were quite unable to prevent Louis XIV from ruining his country by foreign war,—they could not vote themselves privileges and bounties as in England, nor could they declare war on commercial rivals. True, Colbert (1662−1683), the great “mercantilist” minister, did his best to encourage new industries, such as silk production, to make rules for the better conduct of old industries, and to lay taxes on such imported goods as might compete with home products, but French industry could not be made to thrive like that of England. It is often said that Colbert's careful regulations did much harm by stifling the spirit of free enterprise; but far more destructive were the wars and taxes [Footnote: In order to obtain money for his court, diplomacy, and wars, Louis XIV not only increased taxes but debased the coinage. Particularly unfortunate, economically, was the revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685), as a result of which some 50,000 of the most industrious and thrifty citizens of France fled to increase the industry of England, Holland, and Brandenburg (Prussia).] of the Grand

Monarch. The only wonder is that France bore the drain of men and money so well.

The English, then, had a more promising navy and a more prosperous trade than the French, and were therefore able to gain control of the seas and to bear the expense of war.

[Sidenote: Comparative Colonial Policies of France and England]

In general colonial policy France seemed decidedly superior. Louis XIV had taken over the whole of "New France" as a royal province, and the French could present a united front against the divided and discordant English colonies. Under Colbert the number of French colonists in America increased 300 per cent in twenty years. Moreover the French, both in India and in America, were almost uniformly successful in gaining the friendship and trust of the natives, whereas, at least with most of the redmen, the English were constantly at war.

The English, however, had a great advantage in the number of colonists. The population of France, held in check by wars, did not naturally overflow to America; and the Huguenots, persecuted in the mother country, were not allowed to emigrate to New France, lest their presence might impede the missionary labors of the Jesuits among the Indians. [Footnote: The statement is frequently made that the "paternalism" or fatherly care with which Richelieu and Colbert made regulations for the colonies was responsible for the paucity of colonists and the discouragement of colonial industry. This, however, will be taken with considerable reservation when it is remembered that England attempted to prevent the growth of such industries in her colonies as might compete with those at home.] England was more fortunate in that her Puritan, Quaker, and Catholic exiles went to her colonies rather than to foreign lands. The English colonists, less under the direct protection of the mother country, learned to defend themselves against the Indians, and were better able to help the mother country against their common foe, the French.

Taken all in all, the situation was favorable to Great Britain. As long as French monarchs wasted the resources of France in Europe, they could scarcely hope to cope with the superior navy, the thriving commerce, and the more populous colonies, of their ancient enemies.

PRELIMINARY ENCOUNTERS, 1689−1748

[Sidenote: War of the League of Augsburg]

Colonial and commercial rivalry could hardly bring France and Great Britain to blows while the Stuart kings looked to Louis XIV for friendly aid in the erection of absolutism and the reinstatement of Catholicism in England.

The Revolution of 1689, which we have already discussed [Footnote: See above, pp. 286 ff.] in its political significance, was important in its bearing on foreign relations, for it placed on the English throne the arch−enemy of France, William III, whose chief concern was the protection of his ancestral possessions—the Dutch Netherlands—against the encroachments of Louis XIV. The support given by the latter to the pretensions of James II was a second cause of war. In an earlier chapter [Footnote: See above, pp. 247 ff.] we have seen how international relations in 1689 led to the juncture of England and Holland with the League of Augsburg, which included the emperor, the kings of Spain and Sweden, and the electors of Bavaria, Saxony, and the Palatinate; and how the resulting War of the League of Augsburg was waged in Europe from 1689 to 1697. It was during that struggle, it will be remembered, that King William finally defeated James II and the latter's French and Irish allies in the battle of the Boyne (1690). It was also during that struggle that the French navy, though successful against combined Dutch and English squadrons off Beachy Head (1690), was decisively beaten by the English in a three−day battle near La Hogue (1692).

[Sidenote: King William's War, 1689−1697]

The War of the League of Augsburg had its counterpart in the American "King William's War," of which two aspects should be noted. In the first place, the New England colonists aided in the capture (1690) of the French fortress of Port Royal in Acadia (Nova Scotia) and in an inconsequential attack on Quebec. In the second place, we must notice the role of the Indians. As early as 1670, Roger Williams, a famous New England preacher, had declared, "the French and Romish Jesuits, the firebrands of the world, for their godbelly sake, are kindling at our back in this country their hellish fires with all the natives of this country." The outbreak of King William's War was a signal for the kindling of fires more to be feared than those imagined by the good divine; the burning of Dover (N. H.), Schenectady (N. Y.), and Groton (Mass.) by the red allies of the French governor, Count Frontenac, earned the latter the lasting hatred of the "Yankees."

[Sidenote: Treaty of Ryswick, 1697]

The contest was interrupted rather than settled by the colorless treaty of Ryswick (1697), according to which Louis XIV promised not to question William's right to the English throne, and all colonial conquests, including Port Royal, were restored.

[Sidenote: War of the Spanish Succession]

Only five years later Europe was plunged into the long War of the Spanish Succession (1702−1713). King William and the Habsburg emperor with other European princes formed a Grand Alliance to prevent Louis' grandson Philip from inheriting the Spanish crowns. For if France and Spain were united under the Bourbon family, their armies would overawe Europe; their united colonial empires would surround and perhaps engulf the British colonies; their combined navies might drive the British from the seas. Furthermore, the English were angered when Louis XIV, upon the death of James II (1701), openly recognized the Catholic son of the exiled royal Stuart as “James III,” king of Great Britain.

[Sidenote: Queen Anne's War, 1702−1713]

While the duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugene were winning great victories in Europe, [Footnote: See above, pp. 249 ff.] the British colonists in America were fighting “Queen Anne's War” against the French. Again the French sent Indians to destroy New England villages, and again the English retaliated by attacking Port Royal and Quebec. After withstanding two unsuccessful assaults, Port Royal fell in 1710 and left Acadia open to the British. In the following year a fleet of nine war vessels and sixty transports carried twelve thousand Britishers to attack Quebec, while an army of 2300 moved on Montreal by way of Lake Champlain; but both expeditions failed of their object.

On the high seas, as well as in America and in Europe, the British won fresh laurels. It was during Queen Anne's War that the British navy, sometimes with the valuable aid of the Dutch, played an important part in defeating the French fleet in the Mediterranean and driving French privateers from the sea, in besieging and capturing Gibraltar, in seizing a rich squadron of Spanish treasure ships near Cartagena, and in terrorizing the French West Indies.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Utrecht, 1713]

The main provisions of the treaty of Utrecht, which terminated this stage of the conflict, in so far as they affected the colonial of situation, [Footnote: For the European settlement, see above, pp. 253 f.] were as follows: (1) The French Bourbons, were allowed to become the reigning family in Spain, and though the proviso was inserted that the crowns of France and Spain should never be united, nevertheless so long as Bourbons reigned in both countries, the colonies of Spain and France might almost be regarded as one immense Bourbon empire. (2) Great Britain was confirmed in possession of Acadia, [Footnote: A dispute later arose whether, as the British claimed, “Acadia” included Cape Breton Island.] which was rechristened Nova Scotia, and France abandoned her claims to Hudson Bay, Newfoundland, and the island of St. Kitts in the West Indies. (3) Great Britain secured from Spain the cession of the island of Minorca and the rocky stronghold of Gibraltar —bulwarks of Mediterranean commerce. (4) Of more immediate value to Great Britain was the trade concession, called the Asiento, made by Spain (1713). Prior to the Asiento, the British had been forbidden to trade with the Spanish possessions in America, and the French had monopolized the sale of slaves to the Spanish colonies.

[Sidenote: The Asiento, 1713]

The Asiento, however, allowed Great Britain exclusive right to supply Spanish America with negro slaves, at the rate of 4800 a year, for thirty years. They were still forbidden to sell other commodities in the domains of the Spanish king, except that once a year one British ship of five hundred tons burden might visit Porto Bello on the Isthmus of Panama for purposes of general trade. For almost three decades after the peace of Utrecht, the smoldering colonial jealousies were not allowed to break forth into the flame of open war.

[Sidenote: The Interlude of Peace, 1713−1739]

During the interval, however, British ambitions were coming more and more obviously into conflict with the claims of Spain and France in America, and with those of France in India.

[Sidenote: French Aggressiveness in America]

In spite of her losses by the treaty of Utrecht, France still held the St. Lawrence River, with Cape Breton Island defending its mouth; her fishermen still had special privileges on the Newfoundland banks; her islands in the West Indies flourished under greater freedom of trade than that enjoyed by the English; and her pioneers were occupying the vast valley of the Mississippi. Moreover, in preparing for the next stage of the conflict, France

displayed astonishing energy. Fort Louisburg was erected on Cape Breton Island to command the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence. A long series of fortifications was constructed to stake out and guarantee the French claims. From Crown Point on Lake Champlain, the line was carried westward by Fort Niagara, Fort Detroit, Sault Sainte Marie, on to Lake Winnipeg and even beyond; other forts commanded the Wabash and Illinois rivers, and followed the Mississippi down to the Gulf. [Footnote: By the year 1750 there were over sixty French forts between Montreal and New Orleans.] Settlements were made at Mobile (1702) and at New Orleans (1718), and British sailors were given to understand that the Mississippi was French property. The governors of British colonies had ample cause for alarm.

[Sidenote: French Aggressiveness in India: Dupleix]

In India, likewise, the French were too enterprising to be good neighbors. Under the leadership of a wonderfully able governor−general, Dupleix, who was appointed in 1741, they were prospering and were extending their influence in the effete empire of the Great Mogul. Dupleix exhibited a restless ambition; he began to interfere in native politics and to assume the pompous bearing, gorgeous apparel, and proud titles of a native prince. He conceived the idea of augmenting his slender garrisons of Europeans with “sepoys,” or carefully drilled natives, and fortified his capital, Pondicherry, as if for war.

[Sidenote: Trade Disputes between Spain and Great Britain]

To the dangerous rivalry between British and French colonists and traders in America and in India, during the thirty years which followed the treaty of Utrecht, was added the continuous bickering which grew out of the Asiento concluded in 1713 between Great Britain and Spain. Spaniards complained of British smugglers and protested with justice that the British outrageously abused their special privilege by keeping the single stipulated vessel in the harbor of Porto Bello and refilling it at night from other ships. On the other hand, British merchants resented their general exclusion from Spanish markets and recited to willing listeners at home the tale of their grievances against the Spanish authorities. Of such tales the most notorious was that of a certain Captain Robert Jenkins, who with dramatic detail told how the bloody Spaniards had attacked his good ship, plundered it, and in the fray cut off one of his ears, and to prove his story he is said to have produced a box containing what purported to be the ear in question. In the face of the popular excitement aroused in England by this and similar incidents, Sir Robert Walpole, the peace−loving prime minister, was unable to restrain his fellow−countrymen from declaring war against Spain.

[Sidenote: The “War of Jenkins's Ear,” 1739]

It was in 1739 that the commercial and colonial warfare was thus resumed,—on this occasion involving at the outset only Spain and Great Britain,—in a curious struggle commonly referred to as the War of Jenkins's Ear. A British fleet captured Porto Bello, but failed to take Cartagena. In North America the war was carried on fruitlessly by James Oglethorpe, who had recently (1733) founded the English colony of “Georgia” [Footnote: So named in honor of the then reigning King George II (1727−1760)] to the south of the Carolinas, in territory claimed by the Spanish colony of Florida.

[Sidenote: War of the Austrian Succession. King George's War, 1744−1748]

The War of Jenkins's Ear proved but an introduction to the resumption of hostilities on a large scale between France and Great Britain. In a later chapter [Footnote: See below, pp. 354 ff.] it is explained how in 1740 the War of the Austrian Succession broke out on the continent of Europe—a war stubbornly fought for eight years, and a war in which Great Britain entered the lists for Maria Theresa of Austria against France and Prussia and other states. And the European conflict was naturally reflected in “King George's War” (1744−1748) in America, and in simultaneous hostilities in India.

The only remarkable incident of King George's War was the capture of Louisburg (1745) by Colonel William Pepperell of New Hampshire with a force of British colonists, who were sorely disappointed when, in 1748, the captured fortress was returned to France by the treaty of Aix−la−Chapelle. The war in India was similarly indecisive. In 1746 a French squadron easily captured the British post at Madras; other British posts were attacked, and Dupleix defeated the nawab of the Carnatic, who would have punished him for violating Indian peace and neutrality.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Aix−la−Chapelle, 1748]

The tables were turned by the arrival of a British fleet in 1748, which laid siege to Dupleix in Pondicherry. At this juncture, news arrived that Great Britain and France had concluded the treaty of Aix−la− Chapelle (1748),

whereby all conquests, including Madras and Louisburg, were to be restored. So far as Spain was concerned. Great Britain in 1750 renounced the privileges of the Asiento in return for a money payment of L100,000.

THE TRIUMPH OF GREAT BRITAIN: THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR, 1756−1763

[Sidenote: Questions at Issue in 1750] [Sidenote: World−wide Extent of the Seven Years' War]

Up to this point, the wars had been generally indecisive, although Great Britain had gained Hudson Bay, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia by the peace of Utrecht (1713). British naval power, too, was undoubtedly in the ascendancy. But two great questions were still unanswered. Should France be allowed to make good her claim to the Mississippi valley and possibly to drive the British from their slender foothold on the coast of America? Should Dupleix, wily diplomat as he was, be allowed to make India a French empire? To these major disputes was added a minor quarrel over the boundary of Nova Scotia, which, it will be remembered, had been ceded to Great Britain in 1713. Such questions could be decided only by the crushing defeat of one nation, and that defeat France was to suffer in the years between 1754 and 1763. Her loss was fourfold: (1) Her European armies were defeated in Germany by Frederick the Great, who was aided by English gold, in the Seven Years' War (1756−1763). [Footnote: For an account of the European aspects of this struggle, see below, pp. 358 ff.] (2) At the same time her naval power was almost annihilated by the British, whose war vessels and privateers conquered most of the French West Indies and almost swept French commerce from the seas. (3) In India, the machinations of Dupleix were foiled by the equally astute but more martial Clive. (4) In America, the “French and Indian War” (1754−1763) dispelled the dream of a New France across the Atlantic. We shall first consider the war in the New World.

[Sidenote: The American Phase of the Seven Years' War: the “French and Indian” War, 1754−1763]

The immediate cause of the French and Indian War was a contest for the possession of the Ohio valley. The English had already organized an Ohio Company (1749) for colonization of the valley, but they did not fully realize the pressing need of action until the French had begun the construction of a line of forts in western Pennsylvania—Fort Presqu'Isle (Erie), Fort Le Boeuf (Waterford), and Fort Venango (Franklin). The most important position—the junction of the Monongahela and Allegheny rivers—being still unoccupied, the Ohio Company, early in 1754, sent a small force to seize and fortify it. The French, however, were not to be so easily outwitted; they captured the newly built fort with its handful of defenders, enlarged it, and christened it Fort Duquesne in honor of the governor of Canada. Soon afterward a young Virginian, George Washington by name, arrived on the scene with four hundred men, too late to reenforce the English fort−builders, and he also was defeated on 4 July, 1754.

Hope was revived, however, in 1755 when the British General Braddock arrived with a regular army and an ambitious plan to attack the French in three places—Crown Point (on Lake Champlain), Fort Niagara, and Fort Duquesne. Against the last−named fort he himself led a mixed force of British regulars and colonial militia, and so incautiously did he advance that presently he fell into an ambush. From behind trees and rocks the Frenchmen and redskins peppered the surprised redcoats. The “seasoned” veterans of European battlefields were defeated, and might have been annihilated but for the timely aid of a few “raw” colonial militiamen, who knew how to shoot straight from behind trees. The expedition against Niagara also failed of its object but entailed no such disaster. Failing to take Crown Point, the English built Forts Edward and William Henry on Lake George, while the French constructed the famous Fort Ticonderoga. [Footnote: This same year, 1755, so unfortunate for the English, was a cruel year for the French settlers in Nova Scotia; like so many cattle, seven thousand of them were packed into English vessels and shipped to various parts of North America. The English feared their possible disloyalty.]

[Sidenote: Montcalm]

The gloom which gathered about British fortunes seemed to increase during the years 1756 and 1757. Great Britain's most valuable ally, Frederick the Great of Prussia, was defeated in Europe; an English squadron had been sadly defeated in the Mediterranean; the French had captured the island of Minorca; and a British attack on the French fortress of Louisburg had failed. To the French in America, the year 1756 brought Montcalm and continued success. The Marquis de Montcalm (1712−1759) had learned the art of war on European battlefields, but he readily adapted himself to new conditions, and proved to be an able commander of the French and Indian forces in the New World. The English fort of Oswego on Lake Ontario, and Fort William Henry on Lake George, were captured, and all the campaigns projected by the English were foiled.

In 1757, however, new vigor was infused into the war on the part of the British, largely by reason of the entrance of William Pitt (the Elder) into the cabinet. Pitt was determined to arouse all British subjects to fight for their country. Stirred with martial enthusiasm, colonial volunteers now joined with British regulars to provide a force of about 50,000 men for simultaneous attacks on four important French posts in America—Louisburg, Ticonderoga, Niagara, and Duquesne. The success of the attack on Louisburg (1758) was insured by the support of a strong British squadron; Fort Duquesne was taken and renamed Fort Pitt [Footnote: Whence the name of the modern city of Pittsburgh.] (1758); Ticonderoga repulsed one expedition (1758) but surrendered on 26 July, 1759, one day after the capture of Fort Niagara by the British.

[Sidenote: Wolfe]

Not content with the capture of the menacing French frontier forts, the British next aimed at the central strongholds of the French. While one army marched up the Hudson valley to attack Montreal, General Wolfe, in command of another army of 7000, and accompanied by a strong fleet, moved up the St. Lawrence against Quebec. An inordinate thirst for military glory had been Wolfe's heritage from his father, himself a general. An ensign at fourteen, Wolfe had become an officer in active service while still in his teens, had commanded a detachment in the attack on Louisburg in 1758, and now at the age of thirty−three was charged with the capture of Quebec, a natural stronghold, defended by the redoubtable Montcalm. The task seemed impossible; weeks were wasted in futile efforts; sickness and apparent defeat weighed heavily on the young commander. With the energy of despair he fastened at last upon a daring idea. Thirty−six hundred of his men were ferried in the dead of night to a point above the city where his soldiers might scramble through bushes and over rocks up a precipitous path to a high plain— the Plains of Abraham—commanding the town.

[Sidenote: British Victory at Quebec, 1759]

Wolfe's presence on the heights was revealed at daybreak on 13 September, 1759, and Montcalm hastened to repel the attack. For a time it seemed as if Wolfe's force would be over−powered, but a well−directed volley and an impetuous charge threw the French lines into disorder. In the moment of victory, General Wolfe, already twice wounded, received a musket−ball in the breast. His death was made happy by the news of success, but no such exultation filled the heart of the mortally wounded Montcalm, dying in the bitterness of defeat.

Quebec surrendered a few days later. It was the beginning of the end of the French colonial empire in America. All hope was lost when, in October, 1759, a great armada, ready to embark against England, was destroyed in Quiberon Bay by Admiral Hawke. In 1760 Montreal fell and the British completed the conquest of New France, at the very time when the last vestiges of French power were disappearing in India.

[Sidenote: Futile Intervention of Spain, 1762]

In his extremity, Louis XV of France secured the aid of his Bourbon kinsman, the king of Spain, against England, but Spain was a worthless ally, and in 1762 British squadrons captured Cuba and the Philippine Islands as well as the French possessions in the West Indies.

[Sidenote: Phase of the Seven Years' War in India] [Sidenote: Continued Activity of Dupleix]

Let us now turn back and see how the loss of New France was paralleled by French defeat in the contest for the vastly more populous and opulent empire of India. The Mogul Empire, to which reference has already been made, had been rapidly falling to pieces throughout the first half of the eighteenth century. The rulers or nawabs (nabobs) of the Deccan, of Bengal, and of Oudh had become semi−independent princes. In a time when conspiracy and intrigue were common avenues to power, the French governor, Dupleix, had conceived the idea of making himself the political leader of India, and in pursuit of his goal, as we have seen, he had affected Oriental magnificence and grandiloquent titles, had formed alliances with half the neighboring native magnates, had fortified Pondicherry, and begun the enrollment and organization of his sepoy army. In 1750 he succeeded in overthrowing the nawab of the Carnatic [Footnote: The province in India which includes Madras and Pondicherry and has its capital at Arcot.] and in establishing a pretender whom he could dominate more easily.

[Sidenote: Robert Clive] [Sidenote: French Failure in the Carnatic]

The hopes of the experienced and crafty Dupleix were frustrated, however, by a young man of twenty−seven—Robert Clive. At the age of eighteen, Clive had entered the employ of the English East India Company as a clerk at Madras. His restless and discontented spirit found relief, at times, in omnivorous reading; at other times he grew despondent. More than once he planned to take his own life. During the War of the Austrian Succession, he had resigned his civil post and entered the army. The hazards of military life were more

to his liking, and he soon gave abundant evidence of ability. After the peace of 1748 he had returned to civil life, but in 1751 he came forward with a bold scheme for attacking Arcot, the capital of the Carnatic, and overthrowing the upstart nawab who was supported by Dupleix. Clive could muster only some two hundred Europeans and three hundred sepoys, but this slender force, infused with the daring and irresistible determination of the young leader, sufficed to seize and hold the citadel of Arcot against thousands of assailants. With the aid of native and British reenforcements, the hero of Arcot further defeated the pretender; and, in 1754, the French had to acknowledge their failure in the Carnatic and withdraw support from their vanquished protege. Dupleix was recalled to France in disgrace; and the British were left to enjoy the favor of the nawab who owed his throne to Clive.

[Sidenote: Plassey] [Sidenote: British Success in India]

Clive's next work was in Bengal. In 1756 the young nawab of Bengal, Suraj−ud−Dowlah by name, seized the English fort at Calcutta and locked 146 Englishmen overnight in a stifling prison—the “Black Hole” of Calcutta—from which only twenty−three emerged alive the next morning. Clive, hastening from Madras, chastised Suraj for this atrocity, and forced him to give up Calcutta. And since by this time Great Britain and France were openly at war, Clive did not hesitate to capture the near−by French post of Chandarnagar. His next move was to give active aid to a certain Mir Jafir, a pretender to the throne of the unfriendly Suraj−ud−Dowlah. The French naturally took sides with Suraj against Clive. In 1757 Clive drew up 1100 Europeans, 2100 sepoys, and nine cannon in a grove of mango trees at Plassey, a few miles south of the city of Murshidabad, and there attacked Suraj, who, with an army of 68,000 native troops and with French artillerymen to work his fifty−three cannon, anticipated an easy victory. The outcome was a brilliant victory for Clive, as overwhelming as it was unexpected. The British candidate forthwith became nawab of Bengal and as token of his indebtedness he paid over L1,500,000 to the English East India Company, and made Clive a rich man. The British were henceforth dominant in Bengal. The capture of Masulipatam in 1758, the defeat of the French at Wandewash, between Madras and Pondicherry, and the successful siege of Pondicherry in 1761, finally established the British as masters of all the coveted eastern coast of India.

[Sidenote: The Treaty of Paris, 1763]

The fall of Quebec (1759) and of Pondicherry (1761) practically decided the issue of the colonial struggle, but the war dragged on until, in 1763, France, Spain, and Great Britain concluded the peace of Paris. Of her American possessions France retained only two insignificant islands on the Newfoundland coast, [Footnote: St. Pierre and Miquelon.] a few islands in the West Indies, [Footnote: Including Guadeloupe and Martinique.] and a foothold in Guiana in South America. Great Britain received from France the whole of the St. Lawrence valley and all the territory east of the Mississippi River, together with the island of Grenada in the West Indies; and from Spain, Great Britain secured Florida. Beyond the surrender of the sparsely settled territory of Florida, Spain suffered no loss, for Cuba and the Philippines were restored to her, and France gave her western Louisiana, that is, the western half of the Mississippi valley. The French were allowed to return to their old posts in India, but were not to maintain troops in Bengal or to build any fort. In other words, the French returned to India as traders but not as empire builders. [Footnote: During the war, the French posts in Africa had been taken, and now Goree was returned while the mouth of the Senegal River was retained by the British.]

[Sidenote: Significance of the Seven Years' War to Great Britain and France]

Let us attempt to summarize the chief results of the war. In the first place, Great Britain preserved half of what was later to constitute the United States, and gained Canada and an ascendancy in India—empires wider, richer, and more diverse than those of a Caesar or an Alexander. Henceforth Great Britain was indisputably the preeminent colonizing country—a nation upon whose domains the sun never set. It meant that the English language was to spread as no other language, until to−day one hundred and sixty millions of people use the tongue which in the fifteenth century was spoken by hardly five millions.

Secondly, even more important than this vast land empire was the dominion of the sea which Great Britain acquired, for from the series of wars just considered, and especially from the last, dates the maritime supremacy of England. Since then her commerce, protected and advertised by the most powerful navy in the world, has mounted by leaps and bounds, so that now half the vessels which sail the seas bear at their masthead the Union Jack. From her dominions beyond the oceans and from her ships upon the seas Great Britain drew power and prestige; British merchants acquired opulence with resulting social and political importance to themselves and to

their country, and British manufactures received that stimulation which prepared the way for the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.

Thirdly, the gains of Great Britain were at least the temporary ruin of her rival. Not without reluctance did France abandon her colonial ambitions, but nearly a century was to elapse after the treaty of Paris before the French should seriously reenter the race for the upbuilding of world empire. Nor was France without a desire for revenge, which was subsequently made manifest in her alliance with Britain's rebellious American colonies in 1778. But French naval power had suffered a blow from which it was difficult to recover, [Footnote: Yet between 1763 and 1778 the French made heroic and expensive efforts to rebuild their navy. And as we shall presently see in studying the general war which accompanied the American revolt, France attempted in vain to reverse the main result of the Seven Years' War.] and much of her commerce was irretrievably lost. If toward the close of the eighteenth century bankruptcy was to threaten the Bourbon court and government at Versailles, and if at the opening of the next century, British sea−power was to undermine Napoleon's empire, it was in no slight degree the result in either case of the Seven Years' disaster.

India and America were lost to France. Her trade in India soon dwindled into insignificance before the powerful and wealthy British East India Company. “French India” to−day consists of Pondicherry, Karikal, Yanaon, Mahe, and Chandarnagar—196 square miles in all,—while the Indian Empire of Britain spreads over an area of 1,800,000 square miles. French empire in America is now represented only by two puny islands off the coast of Newfoundland, two small islands in the West Indies, and an unimportant tract of tropical Guiana, but historic traces of its former greatness and promise have survived alike in Canada and in Louisiana. In Canada the French population has stubbornly held itself aloof from the British in language and in religion, and even to−day two of the seven millions of Canadians are Frenchmen, quite as intent on the preservation of their ancient nationality as upon their allegiance to the British rule. In the United States the French element is less in evidence; nevertheless in New Orleans sidewalks are called “banquettes,” and embankments, “levees”; and still the names of St. Louis, Des Moines, Detroit, and Lake Champlain perpetuate the memory of a lost empire.

ADDITIONAL READING

GENERAL. Textbooks and brief treatises: J. S. Bassett, *A Short History of the United States* (1914), ch. iii−vii; A. L. Cross, *History of England and Greater Britain* (1914), ch. xxxvi−xlii; J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe*, Vol. I (1907), ch. vi, vii; A. D. Innes, *History of England and the British Empire*, Vol. III (1914), ch. i−vi; W. H. Woodward, *A Short History of the Expansion of the British Empire, 1500−1911*, 3d ed. (1912), ch. i−v; A. T. Story, *The Building of the British Empire* (1898), Part I, *1558−1688*; H. C. Morris, *The History of Colonization* (1900), Vol. I, Part III, ch. x− xii, Vol. II, ch. xvi−xviii. More detailed and specialized studies: John Fiske, *New France and New England_(1902), a delightful review of the development of the French empire in America, its struggle with the British, and its collapse, and, by the same author, Colonization of the New World , ch. vii−x, and Independence of the New World, ch. i− iii, the last two books being respectively Vols. XXI and XXII of the History of All Nations; Cambridge Modern History, Vol. V (1908), ch. xxii, on the growth of the French and English empires, Vol. VI (1909), ch. xv, on the English and French in India, 1720−1763, and Vol. VII (1903), ch. i−iv, on the struggle in the New World; Pelham Edgar, The Struggle for a Continent (1902), an excellent account of the conflict in North America, edited from the writings of Parkman; E. B. Greene, Provincial America, 1690−1740 (1905), being Vol. VI of the “American Nation” Series; Emile Levasseur, Histoire du commerce de la France, Vol. I (1911), the best treatment of French commercial and colonial policy prior to 1789; Sir J. R. Seeley, Expansion of England (1895), stimulating and suggestive on the relations of general European history to the struggle for world dominion; A. W. Tilby, The English People Overseas, a great history of the British empire, projected in 8 vols., of which three (1912) are particularly important—Vol. I, The American Colonies, 1583−1763, Vol. II, British India, 1600−1828, and Vol. IV, Britain in the Tropics, 1527−1910; A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660−1783, 24th ed. (1914), an epoch−making work; Sir W. L. Clowes (editor), The Royal Navy: a History, 7 vols. (1897− 1903), ch. xx−xxviii; J. S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years' War, 2 vols. (1907), strongly British and concerned chiefly with naval warfare; J. W. Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vols. I and II (1899). See also the general histories of imperialism and of the British Empire listed in the bibliographies appended to Chapters XXVII and XXIX, of Volume II.*

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE BRITISH IN AMERICA. C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period*

(1912) in “Home University Library,” and C. L. Becker, *Beginnings of the American People* (1915) in “The Riverside History,” able and stimulating resumes; L. G. Tyler, *England in America, 1580− 1652* (1904), Vol. IV of “American Nation" Series; John Fiske, *Old Virginia and her Neighbors* (1900), and, by the same author, in his usually accurate and captivating manner, *Beginnings of New England* (1898), and *Dutch and Quaker Colonies in America* (1903); H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century*, 3 vols. (1904−1907), the standard authority, together with J. A. Doyle, *English Colonies in America*, 5 vols. (1882−1907); Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, Vol. II, *A Century of Colonial History, 1660−1760* (1908), very favorable to New England.

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE FRENCH IN AMERICA. R. G. Thwaites, *France in America, 1497−1763* (1905), Vol. VII of the “American Nation” Series, is a clear and scholarly survey. For all concerning French Canada prior to the British conquest, the works of Francis Parkman occupy an almost unique position: they are well known for their attractive qualities, descriptive powers, and charm of style; on the whole, they are accurate, though occasionally Parkman seems to have misunderstood the Jesuit missionaries. The proper sequence of Parkman's writings is as follows: *Pioneers of France in the New World* (1865), *The Jesuits in North America* (1867), *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West* (1869), *The Old Regime in Canada* (1874), *Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV* (1877), *A Half Century of Conflict*, 2 vols. (1892), *Montcalm and Wolfe* , 2 vols. (1884), *The Conspiracy of Pontiac, and the Indian War after the Conquest of Canada*, 2 vols. (1851). Other useful studies: C. W. Colby, *Canadian Types of the Old Regime, 1608−1698* (1908); G. M. Wrong, *The Fall of Canada: a Chapter in the History of the Seven Years' War* (1914); Thomas Hughes, S.J., *History of the Society of Jesus in North America*, Vols. I, II (1907−1908), the authoritative work of a learned Jesuit; T. J. Campbell, S.J., *Pioneer Priests of North America, 1642− 1710*, 3 vols. (1911−1914); William Kingsford, *History of Canada*, 10 vols. (1887−1897), elaborate, moderately English in point of view, and covering the years from 1608 to 1841; F. X. Garneau, *Histoire du Canada*, 5th ed. of the famous work of a French Canadian, revised by his grandson Hector Garneau, Vol. I to 1713 (1913).

INDIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES. A monumental *History of India* in 6 bulky volumes is now (1916) in preparation by the Cambridge University Press on the model of the “Cambridge Modern History.” Of brief accounts, the best are: A. C. Lyall, *The Rise and Expansion of British Dominion in India*, 5th ed. (1910); A. D. Innes, *A Short History of the British in India* (1902); and G. B. Malleson, *History of the French in India, 1674−1761*, 2d ed. reissued (1909). See also the English biography of *Dupleix* by G. B. Malleson (1895) and the French lives by Tibulle Hamont (1881) and Eugene Guenin (1908). An excellent brief biography of *Clive* is that of G. B. Malleson (1895). Robert Orme (1728−1801), *History of the Military Transactions of the British Nation in Indostan from 1745* [to 1761], 2 vols. in 3, is an almost contemporaneous account by an agent of the English East India Company who had access to the company's records, and Beckles Willson, *Ledger and Sword*, 2 vols. (1903), deals with the economic and political policies of the English East India Company. For history of the natives during the period, see Sir H. M. Elliot, *History of India, as told by its own Historians: the Muhammadan Period*, 8 vols. (1867−1877); and J. G. Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, new ed., 3 vols. (1913).

WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM. Of the character of the Elder Pitt, such an important factor in the British triumph over France, many different estimates have been made by historians. The two great biographies of the English statesman are those of Basil Williams, 2 vols. (1913), very favorable to Pitt, and Albert von Ruville, Eng. trans., 3 vols. (1907), hostile to Pitt. See also Lord Rosebery, *Lord Chatham, His Early Life and Connections* (1910); D. A. Winstanley, *Lord Chatham and the Whig Opposition* (1912); and the famous essay on Pitt by Lord Macaulay.

# CHAPTER X. THE REVOLUTION WITHIN THE BRITISH EMPIRE

THE BRITISH COLONIAL SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The contest for world−empire, from which we have seen Great Britain emerge victorious, was closely followed by a less successful struggle to preserve that empire from disrupting forces. We may properly leave to American history the details of the process by which, as the colonies became more acutely conscious of the inherent conflict between their economic interests and the colonial and commercial policy of Great Britain, they grew at the same time into a self−confident and defiant independence. Nevertheless, as an epochal event in the history of British imperialism, the American War of Independence deserves a prominent place in European history.

[Sidenote: Mercantilism and the British Colonies]

The germs of disease were imbedded in the very policy to which many statesmen of the eighteenth century ascribed England's great career,— the mercantilist theories, whose acquaintance we made in an earlier chapter. [Footnote: See above, pp. 63 ff, and likewise pp. 239 f.] The mercantilist statesman, anxious to build up the power, and therefore the wealth, of his country, logically conceived three main ideas about colonies: (1) they should furnish the mother country with commodities which could not be produced at home; (2) they should not injure the mother country by competing with her industries or by enriching her commercial rivals; and (3) they should help bear the burdens of the government, army, and navy. Each one of these ideas was reflected in the actual policy which the British government in the eighteenth century adopted and enforced in respect of the American colonies.

[Sidenote: Regulation of Colonial Industry. Bounties]

(1) Various expedients were employed to encourage the production of particular colonial commodities which the British Parliament thought desirable. The commodity might be exempted from customs duties, or Parliament might forbid the importation into Great Britain of similar products from foreign countries, or might even bestow outright upon the colonial producer “bounties,” or sums of money, as an incentive to persevere in the industry. Thus the cultivation of indigo in Carolina, of coffee in Jamaica, of tobacco in Virginia, was encouraged, so that the British would not have to buy these desirable commodities from Spain. Similarly, bounties were given for tar, pitch, hemp, masts, and spars imported from America rather than from Sweden.

[Sidenote: Restrictions on Colonial Industry]

(2) The chief concern of the mercantilist was the framing of such governmental regulations of trade as would deter colonial commerce or industry from taking a turn which conceivably might lessen the prosperity of the British manufacturers or shippers, on whom Parliament depended for taxes. Of the colonial industries which were discouraged for this reason, two or three are particularly noteworthy. Thus the hat manufacturers in America, though they could make hats cheaply, because of the plentiful supply of fur in the New World, were forbidden to manufacture any for export, lest they should ruin the hatters of London. The weaving of cloth was likewise discouraged by a law of 1699 which prohibited the export of woolen fabrics from one colony to another. Again, it was thought necessary to protect British iron−masters by forbidding (1750) the colonists to manufacture wrought iron or its finished products. Such restrictions on manufacture were imposed, not so much for fear of actual competition in the English market, as to keep the colonial markets for English manufacturers. They caused a good deal of rancor, but they were too ill enforced to bear heavily upon the colonies.

[Sidenote: Restrictions on Colonial Trade]

More irksome were the restrictions on commerce. As far back as 1651, when Dutch traders were bringing spices from the East and sugar from the West to sell in London at a handsome profit, Parliament had passed the first famous Navigation Act, [Footnote: See above, pp. 277 f., 304 f.] which had been successful in its general design—to destroy the Dutch carrying trade and to stimulate British ship−building. In the eighteenth century a similar policy was applied to the colonies. For it was claimed that the New England traders who sold their fish and lumber for sugar, molasses, and rum in the French West Indies were enriching French planters rather than English. Consequently, a heavy tariff was laid on French sugar−products. Moreover, inasmuch as it was deemed most essential for a naval power to have many and skilled ship−builders, the Navigation Acts [Footnote:

Subsequent to the Act of 1651, important Navigation Acts were passed in 1660, 1663, 1672, and 1696.] were so developed and expanded as to include the following prescriptions: (1) In general all import and export trade must be conducted in ships built in England, in Ireland, or in the colonies, manned and commanded by British subjects. Thus, if a French or Dutch merchantman appeared in Massachusetts Bay, offering to sell at a great bargain his cargo of spices or silks, the shrewd merchants of Boston were legally bound not to buy of him. (2) Certain "enumerated" articles, such as sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and, later, rice and furs, could be exported only to England. A Virginia planter, wishing to send tobacco to a French snuff−maker, would have to ship it to London in an English ship, pay duties on it there, and then have it reshipped to Havre. (3) All goods imported into the American colonies from Europe must come by way of England and must pay duties there. Silks might be more expensive after they had paid customs duties in London and had followed a roundabout route to Virginia, but the proud colonial dame was supposed to pay dearly and to rejoice that English ships and English sailors were employed in transporting her finery.

[Sidenote: Reasons for Early Colonial Toleration of Restrictions on the Industry and Trade]

It would seem as if such restrictive measures would not have been tolerated in the colonies, even when imposed by the mother country. There were, however, several very good reasons why the trade restrictions were long tolerated.

[Sidenote: Leniency of Enforcement]

In the first place, for many years they had been very poorly enforced. During his long ministry, from 1721 to 1742, Sir Robert Walpole had winked at infractions of the law and had allowed the colonies to develop as best they might under his policy of "salutary neglect." Then, during the colonial wars, it had been inexpedient and impossible to insist upon the Navigation Acts; and smuggling had become so common that respectable merchants made no effort to conceal their traffic in goods which had been imported contrary to provisions of the law.

[Sidenote: Fear of the French]

Moreover, the colonies would gladly endure a good deal of economic hardship in order to have the help of the mother country against the French. So long as Count de Frontenac and his successors were sending their Indians southward and eastward to burn New England villages, it was very comforting to think that the mother country would send armies of redcoats to conquer the savages and defeat the French.

[Sidenote: Weakness and Disunion of the Thirteen Colonies]

But even had there been every motive for armed resistance to Great Britain, the American colonies could hardly have attempted it until after the conclusion of the French and Indian War. Until the second half of the eighteenth century the British colonies were both weak and divided. They had no navy and very few fortifications to defend their coastline. They had no army except raw and unreliable militia. Even in 1750 their inhabitants numbered but a paltry 1,300,000 as compared with a population in Great Britain of more than 10,000,000; and in wealth and resources they could not dream of rivaling the mother country.

The lack of union among the colonies sprang from fundamental industrial, social, and religious differences. The southern provinces— Georgia, the Carolinas, and Virginia—were agricultural, and their products were plantation−grown rice, indigo, and tobacco. New York and Pennsylvania produced corn and timber. In New England, although there were many small farmers, the growing interest was in trade and manufacture. The social distinctions were equally marked. The northern colonists were middle−class traders and small farmers, with democratic town governments, and with an intense pride in education. In the South, gentlemen of good old English families lived like feudal lords among their slaves and cultivated manners quite as assiduously as morals. Of forms of the Christian religion, the Atlantic coast presented a bizarre mixture. In the main, New England was emphatically Calvinistic and sternly Puritanical; Virginia, proudly Episcopalian (Anglican); and Maryland, partly Roman Catholic. Plain−spoken Quakers in Pennsylvania, Presbyterians and Baptists in New Jersey, and German Lutherans in Carolina added to the confusion.

Between colonies so radically different in religion, manners, and industries, there could be at the outset little harmony or cooperation. It would be hard to arouse them to concerted action, and even harder to conduct a war. Financial cooperation was impeded by the fact that the paper money issued by any one colony was not worth much in the others. Military cooperation was difficult because while each colony might call on its farmers temporarily to join the militia in order to repel an Indian raid, the militia−men were always anxious to get back to their crops and would obey a strange commander with ill grace.

[Sidenote: Altered Situation in the Thirteen Colonies after 1763]

With the conclusion of the French and Indian War, however, conditions were materially changed, (1) The fear of the French was no longer present to bind the colonies to the mother country. (2) During the wars the colonies had grown not only more populous (they numbered about 2,000,000 inhabitants in 1763) and more wealthy, but also more self− confident. Recruits from the northern colonies had captured Louisburg in 1745 and had helped to conquer Canada in the last French war. Virginia volunteers had seen how helpless were General Braddock's redcoats in forest−warfare. Experiences like these gave the provincial riflemen pride and confidence. Important also was the Albany Congress of 1754, in which delegates from seven colonies came together and discussed Benjamin Franklin's scheme for federating the thirteen colonies. Although the plan was not adopted, it set men to thinking about the advantages of confederation and so prepared the way for subsequent union.

[Sidenote: More Rigorous Attitude of Great Britain toward the Colonies after Accession of George III, 1760]

Not only were the colonists in a more independent frame of mind, but the British government became more oppressive. During two reigns—those of George I and George II—ministers had been the power behind the throne, but in 1760 George III had come to the throne as an inexperienced and poorly educated youth of twenty−two, full of ambition to be the power behind the ministers. Not without justice have historians accused George III of prejudice, stubbornness, and stupidity. Nevertheless, he had many friends. The fact that he, the first really English king since the Revolution of 1688, should manifest a great personal interest and industry in affairs of state, endeared him to many who already respected his irreproachable private morality and admired his flawless and unfailing courtesy. Under the inspiration of Lord Bute, [Footnote: The earl of Bute (1713−1792) became prime minister in 1762, after the resignations of Pitt, who had been the real head of the cabinet, and the duke of Newcastle, who had been the nominal premier. Bute in turn was succeeded by George Grenville (1712−1770).] the “king's friends” became a political party, avowedly intent on breaking the power of the great Whig noblemen who had so long dominated corrupt Parliaments and unscrupulous ministries.

[Sidenote: Grenville, Prime Minister, 1763−1765, Executor of the Colonial Policies of George III]

George III attempted at the outset to gain control of Parliament by wholesale bribery of its members, but, since even this questionable expedient did not give him a majority, he tried dividing the forces of his Whig opponents. This was somewhat less difficult since Pitt, the most prominent Whig, the eloquent Chauvinist [Footnote: Chauvin, a soldier in Napoleon's army, was so enthusiastic for the glory of the great general that his name has since been used as an adjective denoting excessive patriotism and fondness for war.] minister, “friend of the colonies,” and idol of the cities, had lost control of the ministry. England, too, felt the burdensome expense of war, and the public debt had mounted to what was then the enormous sum of L140,000,000. George III, therefore, chose for prime minister (1763−1765) George Grenville, a representative of a faction of Whig aristocrats, who, alarmed by the growth of the public debt, and jealous of Pitt's power, were quite willing to favor the king's colonial policies. Great Britain, they argued, had undergone a costly war to defend the colonists on the Atlantic coast from French aggression. The colonies were obviously too weak and too divided to garrison and police the great Mississippi and St. Lawrence valleys; and yet, in order to prevent renewed danger from French, Spaniards, or Indians, at least ten thousand regular soldiers would be needed at an annual expense of L300,000. What could be more natural than that the colonists, to whose benefit the war had redounded, and to whose safety the army would add, should pay at least a part of the expense? This idea, put forward by certain Whig statesmen, that the colonists should bear part of the financial burden of imperial defense, was eagerly seized upon by George III and utilized as the cornerstone of his colonial policy. To such a policy the Tories, as ardent upholders of the monarchy, lent their support.

[Sidenote: The Sugar Act, 1764]

Grenville, the new minister, accordingly proposed that the colonists should pay about L150,000 a year,—roughly a half of the estimated total amount,—and for raising the money, he championed two special finance acts in the British Parliament. The first was the Sugar Act of 1764. Grenville recognized that a very high tariff on the importation of foreign sugar−products into the colonies invited smuggling on a large scale, was therefore generally evaded, and yielded little revenue to the government. As a matter of fact, in the previous year, Massachusetts merchants had smuggled 15,000 hogsheads of molasses [Footnote: Large quantities of molasses were used in New England for the manufacture of rum.] from the French West Indies. Now, in accordance with the new enactment, the duty was actually halved, but a serious attempt was made to collect what remained. For

the purpose of the efficient collection of the sugar tax, the Navigation Acts were revived and enforced; British naval officers were ordered to put a peremptory stop to smuggling; and magistrates were empowered to issue "writs of assistance" enabling customs collectors to search private houses for smuggled goods. The Sugar Act was expected to yield one−third of the amount demanded by the British ministry.

[Sidenote: The Stamp Act, 1765] [Sidenote: Opposition in the Colonies]

The other two−thirds of the L150,000 was to be raised under the Stamp Act of 1765. Bills of lading, official documents, deeds, wills, mortgages, notes, newspapers, and pamphlets were to be written or printed only on special stamped paper, on which the tax had been paid. Playing cards paid a stamp tax of a shilling; dice paid ten shillings; and on a college diploma the tax amounted to L2. The Stamp Act bore heavily on just the most dangerous classes of the population— newspaper−publishers, pamphleteers, lawyers, bankers, and merchants. Naturally the newspapers protested and the lawyers argued that the Stamp Act was unconstitutional, that Parliament had no right to levy taxes on the colonies. The very battle−cry, "Taxation without Representation is Tyranny," was the phrase of a Boston lawyer, James Otis.

At once the claim was made that the colonists were true British subjects and that taxation without representation was a flagrant violation of the "immemorial rights of Englishmen." Now the colonists had come to believe that their only true representatives were those for whom they voted personally, the members of the provincial assemblies. Each colony had its representative assembly; and these assemblies, like the parent Parliament in Great Britain, had become very important by acquiring the function of voting taxes. The colonists, therefore, claimed that taxes could be voted only by their own assemblies, while the British government replied, with some pertinency, that Parliament, although elected by a very small minority of the population, was considered to be generally representative of all British subjects.

[Sidenote: The Stamp Act Congress, 1765]

Many colonists, less learned than the lawyers, were unacquainted with the subtleties of the argument, but they were quite willing to be persuaded that in refusing to pay British taxes they were contending for a great principle of liberty and self−government. Opposition to the stamp tax spread like wildfire and culminated in a congress at New York in October, 1765, comprising delegates from nine colonies. The "Stamp Act Congress," for so it was called, issued a declaration of rights— the rights of trial by jury [Footnote: The right of trial by jury had been violated by British officials in punishing smugglers.] and of self−taxation—and formally protested against the Stamp Act.

[Sidenote: Repeal of the Stamp Act, 1776]

Parliament might have disregarded the declaration of the Congress, but not the tidings of popular excitement, of mob violence, of stamp−collectors burned in effigy. Moreover, colonial boycotts against British goods—"nonimportation agreements"—were effective in creating sentiment in England in favor of conciliation. Taking advantage of Grenville's resignation, a new ministry under the marquess of Rockingham, [Footnote: Rockingham retired in July, 1766] a liberal Whig, procured the repeal of the obnoxious Stamp Act in March, 1766. While the particular tax was abandoned, a Declaratory Act was issued, affirming the constitutional right of Parliament to bind the colonies in all cases.

[Sidenote: The Townshend Acts, 1767]

That right was asserted again in 1767 by a brilliant but reckless chancellor of the exchequer, Charles Townshend, who, without the consent of the other ministers, put through Parliament the series of acts which bear his name. His intention was to raise a regular colonial revenue for the support of colonial governors, judges, and other officers as well as for the defense of the colonies. For these purposes, import duties were laid on glass, lead, painters' colors, paper, and tea; the duties were to be collected by English commissioners resident in the American ports; and infractions of the law in America were to be tried in courts without juries.

[Sidenote: "The Boston Massacre"]

The Townshend Acts brought forth immediate and indignant protests. Colonial merchants renewed and extended their nonimportation agreements. Within a year the imports Boston from Great Britain fell off by more than L700,000. The customs officers were unable or afraid to collect the duties strictly, and it is said that in three years the total revenue from them amounted only to L16,000. Troops were dispatched to overawe Boston, but the angry Bostonians hooted and hissed the "lobsterbacks," as the redcoats were derisively styled, and in 1770 provoked them to actual bloodshed—the so−called "Boston Massacre."

[Sidenote: Lord North, Prime Minister, 1770]

At this crucial moment, King George III chose a new prime minister, Lord North, a gentleman of wit, ability, and affability, unfailingly humorous, and unswervingly faithful to the king. Among his first measures was the repeal (1770) of the hated Townshend duties. Merely a tax of threepence a pound on tea was retained, in order that the colonies might not think that Parliament had surrendered its right to tax them. Lord North even made an arrangement with the East India Company whereby tea was sold so cheaply that it would not pay to smuggle tea from the Dutch.

[Sidenote: "The Boston Tea Party," 1773]

But the colonists would not now yield even the principle of Parliamentary taxation. [Footnote: Despite the fact that the colonists had regularly been paying import duties on molasses and on foreign wine.] They insisted that were they to pay this tax, trifling as it might be, Parliament would assert that they had acknowledged its right to tax them, and would soon lay heavier taxes upon them. They, therefore, refused to buy the tea, and on a cold December night in 1773 a number of Boston citizens dressed up like Indians, boarded a British tea ship, and emptied 342 chests of tea into the harbor.

[Sidenote: The Five "Intolerable Acts," 1774]

Boston's "Tea−Party" brought punishment swift and sure in the famous five "intolerable acts" (1774). Boston harbor was closed; Massachusetts was practically deprived of self−government; royal officers who committed capital offenses were to be tried in England or in other colonies; royal troops were quartered on the colonists; and the province of Quebec was extended south to the Ohio, cutting off vast territories claimed by Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Virginia. This last act, by recognizing and establishing the Roman Catholic Church in French−speaking Quebec, excited the liveliest fear and apprehension on the part of Protestants in the English−speaking colonies.

[Sidenote: First Continental Congress, 1774]

Agitators in the other colonies feared that their turn would come next, and rallied to the aid of Massachusetts. The first Continental Congress of delegations from all the colonies [Footnote: Except Georgia.] met in 1774 in Philadelphia "to deliberate and determine upon wise and proper measures, to be by them recommended to all the colonies, for the recovery and establishment of their just rights and liberties, civil and religious, and the restoration of union and harmony between Great Britain and the colonies." The Congress dispatched a petition to the king and urged the colonists to be faithful to the "American Association" for the non−importation of British goods.

THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE, 1775−1783

[Sidenote: Revolt of the Thirteen Colonies]

Neither king nor colonies would yield a single point. William Pitt, now earl of Chatham, in vain proposed conciliatory measures. The colonies fast drifted into actual revolt. In May, 1775, the second Continental Congress met at Philadelphia, but already blood had been shed at Lexington (Massachusetts), 19 April, 1775, and New England was a hotbed of rebellion. The Congress accepted facts as they were, declared war, appointed George Washington commander−in−chief, sent agents to France and other foreign countries, and addressed a final petition to the king.

[Sidenote: The Declaration of Independence, 1776]

But it was too late for reconciliation, and events marched rapidly until on 4 July, 1776, the colonies declared themselves "free and independent states." [Footnote: The colonies on the recommendation of Congress set up independent governments and these state governments were formally federated in accordance with "articles of Confederation and perpetual Union," drawn up in Congress in 1777 and finally ratified in 1781.] The Declaration of Independence was remarkable for two things, its philosophy and its effects. The philosophy was that held by many radical thinkers of the time—"that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights"; that among such rights are life, liberty, and the exclusive right to tax themselves; and that any people may rightfully depose a tyrannical ruler. We shall find a similar philosophy applied more boldly in the French Revolution.

In America the Declaration was denounced by "Tories" as treason, but was welcomed by "patriots" as an inspiration and a stimulus. To show their joy, the people of New York City pulled down the leaden statue of King George and molded it into bullets. Instead of rebellious subjects, the English−speaking Americans now claimed to

be a belligerent nation, and on the basis of this claim they sought recognition and aid from other nations.

[Sidenote: Difficulties and Early Successes of the British]

For over three years, however, the war was carried on simply between rebellious colonies and the mother country. Had the grave nature of the revolt been thoroughly understood in England from the outset, the colonists might possibly have been crushed within a short time, for many of the richest colonists were opposed to the war; and even had the “people of the United States” supported the struggle unanimously, they were no match for Great Britain in wealth, population, or naval power. As it was, Great Britain allowed the revolution to get under full headway before making a serious effort to suppress it. In 1776, however, a force of about 30,000 men, many of whom were mercenary German soldiers, commonly called “Hessians,” was sent to occupy New York. Thenceforward, the British pursued aggressive tactics, and inasmuch as their armies were generally superior to those of the colonists in numbers, discipline, and equipment, and besides were supported by powerful fleets, they were able to possess themselves of the important colonial ports of New York, Philadelphia, and Charlestown, [Footnote: Name changed to Charleston in 1783.] and to win many victories. On the other hand, the region to be conquered was extensive and the rebel armies stubborn and elusive. Moreover, the colonists possessed a skillful leader in the person of the aristocratic Virginian planter who has already been mentioned as taking a part in the French and Indian War. At first, George Washington was criticized for bringing the gravity of a judge and the dignified bearing of a courtier to the battlefield, but he soon proved his ability. He was wise enough to retreat before superior forces, always keeping just out of harm's way, and occasionally catching his incautious pursuer unawares, as at Princeton or Trenton.

[Sidenote: British Reverse at Saratoga, 1777]

One of the crucial events of the war was the surrender of the British General Burgoyne with some six thousand men at Saratoga, on 17 October, 1777, after an unsuccessful invasion of northern New York. At that very time, Benjamin Franklin, the public−spirited Philadelphia publisher, was in Paris attempting to persuade France to ally herself with the United States. Franklin's charming personality, his “republican plainness,” his shrewd common sense, as well as his knowledge of philosophy and science, made him welcome at the brilliant French court; but France, although still smarting under the humiliating treaty of 1763, would not yield to his persuasion until the American victory at Saratoga seemed to indicate that the time had come to strike. An alliance with the United States was concluded, and in 1778 war was declared against Great Britain.

[Sidenote: Entrance into the War of France (1778), Spain (1779), Holland (1780)] [Sidenote: Isolation of Great Britain]

The war now took on a larger aspect, and in its scale of operations and in its immediate significance the fighting in the colonies was dwarfed into comparative insignificance. In the attack upon Great Britain, France was dutifully joined by Spain (1779). Holland, indignant at the way in which Great Britain had tried to exclude Dutch traders from commerce with America, joined the Bourbons (1780) against their common foe. Other nations, too, had become alarmed at the rapid growth and domineering maritime policy of Great Britain. Since the outbreak of hostilities, British captains and admirals had claimed the right to search and seize neutral vessels trading with America or bearing contraband of war. Against this dangerous practice, Catherine II of Russia protested vigorously, and in 1780 formed the “armed neutrality of the North” with Sweden and Denmark to uphold the protest with force, if necessary. Prussia, Portugal, the Two Sicilies, and the Holy Roman Empire subsequently pronounced their adherence to the Armed Neutrality, and Great Britain was confronted by a unanimously hostile Europe.

[Sidenote: The War in Europe]

In the actual operations only three nations figured—France, Spain, and Holland; and of the three the last named gave little trouble except in the North Sea. More to be feared were France and Spain, for by them the British Empire was attacked in all its parts. For a while in 1779 even the home country was threatened by a Franco−Spanish fleet of sixty−six sail, convoying an army of 60,000 men; but the plan came to naught. Powerful Spanish and French forces, launched against Great Britain's Mediterranean possessions, succeeded in taking Minorca, but were repulsed by the British garrison of Gibraltar.

[Sidenote: The War in America]

On the continent of North America the insurgent colonists, aided by French fleets and French soldiers, gained a signal victory. An American and French army under Washington and Lafayette and a French fleet under De

Grasse suddenly closed in upon the British general, Lord Cornwallis, in Yorktown, Virginia, and compelled him to surrender on 19 October, 1781, with over 7000 men. The capitulation of Cornwallis practically decided the struggle in America, for all the reserve forces of Great Britain were required in Europe, in the West Indies, and in Asia.

[Sidenote: The War in the West Indies] [Sidenote: Battle of Saints, 1782]

Matters were going badly for Great Britain until a naval victory in the Caribbean Sea partially redeemed the day. For three winters an indecisive war had been carried on in the West Indies, but in 1782 thirty−six British ships, under the gallant Rodney, met the French Count de Grasse with thirty−three sail of the line near the group of islands known as "the Saints," and a great battle ensued—the "battle of Saints"—on 12 April, 1782. During the fight the wind suddenly veered around, making a great gap in the line of French ships, and into this gap sailed the British admiral, breaking up the French fleet, and, in the confusion, capturing six vessels.

[Sidenote: The War in India]

While the battle of Saints saved the British power in the West Indies, the outlook in the East became less favorable. At first the British had been successful in seizing the French forts in India (1778) and in defeating (1781) the native ally of the French, Hyder Ali, the sultan of Mysore. But in 1782 the tide was turned by the appearance of the French admiral De Suffren, whose brilliant victories over a superior British fleet gave the French temporary control of the Bay of Bengal.

[Sidenote: Defeat but not Ruin of Great Britain] [Sidenote: Treaties of Paris and Versailles, 1783]

Unsuccessful in America, inglorious in India, expelled from Minorca, unable to control Ireland, [Footnote: The Protestants in Ireland had armed and organized volunteer forces, and threatened rebellion unless Great Britain granted "home rule" to them. Great Britain yielded and in 1782 granted legislative autonomy to the Irish Parliament. See below, p. 431.] and weary with war, England was very ready for peace, but not entirely humbled, for was she not still secure in the British Channel, victorious over the Dutch, triumphant in the Caribbean, unshaken in India, and unmoved on Gibraltar? Defeat, but not humiliation, was the keynote of the treaties (1783) which Great Britain concluded, one at Paris with the United States, and one at Versailles with France and Spain. Let us consider the provisions of these treaties in order, as they affected the United States, France, and Spain.

[Sidenote: The United States of America]

By the treaty of Paris (3 September, 1783), the former thirteen colonies were recognized as the sovereign and independent United States of America,—bounded on the north by Canada and the Great Lakes, on the east by the Atlantic, on the west by the Mississippi, and on the south by Florida. Important fishing rights on the Newfoundland Banks and the privilege of navigation on the Mississippi were extended to the new nation. When the treaty of Paris was signed, the United States were still held loosely together by the articles of Confederation, but after several years of political confusion, a new and stronger federal constitution was drawn up in 1787, and in 1789 George Washington became first president of the republic. The republic thus created was the first important embodiment of the political theories of Montesquieu and other French philosophers, who, while condemning titled nobility and absolute monarchy, distrusted the ignorant classes of the people, and believed in placing political control chiefly in the hands of intelligent men of property and position.

[Sidenote: Results to France]

Had it not been for the disastrous battle of Saints, France might have dictated very favorable terms in the treaty of Versailles, [Footnote: In 1786 a supplementary Anglo−French treaty restored regular commerce between the two nations, and recognized that Great Britain had no right to seize traders flying a neutral flag, except for contraband of war, *i.e.*, guns, powder, and provisions of war.] but, as it was, she merely regained Tobago in the West Indies and Senegal in Africa, which she had lost in 1763. [Footnote: See above, p. 317.] The equipment of navies and armies had exhausted the finances of the French government, and was largely responsible for the bankruptcy which was soon to occasion the fall of absolutism in France. Moreover, French "radicals," having seen the Americans revolt against a king, were, themselves, the more ready to enter upon a revolution.

[Sidenote: Results to Spain]

Better than France fared Spain. By the treaty of Versailles she received the island of Minorca and the territory of Florida, which then included the southern portions of what later became the American states of Alabama and Mississippi. [Footnote: The Louisiana territory, which had come into Spanish possession in 1763, was re−ceded to France in 1800 and sold by France to the United States in 1803. Eighteen years later (1821) all of Florida was

formally transferred to the United States. And see below, p. 532.]

[Sidenote: Settlement between Great Britain and Holland, 1784]

Holland, the least important participant in the war, was not a party to the treaty of Versailles, but was left to conclude a separate peace with Great Britain in the following year (1784). The Dutch not only lost some of their East Indian possessions, [Footnote: Including stations on the Malabar and Coromandel coasts of India.] but, what was more essential, they were forced to throw open to British merchants the valuable trade of the Malay Archipelago.

THE REFORMATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

[Sidenote: New Conciliatory Colonial Policy]

The War of American Independence not only had cost Great Britain the thirteen colonies, hitherto the most important, [Footnote: The thirteen colonies were not actually then so profitable, however, as the fertile West Indies, nor did they fit in so well with the mercantilist theory of Colonialism.] oldest, and strongest of her possessions, and likewise Senegal, Florida, Tobago, and Minorca, but it had necessitated a terrible expenditure of men, money, and ships. More bitter than the disastrous results of the war, however, was the reflection that possibly all might have been avoided by a policy of conciliation and concession. Still it was not too late to learn, and in its treatment of the remaining colonies, the British government showed that the lesson had not been lost.

[Sidenote: Quebec Act, 1774] [Sidenote: Board of Control in India, 1784] [Sidenote: Separate Parliament for Ireland, 1782]

On the eve of the revolt of the English−speaking colonies in America, a wise measure of toleration was accorded to the French inhabitants of Canada by the Quebec Act of 1774, which allowed them freely to profess their Roman Catholic religion, and to enjoy the continuance of the French civil law. To these advantages was added in 1791 the privilege of a representative assembly. India, too, felt the influence of the new policy, when in 1784 Parliament created a Board of Control to see that the East India Company did not abuse its political functions. Even Ireland, which was practically a colony, was accorded in 1782 the right to make its own local laws, a measure of self−government enjoyed till 1 January, 1801. [Footnote: See below, p. 431.]

[Sidenote: Decline and Gradual Abandonment of Mercantilism]

British commercial policy, too, underwent a change, for the Navigation Acts, which had angered the American colonies, could not now be applied to the free nation of the United States. Moreover, the mercantilist theory, having in this case produced such unfortunate results, henceforth began to lose ground, and it is not without interest that Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, the classic expression of the new political economy of free trade,—of *laisser−faire*, as the French styled it,—which was destined to supplant mercantilism, was published in 1776, the very year of the declaration of American independence. Of course Great Britain's mercantilist trade regulations were not at once abandoned, but they had received a death−blow, and British commerce seemed none the worse for it. The southern American states began to grow cotton [Footnote: During the war, cotton was introduced into Georgia and Carolina from the Bahamas, and soon became an important product. In 1794, 1,600,000 pounds were shipped to Great Britain.] for the busy looms of British manufacturers, and of their own free will the citizens of the United States bought the British manufactures which previously they had boycotted as aggrieved colonists. In this particular, at least, the loss of the colonies was hardly a loss at all.

[Sidenote: Extent of the British Empire at Close of Eighteenth Century]

Even for those ardent British patriots who wished to see their flag waving over half the world and who were deeply chagrined by the untoward political schism that had rent kindred English−speaking peoples asunder, there was still some consolation and there was about to be some compensation. In the New World, Canada, Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, and smaller islands of the West Indies, and a part of Honduras, made no mean empire; and in the Old World the British flag flew over the forts at Gibraltar, Gambia, and the Gold Coast, while India offered almost limitless scope for ambition and even for greed.

[Sidenote: Extension of the British Empire in India] [Sidenote: Warren Hastings]

To the extension and solidification of her empire in the East, Great Britain now devoted herself, and with encouraging results. It will be remembered that British predominance in India had already been assured by the brilliant and daring Clive, who had defeated the French, set up a puppet nawab in Bengal, and attempted to eliminate corruption from the administration, Clive's work was continued by a man no less famous, Warren Hastings (1732−1818), whose term as governor−general of India (1774−1785) covered the whole period of the

American revolt. At the age of seven−teen, Hastings had first entered the employ of the British East India Company, and an apprenticeship of over twenty years in India had browned his face and inured his lean body to the peculiarities of the climate, as well as giving him a thorough insight into the native character. When at last, in 1774, he became head of the Indian administration, Hastings inaugurated a policy which he pursued with tireless attention to details—a policy involving the transference of British headquarters to Calcutta, and a thorough reform of the police, military, and financial systems. In his wars and intrigues with native princes and in many of his financial transactions, a Parliament, which was inclined to censure, found occasion to attack his honor, and the famous Edmund Burke, with all the force of oratory and hatred, attempted to convict the great governor of "high crimes and misdemeanors." But the tirades of Burke were powerless against the man who had so potently strengthened the foundations of the British empire in India.

[Sidenote: Cornwallis]

In 1785 Hastings was succeeded by Lord Cornwallis—the same who had surrendered to Washington at Yorktown. Cornwallis was as successful in India as he had been unfortunate in America. His organization of the tax system proved him a wise administrator, and his reputation as a general was enhanced by the defeat of the rebellious sultan of Mysore.

The work begun so well by Clive, Hastings, and Cornwallis, was ably carried on by subsequent administrators, [Footnote: For details concerning British rule in India between 1785 and 1858, see Vol. II, pp. 662 ff.] until in 1858 the crown finally took over the empire of the East India Company, an empire stretching northward to the Himalayas, westward to the Indus River, and eastward to the Brahmaputra.

[Sidenote: The Straits Settlements] [Sidenote: Australia]

In the years immediately following the War of American Independence occurred two other important extensions of British power. One was the occupation of the "Straits Settlements" which gave Great Britain control of the Malay peninsula and of the Straits of Malacca through which the spice ships passed. But more valuable as a future home for English−speaking Europeans, and, therefore, as partial compensation for the loss of the United States, was the vast island−continent of Australia, which had been almost unknown until the famous voyage of Captain Cook to Botany Bay in 1770. For many years Great Britain regarded Australia as a kind of open−air prison for her criminals, and the first British settlers at Port Jackson (1788) were exiled convicts. The introduction of sheep−raising and the discovery of gold made the island a more attractive home for colonists, and thenceforth its development was rapid. To−day, with an area of almost 3,000,000 square miles, and a population of some 4,800,000 English−speaking people, Australia is a commonwealth more populous than and three times as large as were the thirteen colonies with which Great Britain so unwillingly parted in 1783.

ADDITIONAL READING

BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY. A very brief survey: J. S. Bassett, *A Short History of the United States* (1914), ch. viii, ix. The most readable and reliable detailed account of mercantilism as applied by the British to their colonies is to be found in the volumes of G. L. Beer, *The Origin of the British Colonial System*, 1578−1660 (1908); *The Old Colonial System*, 1660−1754, Part I, *The Establishment of the System*, 2 vols. (1912); *British Colonial Policy*, 1754−1765 (1907); and *The Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies* (1893), a survey. From the English standpoint, the best summary is that of H. E. Egerton, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy* (1897). Other valuable works: C. M. Andrews, *Colonial Self−Government* (1904), Vol. V of the "American Nation" Series; O. M. Dickerson, *American Colonial Government, 1696−1765* (1912), a study of the British Board of Trade in its relation to the American colonies, political, industrial, and administrative; G. E. Howard, *Preliminaries of the Revolution, 1763−1775* (1905), Vol. VIII of the "American Nation" Series; Reginald Lucas, *Lord North, Second Earl of Guilford*, 2 vols. (1913); and the standard treatises of H. L. Osgood and of J. A. Doyle cited in the bibliography to Chapter IX, above.

THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION. Sir G. 0. Trevelyan, *The American Revolution*, 4 vols. (1899−1912), and, by the same author, *George the Third and Charles Fox: the Concluding Part of the American Revolution*, 2 vols. (1914), scholarly and literary accounts, sympathetic toward the colonists and the English Whigs; Edward Channing, *A History of the United States*, Vol. III (1912), the best general work; C. H. Van Tyne, *The American Revolution* (1905), Vol. IX of the "American Nation" Series, accurate and informing; John Fiske, *American Revolution*, 2 vols. (1891), a very readable popular treatment; S. G. Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence*, 2 vols. (1908), unusually favorable to the British loyalists in America; *Cambridge Modern History*,

Vol. VII (1903), ch. v−vii, written in great part by J. A. Doyle, the English specialist on the American colonies; J. B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution* (1911), entertaining and instructive; Arthur Hassall, *The Balance of Power*, 1715−1789 (1896), ch. xii, a very brief but suggestive indication of the international setting of the War of American Independence; J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, Vol. III (1902), an account of the military operations from the English standpoint.

THE REFORMATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE. A good general history: M. R. P. Dorman, *History of the British Empire in the Nineteenth Century* , Vol. I, 1793−1805 (1902), Vol. II, 1806−1900 (1904). On Ireland: W. O'C. Morris, *Ireland*, 1494−1905, 2d ed. (1909). On Canada: Sir C. P. Lucas, *A History of Canada*, 1763−1812 (1909). On India: Sir Alfred Lyall, *Warren Hastings*, originally published in 1889, reprinted (1908), an excellent biography; G. W. Hastings, *Vindication of Warren Hastings* (1909), the best apology for the remarkable governor of India, and should be contrasted with Lord Macaulay's celebrated indictment of Hastings; Sir John Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War* (1892), favorable to Hastings' work in India. On Australia: Greville Tregarthen, *Australian Commonwealth* , 3d ed. (1901), a good outline, in the “Story of the Nations” Series; Edward Jenks, *A History of the Australasian Colonies* (1896), an excellent summary; Edward Heawood, *A History of Geographical Discovery in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries* (1912); Arthur Kitson, *Captain James Cook* (1907).

# CHAPTER XI. THE GERMANIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

## THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE IN DECLINE

[Sidenote: Backwardness of the Germanies]

In another connection we have already described the political condition of the Germanies in the sixteenth century. [Footnote: See above, pp. 10 ff.] Outwardly, little change was observable in the eighteenth. The Holy Roman Empire still existed as a nominal bond of union for a loose assemblage of varied states. There was still a Habsburg emperor. There were still electors—the number had been increased from seven to nine [Footnote: Bavaria became an electorate in 1623 and Hanover in 1708; in 1778 Bavaria and the Palatinate were joined, again making eight.]—with some influence and considerable honor. There was still a Diet, composed of representatives of the princes and of the free cities, meeting regularly at Ratisbon. [Footnote: Ratisbon or Regensburg—in the Bavarian Palatinate. The Diet met there regularly after 1663.] But the empire was clearly in decline. The wave of national enthusiasm which Martin Luther evoked had spent itself in religious wrangling and dissension, and in the inglorious conflicts of the Thirty Years' War. The Germans had become so many pawns that might be moved back and forth upon the international chessboard by Habsburg and Bourbon gamesters. Switzerland had been lost to the empire; both France and Sweden had deliberately dismembered other valuable districts. [Footnote: For the provisions of the treaties of Westphalia, see above, pp. 228 f.]

[Sidenote: Deplorable Results of the Thirty Years' War]

It seemed as though slight foundation remained on which a substantial political structure could be reared, for the social conditions in the Germanies were deplorable. It is not an exaggeration to say that during the Thirty Years' War Germany lost at least half of its population and more than two−thirds of its movable property. In the middle of the seventeenth century, at about the time Louis XIV succeeded to a fairly prosperous France, German towns and villages were in ashes, and vast districts turned into deserts. Churches and schools were closed by hundreds, and religious and intellectual torpor prevailed. Industry and trade were so completely paralyzed that by 1635 the Hanseatic League was virtually abandoned, because the free commercial cities, formerly so wealthy, could not meet the necessary expenses. Economic expansion and colonial enterprise, together with the consequent upbuilding of a well−to−do middle class, were resigned to Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, or England, without a protest from what had once been a proud burgher class in Germany. This elimination of an influential bourgeoisie was accompanied by a sorry impoverishment and oppression of the peasantry. These native sons of the German soil had fondly hoped for better things from the religious revolution and agrarian insurrections of the sixteenth century; but they were doomed to failure and disappointment. The peasantry were in a worse plight in the eighteenth century in Germany than in any other country of western or central Europe.

[Sidenote: The German Princes]

The princes alone knew how to profit by the national prostration. Enriched by the confiscation of ecclesiastical property in the sixteenth century and relieved of meddlesome interference on the part of the emperor or the Diet, they utilized the decline of the middle class and the dismal serfdom of the peasantry to exalt their personal political power. They got rid of the local assemblies or greatly curtailed their privileges, and gradually established petty tyrannies. After the Thirty Years' War, it became fashionable for the heirs of German principalities to travel and especially to spend some time at the court of France. Here they imbibed the political ideas of the Grand Monarch, and in a short time nearly every petty court in the Germanics was a small−sized reproduction of the court of Versailles. In a silly and ridiculous way the princes aped their great French neighbor: they too maintained armies, palaces, and swarms of household officials, which, though a crushing burden upon the people, were yet so insignificant in comparison with the real pomp of France, that they were in many instances the laughingstock of Europe. Beneath an external gloss of refinement, these princes were, as a class, coarse and selfish, and devoid of any compensating virtues. Neither the common people, whom they had impoverished, nor the Church, which they had robbed, was now strong enough to resist the growing absolutism and selfishness of the princes.

## THE HABSBURG DOMINIONS

[Sidenote: Charles VI and his Hereditary Dominions]

At the opening of the eighteenth century, the largest and most important states of the Holy Roman Empire were those which owned the direct sovereignty of the Austrian Habsburgs. Charles VI (1711−1740), who as the Archduke Charles had vainly struggled against Louis XIV to secure the whole Spanish inheritance in the War of the Spanish Succession (1702−1713), reigned over extensive and scattered dominions. Around Vienna, his capital city, were gathered his hereditary possessions: (1) Lower Austria, or Austria proper, on the Danube; (2) Inner Austria, which comprised Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola; (3) Further Austria, consisting of the mountainous regions about Innsbruck, commonly designated the Tyrol; and (4) Upper Austria, embracing Breisgau on the upper Rhine near the Black Forest. To this nucleus of lands, in the greater part of which the German language was spoken universally, had been added in course of time the Czech or Slavic kingdom of Bohemia with its German dependency of Silesia and its Slavic dependency of Moravia, and a portion of the Magyar kingdom of Hungary, with its Slavic dependencies of Croatia and Slavonia and its Rumanian dependency of Transylvania. Charles VI, like so many of his Habsburg ancestors, was also emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and was thereby accounted the foremost of German princes. But neither Bohemia nor Hungary was predominantly German in language or feeling, and Hungary was not even a part of the Holy Roman Empire.

[Sidenote: Conquests of Charles VI]

What additions were made to the Habsburg dominions by Charles VI were all of non−German peoples. The treaty of Utrecht had given him the Flemish−and French−speaking Belgian Netherlands and the Italian−speaking duchy of Milan and kingdom of the Two Sicilies. [Footnote: See above, p. 253, footnote.] A series of wars with the Ottoman Turks had enabled his family to press the Hungarian boundaries south as far as Bosnia and Serbia and to incorporate as a dependency of Hungary the Rumanian−speaking principality of Transylvania. [Footnote: Definitely ceded by Turkey by the treaty of Karlowitz (1699).] Of course all these newer states of the Habsburgs remained outside of the Holy Roman Empire.

[Sidenote: Diversity of Habsburg Dominions]

Between the various peoples who were thus brought under the Habsburg sway, the bond was of loosest description. They spoke a dozen different languages and presented an even greater diversity of interests. They did not constitute a compact, strongly centralized, national state like France. Charles VI ruled his territories by manifold titles: he was archduke of Austria, king of Bohemia, king of Hungary, duke of Milan, and prince of the Netherlands; and the administration of each of these five major groups was independent of the others. The single bond of union was the common allegiance to the Habsburg monarch.

[Sidenote: Check upon Habsburg Ambitions in the Germanies]

To adopt and pursue a policy which would suit all these lands and peoples would hardly be possible for any mortal: it certainly surpassed the wit of the Habsburgs. They had made an attempt in the seventeenth century to develop a vigorous German policy, to unify the empire and to strengthen their hold upon it, but they had failed dismally. The disasters of the Thirty Years' War, the jealousies and ambitions of the other German princes, the interested intervention of foreign powers, notably Sweden and France, made it brutally clear that Habsburg influence in the Germanies had already reached its highest pitch and that henceforth it would tend gradually to wane.

Blocked in the Germanies, the Austrian Habsburgs looked elsewhere to satisfy their aspirations. But almost equal difficulties confronted them. Extension to the southeast in the direction of the Balkan peninsula involved almost incessant warfare with the Turks. Increase of territory in Italy incited Spain, France, and Sardinia to armed resistance. Development of the trade of the Belgian Netherlands aroused the hostility of the influential commercial classes in England, Holland, and France. The time and toil spent upon these non−German projects obviously could not be devoted to the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire. Thus, not only were the Germanies a source of weakness to the Habsburgs, but the Habsburgs were a source of weakness to the Germanies.

[Sidenote: Continued Prestige of the Habsburgs]

Despite these drawbacks, the Habsburg family was still powerful. The natural resources and native wealth of many of the regions, the large, if rather cosmopolitan, armies which might be raised, the intricate marriage relationships with most of the sovereign families of Europe, the championship of the Catholic Church, the absolutist principles and practices of the reigning prince, all contributed to cloak the weaknesses, under a proud name and pretentious fame, of the imperial Austrian line.

[Sidenote: Question of the Habsburg Inheritance] [Sidenote: The “Pragmatic Sanction” of Charles VI]

In the eighteenth century a particularly unkind fate seemed to attend the Habsburgs. We have already noticed how the extinction of the male line in the Spanish branch precipitated a great international war of succession, with the result that the Spanish inheritance was divided and the greater part passed to the rival Bourbon family. Now Charles VI was obliged to face a similar danger in the Austrian inheritance. He himself had neither sons nor brothers, but only a daughter, Maria Theresa. Spurred on by the fate of his Spanish kinsman, Charles VI directed his energies toward securing a settlement of his possessions prior to his death. Early in his reign he promulgated a so−called Pragmatic Sanction which declared that the Habsburg dominions were indivisible and that, contrary to long custom, they might be inherited by female heirs in default of male. Then he subordinated his whole foreign policy to securing general European recognition of the right of Maria Theresa to succeed to all his territories. One after another of his manifold principalities swore to observe the Pragmatic Sanction. One after another of the foreign powers—Prussia, Russia, Great Britain, Holland, the Empire, Poland, France, Spain, and Sardinia,—to whom liberal concessions were made—pledged their word and their honor most sacredly to preserve the Pragmatic Sanction. When Charles VI died in 1740, he left his daughter a disorganized state, a bankrupt treasury, and a small ill−disciplined army, but he bequeathed her an ample number of parchment guarantees. The cynical Prussian king remarked that 200,000 fighting men would have been a more useful legacy, and, as events proved, he was right.

## THE RISE OF PRUSSIA. THE HOHENZOLLERNS

[Sidenote: The Hohenzollern Family]

Next to the Habsburgs, the most influential German family in the eighteenth century was the Hohenzollern. As far back as the tenth century, a line of counts was ruling over a castle on the hill of Zollern just north of what is now Switzerland. These counts slowly extended their lands and their power through the fortunes of feudal warfare and by means of a kindly interest on the part of the Holy Roman Emperors, until at length, in the twelfth century, a representative of the Hohenzollerns became by marriage burgrave of the important city of Nuremberg.

[Sidenote: Brandenburg]

So far the Hohenzollerns had been fortunate, but as yet they were no more conspicuous than hundreds of petty potentates throughout the empire. It was not until they were invested by the Habsburg emperor with the electorate of Brandenburg in 1415 that they became prominent. Brandenburg was a district of northern Germany, centering in the town of Berlin and lying along the Oder River. As a mark, or frontier province, it was the northern and eastern outpost of the German language and German culture, and the exigencies of almost perpetual warfare with the neighboring Slavic peoples had given Brandenburg a good deal of military experience and prestige. As an electorate, moreover, it possessed considerable influence in the internal affairs of the Holy Roman Empire.

In the sixteenth century, the acceptance of Lutheranism by the Hohenzollern electors of Brandenburg enabled them, like many other princes of northern Germany, to seize valuable properties of the Catholic Church and to rid themselves of a foreign power which had curtailed their political and social sway. Brandenburg subsequently became the chief Protestant state of Germany, just as to Austria was conceded the leadership of the Catholic states.

[Sidenote: The Hohenzollerns and the Thirty Years' War]

The period of the Thirty Years' War (1618−1648) was as auspicious to the Hohenzollerns as it was unlucky for the Habsburgs. On the eve of the contest, propitious marriage alliances bestowed two important legacies upon the family—the duchy of Cleves [Footnote: Though the alliance between Brandenburg and Cleves dated from 1614, the Hohenzollerns did not reign over Cleves until 1666. With Cleves went its dependencies of Mark and Ravensberg.] on the lower Rhine, and the duchy of East Prussia, [Footnote: Prussia was then an almost purely Slavic state. It had been formed and governed from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century by the Teutonic Knights, a military, crusading order of German Catholics, who aided in converting the Slavs to Christianity. In the sixteenth century the Grand Master of the Teutonic Knights professed the Lutheran faith and transformed Prussia into an hereditary duchy in his own family. In a series of wars West Prussia was incorporated into Poland, while East Prussia became a fief of that kingdom. It was to East Prussia only that the Hohenzollern elector of Brandenburg succeeded in 1618.] on the Baltic north of Poland. Henceforth the head of the Hohenzollern family could sign himself margrave and elector of Brandenburg, duke of Cleves, and duke of Prussia. In the last−named role, he was a vassal of the king of Poland; in the others, of the Holy Roman Emperor. In the course of the Thirty

Years' War, the Hohenzollerns helped materially to lessen imperial control, and at the close of the struggle secured the wealthy bishoprics of Halberstadt, Minden, and Magdeburg, [Footnote: The right of accession to Magdeburg was accorded the Hohenzollerns in 1648; they did not formally possess it until 1680.] and the eastern half of the duchy of Pomerania.

[Sidenote: The Great Elector]

The international reputation of the Hohenzollerns was established by Frederick William, commonly styled the Great Elector (1640−1688). When he ascended the throne, the Thirty Years' War had reduced his scattered dominions to utmost misery: he was resolved to restore prosperity, to unify his various possessions, and to make his realm a factor in general European politics. By diplomacy more than by military prowess, he obtained the new territories by the peace of Westphalia. Then, taking advantage of a war between Sweden and Poland, he made himself so invaluable to both sides, now helping one, now deserting to the other, that by cunning and sometimes by unscrupulous intrigue, he induced the king of Poland to renounce suzerainty over East Prussia and to give him that duchy in full sovereignty. In the Dutch War of Louis XIV (1672−1678) he completely defeated the Swedes, who were in alliance with France, and, although he was not allowed by the provisions of the peace to keep what he had conquered, nevertheless the fame of his army was established and Brandenburg−Prussia took rank as the chief competitor of Sweden's hegemony in the Baltic.

In matters of government, the Great Elector was, like his contemporary Louis XIV, a firm believer in absolutism. At the commencement of his reign, each one of the three parts of his lands—Brandenburg, Cleves, and East Prussia—was organized as a separate, petty state, with its own Diet or form of representative government, its own army, and its own independent administration. After a hard constitutional struggle, Frederick William deprived the several Diets of their significant functions, centered financial control in his own person, declared the local armies national, and merged the three separate administrations into one, strictly subservient to his royal council at Berlin. Thus, the three states were amalgamated into one; and, to all intents and purposes, they constituted a united monarchy.

The Great Elector was a tireless worker. He encouraged industry and agriculture, drained marshes, and built the Frederick William Canal, joining the Oder with the Elbe. When the revocation of the Edict of Nantes caused so many Huguenots to leave France, the Great Elector's warm invitation attracted to Brandenburg some 20,000, who were settled around Berlin and who gave French genius as well as French names to their adopted country. The capital city, which at the Great Elector's accession numbered barely 8000, counted at his death a population of over 20,000.

[Sidenote: Brandenburg−Prussia a “Kingdom,” 1701]

Brandenburg−Prussia was already an important monarchy, but its ruler was not recognized as “king” until 1701, when the Emperor Leopold conferred upon him that title in order to enlist his support in the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1713, by the treaty of Utrecht, the other European powers acknowledged the title. It was Prussia, rather than Brandenburg, which gave its name to the new kingdom, because the former was an entirely independent state, while the latter was a member of the Holy Roman Empire. Thereafter the “kingdom of Prussia” [Footnote: At first the Hohenzollern monarch assumed the title of king *in* Prussia, because West Prussia was still a province of the kingdom of Poland. Gradually, however, under Frederick William I (1713−1740), the popular appellation of “king of Prussia” prevailed over the formal “king in Prussia.” West Prussia was definitely acquired in 1772 (see below, p. 387).] designated the combined territories of the Hohenzollern family.

Prussia rose rapidly in the eighteenth century. She shared with Austria the leadership of the Germanies and secured a position in Europe as a first−rate power. This rise was the result largely of the efforts of Frederick William I (1713−1740).

[Sidenote: King Frederick William I, 1713−1740]

King Frederick William was a curious reversion to the type of his grandfather: he was the Great Elector over again with all his practical good sense if without his taste for diplomacy. His own ideal of kingship was a paternal despotism, and his ambition, to use most advantageously the limited resources of his country in order to render Prussia feared and respected abroad. He felt that absolutism was the only kind of government consonant with the character of his varied and scattered dominions, and he understood in a canny way the need of an effective army and of the closest economy which would permit a relatively small kingdom to support a relatively large army. Under Frederick William I, money, military might, and divine−right monarchy became the indispensable props of

the Hohenzollern rule in Prussia.

By a close thrift that often bordered on miserliness King Frederick William I managed to increase his standing army from 38,000 to 80,000 men, bringing it up in numbers so as to rank with the regular armies of such first−rate states as France or Austria. In efficiency, it probably surpassed the others. An iron discipline molded the Prussian troops into the most precise military engine then to be found in Europe, and a staff of officers, who were not allowed to buy their commissions, as in many European states, but who were appointed on a merit basis, commanded the army with truly professional skill and devoted loyalty.

In civil administration, the king persevered in the work of centralizing the various departments. A “general directory” was intrusted with the businesslike conduct of the finances and gradually evolved an elaborate civil service—the famous Prussian bureaucracy, which, in spite of inevitable “red tape,” is notable to this day for its efficiency and devotion to duty. The king endeavored to encourage industry and trade by enforcing up−to−date mercantilist regulations, and, although he repeatedly expressed contempt for current culture because of what he thought were its weakening tendencies, he nevertheless prescribed compulsory elementary education for his people.

King Frederick William, who did so much for Prussia, had many personal eccentricities that highly amused Europe. Imbued with patriarchal instincts, he had his eye on everybody and everything. He treated his kingdom as a schoolroom, and, like a zealous schoolmaster, flogged his naughty subjects unmercifully. If he suspected a man of possessing adequate means, he might command him to erect a fine residence so as to improve the appearance of the capital. If he met an idler in the streets, he would belabor him with his cane and probably put him in the army. And a funny craze for tall soldiers led to the creation of the famous Potsdam Guard of Giants, a special company whose members must measure at least six feet in height, and for whose service he attracted many foreigners by liberal financial offers: it was the only luxury which the parsimonious king allowed himself.

[Sidenote: Accession of Frederick the Great, 1740]

During a portion of his reign the crabbed old king feared that all his labors and savings would go for naught, for he was supremely disappointed in his son, the crown−prince Frederick. The stern father had no sympathy for the literary, musical, artistic tastes of his son, whom he thought effeminate, and whom he abused roundly with a quick and violent temper. When Prince Frederick tried to run away, the king arrested him and for punishment put him through such an arduous, slave−like training in the civil and military administration, from the lowest grades upward, as perhaps no other royal personage ever received. It was this despised and misunderstood prince who as Frederick II succeeded his father on the throne of Prussia in 1740 and is known in history as Frederick the Great.

The year 1740 marked the accession of Frederick the Great in the Hohenzollern possessions and of Maria Theresa in the Habsburg territories. [Footnote: Below are discussed the foreign achievements (pp. 354 ff.) of these two rival sovereigns, and in Chapter XIV (pp. 440 ff.) their internal policies.] It also marked the outbreak of a protracted struggle within the Holy Roman Empire between the two foremost German states—Austria and Prussia.

THE MINOR GERMAN STATES

[Sidenote: German States Other than Austria and Prussia]

Of the three hundred other states which composed the empire, few were sufficiently large or important to exert any considerable influence on the issue of the contest. A few, however, which took sides, deserve mention not only because in the eighteenth century they preserved a kind of balance of power between the rivals but also because they have been more or less conspicuous factors in the progress of recent times. Such are Bavaria, Saxony, and Hanover.

[Sidenote: Bavaria]

Bavaria lay on the upper Danube to the west of Austria and in the extreme southeastern corner of what is now the German Empire. For centuries it was ruled by the Wittelsbach family, whose remarkable prince, Maximilian I (1597−1651), had headed the Catholic League and loyally supported the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years' War, and by the peace of Westphalia had gained a part of the Palatinate [Footnote: The other part of the Palatinate, under another branch of the Wittelsbachs, was reunited with Bavaria in 1779.] together with the title of “elector.” His successor had labored with much credit in the second half of the seventeenth century to repair the wounds caused by the war, encouraging agriculture and industries, building or restoring numerous churches and monasteries. But the Bavarian electors in the first half of the eighteenth century sacrificed a sound, vigorous policy of internal

reform to a far−reaching ambition in international politics. Despite the bond of a common religion which united them to Austria, they felt that their proximity to their powerful neighbor made the Habsburgs their natural enemies. In the War of the Spanish Succession, therefore, Bavaria took the side of France against Austria, and when Maria Theresa ascended the throne in 1740, the elector of Bavaria, who had married a Habsburg princess disbarred by the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI, immediately allied himself with Frederick of Prussia and with France in order to dismember the Austrian dominions.

[Sidenote: Saxony]

The Saxony of the eighteenth century was but a very small fraction of the vast Saxon duchy which once comprised all northwestern Germany and whose people in early times had emigrated to England or had been subjugated by Charlemagne. Saxony had been restricted since the thirteenth century to a district on the upper Elbe, wedged in between Habsburg Bohemia and Hohenzollern Brandenburg. Here, however, several elements combined to give it an importance far beyond its extent or population. It was the geographical center of the Germanies. It occupied a strategic position between Prussia and Austria. Its ruling family—the Wettins—were electors of the empire. It had been, moreover, after the championship of Martin Luther by one of its most notable electors, [footnote: Frederick the Wise( 1486−1525)] a leader of the Lutheran cause, and the reformer's celebrated translation of the Bible had fixed the Saxon dialect as the literary language of Germany. At one time it seemed as if Saxony, rather than Brandenburg−Prussia, might become the dominant state among the Germanies. But the trend of events determined otherwise. A number of amiable but weak electors in the seventeenth century repeatedly allied themselves with Austria against the Hohenzollerns and thereby practically conceded to Brandenburg the leadership of the Protestant states of northern Germany.[Footnote: Another source of weakness in Saxony was the custom in the Wettin family of dividing the inheritance among members of the family. Such was the origin of the present infinitesimal states of Saxe−Weimar, Saxe−Coburg−Gotha, Saxe−Meiningen, and Saxe−Altenburg.]

[Sidenote: Personal Union of Saxony and Poland]

Then, too, toward the close of the century, the elector separated himself from his people by becoming a Roman Catholic, and, in order that he might establish himself as king of Poland, he burdened the state with continued Austrian alliance, with war, and with heavy taxes. The unnatural union of Saxony and Poland was maintained throughout the greater part of the eighteenth century: it was singularly disastrous for both parties.

[Sidenote: Hanover, and its Personal Union with Great Britain]

A part of the original ancient territory of the Saxons in north western Germany was included in the eighteenth century in the state of Hanover, extending between the Elbe and the Weser and reaching from Brandenburg down to the North Sea. Hanover was recognized as an electorate during the War of the Spanish Succession, [Footnote: The emperor had given the title of elector to Ernest Augustus in 1692; the Powers recognized George I as elector in 1708.] but its real importance rested on the fact that its first elector, through his mother's family, became in 1714 George I of Great Britain, the founder of the Hanoverian dynasty in that country. This personal union between the British kingdom and the electorate of Hanover continued for over a century, and was not without vital significance in international negotiations. Both George I and George II preferred Hanover to England as a place of residence and directed their primary efforts towards the protection of their German lands from Habsburg or Hohenzollern encroachments.

Enough has now been said to give some idea of the distracted condition of the Germanies in the eighteenth century and to explain why the Holy Roman Empire was an unimportant bond of union. Austria, traditionally the chief of the Germanies, was increasingly absorbed in her non−German possessions in Hungary, Italy, and the Netherlands. Prussia, the rising kingdom of the North, comprised a population in which Slavs constituted a large minority. Saxony was linked with Poland; Hanover, with Great Britain. Bavaria was a chronic ally of France. Add to this situation, the political domination of France or Sweden over a number of the petty states of the empire, the selfishness and jealousies of all the German rulers, the looming bitter rivalry between Prussia and Austria, and the sum−total is political chaos, bloodshed, and oppression.

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN HOHENZOLLERNS AND HABSBURGS

[Sidenote: Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa]

In the struggle between Prussia and Austria—between Hohenzollerns and Habsburgs—centered the European diplomacy and wars of the mid−eighteenth century. On one side was the young king Frederick II (1740−1786); on

the other, the young queen Maria Theresa (1740−1780). Both had ability and sincere devotion to their respective states and peoples,—a high sense of royal responsibilities. Maria Theresa was beautiful, emotional, and proud; the Great Frederick was domineering, cynical, and always rational. The Austrian princess was a firm believer in Catholic Christianity; the Prussian king was a friend of Voltaire and a devotee of skepticism.

[Sidenote: Coalition against Maria Theresa]

Frederick inherited from his father a fairly compact monarchy and a splendidly trained and equipped army of 80,000 men. He smiled at the disorganized troops, the disordered finances, the conflicting interests in the hodge−podge of territories which his rival had inherited from her father. He also smiled at the solemn promise which Prussia had made to respect the Austrian dominions. No sooner was the Emperor Charles VI dead and Maria Theresa proclaimed at Vienna than Frederick II entered into engagements with Bavaria and France to dismember her realm. The elector of Bavaria was to be made Holy Roman Emperor as Charles VII and Prussia was to appropriate Silesia. France was suspected of designs upon the Austrian Netherlands.

[Sidenote: Frederick's Designs on Silesia]

Silesia thus became the bone of contention between Frederick II and Maria Theresa. Silesia covered the fertile valley of the upper Oder, separating the Slavic Czechs of Frederick's Bohemia on the west from the Slavic Poles on the east. Its population, which was largely German, was as numerous as that of the whole kingdom of Prussia, and if annexed to the Hohenzollern possessions would make them overwhelmingly German. On the other hand, the loss of Silesia would give Austria less direct influence in strictly German affairs and would deprive her of a convenient point of attack against Berlin and the heart of Prussia.

[Sidenote: Outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession, 1740]

Trumping up an ancient family claim to the duchy, Frederick immediately marched his army into Silesia and occupied Breslau, its capital. To the west, a combined Bavarian and French army prepared to invade Austria and Bohemia. Maria Theresa, pressed on all sides, fled to Hungary and begged the Magyars to help her. The effect was electrical. Hungarians, Austrians, and Bohemians rallied to the support of the Habsburg throne; recruits were drilled and hurried to the front; the War of the Austrian Succession (1740−1748) was soon in full swing.

[Sidenote: Entrance of Great Britain and Spain]

A trade war had broken out between Great Britain and Spain in 1739, [Footnote: Commonly called the War of Jenkins's Ear. See above, p. 311] which speedily became merged with the continental struggle. Great Britain was bent on maintaining liberal trading privileges in the Belgian Netherlands and always opposed the incorporation of those provinces into the rival and powerful monarchy of France, preferring that they should remain in the hands of some distant and less−feared, less commercial power, such as Austria. Great Britain, moreover, had fully recognized the Pragmatic Sanction and now determined that it was in accordance with her own best interests to supply Maria Theresa with money and to dispatch armies to the Continent to defend the Netherlands against France and to protect Hanover against Prussia. On the other side, the royal family of Spain sympathized with their Bourbon kinsmen in France and hoped to recover from Austria all the Italian possessions of which Spain had been deprived by the treaty of Utrecht (1713).

The main parties to the War of the Austrian Succession were, therefore, on the one hand, Prussia, France, Spain, and Bavaria, and, on the other, Austria and Great Britain. With the former at first joined the elector of Saxony, who wished to play off Prussia against Austria for the benefit of his Saxon and Polish lands, and the king of Sardinia, who was ever balancing in Italy between Habsburg and Bourbon pretensions. With Austria and Great Britain was united Holland, because of her desire to protect herself from possible French aggression.

[Sidenote: Course of the War]

The war was not so terrible or bloody as its duration and the number of contestants would seem to indicate. Saxony, which inclined more naturally to Austrian than to Prussian friendship, was easily persuaded by bribes to desert her allies and to make peace with Maria Theresa. Spain would fight only in Italy; and Sardinia, alarmed by the prospect of substantial Bourbon gains in that peninsula, went over to the side of Austria. The Dutch were content to defend their own territories.

[Sidenote: Success of Frederick]

Despite the greatest exertions, Maria Theresa was unable to expel Frederick from Silesia. Her generals suffered repeated reverses at his hands, and three times she was forced to recognize his occupation in order that she might employ all her forces against her western enemies. By the third treaty between the two German

sovereigns, concluded at Dresden in 1745, Silesia [Footnote: Except a very small district, which thereafter was known as “Austrian Silesia.”] was definitely ceded by Austria to Prussia. Frederick had gained his ends: he coolly deserted his allies and withdrew from the war.

Meanwhile the Austrian arms had elsewhere been more successful. The French and Bavarians, after winning a few trifling victories in Bohemia, had been forced back to the upper Danube. Munich was occupied by the troops of Maria Theresa at the very time when the elector was being crowned at Frankfort as Holy Roman Emperor. The whole of Bavaria was soon in Austrian possession, and the French were in retreat across the Rhine. Gradually, also, the combined forces of Austria and Sardinia made headway in Italy against the Bourbon armies of France and Spain.

In the last years of the war, the French managed to protect Alsace and Lorraine from Austrian invasion, and, under the command of the gifted Marshal Saxe, they actually succeeded in subjugating the greater part of the Austrian Netherlands and in carrying the struggle into Holland. On the high seas and in the colonies, the conflict raged between France and Great Britain as “King George's War,” which has already been separately noted. [Footnote: See above, pp. 311 f.]

[Sidenote: Treaties of Aix−la−Chapelle (1748): Indecisive Character of Struggle between Prussia and Austria]

The treaties which ended the War of the Austrian Succession were signed at Aix−la−Chapelle in 1748. They guaranteed the acquisition of Silesia by Frederick II of Prussia and restored everything else to the situation at the opening of the conflict. The Wittelsbach family was reinstated in Bavaria and in the Palatinate, and the husband of Maria Theresa, Francis of Lorraine, succeeded Charles VII as Holy Roman Emperor. France, for all her expenditures and sacrifices, gained nothing. The War of the Austrian Succession was but a preliminary encounter in the great duel for German leadership between Prussia and Austria. It was similarly only an indecisive round in the prolonged battle between France and Great Britain for the mastery of the colonial and commercial world.

[Sidenote: Coalition against Frederick the Great]

In the war just closed, Austria had been the chief loser, and the resolute Maria Theresa set herself at once to the difficult task of recovering her prestige and her ceded territory. Her first efforts were directed toward internal reform—consolidating the administrations of her various dominions by the creation of a strong central council at Vienna, encouraging agriculture, equalizing and augmenting the taxes, and increasing the army. Her next step was to form a great league of rulers that would find a common interest with her in dismembering the kingdom of Frederick. She knew she could count on Saxony. She easily secured an ally in the Tsarina Elizabeth of Russia, who had been deeply offended by the caustic wit of the Prussian king. She was already united by friendly agreements with Great Britain and Holland. She had only France to win to her side, and in this policy she had the services of an invaluable agent, Count Kaunitz, the greatest diplomat of the age. Kaunitz held out to France, as the price for the abandonment of the Prussian alliance and the acceptance of that of Austria, the tempting bait of Frederick's Rhenish provinces. But Louis XV at first refused an Austrian alliance: it would be a departure from the traditional French policy of opposing the Habsburgs. Kaunitz then appealed to the king's mistress, the ambitious Madame de Pompadour, who, like the Tsarina Elizabeth, had had plenty of occasions for taking offense at the witty verses of the Prussian monarch: the favor of the Pompadour was won, and France entered the league against Prussia.

[Sidenote: The “Diplomatic Revolution"]

Meanwhile, however, Great Britain had entered into a special agreement with Frederick with the object of guaranteeing the integrity of Hanover and the general peace of the Germanies. When, therefore, the colonial war between Great Britain and France was renewed in 1754, it was quite natural that the former should contract a definite alliance with Prussia. Thus it befell that, whereas in the indecisive War of the Austrian Succession Prussia and France were pitted against Austria and Great Britain, in the determinant Seven Years' War, which ensued, Austria and France were in arms against Prussia and Great Britain. This overturn of traditional alliances has been commonly designated the “Diplomatic Revolution.”

[Sidenote: The Seven Years' War, 1756−1763]

The Seven Years' War lasted in Europe from 1756 to 1763, and, as regards both the number of combatants and the brilliant generalship displayed, deserves to rank with the War of the Spanish Succession as the greatest war which the modern world had so far witnessed. The story has already been told of its maritime and colonial counterpart, which embraced the French and Indian War in America (1754−1763) and the triumphant campaigns

of Clive in India, and which decisively established the supremacy of Great Britain on the seas, in the Far East, and in the New World. [Footnote: See above, pp. 312 ff.] There remains to sketch its course on the European continent.

[Sidenote: Frederick's Victory at Rossbach, 1757]

Without waiting for a formal declaration of hostilities, Frederick seized Saxony, from which he exacted large indemnities and drafted numerous recruits, and, with his well−trained veteran troops, crossed the mountains into Bohemia. He was obliged by superior Austrian forces to raise the siege of Prague and to fall back on his own kingdom. Thence converged from all sides the allied armies of his enemies. Russians moved into East Prussia, Swedes from Pomerania into northern Brandenburg, Austrians into Silesia, while the French were advancing from the west. Here it was that Frederick displayed those qualities which entitle him to rank as one of the greatest military commanders of all time and to justify his title of “the Great.” Inferior in numbers to any one of his opponents, he dashed with lightning rapidity into central Germany and at Rossbach (1757) inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the French, whose general wrote to Louis XV, “The rout of our army is complete: I cannot tell you how many of our officers have been killed, captured, or lost.” No sooner was he relieved of danger in the west than he was back in Silesia. He flung himself upon the Austrians at Leuthen, took captive a third of their army, and put the rest to flight.

The victories of Frederick, however, decimated his army. He still had money, thanks to the subsidies which Pitt poured in from Great Britain, but he found it very difficult to procure men: he gathered recruits from hostile countries; he granted amnesty to deserters; he even enrolled prisoners of war. He was no longer sufficiently sure of his soldiers to take the offensive, and for five years he was reduced to defensive campaigns in Silesia. The Russians occupied East Prussia and penetrated into Brandenburg; in 1759 they captured Berlin.

[Sidenote: French Reverses. The “Family Compact"]

The French, after suffering defeat at Rossbach, directed their energies against Hanover but encountered unexpected resistance at the hands of an army collected by Pitt's gold and commanded by a Prussian general, the prince of Brunswick. Brunswick defeated them and gradually drove them out of Germany. This series of reverses, coupled with disasters that attended French armies in America and in India, caused the French king to call upon his cousin, the king of Spain, for assistance. The result was the formation of the defensive alliance (1761) between the Bourbon states of France, Spain, and the Two Sicilies, and the entrance of Spain into the war (1762).

[Sidenote: Withdrawal of Russia]

What really saved Frederick the Great was the death of the Tsarina Elizabeth (1762) and the accession to the Russian throne of Peter III, a dangerous madman but a warm admirer of the military prowess of the Prussian king. Peter in brusque style transferred the Russian forces from the standard of Maria Theresa to that of Frederick and restored to Prussia the conquests of his predecessor. [Footnote: Peter III was dethroned in the same year; his wife, Catherine II, who succeeded him, refused to give active military support to either side.] Spain entered the war too late to affect its fortunes materially. She was unable to regain what France had lost, and in fact the Bourbon states were utterly exhausted. The Austrians, after frantic but vain attempts to wrest Silesia from Frederick, finally despaired of their cause.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Hubertusburg (1763): Humiliation of the Habsburgs and Triumph of the Hohenzollerns]

The treaty of Hubertusburg (1763) put an end to the Seven Years' War in Europe. Maria Theresa finally, though reluctantly, surrendered all claims to Silesia. Prussia had clearly humiliated Austria and become a first−rate power. The Hohenzollerns were henceforth the acknowledged peers of the Habsburgs. The almost synchronous treaty of Paris closed the war between Great Britain, on the one hand, and France and Spain on the other, by ceding the bulk of the French colonial empire to the British. Thereafter, Great Britain was practically undisputed mistress of the seas and chief colonial power of the world.

[Sidenote: Frederick the Great and the Partition of Poland]

Frederick the Great devoted the last years of his life to the consolidation of his monarchy [Footnote: For the internal reforms of Frederick, see below, pp. 440 ff.] and to enlarging its sphere of influence rather by diplomacy than by war. Frederick felt that the best safeguard against further attempts of Austria to recover Silesia was a firm alliance between Prussia and Russia. And it was an outcome of that alliance that in 1772 he joined with the Tsarina Catherine in making the first partition of Poland. Catherine appropriated the country east of the Duena and the Dnieper rivers. Frederick annexed West Prussia, except the towns of Danzig and Thorn, thereby linking

up Prussia and Brandenburg by a continuous line of territory. Maria Theresa, moved by the loss of Silesia and by fear of the undue preponderance which the partition of Poland would give to her northern rivals, thought to adjust the balance of power by sharing in the shameful transaction: she occupied Galicia, including the important city of Cracow. Maria Theresa repeatedly expressed her abhorrence of the whole business, but, as the scoffing Frederick said, “She wept, but she kept on taking.”

The partition of Poland was more favorable to Prussia than to Austria. In the former case, the land annexed lay along the Baltic and served to render East Prussia, Brandenburg, and Silesia a geographical and political unit. On the other hand, Austria to some extent was positively weakened by the acquisition of territory outside her natural frontiers, and the addition of a turbulent Polish people further increased the diversity of races and the clash of interests within the Habsburg dominions.

When, a few years later, the succession to the electorate of Bavaria was in some doubt and Austria laid claims to the greater part of that state (1777−1779), Frederick again stepped in, and now by intrigue and now by threats of armed force again prevented any considerable extension of Habsburg control. His last important act was the formation of a league of princes to champion the lesser German states against Austrian aggression.

By hard work, by military might, by force of will, unhampered by any moral code, Frederick the Great perfected the policies of the Great Elector and of Frederick William I and raised Prussia to the rank of partner with Austria in German leadership and to an eminent position in the international affairs of Europe. Had Frederick lived, however, but a score of years longer, he would have witnessed the total extinction of the Holy Roman Empire, the apparent ruin of the Germanies, and the degradation of his own country as well as that of Austria. [Footnote: See below, Chapter XVI.] He might even have perceived that a personal despotism, built by bloodshed and unblushing deceit, was hardly proof against a nation stirred by idealism and by a consciousness of its own rights and power.

[Illustration: THE HOHENZOLLERN FAMILY (1415−1915): ELECTORS OF BRANDENBURG, KINGS OF PRUSSIA, AND GERMAN EMPERORS]

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# CHAPTER XII. THE RISE OF RUSSIA AND THE DECLINE OF TURKEY, SWEDEN, AND POLAND

## RUSSIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

How the backward, Oriental tsardom of Muscovy has been transformed into the huge empire of Russia, now comprising one−sixth of the land surface and one−twelfth of the population of the earth, is one of the most fascinating phases of the history of modern times. It was not until the eighteenth century that Russia came into close contact with the commerce and culture of western Christendom; not until then did she become a great power in the European family of nations.

[Sidenote: Russian Expansion]

Several occurrences during the two centuries which separated the reign of the Tsar Ivan the Great from that of Peter the Great paved the way for the subsequent, almost startling rise of the powerful empire of northern and eastern Europe. The first in importance was the expansion of the Russian race and dominion. Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the farming folk of the region about Moscow were emigrating south and east and establishing themselves in the fertile plains of the Don, the Volga, and the Irtysh. [Footnote: Armies of the tsar backed up the colonists: they occupied Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan, near the Caspian Sea, in 1554.] A glance at the map of Russia will show how the network of rivers combined with the level character of the country to facilitate this process of racial expansion. The gentle southerly flowing Dnieper, Don, and Volga, radiating from the same central region, and connected by way of the Kama with the headwaters of the Dwina, which empties into the White Sea in the extreme north, became chief channels of trade and migration, and contributed much more to the elaboration of national unity than any political institutions. Boats could be conveyed over flat and easy portages from one river−basin to another, and these portages with a relatively small amount of labor were gradually changed into navigable channels, so that even now the canals are more important than many of the railways as arteries of commerce.

[Sidenote: The Cossacks]

As the emigrants threaded their way along the river courses and over the broad plains they had to be constantly on the alert against attacks of troublesome natives, and they accordingly organized themselves in semi−military fashion. Those in the vanguard of territorial expansion constituted a peculiar class known as Cossacks, who, like frontiersmen of other times and places, for example, like those that gained for the United States its vast western domain, lived a wild life in which agricultural and pastoral pursuits were intermingled with hunting and fighting. In the basins of the southern rivers, the Cossacks formed semi−independent military communities: those of the Volga and the Don professed allegiance to the tsar of Muscovy, while those of the Dnieper usually recognized the sovereignty of the king of Poland.

[Sidenote: Eastword Expansion into Asia]

Nor was the migration of the Russian race restricted to Europe. The division between Europe and Asia is largely imaginary, as another glance at the map will prove,—the low−lying Urals are a barrier only toward the north, while southward the plains of Russia stretch on interminably above the Caspian until they are merged in the steppes of Siberia. Across these plains moved a steady stream of Cossacks and peasants and adventurers, carrying with them the habits and traditions of their Russian homes. Ever eastward wended the emigrants. They founded Tobolsk in 1587 and Tomsk in 1604; they established Yakutsk on the Lena River in 1632, and Irkutsk on Lake Baikal in 1652; in 1638 they reached the Sea of Okhotsk, and, by the close of the seventeenth century, they occupied the peninsula of Kamchatka and looked upon the broad Pacific. Thus at the time when the Spaniards were extending their speech and laws throughout South America and the English were laying the foundations for the predominance of their institutions in North America, the Russians were appropriating northern Asia and demonstrating that, with them at least, the course of empire takes its way eastward.

Ivan the Great had already been described in church service as “the ruler and autocrat of all Russia, the new Tsar Constantine [Footnote: The last Caesar of the Graeco−Roman Empire, Constantine XI, had perished in 1453 in vain defense of Constantinople against the Turks. It was a significant fact that the Russian rulers, who owed their Christianity and their nation's culture to the Greeks, should now revive the title of Caesar (Russian form, tsar

or czar).] in the new city of Constantine, Moscow." His successors invariably had themselves crowned as tsars and autocrats of all Russia. By military might they maintained their control over the ever−widening territories of the Russian people; with racial pride and religious fervor, the distant emigrants regarded their royal family at Moscow. The power of the tsars kept pace with the expansion of the state.

[Sidenote: Oriental Characteristics of Russia]

Yet this greater Russia remained essentially Oriental. Its form of Christianity was derived from the East rather than from the West. Its social customs savored more of Asia than of Europe. Its nobles and even its tsars were rated by western Christendom as little better than barbarians. In fact, the Russian state was looked upon in the seventeenth century in much the same way as China was regarded in the nineteenth century.

The reasons for this relative backwardness are not hard to ascertain. In the first place, the religion of the state was a direct heritage of the expiring Eastern Empire and was different from either the Catholicism or the Protestantism of western Europe. Secondly, long and close contact with the conquering Mongols or Tatars of Asia had saturated the Russian people with Oriental customs and habits.[Footnote: See above, pp. 21 f.] Thirdly, the nature of the country tended to exalt agriculture and to discourage industry and foreign commerce, and at the same time to turn emigration and expansion eastward rather than westward. Finally, so long as the neighboring western states of Sweden, Poland, and Turkey remained powerful and retained the entire coast of the Baltic and Black seas, Russia was deprived of seaports that would enable her to engage in traffic with western Europe and thus to partake of the common culture of Christendom.

Not until Russia was modernized and westernized, and had made considerable headway against one or all of her western neighbors, could she hope to become a European Power. Not until the accession of the Romanov dynasty did she enter seriously upon this twofold policy.

[Sidenote: The "Troublous Times"]

The direct line of Ivan the Great had died out at the close of the sixteenth century, and there ensued what in Russian history are known as "the troublous times." Disputes over the succession led to a series of civil wars, and the consequent anarchy invited foreign intervention. For a time the Poles harassed the country and even occupied the Kremlin, or citadel, of Moscow. The Swedes, also, took advantage of the troublous times in Russia to enlarge their conquests on the eastern shore of the Baltic and to seize the important trading center of Novgorod. In the south, the Turks warred with the Cossacks and brought many of the Crimean principalities under their control.

[Sidenote: The Accession of the Romanovs, 1613]

Under these discouraging circumstances a great national assembly met at Moscow in 1613 to elect a tsar, and their choice fell upon one of their own number, a certain Michael Romanov, whose family had been connected by marriage ties with the ancient royal line. It is an interesting fact that the present autocrat of Russia is a lineal descendant of the Romanov who was thus popularly elected to supreme authority in 1613.

Michael Romanov proved an excellent choice. Accepted by all classes, he reestablished order and security throughout the country and successfully resisted foreign encroachments. He founded several fortified towns in the south against the Tatars and the Turks. He recovered Novgorod from the Swedes. During the reign of his son, Polish depredations were stopped and the Dnieper River was fixed upon [Footnote: Treaty of Andrussovo (1667), in accordance with which Poland ceded to Russia Kiev, Smolensk, and eastern Ukraine.] as the general dividing line between Poland and Russia.

PETER THE GREAT

[Sidenote: His Accession and Early Travels]

The grandson of Michael Romanov was the celebrated Peter the Great, who may rightfully be designated as the father of modern Russia. His older brothers, with whom during his youth he was nominally associated in the government, died in turn without leaving direct heirs, and Peter became sole ruler in 1696. From the outset he showed an insatiable curiosity about the arts and sciences of western Europe, the authority of its kings and the organization of its armies and fleets. To an intense curiosity, Peter added an indomitable will. He was resolved to satisfy his every curiosity and to utilize whatever he learned or found.

From childhood, Peter had displayed an aptitude for mechanical tools and inventions and especially for boat−making. Shipbuilding and ship−sailing became his favorite pastimes. When he was barely twenty−one, he launched at Archangel, on the ice−bound White Sea, a ship which he had built with his own hands. Now in 1696, being sole tsar at the age of twenty−four, he fitted out a fleet which defeated the Turks on the Black Sea and

allowed him to capture the valuable port of Azov. No other successes were gained, however, in this Turkish War; and the young tsar began to perceive that if he were to succeed in his cherished project he would have to obtain Western aid. In 1697, therefore, a special commission left Moscow for the purpose of soliciting the cooperation of the principal Powers against Turkey, and to this commission the young tsar attached himself as a volunteer sailor, "Peter Mikhailov," in order that he might incidentally learn much about ship−building and other technical sciences.

In its primary purpose, the Russian commission failed signally. Western Europe was on the eve of the War of the Spanish Succession, and all the European sovereigns seemed to be engrossed in the distractions of dynastic politics. No help against the Turks was forthcoming. But personally Peter learned many useful things. In Holland he studied ship−building as well as anatomy and engraving. In England he investigated industry and commerce. He closely scrutinized the military establishment of Prussia. In all places which he visited he collected artisans, sailors, engineers, or other workmen, whom he sent back to Russia to instruct his people.

[Sidenote: Suppression of the Streltsi]

While he was on his way from Vienna to Venice, news reached him that the royal bodyguard, called the *streltsi,* had taken advantage of his absence of a year and a half and had mutinied at Moscow. In hot haste he hurried home and wreaked dire vengeance upon the mutineers. Two thousand were hung or broken on the wheel, five thousand were beheaded, and Peter for many days amused himself and edified his court by the wonderful dexterity he displayed in slicing off the heads of *streltsi* with his own royal arm.

The severe punishment of the rebellious *streltsi* and the immediate abolition of their military organization was clear evidence that Peter was fully determined both to break with the past traditions of his country and to compel all the Russian people to do likewise.

[Sidenote: Military Reform]

His first care was the reconstruction of the army on the Prussian model. Officered and disciplined by foreigners dependent entirely upon the tsar, the new army replaced the *streltsi* and proved a potent factor in furthering the domestic and foreign policies of Peter the Great.

[Sidenote: Introduction of Occidental Customs]

The young reformer next turned his attention to the customs of his people—their clothing and manners—which he would transform from Oriental to Occidental. Edict followed edict with amazing rapidity. The chief potentates of the empire were solemnly assembled so that Peter with his own hand might deliberately clip off their long beards and flowing mustaches. A heavy tax was imposed on such as persisted in wearing beards. French or German clothes were to be substituted, under penalty of large fines, for the traditional Russian costume. The use of tobacco was made compulsory. The Oriental semi−seclusion of women was prohibited. Both sexes were to mingle freely in the festivities of the court. These innovations were largely superficial: they partially permeated the nobility and clergy, but made little impression on the mass of the population. Peter had begun a work, however, which was certain of great results in the future.

[Sidenote: Development of Autocracy]

The reign of Peter the Great is notable for the removal of serious checks upon the power of the tsar and the definitive establishment of that form of absolutism which in Russia is called "autocracy." By sheer ability and will−power, the tsar was qualified to play the role of divine−right monarch, and his observation of the centralized government of Louis XIV, as well as the appreciation of his country's needs, convinced him that that kind of government was the most suitable for Russia.

[Sidenote: Subordination of the Orthodox Church to the Russian State] [Sidenote: The Holy Synod]

We have already observed how Peter replaced the independent, turbulent *streltsi* with a thoroughly devoted and orderly standing army. That was one important step in the direction of autocracy. The next was the subordination of the Church to the state. The tsar understood the very great influence which the Holy Orthodox Church exerted over the Russian people and the danger to his policies that ecclesiastical opposition might create. He was naturally anxious that the Church should become the ally, not the enemy, of autocracy. He, therefore, took such steps as would exalt the Church in the opinion of his countrymen and at the same time would render it a serviceable agent of the government. Professing the warmest faith in its religious tenets, he deprived the patriarch [Footnote: Until late in the sixteenth century, the metropolitan of Moscow was in theory under the authority of the patriarch of Constantinople; thereafter, through Boris Godunov, he became independent with full consent and

approval of the whole Greek Orthodox Church and was styled the patriarch of Moscow.] of Moscow of his privilege of controlling the ecclesiastical organization and vested all powers of church government in a body, called the Holy Synod, whose members were bishops and whose chief was a layman, all chosen by the tsar himself. No appointment to ecclesiastical office could henceforth be made without the approval of the Holy Synod; no sermon could be preached and no book could be published unless it had received the sanction of that august body. The authority which the tsar thereby obtained over the Russian Church was as complete and far−reaching as that which Henry VIII had acquired, two centuries earlier, over the Anglican Church. The results have been in keeping with Peter's fondest expectations, for the Orthodox Church in Russia has been from his time to the present the right−hand support of absolutism. The tsars have exalted the Church as the fountain of order and holiness; as a veritable ark of the covenant have the clergy magnified and extolled the autocracy.

[Sidenote: Secular Power of the Tsar]

A remodeling of the secular government of Russia along autocratic lines was another achievement of Peter the Great which long endured. At the head of the state was the tsar or emperor, possessing absolute, unlimited powers. An ancient assembly, or Duma, of nobles, which had formerly exercised vague legislative rights, was practically abolished, its place being taken by an advisory Council of State whose members, usually noblemen, were selected by the tsar. All traces of local self−government were similarly swept away, and the country was henceforth administered by the tsar's personal agents. To enforce his autocratic will, a system of police was organized on a militia basis, its chiefs being made dependent on the central authority. In these, as in all his other reforms, the tsar encountered a good deal of opposition, and for a while was obliged to rely largely on foreigners to carry them out. As soon as possible, however, Peter employed natives, for it was a cardinal point in his policy that the Russians themselves must manage their own state without foreign interference or help.

[Sidenote: Attempted Social Reforms of Peter the Great]

Like his contemporaries in western Europe, Peter gave considerable attention to the economic condition of the monarchy. He strove, though often in a bungling manner, to promote agriculture and to improve the lot of the peasantry, who still constituted the overwhelming bulk of forms of the population. He certainly deprived the nobles of many of their former privileges and sought to rest political power and social position on ability rather than on birth. He understood that Russia grievously lacked a numerous and prosperous middle class, and he aimed to create one by encouraging trade and industries. His almost constant participation in wars, however, prevented him from bringing many of his economic and social plans to fruition.

[Sidenote: Ambitious Foreign Policy of Peter the Great]

Internal reforms were but one−half of Peter's ambitious program. To him Russia owes not only the abolition of the *streltsi*, the loss of the independence of the Church, the Europeanization of manners and customs, and the firm establishment of autocracy, but also the pronouncement and enforcement of an elaborate scheme of foreign aggrandizement. On one hand, the tsar showed a lively interest in the exploration and colonization of Siberia and in the extension of Russian dominion around the Caspian Sea and towards the Persian Empire. On the other hand,—and this, for our purposes, is far more important,—he was resolved to make the cultural and commercial connection between Russia and Europe strong and intimate, to open a way to the west by gaining outlets on both the Black and Baltic seas—“windows” to the west, as he termed them.

On the Baltic Sea, Sweden blocked him; toward the Black Sea, the Ottoman power hemmed him in. It was, therefore, against Sweden and Turkey that Peter the Great waged war. It seemed to him a matter of dire necessity for the preservation of European civilization in Russia that he should defeat one or both of these states. Against the Turks, as events proved, he made little headway; against the Swedes he fared better.

In order that we may understand the nature of the momentous conflict between Russia and Sweden in the first quarter of the eighteenth century, it will be necessary at this point to notice the parallel development of Sweden.

SWEDEN AND THE CAREER OF CHARLES XII

[Sidenote: Sweden a Great Power in the Seventeenth Century]

It will be recalled that a century before Peter the Great, the remarkable Gustavus Adolphus had aimed to make the Baltic a Swedish lake. To his own kingdom, lying along the western shore of that sea, and to the dependency of Finland, he had added by conquest the eastern provinces of Karelia, Ingria, Esthonia, and Livonia [Footnote: Livonia, occupied by Gustavus Adolphus during the Polish War of 1621−1629, was not formally relinquished by Poland until 1660. Esthonia had been conquered by the Swedes in 1561, but Russia did not renounce her

pretensions to this province until 1617.], and his successful interference in the Thirty Years' War had given Sweden possession of western Pomerania and the mouths of the Elbe, Oder, and Weser rivers and a considerable influence in German affairs. For many years after the death of Gustavus Adolphus, Sweden was the recognized leader of continental Protestantism, and her trade on the Baltic grew and thrived. The exports of Russia and Poland found a convenient outlet through the Swedish port of Riga, and those of the northern Germanics were frequently dispatched on Swedish vessels from Stettin or Stralsund.

Repeated efforts were made by Denmark, Poland, and Brandenburg to break the commercial monopoly which Sweden enjoyed upon the Baltic and to deprive her of her conquests, but for a long time in vain. Victory continued to attend Swedish arms and a general treaty in 1660 confirmed her dominion. At that time Sweden was not only a military power of the first magnitude but also one of the largest states of Europe, possessing about twice as much area as present−day Sweden. Her area embraced a land−surface 7000 square miles larger than the modern German Empire. All the islands and the greater part of the coast of the Baltic belonged to her. Stockholm, the capital, lay in the very center of the empire, whose second city was Riga, on the other side of the sea. In politics, in religion, and in trade, Sweden was feared and respected.

[Sidenote: Elements of Weakness in Sweden's Position]

Yet the greatness of Sweden in the seventeenth century was more apparent than real. Her commerce provoked the jealousy of all her neighbors. Her dependencies across the Baltic were difficult to hold: peopled by Finns, Russians, Poles, Germans, and Danes, their bond with Sweden was essentially artificial, and they usually sympathized, naturally enough, with their sovereign's enemies. They, therefore, imposed on the mother country the duty of remaining a military monarchy, armed from head to foot for every possible emergency. For such a tremendous destiny Sweden was quite unfitted. Her wide territory was very sparsely populated, and her peasantry were very poor. Only the French alliance gave her solid backing in the Germanies, and, with the decline of the fortunes of Louis XIV and the rise of Prussia and Russia, she was bound to lose her leadership in the North.

To the fate of Sweden, her rulers in the seventeenth century contributed no small share. Nearly all of them were born fighters and nearly all of them were neglectful of home interests and of the works of peace. The military instincts of the Swedish kings not only sacrificed thousands of lives that were urgently needed in building up their country and cost the kingdom enormous sums of money but likewise impaired commerce, surrounded the empire with a broad belt of desolated territory, and implanted an ineradicable hatred in every adjacent state. Then, too, the extravagance and negligence of the sovereigns led to chaos in domestic government. Taxes were heavy and badly apportioned. The nobles recovered many of their political privileges. The royal power steadily dwindled away at the very time when it was most needed; and a selfish, grasping aristocracy hastened their country's ruin. [Footnote: A reaction appeared under the capable Charles XI (1660−1697), but its fruits were completely lost by his son and successor, Charles XII.]

[Sidenote: Coalition against Charles XII]

At length, in 1697, when Charles XII, a boy of fifteen years, ascended the throne of Sweden, the neighboring Powers thought the time had arrived to partition his territories among themselves. Tsar Peter, while returning home the following year from his travels abroad, had discussed with Augustus II, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, a plan which the latter had formed for the dismemberment of the Swedish Empire: Poland was to recover Livonia and annex Esthonia; Russia was to obtain Ingria and Karelia and thereby a port on the Baltic; Brandenburg was to occupy western Pomerania; and Denmark was to take possession of Holstein and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. Charles XII was to retain only his kingdom in the Scandinavian peninsula and the grand duchy of Finland. At the last moment Brandenburg balked, but Saxony, Denmark, and Russia signed the nefarious alliance in 1699. The allies expected quick and decisive victory. All western and southern Europe was on the verge of a great struggle for the Spanish inheritance and would clearly be unable to prevent them from despoiling Sweden.

[Sidenote: Military Exploits of Charles XII]

But the allies grossly underrated their foe. Charles XII was a mere boy, but precocious, gloomy, and sensitive, and endowed with all the martial determination and heroism of his ancestors. He desired nothing better than to fight against overwhelming odds, and the fury of the youthful commander soon earned him the sobriquet of the “madman of the North.” The alliance of 1699 precipitated the Great Northern War which was to last until 1721 and slowly, but no less inevitably, lower Sweden to the position of a third−rate power. It was amid the most

spectacular exploits of the boy−king that the ruin of Sweden was accomplished. It was a grander but more tragic fate than in the same period befell Spain.

Charles XII did not give the allies time to unite. Hurriedly crossing the straits, he invaded Denmark, whose terrified king promptly signed a treaty with him (1700), paying a large indemnity and engaging to keep the peace in future.

Thence Charles hastened across the Baltic to Esthonia in order to deal with the invading Russians. At Narva he met and annihilated their army. Then he turned southward, clearing Livonia and Lithuania of Poles, Saxons, and Russians.

Into the very heart of Poland he carried the war, possessing himself of both Warsaw and Cracow. He obliged the Polish Diet to dethrone Augustus and to accept a king of his own choice in the person of a certain Stanislaus Leszczynski (1704).

All these things had been done by a young man between the age of seventeen and twenty—two. It was quite natural that he should be puffed up with pride in his ability and successes. It was almost as natural that, hardened at an early age to the horrors of war, he should become increasingly callous and cruel. Many instructions the impulsive youth sent out over conquered districts in Russia, Poland, and Saxony “to slay, burn, and destroy.” “Better that the innocent suffer than that the guilty escape” was his favorite adage.

Small wonder, then, that neither Peter the Great nor the Elector Augustus would abandon the struggle. While Charles was overrunning Poland, Peter was reorganizing his army and occupying Karelia and Ingria; and when the Swedish king returned to engage the Russians, Augustus drove out Stanislaus and regained the crown of Poland. Yet Charles, with an unreasoning stubbornness, would not perceive that the time had arrived for terminating the conflict with a few concessions. Russia at that time asked only a port on the Gulf of Finland as the price of an alliance against Poland.

[Sidenote: Battle of Poltava (1709): Defeat of Charles XII]

To all entreaties for peace, Charles XII turned a deaf ear, and pressed the war in Russia. Unable to take Moscow, he turned southward in order to effect a juncture with some rebellious Cossacks, but met the army of Peter the Great at Poltava (1709). Poltava marks the decisive triumph of Russia over Sweden. The Swedish army was destroyed, only a small number being able to accompany the flight of their king across the southern Russian frontier into Turkish territory.

Then Charles stirred up the Turks to attack the tsar, but from the new contest he was himself unable to profit. Peter bought peace with the Ottoman government by re−ceding the town of Azov, and the latter gradually tired of their guest's continual and frantic clamor for war. After a sojourn of over five years in Ottoman lands, Charles suddenly and unexpectedly appeared, with but a single attendant, at Stralsund, which by that time was all that remained to him outside of Sweden and Finland.

[Sidenote: Obstinacy and Death of Charles XII]

Still, however, the war dragged on. The allies grew in numbers and in demands. Peter the Great and Augustus were again joined by the Danish king. Great Britain, Hanover, and Prussia, all covetous of Swedish trade or Swedish territory, were now members of the coalition. Charles XII stood like adamant: he would retain all or he would lose all. So he stood until the last. It was while he was directing an invasion of Norway that the brilliant but ill−balanced Charles lost his life (1718), being then but thirty−six years of age.

[Sidenote: Decline of Sweden]

Peace which had been impossible during the lifetime of Charles, became a reality soon after his death. It certainly came none too soon for the exhausted and enfeebled condition of Sweden. By the treaties of Stockholm (1719 and 1720), Sweden resigned all her German holdings except a small district of western Pomerania including the town of Stralsund. Denmark received Holstein and a money indemnity. Hanover gained the mouths of the Elbe and Weser; Prussia, the mouth of the Oder and the important city of Stettin. Augustus was restored to the Polish throne, though without territorial gain. Great Britain, Denmark, and Prussia became the principal commercial heirs of Sweden.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Nystad (1721): Russia on the Baltic] [Sidenote: Petrograd]

The treaty of Nystad (1721) was the turning point for Russia, for thereby she acquired from Sweden full sovereignty over not only Karelia and Ingria but the important Baltic provinces of Esthonia and Livonia and a narrow strip of southern Finland including the strong fortress of Viborg. Peter the Great had realized his ambition

of affording his country a “window to the west.” On the waste marshes of the Neva he succeeded with enormous effort and sacrifice of life in building a great city which might be a center of commerce and a bond of connection between Russia and the western world. He named his new city St. Petersburg [Footnote: Known generally in the Teutonic form “St. Petersburg” from its foundation until the War of the Nations in 1914, when the Slavic form of “Petrograd” was substituted.] and to it he transferred his government from Moscow. Russia supplanted Sweden in the leadership of the Baltic and assumed a place among the Powers of Europe.

Peter the Great did not realize his other ambition of securing a Russian port on the Black Sea. Although he captured and held Azov for a time, he was obliged to relinquish it, as we have seen, in order to prevent the Turks from joining hands with Charles XII.

[Sidenote: Character of Peter the Great]

Nevertheless, when Peter died in 1725, he left his empire a compact state, well−organized, and well−administered, westernized at least superficially, and ready to play a conspicuous role in the international politics of Europe. The man who succeeded in doing all these things has been variously estimated. By some he has been represented as a monster of cruelty and a murderer, [Footnote: Peter had his son and heir, the Grand Duke Alexius, put to death because he did not sympathize with his reforms. The tsar's other punishments often assumed a most revolting and disgusting character.] by others as a demon of the grossest sensuality, by still others as a great national hero. Probably he merited all such opinions. But, above all, he was a genius of fierce energy and will, who toiled always for what he considered to be the welfare of his country.

CATHERINE THE GREAT: THE DEFEAT OF TURKEY AND THE DISMEMBERMENT OF POLAND

It is hardly possible to feel much respect for the character of the Russian rulers who succeeded Peter the Great in the eighteenth century. Most of them were women with loose morals and ugly manners. But they had little to fear from Sweden, which, utterly exhausted, was now on a steady decline; and domestic difficulties both in Poland and in Turkey removed any apprehension of attacks from those countries. In policies of internal government, Peter had blazed a trail so clear and unmistakable that one would have difficulty in losing it.

[Sidenote: Character of the Tsarina Catherine II]

Of those female sovereigns of the Russian Empire, the most notable was Catherine II, usually called Catherine the Great (1762−1796). By birth she was not even a Russian, but a princess of Protestant Germany, whom dynastic considerations made the wife of the heir to the Russian crown. [Footnote: The marriage was arranged by Frederick the Great in order to minimize Austrian influence at Petrograd.]

No sooner was she in her adopted country than she set to work to ingratiate herself with its people. She learned the Russian language. She outwardly conformed to the Orthodox Church. She slighted her German relatives and surrounded herself with Russians. She established a reputation for quick wit and lofty patriotism. So great was her success that when her half−insane husband ascended the throne as Peter III in 1762, the people looked to her rather than to him as the real ruler, and before the year was over she had managed to make away with him and to become sovereign in name as well as in fact. For thirty−four years Catherine was tsarina of Russia. Immoral to the last, without conscience or scruple, she ruled the country with a firm hand and consummated the work of Peter the Great.

[Sidenote: Her Administration]

In the administrative system Catherine introduced the “governments" and “districts,” divisions and subdivisions of Russia, over which were placed respectively governors and vice−governors, all appointed by the central authority. To the ecclesiastical alterations of Peter, she added the secularization of church property, thereby making the clergy distinctly dependent upon her bounty and strengthening the autocracy.

[Sidenote: Her Patronage of Learning]

The tsarina had some personal interest in the literary and scientific progress of the eighteenth century and was determined to make Russia appear cultured in the eyes of western Europe. She corresponded with Voltaire and many other philosophers and learned men of the time. She pensioned Diderot, the author of the great Encyclopaedia, and invited scholars to her court. She posed as the friend of higher education.

[Sidenote: Her Foreign Policy]

Of the three foreign countries which in the eighteenth century blocked the western expansion of Russia, Sweden had been humbled by Peter in the Great Northern War and the treaty of Nystad. Poland and Turkey remained to be dealt with by Catherine the Great. Let us see what had lately transpired to render this task

comparatively easy for the tsarina.

[Sidenote: Poland in the Eighteenth Century]

Poland in the first half of the eighteenth century was geographically a large state, but a variety of circumstances contributed to render it weak and unstable. In the first place, it was without natural boundaries or adequate means of defense. To the west it was separated from Prussia and Austria by an artificial line drawn through level plains or over low−lying hills. To the south a fluctuating frontier, fixed usually along the Dniester River, set it off from the Ottoman Empire. The fertile valleys of the Dnieper, to the east, and of the Dona, to the north, were shared by Russia and Poland. No chains of mountains and no strongly fortified places protected the Polish people from Germans, Turks, or Russians.

Nor was this wide, but indefensible, territory inhabited by a single homogeneous people. The Poles themselves, centering in the western cities of Warsaw and Cracow, constituted a majority of the population, but the Lithuanians, a kindred Slavic folk, covered the east−central part of the kingdom and a large number of Cossacks and "Little Russians" [Footnote: Ruthenians.] lived in the extreme east, while along the northern and western borders were settlements of Germans and Swedes. Between the Poles and the Lithuanians existed a long−standing feud, and the Germans regarded all the Slavs with ill−disguised contempt.

Religion added its share to the dissension created by race and language within Poland. The Poles and most of the Lithuanians were stanch Roman Catholics. Other Lithuanians—especially the great nobles—together with the Russians and Cossacks adhered to the Greek Orthodox faith, while Lutheran Protestantism was upheld by the western settlements of Swedes and Germans. The Dissenters, as the Orthodox and Protestants were called, demanded from the Catholic majority a toleration and a freedom of worship which at that time existed in no other country of Europe. When it was not forthcoming, they appealed to foreign Powers— the Lutherans to Prussia, the Orthodox to Russia.

[Sidenote: Wretched Social Conditions in Poland]

Worst of all were the social conditions in Poland. By the eighteenth century, the towns had sunk into relative insignificance, leaving Poland without a numerous or wealthy middle class. Of the other classes, the great nobles or magnates owned the land, lived in luxury, selfishly looked out for their own interests, and jealously played politics, while the mass of the nation were degraded into a state of serfdom and wretchedness that would be difficult to parallel elsewhere in Europe. With a grasping, haughty nobility on one hand, and an oppressed, ignorant peasantry on the other, social solidarity, the best guarantee of political independence, was entirely lacking.

[Sidenote: Weakness of Polish Political Institutions]

An enlightened progressive government might have done something to remedy the social ills, but of all governments that the world has ever seen, the most ineffectual and pernicious was the Polish. Since the sixteenth century, the monarchy had been elective, with the result that the reign of every sovereign was disfigured by foreign intrigues and domestic squabbles over the choice of his successor, and also that the noble electors were able not only to secure liberal bribes but to wring from the elect such concessions as gradually reduced the kingship to an ornamental figurehead. Most of the later kings were foreigners who used what little power was left to them in furtherance of their native interests rather than of the welfare of Poland. Thus the kings in the first half of the eighteenth century were German electors of Saxony, who owed their new position to the interested friendship of Austria, Prussia, or Russia, and to the large sums of money which they lavished upon the Polish magnates; these same Saxon rulers cheerfully applied the Polish resources to their German policies.

Another absurdity of the Polish constitution was the famous " *liberum veto*," a kind of gentlemen's agreement among the magnates, whereby no law whatsoever could be enacted by the Diet if a single member felt it was prejudicial to his interests, and objected. In the course of the seventeenth century the principle of the *liberum veto* had been so far extended as to recognize the lawful right of any one of the ten thousand noblemen of Poland to refuse to obey a law which he had not approved. This amounted to anarchism. And anarchism, however beautiful it might appear as an ideal, was hardly a trustworthy weapon with which to oppose the greedy, hard−hearted, despotic monarchs who governed all the surrounding countries.

[Sidenote: Steady Decline of Ottoman Power during Seventeenth Century]

The Ottoman Empire was not in such sore straits as Poland, but its power and prestige were obviously waning. In another place we have reviewed the achievements of the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries—how

they overran the Balkan peninsula, captured Constantinople, put an end to the ancient Graeco−Roman Empire and under Suleiman the Magnificent extended their conquests along the northern coast of Africa and in Europe across the Danube into the very heart of Hungary. Although the sea−power of the Turks suffered a serious reverse at Lepanto (1571), their continued land advances provoked in Christendom the liveliest apprehension throughout the seventeenth century. After a twenty−five−years conflict they took Crete from Venice. They subjugated to their dominion the Tatars and Russians immediately north of the Black Sea. They exacted homage from the princes of Rumania and Transylvania. They annexed Hungary. For a time they received tribute from the king of Poland. In 1683 they laid siege to the city of Vienna and would have taken it had not the patriotic Polish monarch, John Sobieski, brought timely aid to the beleaguered Austrians. That was the high−water mark of the Mohammedan advance in Europe.

Thenceforth the Turkish boundaries gradually receded. An alliance of Venice, Poland, the pope, and Austria waged long and arduous warfare with the Ottomans, and the resulting treaty of Karlowitz, signed at the very close of the seventeenth century, gave the greater part of Hungary, including Transylvania, to the Austrian Habsburgs, extended the southern boundary of Poland to the Dniester River, and surrendered important trading centers on the Dalmatian and Greek coasts to the Venetians. Two subsequent wars between the sultan and the Habsburgs definitely freed the whole of Hungary from the Ottoman yoke. The reasons for the wane of Turkey's power are scarcely to be sought in the inherent strength of her neighbors, for, with the possible exception of Austria and Russia, they were notoriously weak and had seldom been able or willing to work together in behalf of any common cause. The real reasons lay rather in the character and nature of the Turkish power itself. Domestic, not foreign, difficulties prepared the way for future disasters.

[Sidenote: Nature of the Turkish Conquests]

It should be borne in mind that the Turks never constituted a majority of the population of their European possessions. They were a mere body of conquerors, who in frenzies of religious or martial enthusiasm, inspired with the idea that Divine Providence was using them as agents for the spread of Mohammedanism, had fought valiantly with the sword or cunningly taken advantage of their enemies' quarrels to plant over wide areas the crescent in place of the cross. In the conquered regions, the native Christian peoples were reduced to serfdom, and the Turkish conquerors became great landholders and the official class. To extend, even to maintain, such an artificial order of things, the Turks would be obliged to keep their military organization always at the highest pitch of excellence and to preserve their government from weakness and corruption. In neither of these respects did the Turks ultimately succeed.

[Sidenote: Corruption In the Turkish Government]

The sultans of the eighteenth century were not of the stuff of which a Suleiman the Magnificent had been made. To the grim risks of battle they preferred the cushioned ease of the palace, and all their powers of administration and government were quite consumed in the management of the household and the harem. Actual authority was gradually transferred to the Divan, or board of ministers, whose appointments or dismissals were the results of palace intrigues, sometimes petty but more often bloody. Corruption ate its way through the entire office−holding element of the Ottoman state: positions were bought and sold from the Divan down to the obscure village, and office was held to exist primarily for financial profit and secondarily as a means of oppressing the subject people.

The army, on which so much in the Turkish state depended, naturally reflected the demoralized condition of the government. While Peter the Great was organizing a powerful army in Russia, and Frederick the Great was perfecting the Prussian military machine, the Ottoman army steadily declined. It failed to keep pace with the development of tactics and of firearms in western Europe, and fell behind the times. The all−prevalent corruption ruined its discipline, and its regularly organized portion—the “janissaries”—became the masters rather than the servants of the sultans and of the whole Turkish government.

It was the fortune of the Russian tsarina—Catherine the Great—to appreciate the real weakness of both Turkey and Poland and to turn her neighbors' distress to the profit of her own country.

[Sidenote: Catherine's Interference in Poland]

No sooner had Catherine secured the Russian crown and by her inactivity permitted Frederick the Great to bring the Seven Years' War to a successful issue, than the death of Augustus III, elector of Saxony and king of Poland, gave her an opportunity to interfere in Polish affairs. She was not content with the Saxon line which was

more or less under Austrian influence, and, with the astute aid of Frederick, she induced the Polish nobles to elect one of her own courtiers and favorites, Stanislaus Poniatowski, who thus in 1764 became the last king of an independent Poland.

With the accession of Stanislaus, the predominance of Russia was fully established in Poland. Russia entered into an execrable agreement with Prussia and Austria to uphold the anarchical constitution of the unhappy and victimized country. When patriotic Poles made efforts—as they now frequently did—to reform their government, to abolish the *liberum veto*, and to strengthen the state, they found their attempts thwarted by the allies either by force of arms or by bribes of money. The racial animosities and the religious differences within Poland afforded sufficient pretexts for the intervention of the neighboring Powers, especially Prussia and Russia.

A popular insurrection of Polish Catholics against the intolerable meddling of foreigners was crushed by the troops of Catherine, with the single result that the Russians, in pursuing some fleeing insurgents across the southern frontier, violated Turkish territory and precipitated a war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.

[Sidenote: Catherine's War with the Turks, 1768−1774]

This Turkish War lasted from 1768 to 1774. The Ottoman government was profoundly alarmed by the Russian foreign policy, believing that the intrigues in Poland would end in the annexation of that state to Russia and the consequent upsetting of the balance of power in the East, and that, Poland once being disposed of, the turn of Turkey would come next. The Turks, moreover, were egged on by the French government, which, anxious also to preserve the balance of power and to defend the liberties of Poland, was too financially embarrassed itself to undertake a great war against Prussia and Russia.

This war between Russia and Turkey fully confirmed the belief that the power of the latter was waning. The Ottoman troops, badly armed and badly led, suffered a series of reverses. The Russians again occupied Azov, which Peter the Great had been compelled to relinquish; they overran Moldavia and Wallachia; they seized Bucharest; and they seemed likely to cross the Danube. Catherine went so far as to fan a revolt among the Greek subjects of the sultan.

[Sidenote: Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774): Russia on the Black Sea]

At length, in 1774, the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji was concluded between the belligerents. It was most important in marking the southern extension of Russia. By its provisions, (1) Turkey formally ceded Azov and adjacent territory to Russia and renounced sovereignty over all land north of the Black Sea; (2) Turkey recovered Wallachia, Moldavia, and Greece, on condition that they should be better governed; (3) Russia obtained the right of free navigation for her merchant ships in Turkish waters; and (4) Russia was recognized as the protector of certain churches in the city of Constantinople.

Within a few years after the signature of the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, Catherine established Russian control over the various Tatar principalities north of the Black Sea, whose sovereignty Turkey had renounced, and by a supplementary agreement in 1792, the Dniester River was fixed upon as the boundary between the Russian and Ottoman empires.

The Turkish policy of Catherine the Great bore three significant results. In the first place, Russia acquired a natural boundary in southern Europe, and became the chief Power on the Black Sea, whence her ships might pass freely through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles out into the Mediterranean to trade with western Europe. Russia's second “window to the west” was gained. Then, in the second place, Russia was henceforth looked upon as the natural ally and friend of oppressed nationalities within the Turkish Empire. Finally, the special clause conferring on Russia the protectorate of certain churches in Constantinople afforded her a pretext for a later claim to protect Christians throughout the Ottoman state and consequently to interfere incessantly in Turkish affairs. Since the treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji, Turkey has declined with ever−increasing rapidity, and Russia has become an eager candidate for a liberal share of the spoils.

[Sidenote: Catherine and the Partition of Poland] [Sidenote: First Partition, 1772]

Even while the Turkish War was in progress, Catherine the Great had not lost sight of her Polish policy. Frederick of Prussia had doubtless hoped that she would, in order that he might have a free rein to direct a distribution of territory entirely satisfactory to himself and to Prussia But the wily tsarina was never so immersed in other matters that she neglected Russian interests in Poland. In 1772, therefore, she joined with Frederick and with Maria Theresa of Austria in making the first partition of Poland. Russia took all the country which lay east of the Dona and Dnieper rivers. Prussia took West Prussia except the town of Danzig. Austria took Galicia and the

city of Cracow. In all, Poland was deprived of about a fourth of her territory.

[Sidenote: Second Partition, 1793] [Sidenote: Third and Last Partition, 1795]

The partition of 1772 sobered the Polish people and brought them to a full realizing sense of the necessity of radical political reform. But the shameful and hypocritical attitude of the neighboring sovereigns continued to render their every effort abortive. For another twenty−one years the wretched country struggled on, a victim of selfish foreign tutelage. Although both Frederick and Maria Theresa died in the interval, their successors proved themselves quite as willing to cooeperate with the implacable tsarina. In 1793 Russia and Prussia effected the second partition of Poland, and in 1795, following a last desperate attempt of the Poles to establish a new government, they admitted Austria to a share in the final dismemberment of the unhappy country. Desperately did the brave Kosciuszko try to stem the tide of invasion which poured in from all sides. His few forces, in spite of great valor, were no match for the veteran allies, and the defense was vain. “Freedom shrieked when Kosciuszko fell.” King Stanislaus Poniatowski resigned his crown and betook himself to Petrograd. Poland ceased to exist as an independent state.

By the partitions of 1793 and 1795, Austria obtained the upper valley of the Vistula, and Prussia the lower, including the city of Warsaw, while the rest—the major share—went to Russia. Little Russia (Ruthenia) and approximately all of Lithuania thus passed into the hands of the tsarina. Russia thenceforth bordered immediately on Prussia and Austria and became geographically a vital member of the European family of nations.

Catherine the Great survived the third and final partition of Poland but a year, dying in 1796. If it can be said of Peter that he made Russia a European Power, it can be affirmed with equal truth that Catherine made Russia a Great Power. The eighteenth century had witnessed a marvelous growth of Russia in Europe. She had acquired territory and a capital on the Baltic. She had secured valuable ports on the Black Sea. She had pushed her boundaries westward into the very center of the Continent.

The rise of Russia was at the expense of her neighbors. Sweden had surrendered her eastern provinces and lost her control of the Baltic. Turkey had abandoned her monopoly of the shores and trade of the Black Sea. Poland had disappeared from the map.

[Illustration: THE ROMANOV FAMILY: RUSSIAN SOVEREIGNS (1613−1915)]

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## PART III
## "LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY"

Our narrative of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries thus far has been full of intrigue, dynastic rivalry, and colonial competition. We have sat with red−robed cardinals in council to exalt the monarch of France; we have witnessed the worldwide wars by which Great Britain won and lost vast imperial domains; we have followed the thundering march of Frederick's armies through the Germanies, wasted with war; but we have been blind indeed if the glare of bright helmets and the glamour of courtly diplomacy have hidden from our eyes a phenomenon more momentous than even the growth of Russia or the conquest of New France. It is the rise of the bourgeoisie.

Driven on by insatiable ambition, not content to be lords of the world of business, with ships and warehouses for castles and with clerks for retainers, the bourgeoisie have placed their lawyers in the royal service, their learned men in the academies, their economists at the king's elbow, and with restless energy they push on to shape state and society to their own ends. In England they have already helped to dethrone kings and have secured some hold on Parliament, but on the Continent their power and place is less advanced.

For the eighteenth century is still the grand age of monarchs, who take Louis XIV as the pattern of princely power and pomp. "Benevolent despots" they are, these monarchs meaning well to govern their people with fatherly kindness. But their plans go wrong and their reforms fall flat, while the bourgeoisie become self−conscious and self−reliant, and rise up against the throne of the sixteenth Louis in France. It is the bourgeoisie that start the revolutionary cry of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," and it is this cry in the throats of the masses which sends terror to the hearts of nobles and kings. Desperately the old order—the old regime—defends itself. First France, then all Europe, is affected. Revolutionary wars convulse the Continent. Never had the world witnessed wars so disastrous, so bloody.

Yet the triumph of the bourgeoisie is not assured. The Revolution has been but one battle in the long war between the rival aristocracies of birth and of business—a war in which peasants and artisans now give their lives for illusory dreams of "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," now fight their feudal lords, and now turn on their pretended liberators, the bourgeoisie. For already it begins to dawn on the dull masses that "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" are chiefly for their masters.

The old regime, its decay, the rise of the bourgeoisie, the disappointment of the common people,—these are the bold landmarks on which the student must fix his attention, while in the following chapters we sketch the condition of Europe in the eighteenth century, and trace the course of the French Revolution, the career of Napoleon, and the restoration of "law and order" under Metternich.

# CHAPTER XIII. EUROPEAN SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

## AGRICULTURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: General Backwardness]

If some “Rip Van Winkle” of the sixteenth century could have slept for two centuries to awake in 1750, he would have found far less to marvel at in the common life of the people than would one of us. Much of the farming, even of the weaving, buying, and selling, was done just as it had been done centuries before; and the great changes that were to revolutionize the life and work of the people were as yet hardly dreamed of. In fact, there was so much in common between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, that the reader who has already made himself familiar with the manor and the gild, as described in Chapter II, will find himself quite at home in the “old regime,” as the order of things in the eighteenth century is now termed.

One might still see the countless little agricultural villages and manor houses nestling among the hills or dotting the plains, surrounded by green fields and fringed with forest or wasteland. The simple villagers still cultivated their strips in the common fields in the time−honored way, working hard for meager returns. A third of the land stood idle every year; it often took a whole day merely to scratch the surface of a single acre with the rude wooden plow then in use; cattle were killed off in the autumn for want of good hay; fertilizers were only crudely applied, if at all; many a humble peasant was content if his bushel of seed brought him three bushels of grain, and was proud if his fatted ox weighed over four hundred pounds, though a modern farmer would grumble at results three or four times as good.

[Sidenote: “Gentlemen Farmers” and “Husbandry"] [Sidenote: “Rotation of Crops"]

There were some enterprising and prosperous landowners who used newer and better methods, and even wrote books about “husbandry,” as agriculture was called. The Dutch, especially, learned to cultivate their narrow territory carefully, and from them English farmers learned many secrets of tillage. They grew clover and “artificial grasses”—such as rye—for their cattle, cultivated turnips for winter fodder, tilled the soil more thoroughly, used fertilizers more diligently, and even learned how to shift their crops from field to field according to a regular plan, so that the soil would not lose its fertility and would not have to be left idle or “fallow” every third year.

[Sidenote: Survival of Primitive Methods]

These new methods were all very fine for “gentlemen farmers,” but for the average peasant the old “open−field” system was an effective barrier to progress. He could not plant new crops on his strips in the grain fields, for custom forbade it; he could not breed his cows scientifically, while they ran in with the rest of the village cattle. At best he could only work hard and pray that his cows would not catch contagion from the rest, and that the weeds from his neighbor's wheat−patch might not spread into his own, for between such patches there was neither wall nor fence.

[Sidenote: Survival of Serfdom] [Sidenote: Sorry Condition of the Peasantry]

Primitive methods were not the only survivals of manorial life. Actual serfdom still prevailed in most of the countries of Europe except France [Footnote: Even in France, some serfdom still survived.] and England, and even in these countries nominal freedom lifted the peasantry but little above the common lot. It is true, indeed, that countless differences in the degree and conditions of servitude existed between Russians and Frenchmen, and even between peasants in the same country or village. The English or French plowman, perhaps, might not be sold to fight for other countries like the Hessians, nor could he be commanded to marry an undesired bride, as were of the tenants of a Russian nobleman. But in a general way we may say that all the peasants of Europe suffered from much the same causes. With no voice in making the laws, they were liable to heavy fines or capital punishment for breaking the laws. Their advice was not asked when taxes were levied or apportioned, but upon them fell the heaviest burdens of the state.

It was vexatious to pay outrageous fees for the use of a lord's mill, bridge, oven, or wine−press, to be haled to court for an imaginary offense, or to be called from one's fields to war, or to work on the roads without pay. It was hard for the hungry serf to see the fat deer venturing into his very dooryard, and to remember that the master of the mansion house was so fond of the chase that he would not allow his game to be killed for food for vulgar

plowmen.

But these and similar vexations sank into insignificance in comparison with the burdens of the taxes paid to lord, to church, and to king. In every country of Europe the peasants were taxed, directly or indirectly, for the support of the three pillars of the “old regime.” The form of such taxation in England differed widely from that in Hungary; in Sweden, from that in Spain. But beneath discrepancies of form, the system was essentially the same. Some idea of the triple taxation that everywhere bore so heavily upon the peasantry may be obtained from a brief resume of the financial obligations of an ordinary French peasant to his king, his Church, and his lord.

[Sidenote: Peasant Obligations to Landlord]

To the lord the serf owed often three days' labor a week, in addition to stated portions of grain and poultry. In place of servile work the freeman paid a “quit−rent,” that is, a sum of money instead of the services which were considered to accompany the occupation of land. Double rent was paid on the death of the peasant, and, if the farm was sold, one−fifth of the price went to the lord. Sometimes, however, a freeman held his land without quit−rent, but still had numerous obligations which had survived from medieval times, such as the annual sum paid for a “military protection” which he neither demanded nor received.

[Sidenote: Peasant Obligation to Church]

The second obligation was to the church—the tithe or tenth, which usually amounted every year to a twelfth or a fifteenth of the gross produce of the peasant's land.

[Sidenote: Peasant Obligations to King and State]

Heaviest of all were the taxes levied by the king. The *taille* , or land tax, was the most important. The amount was not fixed, but was supposed to be proportional to the value of the peasant's land and dwelling. In practice the tax−collectors often took as much as they could get. and a shrewd peasant would let his house go to pieces and pretend to be utterly destitute in order that the assessors might not increase the valuation of his property.

The other direct taxes were the poll tax, *i.e.*, a certain sum which everybody alike must pay, and the income tax, usually a twentieth part of the income. Finally, there were indirect taxes, such as the salt *gabelle*. Thus, in certain provinces every person had to buy seven pounds of salt a year from the government salt−works at a price ten times its real value. Road−making, too, was the duty of the peasant, and the *corvee*, or labor on roads, often took several weeks in a year.

[Sidenote: Burden of Taxation on Peasants]

All these burdens—dues to the lord, tithes to the church, taxes to the king—left the peasant but little for himself. It is so difficult to get exact figures that we can put no trust in the estimate of a famous writer that dues, tithes, and taxes absorbed over four−fifths of the French peasant's produce: nevertheless, we may be sure that the burden was very great. In a few favored districts of France and England farmers were able to pay their taxes and still live comfortably. But elsewhere the misery of the people was such as can hardly be imagined. With the best of harvests they could barely provide for their families, and a dry summer or long winter would bring them to want. There was only the coarsest of bread—and little of that; meat was a luxury; and delicacies were for the rich. We read how starving peasants in France tried to appease their hunger with roots and herbs, and in hard times succumbed by thousands to famine. One−roomed mud huts with leaky thatched roofs, bare and windowless, were good enough dwellings for these tillers of the soil. In the dark corners of the dirt−floors lurked germs of pestilence and death. Fuel was expensive, and the bitter winter nights must have found many a peasant shivering supperless on his bed of straw.

True, the gloom of such conditions was relieved here and there by a prosperous village or a well−to−do peasant. But, speaking in a general way, the sufferings of the poorer European peasants and serfs can hardly be exaggerated. It was they who in large part had paid for the wars, theaters, palaces, and pleasures of the courts of Europe.

## COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: Growth of Towns]

Let us now turn our eyes from the country to the city, for in the towns are to be found the bourgeoisie, the class in which we are most interested. The steady expansion of commerce and industry during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had been attended by a remarkable development of town life. Little villages had grown, until in 1787 there were 78 towns of over 10,000 inhabitants each. London, the greatest city in Europe, had increased in population from about half a million in 1685 to over a million in 1800. Paris was at least half as

large; Amsterdam was a great city; and several German towns like Hamburg, Bremen, and Frankfort were important trading centers.

The towns had begun to lose some of their medieval characteristics. They had spread out beyond their cramping walls; roomy streets and pleasant squares made the newer sections more attractive. The old fortifications, no longer needed for protection, served now as promenades. City thoroughfares were kept cleaner, sometimes well paved with cobbles; and at night the feeble but cheerful glow of oil street−lamps lessened the terrors of the belated burgher who had been at the theater or listened to protracted debates at the great town hall.

[Sidenote: Industry Gild Regulation]

The life of the town was nourished by industry and commerce. Industry in the eighteenth century meant far more than baking bread, making clothes, cobbling shoes, and fashioning furniture for use in the town; it meant the production on a large scale of goods to sell in distant places,—cloth, clocks, shoes, beads, dishes, hats, buttons, and what not. Many of these articles were still manufactured under the regulations of the old craft gilds. For although the gild system was pretty well broken up in England, it still maintained its hold on the Continent. In France the division of crafts had become so complicated that innumerable bickerings arose between cobblers' gilds and shoemakers' gilds, between watch−makers and clock−makers. In Germany conditions were worse. The gilds, now aristocratic and practically hereditary corporations, used their power to prevent all competition, to keep their apprentices and journeymen working for little or nothing, to insure high profits, and to prevent any technical improvements which might conceivably injure them. “A hatter who improved his wares by mixing silk with the wool was attacked by all the other hatters; the inventor of sheet lead was opposed by the plumbers; a man who had made a success in print−cloths was forced to return to antiquated methods by the dyers.”

[Sidenote: Government Regulation of Industry: Mercantilism]

To gild regulation was added government regulation. It will be remembered that many seventeenth−century statesmen had urged their kings to make laws for the greater prosperity of industry, and that Colbert had given the classic expression in France to the mercantilist idea that wealth could be cultivated by regulating and encouraging manufactures. In order that French dyers might acquire a reputation for thorough work, he issued over three hundred articles of instruction for the better conduct of the dyeing business. In an age when unscrupulous English merchants were hurting the market with poorly woven fabrics, French weavers were given careful orders about the quality of the thread, the breadth of the cloth, and the fineness of the weave. It is said that in 1787 the regulations for French manufactures filled eight volumes in quarto; and other governments, while less thorough, were equally convinced of the wisdom of such a policy.

The mercantilist was not content with making rules for established industries. In justice to him it should be explained that he was anxious to plant new trades. Privileges, titles of nobility, exemption from taxation, generous grants of money, and other favors were accorded to enterprising business men who undertook to introduce new branches of manufacture.

In general, however, the efforts of such mercantilists as Colbert have been adversely criticized by economists. The regulations caused much inconvenience and loss to many manufacturers, and the privileges granted to new enterprises often favored unstable and unsuitable industries at the expense of more natural and valuable trades. It is impossible to estimate the value to France of Colbert's pet industries, and equally impossible to see what would have happened had industry been allowed free rein. But we must not entirely condemn the system simply because its faults are so obvious and its benefits so hard to ascertain.

[Sidenote: Restrictions on Commerce]

Commerce, like industry, was subject to restrictions and impeded by antiquated customs. Merchants traversing the country were hindered by poor roads; at frequent intervals they must pay toll before passing a knight's castle, a bridge, or a town gate. Customs duties were levied on commerce between the provinces of a single kingdom. And the cost of transportation was thus made so high that the price of a cask of wine passing from the Orleanais to Normandy—two provinces in northwestern France—increased twenty−fold.

From our past study of the commercial and colonial wars of the eighteenth century, especially those between France and Great Britain, we have already learned that mercantilist ideas were still dominant in foreign commerce. We have noted the heavy protective tariffs which were designed to shut out foreign competition. We have discussed the Navigation Acts, by means of which England encouraged her ship−owners. We have also mentioned the absorption, by specially chartered companies, of the profits of the lucrative European trade with the

Indies. The East India Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, the Dutch East India Company, and the French *Compagnie des Indes* were but a few famous examples of the chartered companies which still practically monopolized the trade of most non−European countries.

[Sidenote: Great Growth of Commerce]

Customs and companies may have been injurious in many respects, but commerce grew out of all bounds. The New World gave furs, timber, tobacco, cotton, rice, sugar, rum, molasses, coffee, dyes, gold, and silver, in return for negro slaves, manufactures, and Oriental wares; and the broad Atlantic highways were traversed by many hundreds of heavily laden ships. The spices, jewels, tea, and textiles of the Far East made rich cargoes for well−built East Indiamen. Important, too, was the traffic which occupied English and Dutch merchant fleets in the Baltic; and the flags of many nations were carried by traders coastwise along all the shores of Europe. Great Britain at the opening of the eighteenth century possessed a foreign commerce estimated at $60,000,000, and that of France was at least two−thirds as great. During the century the volume of commerce was probably more than quadrupled.

It is difficult to realize the tremendous importance of this expansion of commerce and industry. It had erected colonial empires, caused wars, lured millions of peasants from their farms, and built populous cities. But most important of all—it had given strength to the bourgeoisie.

[Sidenote: Rise of the Bourgeoisie]

Merchants, bankers, wholesalers, rich gild−masters, and even less opulent shopkeepers, formed a distinct “middle class,” between the privileged clergy and nobility on the one hand, and the oppressed peasant and artisan, or manual laborer, on the other. The middle class, often called by the French word *bourgeoisie* because it dwelt in towns or *bourgs*, was strongest in England, the foremost commercial nation of Europe, was somewhat weaker in France, and very much weaker in less commercial countries, such as Germany, Austria, and Russia.

If the bourgeoisie was all−powerful in the world of business, it was influential in other spheres. Lawyers came almost exclusively from commercial families. Judges, local magistrates, keepers of prisons, government secretaries, intendants, all the world of officialdom was thronged with scions of bourgeois families. The better and older middle−class families prided themselves on their wealth, influence, and culture. They read the latest books on science and philosophy; they sometimes criticized the religious ideas of the past; and they eagerly discussed questions of constitutional law and political economy.

[Sidenote: Ambition of the Bourgeoisie]

Ambition came quite naturally with wealth and learning. The bourgeoisie wanted power and privilege commensurate with their place in business and administration. It seemed unbearable that a foppish noble whose only claims to respect were a moldy castle and a worm−eaten patent of nobility should everywhere take precedence over men of means and brains. Why should the highest social distinctions, the richest sinecures, and the posts of greatest honor in the army and at court be closed to men of ignoble birth, as if a man were any better for the possession of a high−sounding title?

Moreover, the bourgeoisie desired a more direct say in politics. In England, to be sure, the sons of rich merchants were frequently admitted to the nobility, and commercial interests were pretty well represented in Parliament. In France, however, the feudal nobility was more arrogant and exclusive, and the government less in harmony with middle−class notions. The extravagant and wasteful administration of royal money was censured by every good business man. It was argued that if France might only have bourgeois representation in a national parliament to regulate finance and to see that customs duties, trade−laws, and foreign relations were managed in accordance with business interests, then all would be well.

THE PRIVILEGED CLASSES

Thus far, in analyzing social and economic conditions in the eighteenth century, we have concerned ourselves with the lowest class, the peasants and day laborers, and with the middle class or bourgeoisie— the “Third Estate” of France and the “Commons” of Great Britain. All of these were technically unprivileged or ignoble classes. The highest place in society was reserved for the classes of the privileged, the clergy and the nobility, constituting the First and the Second Estates, respectively. And it is to these that we must now direct our attention.

[Sidenote: Small Number of “Privileged"]

The privileged classes formed a very small minority of the population. Of the 25,000,000 inhabitants of France, probably less than 150,000 were nobles and 130,000 clerics; about one out of every hundred of the people

was therefore privileged.

[Sidenote: Large Number of “Privileges"]

This small upper class was distinguished from the common herd by rank, possessions, and privileges. The person of noble birth, *i.e.* , the son of a noble, was esteemed to be inherently finer and better than other men; so much so that he would disdain to marry a person of the lower class. He was addressed in terms of respect—“my lord,” “your Grace”; common men saluted him as their superior. His clothes were more gorgeous than those of the plain people; on his breast glittered the badges of honorary societies, and his coach was proudly decorated with an ancestral coat of arms. His “gentle” birth admitted him to the polite society of the court and enabled him to seek preferment in church or army.

More substantial than marks of honor were the actual possessions of nobles and clergy. Each noble bequeathed to his eldest son a castle or a mansion with more or less territory from which to collect rents or feudal dues. Bishops, abbots, and archbishops received their office by election or appointment rather than by inheritance, and, being unmarried, could not transmit their stations to children. But in countries where the wealth of the Church had not been confiscated by Protestants, the “prince of the Church” often enjoyed during his lifetime magnificent possessions. The bishop of Strassburg had an annual income approximating 500,000 francs. Castles, cathedrals, palaces, rich vestments, invaluable pictures, golden chalices, rentals from broad lands, tithes from the people,—these were the property of the clergy. It is estimated that the clergy and nobility each owned one−fifth of France, and that one−third of all the land of Europe, one−half the revenue, and two−thirds the capital, were in the hands of Christian churches.

The noble families, possessing thousands of acres, and monopolizing the higher offices of church and army, were further enriched, especially in France, by presents of money from the king, by pensions, by grants of monopolies, and by high−salaried positions which entailed little or no work. “One young man was given a salary of $3600 for an office whose sole duty consisted in signing his name twice a year.”

[Sidenote: Exemption from Taxation]

With all their wealth the first two orders contributed almost nothing to lighten the financial burdens of the state. [Footnote: Exemption from taxation was often and similarly granted to bourgeois incumbents of government offices.] The Church in France claimed exemption from taxation, but made annual gifts to the king of several hundred thousand dollars, though such grants represented less than one per cent of its income. The nobles, too, considered the payment of direct taxes a disgrace to their gentle blood, and did not hesitate by trickery to evade indirect taxation, leaving the chief burdens to fall upon the lower classes, and most of all upon the peasantry.

[Sidenote: Failure of the Privileged to Perform Real Services] [Sidenote: The Higher Nobility]

All these advantages, privileges, and immunities might be looked upon as a fitting reward which medieval Europe had given to her nobles for protecting peaceable plowmen from the marauding bands then so common, and which she had bestowed upon her clergy for preserving education, for encouraging agriculture, for fostering the arts, for tending the poor, the sick, and the traveler, and for performing the offices of religion. But long before the eighteenth century the protective functions of feudal nobles had been transferred to the royal government. No longer useful, the hereditary nobility was merely burdensome, and ornamental. Such as could afford it, spent their lives in the cities or at the royal court where they rarely did anything worth while, unless it were to invent an unusually delicate compliment or to fashion a flawless sonnet. Their morals were not of the best—it was almost fashionable to be vicious—but their manners were perfect.

Meanwhile, the landed estates of these absentee lords were in charge of flint−hearted agents, whose sole mission was to squeeze money from the peasants, to make them pay well for mill, bridge, and oven, to press to the uttermost every claim which might give the absent master a larger revenue.

[Sidenote: The Country Gentry]

The poorer noble, the “country gentleman,” was hardly able to live so extravagant a life, and accordingly remained at home, sometimes making friends of the villagers, standing god−father to peasant−children, or inviting heavy−booted but light−hearted plowmen to dance in the castle courtyard. But often his life was dull enough, with rents hard to collect, and only hunting, drinking, and gossip to pass the time away.

[Sidenote: The Clergy]

A similar and sharper contrast was observable between the higher and lower clergy, in England as well as in

Roman Catholic countries. Very frequently dissipated young nobles were nominated bishops or abbots: they looked upon their office as a source of revenue, but never dreamed of discharging any spiritual duties. While a Cardinal de Rohan with 2,500,000 livres a year astonished the court of France with his magnificence and luxury, many a shabby but faithful country curate, with an uncertain income of less than $150 a year, was doing his best to make both ends meet, with a little to spare for charity.

RELIGIOUS AND ECCLESIASTICAL CONDITIONS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: The Catholic Church]

The great ecclesiastical organization that had dominated the middle ages was no longer the one church of Europe, but was still the most impressive. Although the Protestant Revolt of the sixteenth century had established independent denominations in the countries of northern Europe, as we have seen in Chapter IV, Roman Catholic Christianity remained the state religion of Italy, Spain, Portugal, France, Austria, the Austrian Netherlands, Bavaria, Poland, and several of the Swiss Cantons. Moreover, large sections of the population of Ireland, Bohemia, Hungary, Asia, and America professed Catholic Christianity.

Orthodox Roman Catholics held fast to their faith in dogmas and sacraments and looked for spiritual guidance, correction, and comfort to the regular and secular clergy of their Church. The “secular" hierarchy of pope, cardinals, archbishops, bishops, priests, and deacons, did not cease its pious labor “in the world”; nor was there lack of zealous souls willing to forego the pleasures of this world, that they might live holier lives as monks, nuns, or begging friars,— the “regular” clergy.

[Sidenote: Relations of the Catholic Church with Lay States]

In its relations with lay states, the Roman Catholic Church had changed more than in its internal organization. Many Protestant rulers now recognized the pope merely as an Italian prince, [Footnote: The pope, it will be remembered, ruled the central part of Italy as a temporal prince.] and head of an undesirable religious sect—Roman Catholics were either persecuted, or, as in Great Britain, deprived of political and civil rights. The Pope, on the other hand, could hardly regard as friends those who had denied the spiritual mission and confiscated the temporal possessions of the Church.

In Roman Catholic countries, too, the power of the pope had been lessened. The old dispute whether pope or king should control the appointment of bishops, abbots, and other high church officers had at last been settled in favor of the king. The pope consented to recognize royal appointees, provided they were “godly and suitable” men; in return he usually received a fee (“annate") from the newly appointed prelate. Other taxes the pope rarely ventured to levy; but good Roman Catholics continued to pay “Peter's Pence” as a free−will offering, and the bishops occasionally taxed themselves for his benefit. In other ways, also, the power of the Church was curtailed. Royal courts now took cognizance of the greater part of those cases which had once been within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts;[Footnote: Blasphemy, contempt of religion, and heresy were, however, still matters for church courts.] the right of appeal to the Roman Curia was limited; and the lower clergy might be tried in civil courts. Finally, papal edicts were no longer published in a country without the sanction of the king. These curtailments of papal privilege were doubtless important, but they meant little or nothing to the millions of peasants and humble workmen who heard Mass, were confessed, and received the sacraments as their fathers had done before them.

[Sidenote: Surviving Privileges of the Church]

Besides their incalculable influence over the souls of men, the clergy were an important factor in the civil life of Roman Catholic countries. Education was mostly under their auspices; they conducted the hospitals and relieved the poor. Marriages were void unless solemnized in the orthodox manner, and, in the eye of the law, children born outside of Christian wedlock might not inherit property. Heretics who died unshriven, were denied the privilege of burial in Catholic cemeteries.

Of the exemption of the clergy from taxation, and of the wealth of the Church, we have already spoken, as well as of the high social rank of its prelates—a rank more in keeping with that of wealthy worldly noblemen than with that of devout “servants of the Lord.” But we have yet to mention the influence of the Church in suppressing heresy.

In theory the Roman Catholic religion was still obligatory in Catholic states. Uniformity of faith was still considered essential to political unity. Kings still promised at coronation faithfully to extirpate heretical sects. In Spain, during the first half of the eighteenth century hundreds of heretics were condemned by the Inquisition and

burned at the stake; only toward the close of the century was there an abatement of religious intolerance. In France, King Louis XIV had revoked the Edict of Nantes in 1685, and in the eighteenth century one might have found laws on the French statute−books directing that men who attended Protestant services should be made galley−slaves, that medical aid should be withheld from impenitent heretics, and that writers of irreligious books should suffer death. Such laws were very poorly enforced, however, and active religious persecution was dying out in France in the second half of the eighteenth century. But toleration did not mean equality; full civil and political rights were still denied the several hundred thousand Huguenots in France.

[Sidenote: Summary of Weaknesses in the Catholic Church]

The strength of the Roman Catholic Church in the eighteenth century was impaired by four circumstances: (1) the existence of bitterly antagonistic Protestant sects; (2) the growth of royal power and of the sentiment of nationalism, at the expense of papal power and of internationalism; (3) the indolence and worldliness of some of the prelates; and (4) the presence of internal dissensions. The first three circumstances should be clear from what has already been said, but a word of explanation is necessary about the fourth.

[Sidenote: Jansenism]

The first of these dissensions arose concerning the teachings of a certain Flemish bishop by the name of Cornelius Janssen (1585−1638), [Footnote: Janssen is commonly cited by the Latin version of his name—Jansenius.] whose followers, known as Jansenists, had possessed themselves of a sort of hermitage and nunnery at Port−Royal in the vicinity of Paris. Jansenism found a number of earnest disciples and able exponents, whose educational work and reforming zeal brought them into conflict with the Jesuits. The Jesuits accused the Jansenists of heresy, affirming that Janssen's doctrine of conversion−by−the−will−of−God was in last analysis practically Calvin's predestination. For some years the controversy raged. Blaise Pascal (1623−1662), a famous mathematician and experimenter in physics, defended the Jansenists eloquently and learnedly, but Jesuits had the ear of Louis XIV and broke up the little colony at Port−Royal. Four years later the pope issued a famous bull, called “Unigenitus” (1713), definitively condemning Jansenist doctrines as heretical; but the sect still lived on, especially in Holland, and “Unigenitus” was disliked by many orthodox Roman Catholics, who thought its condemnations too sweeping and too severe.

[Sidenote: Febronianism]

A second dispute, questioning the authority of the papacy, centered in a German theologian [Footnote: Johann Nikolaus von Hoatheim, auxiliary bishop of Trier. His famous work was published in 1763.] who wrote under the Latin name of Febronius. Febronianism was an attempted revival of the conciliar movement of the fifteenth century and closely resembled “Gallicanism,” as the movement in favor of the “Liberties of the Gallican Church” was called. These “Liberties” had been formulated in a French declaration of 1682 and involved two major claims: (1) that the pope had no right to depose or otherwise to interfere with temporal monarchs, and (2) that in spiritual affairs the general council of bishops (oecumenical council) was superior to the sovereign pontiff. This twofold movement towards nationalism and representative church government was most strongly controverted by the Jesuits, who took their stand on the assertion that the pope was supreme in all things. By the opponents of the Jesuits, this looking “beyond the mountains” to the Roman Curia for ultimate authority was called Ultramontanism (beyond−the−mountainism). In almost every Catholic country of Europe the struggle between Ultramontanism and Febronianism aroused controversy, and the nature of papal supremacy remained a mooted point well into the nineteenth century.

[Sidenote: Suppression of the Jesuit Order]

Towards the close of the eighteenth century Ultramontanism received a serious though temporary setback by the suppression of the Jesuits (1773). For over two centuries members of the Society of Jesus had been famed as schoolmasters, preachers, controversialists, and missionaries; but in the eighteenth century the order became increasingly involved in temporal business; its power and wealth were abused; its political entanglements incurred the resentment of reforming royal ministers; and some of its missionaries became scandalously lax in their doctrines. The result was the suppression of the order, first in Portugal (1759), then in other countries, and finally altogether by a papal decree of 1773. [Footnote: In Russia, where the order of suppression was not enforced, the Jesuits kept their corporate organization. Subsequently, on 7 August, 1814, the entire society was restored by papal bull, and is now in a flourishing condition in many countries.]

[Sidenote: The Anglican Church]

We shall next consider the Anglican Church, whose complete independence from the papacy, it will be remembered, was established by Henry VIII of England, and whose doctrinal position had been defined in the Thirty−nine Articles of Elizabeth's reign. It was the state Church of England, Ireland, and Wales, and had scattering adherents in Scotland and in the British colonies. Like the Roman Catholic Church in France, the Anglican Church enjoyed in the British Isles, excepting Scotland, special privileges, great wealth, and the collection of tithes from Anglicans and non−Anglicans alike. It was intensely national, independent of papal control or other foreign influence, and patriotic in spirit. It retained a hierarchical government similar to that of the Roman Catholics. As in France, the bishops were inclined to use the emoluments without doing the work of their office, while the country curates were very poor.

In its relations with others, the Anglican Church was not very liberal. In England, Protestant (Calvinistic) Dissenters had been granted liberty of worship in 1689 (Toleration Act) but still they might not hold civil, military, or political office without the special dispensation of Parliament. Baptism, registration of births and deaths, and marriage could be performed legally only by Anglican clergymen. Non−Anglicans were barred from Oxford and could take no degree at Cambridge University.

Worst of all was the lot of the Roman Catholics. In England they had practically no civil, political, or religious rights. By a law of 1700 [Footnote: Repealed in 1778, but on condition that Roman Catholics should deny the temporal power of the pope and his right to depose kings.] the Roman Catholic must abjure the Mass or lose his property, and priests celebrating Mass were liable to life imprisonment. In Ireland the communicants of the “Church of Ireland” (Anglican) constituted a very small minority, [Footnote: Even in the nineteenth century, there were only about 500,000 Anglicans out of a population of somewhat less than 6,000,000.] while the native Roman Catholics, comprising over four−fifths of the population, were not only seriously hindered from exercising their own religion, not only deprived of their political rights, not only made subservient to the economic interests of the Protestants, but actually forced to pay the tithe to support English bishops and curates, who too often lived in England, since their parishioners were all Roman Catholics.

[Sidenote: Protestant Sects in England: Baptists]

The Dissenters from the Anglican Church embraced many different creeds. We have already spoken of the Calvinistic Presbyterians and Separatists. Besides these, several new sects had appeared. The Baptist Church was a seventeenth−century off−shoot of Separatism. To Calvinistic theology and Congregational Church government, the Baptists had added a belief in adult baptism, immersion, and religious liberty.

[Sidenote: Unitarians]

A group of persons who denied the divinity of Christ, thereby departing widely from usual Protestantism as well as from traditional Catholicism, came into some prominence in the eighteenth century through secessions from the Anglican Church and through the preaching of the scientist Joseph Priestley, and gradually assumed the name of Unitarians. It was not until 1844 that the sect obtained complete religious liberty in England.

[Sidenote: Quakers]

A most remarkable departure from conventional forms was made under the leadership of George Fox, the son of a weaver, whose followers, loosely organized as the Society of Friends, were often derisively called Quakers, because they insisted that true religion was accompanied by deep emotions and quakings of spirit. Although severely persecuted, [Footnote: In 1685 as many as 1460 Quakers lay in English prisons.] the Quakers grew to be influential at home, and in the colonies, where they founded Pennsylvania (1681). Their refusal to take oaths, their quaint “thee” and “thou,” their simple and somber costumes, and their habit of sitting silent in religious meeting until the spirit should move a member to speak, made them a most picturesque body. Professional ministers and the ceremonial observance of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, they held to be forms destructive of spontaneous religion. War, they said, gave free rein to un−Christian cruelty, selfishness, and greed; and, therefore, they would not fight. They were also vigorous opponents of negro slavery.

[Sidenote: Methodists]

The Methodist movement did not come until the eighteenth century. By the year 1740, a group of earnest Oxford students had won the nickname of “Methodists” by their abstinence from frivolous amusements and their methodical cultivation of fervor, piety, and charity. Their leader, John Wesley (1703−1791), was a man of remarkable energy, rising at four in the morning, filling every moment with work, living frugally on L28 a year, visiting prisons, and exhorting his companions to piety. The Methodist leaders were very devout and orthodox

Anglicans, but they were so anxious “to spread Scriptural Holiness over the land” that they preached in open fields as well as in churches. Wesley and other great orators appealed to the emotions of thousands of miners, prisoners, and ignorant weavers, and often moved them to tears. It is said that John Wesley preached more than 40,000 sermons.

The Methodist preachers gradually became estranged from the Anglican Church, established themselves as a new dissenting sect, and dropped much of the Anglican ritual. The influence of their preaching was very marked, however, and many orthodox Anglican clergymen traveled about preaching to the lower classes. This “evangelical movement” is significant because it showed that a new class of industrial workers had grown up without benefit of the church or protection of the state. We shall subsequently hear more of them in connection with the events of the Industrial Revolution.

[Sidenote: Lutheran Churches on the Continent]

In the eighteenth century, Lutheranism was the state religion of Denmark (including Norway), Sweden, and of several German states, notably Prussia, Saxony, and Brunswick. The Lutheran churches retained much of the old ritual and episcopal government. Ecclesiastical lands, however, had been secularized, and Lutheran pastors were supported by free−will offerings and state subventions. In Prussia, [Footnote: Later, in 1817, the Lutherans and Calvinists of Prussia were brought together, under royal pressure, to form the “Evangelical Church.” According to the king, this was not a fusion of the two Protestant faiths, but merely an external union.] Denmark, and Sweden the church recognized the king as its *summus episcopus* or supreme head.

[Sidenote: Reformed Churches]

Zwinglian and Calvinistic churches were usually called “Reformed” or “Presbyterian” and represented a more radical deviation than Lutheranism from Roman Catholic theology and ritual, holding the Lord's Supper to be but a commemorative ceremony, doing away with altar−lights, crucifixes, and set prayers, and governing themselves by synods of priests or presbyters. In the eighteenth century Presbyterianism was still the established religion of Scotland, and of the Dutch Netherlands. In France the Huguenots, in Switzerland the French−speaking Calvinists and German−speaking Zwinglians, and numerous congregations in southern Germany still represented the Reformed Church of Calvin and Zwingli. [Footnote: For the Orthodox Church in Russia, see above, pp. 122, 372, 380. Some reforms in the ritual had been introduced by a certain Nikon, a patriarch of the seventeenth century.]

[Sidenote: Growth of Skepticism. Deism]

One of the most noteworthy features of the eighteenth century was the appearance of a large number of doubters of Christianity. In the comparatively long history of the Christian Church, there had often been reformers, who attacked specific doctrines or abuses, but never before, with the possible exception of Italian humanists of the fifteenth century, [Footnote: See above, pp. 124, 182 ff.] had there been such a considerable and influential number who ventured to assail the very foundations of the Christian belief. During the last quarter of the seventeenth century, a number of English philosophers, imbued with enthusiasm for the discovery of scientific laws, went on to apply the newer scientific methods to religion. They claimed that the Bible was untrustworthy, that the dogmas and ceremonies of the churches were useless if not actually harmful, and that true religion was quite natural in man and independent of miraculous revelation. God, they asserted, had created the universe and established laws for it. He would not upset these laws to answer the foolish prayers of a puny human being. Men served God best by discounting miracles, discrediting “superstition,” and living in accordance with natural law. Just what this law was, they left largely to the common sense of each man to determine. As a result, the positive side of Deism, as the body of the new teachings was called, was lost in vagueness, and the negative side —the mere denial of orthodox Christianity—became uppermost in men's minds.

Deism was important in several ways, especially for France, whence it was carried from England. (1) For a large part of the most intelligent and influential classes, it *destroyed reverence* for the Church, and prepared the way for the religious experiments of the French Revolution. (2) It gave an impetus to *philosophers* who evolved great systems and exhibited wonderful ingenuity and confidence in formulating laws which would explain the why, what, whence, and whither of human life. (3) While casting doubt on the efficacy of particular religions, it demanded *toleration* for all. (4) Finally, it was responsible for a great increase of *indifference* to religion. People too lazy or too ignorant to understand the philosophic basis of Deism, used the arguments of Deists in justification of their contempt for religion, and to many people disbelief and intelligence seemed to be synonymous. We have considered Deism here for its significant bearing on the religious situation in the eighteenth century. In the

following section we shall see how it was part and parcel of the scientific and intellectual spirit of the times.

SCIENTIFIC AND INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: Art]

As we have observed in an earlier chapter, both science and art flowered in the sixteenth century. The great men of the eighteenth century, however, devoted themselves almost exclusively to science; and the artists of the time were too insincere, too intent upon pleasing shallow−brained and frivolous courtiers, to produce much that was worth while. Great numbers of plays were written, it is true, but they were hopelessly dull imitations of classic models. Imitative and uninspired likewise were statues and paintings and poems. One merit they possessed. If a French painter lacked force and originality, he could at least portray with elegance and charm a group of fine ladies angling in an artificial pool. Elegance, indeed, redeemed the eighteenth century from imitative dullness and stupid ostentation: elegance expressed more often in perfumes, laces, and mahogany than in paint or marble. The silk−stockinged courtier accompanying his exquisitely perfect bow with a nicely worded compliment was surely as much an artist as the sculptor. Nor can one help feeling that the chairs of Louis XV were made not to sit in, but to admire; for their curving mahogany legs look too slenderly delicate, their carved and gilded backs too uncomfortable, for mere use. Chairs and fine gentlemen were alike useless, and alike elegant.

[Sidenote: The New Science]

More substantial were the achievements of eighteenth−century scientists. From philosophers of an earlier century—Francis Bacon (1561−1626) and Rene Descartes (1596−1650)—they learned to question everything, to seek new knowledge by actual experiment, to think boldly. You must not blindly believe in God, they said, you must first prove His existence. Or, if you will learn how the body is made, it will not do to believe what Hippocrates or any other Greek authority said about it; you must cut rabbits open and see with your own eyes where heart and lungs are hidden beneath the coat of fur. Seeing and thinking for oneself were the twin principles of the new scientific method.

[Sidenote: Isaac Newton]

The new science found many able exponents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and of them all Sir Isaac Newton (1646−1727) was probably the most illustrious. Coming from a humble family in a little English village, Newton at an early age gave evidence of uncommon intelligence. At Cambridge University he astonished his professors and showed such great skill in mathematics that he was given a professor's chair when only twenty−three years old.

For Descartes, Newton conceived great admiration, and, like Descartes, he applied himself to experimentation as well as to formal mathematics. His boyish ingenuity in the construction of windmills, kites, and water−clocks was now turned to more serious ends. Like other scientists of the day, he experimented with chemicals in his laboratory, and tried different combinations of lenses, prisms, and reflectors, until he was able to design a great telescope with which to observe the stars.

His greatest achievement was in astronomy. Galileo, Copernicus, and other investigators had already concluded that the earth is but one of many similar bodies moving around the sun, which in turn is only one of countless suns—for every star is a sun. Now Newton wondered what held these mighty spheres in their places in space, for they appeared to move in definite and well−regulated orbits without any visible support or prop. It is alleged that the answer to the problem was suggested by the great philosopher's observation of a falling apple. The same invisible force that made the apple fall to the ground must, he is said to have reasoned, control the moon, sun, and stars. The earth is pulled toward the sun, as the apple to the earth, but it is also pulled toward the stars, each of which is a sun so far away that it looks to us very small. The result is that the earth neither falls to the sun nor to any one star, but moves around the sun in a regular path.

This suggestive principle by which every body in the universe is pulled towards every other body, Newton called the law of universal gravitation. Newton's law [Footnote: It was really only a shrewd guess, but it appears to work so well that we often call it a “law.”] was expressed in a simple mathematical formula [Footnote: “The force increases directly in proportion to the product of the masses, and inversely in proportion to the square of the distance.”] by means of which physics and astronomy were developed as mathematical sciences. When a modern astronomer foretells an eclipse of the sun or discusses the course of a comet, or when a physicist informs us that he has weighed the earth, he is depending directly or indirectly upon Newton's discovery.

[Sidenote: Experimental and Applied Science]

The brilliance of Sir Isaac Newton's individual achievement should not obscure the fame of a host of other justly celebrated scientists and inventors. One of Newton's contemporaries, the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibnitz (1646−1716), elaborated a new and valuable branch of mathematics, the differential calculus, [Footnote: The credit for this achievement was also claimed by Newton.] which has proved to be of immense service in modern engineering. At the same time, the first experiments were being made with the mysterious potencies of electricity: the electrical researches of Benjamin Franklin (1706−1790), his discovery that flashes of lightning are merely electrical phenomena and his invention of the lightning rod are too familiar to need repeating; the work of Luigi Galvani (1737−1798) and of Count Alessandro Volta (1745−1827), two famous Italian physicists, is less well known, but their labors contributed much to the development of physical science, and their memory is perpetuated whenever the modern electrician refers to a “voltaic cell” or when the tinsmith speaks of “galvanized” iron. In this same period, the first important advances were made in the construction of balloons, and the conquest of the air was begun. In the eighteenth century, moreover, the foundations of modern chemistry were laid by Joseph Priestley (1733−1804), Antoine Laurent Lavoisier (1743−1794), and Henry Cavendish (1731−1810); oxygen was discovered, water was decomposed into its elements, and the nomenclature of modern chemistry had its inception. In medicine and surgery, too, pioneer work was done by John Hunter (1728−1793), a noted Scotch surgeon and anatomist, and by the Swiss professor Albrecht von Haller (1708−1777), the “father of modern physiology”; the facts which eighteenth−century physicians discovered regarding the circulation of the blood made possible more intelligent and more effective methods of treating disease; and just at the close of the eighteenth century, Edward Jenner (1749−1823), an English physician, demonstrated that the dread disease of smallpox could be prevented by vaccination. Geographical knowledge was vastly extended by the voyages of scientific explorers, like the English navigator Captain James Cook [Footnote: The Captain Cook who discovered, or rediscovered, Australia. See above, P. 340.] (1728−1779) and the French sailor Louis de Bougainville (1739−1811), in the hitherto uncharted expanses of the southern Pacific. Furthermore, since these explorers frequently brought home specimens of unfamiliar tropical animals and plants, rich material was provided for zoology and botany, which, thanks to the efforts of the Frenchman Georges de Buffon (1707−1788) and of the Swede Carolus Linnaeus (1707−1778), were just becoming important sciences.

[Sidenote: Popularity of the New Science]

One reason for the rapid development of natural science in the eighteenth century was the unprecedented popularity and favor enjoyed by scientists. Kings granted large pensions to scientists; British ministers bestowed remunerative offices, and petty princes showered valuable gifts upon them. Pretentious observatories with ponderous telescopes were built, often at public expense, in almost every country of Europe. Groups of learned men were everywhere banded together in “academies” or “societies.” The “Royal Society” of London, founded in 1662, listened to reports of the latest achievements in mathematics, astronomy, and physics. The members of the *Academie francaise (French Academy) were granted pensions by Louis XIV and even reckoned Newton among their honorary members.*

Never before had there been such interest in science, and never before had there been such opportunity to learn. Printing was now well developed; the learned societies and observatories published reports of the latest development in all branches of knowledge. Encyclopedias were gotten out professing to embody in one set of volumes the latest information relative to all the new sciences. Books were too expensive for the common person, but not so for the bourgeoisie, nor for numerous nobles. Indeed, it became quite the fashion in society to be a “savant,” a scientist, a philosopher, to dabble in chemistry, perhaps even to have a little laboratory or a telescope, and to dazzle one's friends with one's knowledge.

[Sidenote: The Spirit of Progress and Reform]

It seemed as if the golden age was dawning: the human mind seemed to be awakening from the slumber of centuries to con the world, to unravel the mysteries of life, and to discover the secrets of the universe. Confident that only a little thought would be necessary to free the world from vice, ignorance, and superstition, thinkers now turned boldly to attack the vexing problems of religion and morality, to criticize state, society, and church, and to point the way to a new and earthly paradise.

This tendency—this enthusiasm—has usually been styled “rationalism” because its champions sought to make everything *rational* or reasonable. Its foremost representatives were to be found in Great Britain between 1675 and 1725. They wrote many books discussing abstruse problems of philosophy, which can have slight interest for

us; but certain ideas they had of very practical importance, ideas which probably found their most notable expression in the writings of John Locke (1632−1704). Locke argued (1) that all government exists, or should exist, by consent of the governed—by a “social” contract, as it were; (2) that education should be more widespread; (3) that superstition and religious formalism should not be allowed to obscure “natural laws” and “natural religion”; and (4) that religious toleration should be granted to all but atheists.

The ideas of these English philosophers were destined to exercise a far greater influence upon France than upon England. They found delighted admirers among the nobility, ardent disciples among the bourgeoisie, and eloquent apostles in Voltaire, Diderot, and Rousseau.

Without a doubt, the foremost figure in the intellectual world of the eighteenth century was Francois Marie Arouet, or, as he called himself, Francois M. A. de Voltaire (1694−1778). Even from his boyhood he had been a clever hand at turning verses, and had fully appreciated his own cleverness. His businesslike father did not enjoy the boy's poetry, especially if it was written when young Francois should have been studying law. But Francois had a mind of his own; he liked to show his cleverness in gay society and relished making witty rhymes about the foibles of public ministers or the stupidity of the prince regent of France.

His sharp tongue and sarcastic pen were a source of constant danger to Voltaire. For libel the regent had him imprisoned a year in the Bastille. Some years later he was beaten by the lackeys of an offended nobleman, again sent to the Bastille, and then exiled three years in England.

At times he was the idol of Paris, applauded by *philosophes* and petted by the court, or again he would be a refugee from the wrath of outraged authorities. For a great part of his life he resided at Cirey in Lorraine,—with his mistress, his books, his half−finished plays, and his laboratory—for Voltaire, like all *philosophes*, had to play at science. Here he lived in constant readiness to flee over the border if the king should move against him. For a time he lived in Germany as the protege of Frederick the Great, but he treated that irascible monarch with neither tact nor deference, and soon left Berlin to escape the king's ire. He visited Catherine the Great of Russia. He also lived at Geneva for a while, but even there he failed to keep peace with the magistrates.

Such conflicts with established authority only increased his fame. Moreover, his three years' exile in England (1726−1729) had been of untold value, for they had given him a first−hand acquaintance with English rationalism. He had been brought up to discount religious “superstition” but the English thinkers provided him with a well−considered philosophy. Full of enthusiasm for the ideas of his English friends, he wrote *Letters on the English*—a triumph of deistic philosophy and sarcastic criticism of church and society.

The opinions which Voltaire henceforth never ceased to expound had long been held by English rationalists. He combined (1) admiration for experimental science with (2) an exalted opinion of his own ability to reason out the “natural laws” which were supposed to lie at the base of human nature, religion, society, the state, and the universe in general. (3) He was a typical Deist, thinking that the God who had made the myriad stars of the firmament and who had promulgated eternal laws for the universe, would hardly concern Himself with the soul of Pierre or Jean. To him all priests were impostors, and sacraments meaningless mummery, and yet he would not abolish religion entirely. Voltaire often said that he believed in a “natural religion,” but never explained it fully. Indeed, he was far more interested in tearing down than in building up, and disposed rather to scoff at the priests, teachings, and practices of the Catholic Church than to convert men to a better religion. (4) Likewise in his criticism of government and of society, he confined himself mostly to bitter denunciations of contemporaneous conditions, without offering a substitute or suggesting practical reforms. His nearest approach to the practical was his admiration for English institutions, but he never explained how the “liberties” of England were to be transplanted into France.

Voltaire was not an acutely original thinker. Nevertheless, his innumerable tragedies, comedies, histories, essays, and letters established his reputation as the most versatile and accomplished writer of his age. But all the “hundred volumes” of Voltaire are rarely read today. They are clever, to be sure, witty, graceful,—but admittedly superficial. He thought that he could understand at a glance the problems upon which more earnest men had spent their lives; he would hurriedly dash off a tragedy, or in spare moments write a pretentious history. He was not always accurate but he was always clever.

Let us remember him as, at the age of eighty−four, he pays a famous visit to Paris,—a sprightly old man with wrinkled face, and with sharp old eyes peering out from either side of the long nose, beaming with pride at the flattery of his admirers, sparkling with pleasure as he makes a witty repartee. The ladies call him a most amusing

old cynic. Cynic he is, and old. His life work has been scoffing. Yet Voltaire is unquestionably the intellectual dictator of Europe. His genius for satire and his fearless attacks on long−standing abuses have made him hated, and feared, and admired. He has given tone and character to the Old Regime.

[Sidenote: Diderot and the Encyclopedists]

Voltaire was not alone in the work of spreading discontent. Less famous but hardly less brilliant or versatile, was Denis Diderot (1713−1784). His great achievement was the editing of the *Encyclopedia*. The gathering of all human knowledge into one set of volumes—an encyclopedia—had been for generations a favorite idea in Europe. Diderot associated with himself the most distinguished mathematicians, astronomers, scientists, and philosophers of the time in the compilation of a work which in seventeen volumes [Footnote: Not counting pictorial supplements.] undertook to summarize the latest findings of the scholarship of the age. Over four thousand copies had been subscribed when the *Encyclopedia* appeared in 1765. It proved to be more than a monument of learning: it was a manifesto of radicalism. Its contributors were the apostles of rationalism and deism, [Footnote: Some went even further and practically denied the existence of God.] and their criticism of current ideas about religion, society, and science won many disciples to the new ideas.

The mission of Voltaire and the Encyclopedists (as the editors of the *Encyclopedia* are called) was to disseminate knowledge and to destroy prejudice, especially in religion. Practical specific reforms were suggested by Montesquieu, Rousseau, Beccaria, and Adam Smith.

[Sidenote: Montesquieu]

Montesquieu (1689−1755), a French lawyer−nobleman, a student of natural science, and an admirer of Newton, was the foremost writer of the eighteenth century on the practice of government. In his *Persian Letters*, and more especially in *The Spirit of the Laws* (1748), he argued that government is a complicated matter and, to be successful, must be adapted to the peculiarities of a particular people. Theoretically he preferred a republic, and the Constitution of the United States consciously embodied many of his theories. Practically, he considered the government of Great Britain very admirable, and although it sheltered many abuses, as we shall presently see, [Footnote: See below, pp. 432 ff.] nevertheless he urged the French to pattern their political organization after it. Moderation was the motto of Montesquieu.

[Sidenote: Rousseau]

A more radical reformer was Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712−1778). In his life Rousseau was everything he should not have been. He was a failure as footman, as servant, as tutor, as secretary, as music copier, as lace maker. He wandered in Turin, Paris, Vienna, London. His immorality was notorious,—he was not faithful in love, and his children were sent to a foundling asylum. He was poverty−stricken, dishonest, discontented, and, in his last years, demented.

Yet this man, who knew so little how to live his own life, exercised a wonderful influence over the lives of others. Sordid as was his career, the man himself was not without beautiful and generous impulses. He loved nature in an age when other men simply studied nature. He liked to look at the clear blue sky, or to admire the soft green fields and shapely trees, and he was not ashamed to confess it. The emotions had been forgotten while philosophers were praising the intellect: Rousseau reminded the eighteenth century that after all it may be as sane to enjoy a sunset as to solve a problem in algebra. Rousseau possessed the soul of a poet.

To him right feeling was as important as right thinking, and in this respect he quarreled with the rationalists who claimed that common sense alone was worth while. Rousseau was a Deist—at most he believed but vaguely in a “Being, whatever He may be, Who moves the universe and orders all things.” But he detested the cold reasoning of philosophers who conceived of God as too much interested in watching the countless stars obey His eternal laws, to stoop to help puny mortals with their petty affairs. “0 great philosophers!” cried Rousseau, “How much God is obliged to you for your easy methods and for sparing Him work.” And again Rousseau warns us to “flee from those [Voltaire and his like] who, under the pretense of explaining nature, sow desolating doctrines in the hearts of men, and whose apparent skepticism is a hundred times more ... dogmatic” than the teachings of priests. Rousseau was not an orthodox Christian, nor a calmly rational Deist; he simply felt that “to love God above all things, and your neighbor as yourself, is the sum of the law.”

This he reproached the philosophers with not doing. Rousseau had seen and felt the bitter suffering of the poor, and he had perceived the cynical indifference with which educated men often regarded it. Science and learning seemed to have made men only more selfish. Indeed, the ignorant peasant seemed to him humbler and

more virtuous than the pompous pedant. In a passionate protest—his *Discourse on Arts and Sciences* (1749)—Rousseau denounced learning as the badge of selfishness and corruption, for it was used to gratify the pride and childish curiosity of the rich, rather than to right the wrongs of the poor.

In fact, it were better, he contended, that all men should be savages, than that a few of the most cunning, cruel, and greedy should make slaves of the rest. His love of nature, his contempt for the silly showiness and shallow hypocrisy of eighteenth−century society, made the idea a favorite one. He loved to dream of the times [Footnote: It must be confessed that here Rousseau was dreaming of times that probably never existed.] when men were all free and equal, when nobody claimed to own the land which God had made for all, when there were no wars to kill, no taxes to oppress, no philosophers to deceive the people.

In an essay inquiring *What is the Origin of Inequality among Men* (1753), Rousseau sought to show how vanity, greed, and selfishness had found lodgment in the hearts of these "simple savages," how the strongest had fenced off plots of land for themselves and forced the weak to acknowledge the right of private property. This, said Rousseau, was the real origin of inequality among men, of the tyranny of the strong over the weak; and this law of private property "for the profit of a few ambitious men, subjected thenceforth all the human race to labor, servitude, and misery."

The idea was applied to government in a treatise entitled the *Social Contract* (1761). The "social−contract" theory was not new, but Rousseau made it famous. He taught that government, law, and social conventions were the outcome of an agreement or contract by which at the misty dawn of history all members of the state had voluntarily bound themselves. All governments exercised their power in last analysis by virtue of this social contract, by will of the people. Laws, therefore, should be submitted to popular vote. The republic is the best form of government, because it is the most sensitive to the desires of the people. This idea of "popular sovereignty," or rule of the people, was in men's minds when they set up a republic in France fourteen years after the death of Rousseau.

Rousseau's cry, "Back to nature," had still another aspect. He said that children should be allowed to follow their natural inclinations, instead of being driven to study. They should learn practical, useful things, instead of Latin and Greek. "Let them learn what they must do when they are men, and not what they must forget."

It is hard to fix limits to the influence of Rousseau's writings. True, both the orthodox Catholics and the philosophical Deists condemned him. But his followers were many, both bourgeois and noble. "Back to nature" became the fad of the day, and court ladies pretended to live a "natural" life and to go fishing. His theory of the social contract, his contention that wealth should not be divided among a few, his idea that the people should rule themselves,—these were to be the inspiration of the republican stage of the French Revolution, and in time to permeate all Europe.

[Sidenote: Beccaria]

The spirit of reform was applied not only against the clergy, the nobles, the monarchy, and faulty systems of law and education, but likewise to the administration of justice. Hitherto the most barbarous "punishments" had been meted out. A pickpocket might be hung for stealing a couple of shillings [Footnote: In England.]; for a more serious offense the criminal might have his bones broken and then be laid on his back on a cart−wheel, to die in agony while crowds looked on and jeered. In a book entitled *Crimes and Punishments* (1764), an Italian marquis of the name of Beccaria (1738−1794) held that such punishments were not only brutal and barbarous, but did not serve to prevent crimes as effectually as milder sentences, promptly and surely administered. Beccaria's ideas are the basis of our modern laws, although the death penalty still lingers in a few cases.

[Sidenote: Political Economy: the Physiocrats]

In yet another sphere—that of economics—philosophers were examining the old order of things, and asking, as ever, "Is it reasonable?" As we have repeatedly observed, most governments had long followed the mercantilist plan more or less consistently. But in the eighteenth century, Francois Quesnay, a bourgeois physician at the court of Louis XV, announced to his friends that mercantilism was all wrong. He became the center of a little group of philosophers who called themselves "economists," and who taught that a nation's wealth comes from farming and mining; that manufacturers and traders produce nothing new, but merely exchange or transport commodities. The manufacturers and merchants should therefore be untaxed and unhampered. *Laissez− faire*—"Let them do as they will." Let the farmers pay the taxes. The foremost disciple of *laisser−faire* in France was Turgot (1727−1781). As minister of finance under Louis XVI he attempted to abolish duties and restrictions on commerce, but his efforts

were only partially successful.

[Sidenote: Adam Smith]

Meanwhile, a Scotchman, who had visited France and had known Quesnay, was conveying the new ideas across the Channel. It was Adam Smith, the “father of political economy.” Smith was quite in harmony with the philosophic spirit, with its “natural rights,” “natural religion,” and “natural laws.” He was a professor of “moral philosophy" in the University of Glasgow, and as an incident of his philosophical speculations, he thought out a system of political economy, *i.e.* , the “laws” by which a nation might increase its wealth, on the lines suggested by Quesnay. Adam Smith's famous book *The Wealth of Nations* appeared in 1776, the year of American independence. It was a declaration of independence for industry. Let each man, each employer of labor, each seller of merchandise follow his own personal business interests without let or hindrance, for in so doing he is “led by an invisible hand” to promote the good of all. Let the government abolish all monopolies, [Footnote: He was somewhat inconsistent in approving joint−stock monopolies and shipping regulations.] all restrictions on trade, all customs duties, all burdens on industry. Thus only can the true wealth of a nation be promoted.

Smith's opinions were so plausible and his arguments so ingenious that his doctrines steadily gained in influence, and in the first half of the nineteenth century pretty generally triumphed. In actual practice the abolition of restrictions on industry was destined to give free rein to the avarice and cruelty of the most selfish employers, to enrich the bourgeoisie, and to leave the lower classes more miserable than ever. The “Wealth of Nations” was to be the wealth of the bourgeoisie. But meanwhile, it was to destroy mercantilism.

[Sidenote: Conclusion]

We have now completed our survey of the social, religious, and intellectual conditions in the Europe of the eighteenth century. Before our eyes have passed poverty−stricken peasants plowing their fields, prosperous merchants who demand power, frivolous nobles squandering their lives and fortunes, worldly bishops neglecting their duties, humble priests remaining faithful, sober Quakers refusing to fight, earnest astronomers who search the skies, sarcastic Deists who scoff at priests, and bourgeois philosophers who urge reform. The procession is not quite done. Last of all come the kings in their royal ermine and ministers in robes of state. To them we dedicate a new chapter. It will be the last occasion on which kings will merit such detailed attention.

ADDITIONAL READING

GENERAL SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN EIGHTEENTH−CENTURY EUROPE. Brief outlines: J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe*, Vol. I (1907), ch. viii, ix; H. E. Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe, 1763−1815* (1914), ch. i, iii; Clive Day, *History of Commerce* (1907). More detailed accounts: *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VI; and *Histoire generale*, Vol. VII, ch. xiii−xvii. The most scholarly and exhaustive study of social conditions is that of Maxime Kovalevsky, *Die oekonomische Entwicklung Europas bis zum Beginn der kapitalistischen Wirtschaftsform* , trans. into German from Russian by Leo Motzkin, 7 vols. (1901−1914), especially Vols. VI, VII.

FRENCH SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION. Shailer Mathews, *The French Revolution* (reprint, 1912), ch. i−v, a clear summary; E. J. Lowell, *The Eve of the French Revolution* (1892), probably the best introduction in English; Alexis de Tocqueville, *The State of Society in France before the Revolution of 1789*, Eng. trans. by Henry Reeve, 3d ed. (1888), a brilliant and justly famous work; H. A. Taine, *The Ancient Regime*, Eng. trans. by John Durand, new rev. ed. (1896), another very celebrated work, better on the literary and philosophical aspects of the Old Regime than on the economic; Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la Revolution francaise, Vol. I (1885) of this monumental history is an able presentation of French social conditions in the eighteenth century; Arthur Young, Travels in France, 1787, 1788, and 1789, valuable observations of a contemporary English gentleman−farmer on conditions in France, published in several editions, notably in the Bohn Library. Detailed treatises in French: Histoire de France, Vol. IX, Part I (1910), Regne de Louis XVI, 1774−1789, by H. Carre, P. Sagnac, and E. Lavisse, especially livres III, IV; Emile Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrieres et de l'industrie en France avant 1789, Vol. II (1901), livre VII; Maxime Kovalevsky, La France economique et sociale a la veille de la Revolution, 2 vols. (1909− 1911), an admirable study of common life both rural and urban; Georges d'Avenel, Histoire economique de la propriete, des salaires, etc., 1200−1800, 6 vols. (1894−1912), elaborate treatments of such topics as money, land, salaries, the wealthy and bourgeois classes, the growth of private expenses, etc.; Albert Babeau's careful monographs on many phases of the Old Regime, such as Les voyageurs en France (1885), La ville (1884), La vie rurale (1885), Les artisans et les domestiques (1886), Les*

*bourgeois (1886), La vie militaire, 2 vols. (1890), Le village (1891), La province, 2 vols. (1894); Nicolas Kareiev, Les paysans et la question paysanne en France dans le dernier quart du XVIIIe siecle, Fr. trans. (1899); Edme Champion, La France d'apres les cahiers de 1789 (1897). Also see books listed under THE FRENCH MONARCHY, 1743−1789, p. 463, below.*

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# CHAPTER XIV. EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

[Sidenote: General]

In the foregoing chapter we have seen how the social structure of the eighteenth century rested on injustice, poverty, and suffering; we have listened to the complaints of the bourgeoisie and to their demands for reform. Philosophers might plead for reform, but only the king could grant it. For in him were vested all powers of government: he was the absolute monarch.

Such was the situation in virtually every important country in Europe. In Great Britain alone were the people even reputed to have a share in the government, and to Great Britain the Voltaires and the Montesquieus of the Continent turned for a model in politics. Let us join them in considering the peculiar organization of the British monarchy, and then we shall observe how the other governments of Europe met the demand for reform.

THE BRITISH MONARCHY

[Sidenote: England. Scotland]

In the eighteenth century, what was the British monarchy? It was, first of all, the government of England (which included Wales). Secondly, it embraced Scotland, for since 1603 Scotland and England had been subject to the same king, and in 1707 by the Act of Union the two kingdoms had been united to form the monarchy of "Great Britain," with a common king and a common Parliament.

[Sidenote: Great Britain]

The British monarchy was properly, then, the government of united England (Wales) and Scotland. But in addition the crown had numerous subordinate possessions: the royal colonies, [Footnote: The royal colonies were, in 1800: Newfoundland (1583), Barbados (1605), Bermudas (1609), Gambia (c. 1618), St. Christopher (1623), Nevis (1628), Montserrat (1632), Antigua (1632), Honduras (1638), St. Lucia (1638), Gold Coast (c. 1650), St. Helena (1651), Jamaica (1655), Bahamas (1666), Virgin Islands (1666), Gibraltar (1704), Hudson Bay Territory (1713), Nova Scotia (1713), New Brunswick (1713), Quebec, Ontario, and Prince Edward Island (1763), Dominica (17633), St. Vincent (1763), Grenada (1763), Tobago (1763), Falkland (1765), Pitcairn (1780), Straits Settlements (1786 ff.), Sierra Leone (1787), New South Wales (1788), Ceylon (1795), Trinidad (1797), and, under the East India Company, Madras (1639), Bombay (1661), and Bengal (1633−1765).] and Ireland. For these dependencies the home government appointed governors, made laws, and levied taxes, in theory at least; but they were possessions rather than integral parts of the monarchy.

[Sidenote: Ireland]

A few words should be said in explanation of the political status of Ireland under the British crown. The English kings had begun their conquests in that island as far back as the twelfth century; and by dint of much bloodshed and many efforts they had long maintained possession. In the seventeenth century Oliver Cromwell had put down a bitter revolt and had encouraged Protestant English and Scotch immigrants to settle in the north and east, taking the land from the native Irishmen, who were Roman Catholics. An Irish parliament had existed since the middle ages, but from the close of the fifteenth century its acts to be valid required the approval of the English Privy Council, and from the middle of the seventeenth century Roman Catholics were debarred from it. In 1782, however, while Great Britain was engaged in the War of American Independence, the Protestants in Ireland secured the right to make most of their own laws, and ten years later the Catholic disqualifications were removed. From 1782 to 1801, Ireland retained this half−way independence; but a Protestant minority actually controlled the Irish Parliament, incurring the dislike of the Roman Catholic Irish and of the British government, so that in 1800, following an Irish revolt, an Act of Union was passed, according to which, in 1801, Great Britain and Ireland became the United Kingdom. Thenceforth Ireland was represented by 28 peers and 100 Commoners in the Parliament of the United Kingdom (often called, carelessly, the British Parliament).

It may be said, then, that except during the brief period of Irish semi−independence (1782−1801), the British Parliament governed not only Great Britain, but Ireland and the crown colonies as well. How the British monarchy was governed, we have now to discover.

[Sidenote: The King and his Nominal Powers]

In theory the king was still the ruler of his kingdom. In his name all laws were made, treaties sealed, governmental officials appointed. Like other monarchs, he had his “Privy Councilors” to advise him, and ministers (Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State, the Lord Chancellor, etc.) to supervise various details of central administration. But this was largely a matter of form. In fact, the kings of Great Britain had lost most of their power, and retained only their dignity; they were becoming figureheads.

[Sidenote: The British Constitution]

Ever since the signing of *Magna Carta*, back in 1215, the English people had been exacting from their sovereigns written promises by which the crown surrendered certain powers. Greatest progress in this direction had been made amid those stirring scenes of the seventeenth century which have been described already in the chapter on the Triumph of Parliamentary Government in England. In addition to formal documents, there had been slowly evolved a body of customs and usages, which were almost as sacred and binding as if they had been inscribed on parchment. Taken together, these written and customary limitations on royal authority were called the “British Constitution.”

[Sidenote: Limitations on the Actual Powers of the King]

This Constitution limited the king's power in four important ways. (1) It deprived him of the right to levy taxes. For his household expenses he was now granted an allowance, called the Civil List. William III, for instance, was allowed L700,000 pounds a year. (2) The king had no right either to make laws on his own responsibility or to prevent laws being made against his will. The sovereign's prerogative to veto Parliament's bills still existed in theory, but was not exercised after the reign of Queen Anne. (3) The king had lost control of the judicial system (*i.e.*, the courts): he could not remove judges even if they gave decisions unfavorable to him; and the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 provided that any one thrown into prison should be told why, and given a fair legal trial. (4) The king could not maintain a standing army without consent of Parliament. These restrictions made Great Britain a “limited,” rather than an “absolute,” monarchy.

[Sidenote: Parliament]

The powers taken from the king were now exercised by Parliament. The constitutional conflict of the seventeenth century had left Parliament not only in enjoyment of freedom of speech for its members but with full power to levy taxes, to make laws, to remove or retain judges, and essentially to determine the policy of the government in war and in peace. Parliament had even taken upon itself on one celebrated occasion (1689) to deprive a monarch of his “divine right” to rule, to establish a new sovereign, and to decree that never again should Great Britain have a king of the Roman Catholic faith.

French philosophers who saw so much power vested in a representative body could not be too loud in their praise of “English liberty.” Had they investigated more closely, these same observers might have learned to their surprise that Parliament represented the people of Great Britain only in name.

[Sidenote: Undemocratic Character of Parliament]

As we have seen in an earlier chapter [Footnote: See above, pp. 265 f.], Parliament consisted of two legislative assemblies or “Houses,” neither one of which could make laws without the consent of the other. One of these houses, the House of Lords, was frankly aristocratic and undemocratic. Its members were the “lords spiritual”—rich and influential bishops of the Anglican Church,—and the “lords temporal,” or peers, haughty descendants of the ancient feudal nobles or haughtier heirs of millionaires recently ennobled by the king. [Footnote: A peer was technically a titled noble who possessed an hereditary seat in the House of Lords. George III created many peers: at his death there were over 300 in all.] These proud gentlemen were mainly landlords, and as a class they were almost as selfish and undemocratic as the courtiers of France.

But, the French philosopher replies, the representatives of the people are found in the lower house, the House of Commons; the peers merely give stability to the government. Let us see.

One thing at least is certain, that in the eighteenth century the majority of the people of Great Britain had no voice in choosing their “representatives.” In the country, the “knights of the shire” were supposedly elected, two for each shire or county. But a man could not vote unless he had an estate worth an annual rent of forty shillings, and, since the same amount of money would then buy a good deal more than nowadays, forty shillings was a fairly large sum. Persons who could vote were often afraid to vote independently, and frequently they sold their vote to a rich noble, so that many “knights of the shire" were practically named by the landed aristocracy, the wealthy and titled landlords.

Matters were even worse in the towns, or “boroughs.” By no means all of the towns had representation. Moreover, for the towns that did choose their two members to sit in the House of Commons, no method of election was prescribed by law; but each borough followed its own custom. In one town the aristocratic municipal corporation would choose the representatives; in another place the gilds would control the election; and in yet another city there might be a few so−called “freemen” (of course everybody was free,—“freeman” was a technical term for a member of the town corporation) who had the right to vote, and sold their votes regularly for about L5 apiece. In general the town representatives were named by a few well−to−do politicians, while the common 'prentices and journeymen worked uninterruptedly at their benches. It has been estimated that fewer than 1500 persons controlled a majority in the House of Commons.

In many places a nobleman or a clique of townsmen appointed their candidates without even the formality of an election. In other places, where rival influences clashed, bribery would decide the day. For in contested elections, the voting lasted forty days, during which time the price of votes might rise to L25 or more. Votes might be purchased with safety, too, for voting was public and any one might learn from the poll−book how each man had voted. Not infrequently it cost several thousand pounds to carry such an election.

[Sidenote: “Rotten Boroughs"]

We may summarize these evils by saying that the peasants and artisans generally were not allowed to vote, and that the methods of election gave rise to corruption. But this was not all. There was neither rhyme nor reason to be found in the distribution of representation between different sections of the country. Old Sarum had once been a prosperous village and had been accorded representation, but after the village had disappeared, leaving to view but a lonely hill, no one in England could have told why two members should still sit for Old Sarum. Nor, for that matter, could there have been much need of representation in Parliament for the sea−coast town of Dunwich. Long ago the coast had sunk and the salt−sea waves now washed the remains of a ruined town. Bosseney in Cornwall was a hamlet of three cottages, but its citizens were entitled to send two men to Parliament.

While these decayed towns and “rotten boroughs” continued to enjoy representation, populous and opulent cities like Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, and Sheffield were ignored. They had grown with the growth of industry, while the older towns had declined. Yet Parliamentary representation underwent no change from the days of Charles II to the third decade of the nineteenth century. Thus Parliament in the eighteenth century represented neither the different classes of society nor the masses of population. Politics was a gentleman's game. The nobleman who sat in the upper house had his dummies in the lower chamber. A certain Sir James Lowther had nine proteges in the lower house, who were commonly called “Lowther's Ninepins.” A distinguished statesman of the time described the position of such a protege: “He is sent here by the lord of this or the duke of that, and if he does not obey the instructions which he receives, he is held to be a dishonest man.”

[Sidenote: Parliamentary Bribery and Corruption]

Under conditions such as these it is not hard to understand how seats in Parliament were bought and sold like boxes at the opera or seats in a stock−exchange. Nor is it surprising that after having paid a small fortune for the privilege of representing the people, the worldly−wise Commoner should be willing to indemnify himself by accepting bribes, or, if perchance his tender conscience forbade monetary bribes, by accepting a government post with fat salary and few duties except to vote with the government.

[Sidenote: The Cabinet]

For many years (1714−1761) the arts of corruption were practiced with astonishing success by a group of clever Whig politicians. As has been noticed in an earlier chapter,[Footnote: See above, pp. 291 f.] it was to their most conspicuous leader, Sir Robert Walpole, that the first two Georges intrusted the conduct of affairs; and Walpole filled the important offices of state with his Whig friends. Likewise it has been noticed [Footnote: See above, p. 290.] that during the same period the idea of the cabinet system became more firmly fixed. Just as Walpole secured the appointment of his friends to the high offices of state, so subsequent statesmen put their supporters in office. The practice was not yet rigid, but it was customary for a dozen or so of the leaders of the faction in power to hold “cabinet” meetings, in which they decided in advance what measures should be presented to Parliament. If a measure indorsed by the cabinet should be defeated by the Commons, the leader of the party would normally resign, and the ministers he had appointed would follow his example. In other words, the cabinet acted in concert and resigned as a whole.

If the affairs of the government were all carried on by the cabinet, and if the cabinet depended for its support

on the majority in the House of Commons, what remained for the king to do? Obviously, very little!

[Sidenote: British Government under George III]

George I and George II had not been averse from cabinet−government: it was easy and convenient. But George III (1760−1820) was determined to make his authority felt. He wished to preside at cabinet meetings; he outbribed the Whigs; and he repeatedly asked his ministers to resign because he disliked their policies.

Besides the friends he purchased, George III possessed a considerable number of enthusiastic and conscientious supporters. The country squires and clergy who believed in the Anglican Church and looked with distrust upon the power of corrupt Whig politicians in Parliament, were quite willing that a painstaking and gentlemanly monarch should do his own ruling. Such persons formed the backbone of the Tory party and sometimes called themselves the “king's friends.” With their support and by means of a liberal use of patronage, George III was able to keep Lord North, a minister after his own heart, in power twelve years (1770−1782). But as we have learned, [Footnote: See above, pp. 332 ff.] the War of American Independence caused the downfall of Lord North, and for the next year or two, politics were in confusion. During 1782−1783 the old Whig and Tory parties [Footnote: See above, pp. 285 f.] were sadly broken up, and a new element was unmistakably infused into party− warfare by the spirit of reform.

[Sidenote: Need and Demand for Reform]

Surely, if ever a country needed reform, it was Great Britain in 1783. The country was filled with paupers maintained by the taxes; poor people might be shut up in workhouses and see their children carted off to factories; sailors were kidnapped for the royal navy; the farmhand was practically bound to the soil like a serf; over two hundred offenses, such as stealing a shilling or cutting down an apple tree, were punishable by death; religious intolerance flourished—Quakers were imprisoned and Roman Catholics were debarred from office and Parliament. And Ireland was being ruined by the selfish and obstinate minority which controlled its parliament.

But about these things English “reformers” were not much concerned. A few altruistic souls decried the traffic in black slaves, but that evil was quite far from English shores. The reform movement was chiefly directed against parliamentary corruption and received its support from the small country gentlemen who hated the great Whig owners of “pocket−boroughs,” [Footnote: Boroughs whose members were named by a political “patron.”] and from the lower and newer ranks of the bourgeoisie. For the small shop−keepers and tradesmen, and especially the rich manufacturers in new industrial towns like Birmingham, felt that Parliament did not represent their interests, and they set up a cry for pure politics and reformed representation.

[Sidenote: Wilkes]

The spirit of reform spread rapidly. In the 'sixties of the eighteenth century, John Wilkes, a squint−eyed and immoral but very persuasive editor, had raised a hubbub of reform talk. He had criticized the policy of George III, had been elected to Parliament, and, when the House of Commons expelled him, had insisted upon the right of the people to elect him, regardless of the will of the House. His admirers —and he had many—shouted for “Wilkes and Liberty,” elected him Lord Mayor of London, and enabled him to carry his point.

The founding of four newspapers furthered the reform movement. They took it upon themselves to report parliamentary debates, and along with information they spread discontent. Their activity was somewhat checked, however, by the operation of the old laws which punished libelous attacks on the king with imprisonment or exile, and also by a stamp duty of 2−1/2d. a sheet (1789).

[Sidenote: Charles James Fox]

Under the new influence a number of Whigs became advocates of reform. George III had outdone them at corruption; they now sought to reestablish their own power and Parliament's by advocating reform. Of these Whigs, Charles James Fox (1749−1806) was the most prominent. Fox had been taught to gamble by his father and took to it readily. Cards and horse−racing kept him in constant bankruptcy; many of his nights were spent in debauchery and his mornings in bed; and his close association with the rakish heir to the throne was the scandal of London. In spite of his eloquence and ability, the loose manner of his life militated against the success of Fox as a reformer. His friends knew him to be a free−hearted, impulsive sympathizer with all who were oppressed, and they entertained no doubt of his sincere wish to bring about parliamentary reform, complete religious toleration, and the abolition of the slave trade. But strangers could not easily reconcile his private life with his public words, and were antagonized by his frequent lack of political tact.

[Sidenote: The Program of Reform]

Despite drawbacks Fox furthered the cause of reform to a considerable extent. He it was who presided over a great mass meeting, held under the auspices of a reform club, at which meeting was drawn up a program of liberal reform, a program which was to be the battle−cry of British political radicals for several generations. It comprised six demands: (1) Votes for all adult males, (2) each district to have representation proportionate to its population, (3) payment of the members of Parliament so as to enable poor men to accept election, (4) abolition of the property qualifications for members of Parliament, (5) adoption of the secret ballot, and (6) Parliaments to be elected annually.

[Sidenote: William Pitt the Younger]

Such reform seemed less likely of accomplishment by Fox than by a younger statesman, William Pitt (1759−1806), second son of the famous earl of Chatham. When but seven years old, Pitt had said: “I want to speak in the House of Commons like papa.” Throughout his boyhood and youth he had kept this ambition constantly before him; he had studied, practiced oratory, and learned the arts of debate. At the age of twenty−one, he was a tall, slender, and sickly youth, with sonorous voice, devouring ambition, and sublime self−confidence. He secured a seat in the Commons as one of Sir James Lowther's “ninepins,” and speedily won the respect of the House. He was the youngest and most promising of the politicians of the day. At the outset he was a Whig.

[Sidenote: The “New Tories"]

By a combination of circumstances young Pitt was enabled to form an essentially new political party—the “New Tories.” By his scrupulous honesty and earnest advocacy of parliamentary reform, he won to his side the unrepresented bourgeoisie and the opponents of “bossism.” On the other hand, by accepting from King George III an appointment as chief minister, and holding the position in spite of a temporarily hostile majority in the House of Commons, Pitt won the respect of the Tory country squires and the clergy, who stood for the king against Parliament. And finally, being quite moral himself (if chronic indulgence in port wine be excepted), and supporting a notoriously virtuous king against corrupt politicians and against the gambling Fox, Pitt became an idol of all lovers of “respectability.”

In the parliamentary elections of 1784 Pitt won a great victory. In that year he was prime minister with loyal majorities in both Houses of Parliament, with royal favor, and with the support of popular enthusiasm. He was feasted in Grocers' Hall in London; the shopkeepers of the Strand illuminated their dwellings in his honor; and crowds cheered his carriage.

Reform seemed to be within sight. The horrors of the slave trade were mitigated, and greater freedom was given the press. Bills were introduced to abolish the representation of “rotten” boroughs and to grant representation to the newer towns.

[Sidenote: Halt of Reform in Great Britain]

It can hardly be doubted that Pitt would have gone further had not affairs in France—the French Revolution—alarmed him at the critical time and caused him fear a similar outbreak in England. [Footnote: For the effect of the French Revolution upon England, see pp. 494 f., 504.] The government and upper classes of Great Britain at once abandoned their roles as reformers, and set themselves sternly to repress anything that might savor of revolution.

[Sidenote: Conclusion]

Two important conclusions may now be drawn from our study of the British government in the eighteenth century. In the first place, despite the admiration with which the French philosophers regarded the British monarchy as a model of political liberty and freedom, it was in fact both corrupt and oppressive. Secondly, the spirit of reform seemed for a time as active and as promising in Great Britain as in France, but from the island kingdom it was frightened away by the tumult of revolution across the Channel.

THE ENLIGHTENED DESPOTS

The spirit of progress and reform had slowly made itself felt in Great Britain through popular agitation and in Parliament. On the Continent it naturally took a different turn, for there government certainly was not by Parliaments, but by sovereigns “by the Grace of God.” In France, Prussia, Austria, Spain, and Russia, therefore, the question was always, “Will his Majesty be cruel, extravagant, and unprogressive; or will he prove himself an able and liberal−minded monarch?”

[Sidenote: The Era of Benevolent Despotism on the Continent]

It happened during the eighteenth century that most of the Continental rulers were of this latter

sort—conscientious and well−meaning. On the thrones of Austria, Prussia, Spain, Portugal, Tuscany, Sardinia, Bavaria, and Sweden sat men of extraordinary ability, who sought rather the welfare of their country than careless personal pleasure.

These were the benevolent despots. They were despots, absolute rulers, countenancing no attempt to diminish royal authority, believing in government by one strong hand rather than by the democratic many. But with despotism they combined benevolence; they were anxious for the glory of their nation, and no less solicitous for the happiness and prosperity of their people. Thus the development of absolute monarchy and the rationalism of the eighteenth century united to produce the benevolent despot. For this reason the term “enlightened” (i.e., philosophical) despot is frequently applied to these autocrats who attempted to rule in the light of reason.

[Sidenote: Frederick the Great of Prussia, 1740−1786]

One of the most successful of the enlightened despots was Frederick II (the Great) of Prussia. In our chapter on the Germanies, [Footnote: See above, ch. xi.] we have seen how he fought all Europe to gain prestige and power for Prussia; we shall now see how he endeavored to apply scientific methods to the government of his own country.

With the major intellectual interests of the eighteenth century, Frederick II became acquainted quite naturally. As a boy he had been fond of reading French plays, had learned Latin against his father's will, had filled his mind with the ideas of deistic philosophers, and had seemed likely to become a dreamer instead of a ruler. But the dogged determination of his father, King Frederick William I, to make something out of Frederick besides a flute−playing, poetizing philosopher, had resulted in familiarizing him with elaborate financial reports and monotonous minutes of tiresome official transactions. Young Frederick, however, learned to like the details of administration and when he came to the throne in 1740 he was not only enlightened but industrious.

The young king had a clear conception of his duties, and even wrote a book in French about the theory of government. “The prince,” he said, “is to the nation he governs what the head is to the man; it is his duty to see, think, and act for the whole community, that he may procure it every advantage of which it is capable.” “The monarch is not the absolute master, but only the first servant of the state.” Frederick was indeed the first servant of Prussia, rising at five in the morning, working on official business until eleven o'clock, and spending the afternoon at committee meetings or army reviews.

He set about laboriously to make Prussia the best and most governed state in Europe. He carefully watched the judges to see that they did not render wrongful decisions or take bribes. He commissioned jurists to compile the laws and to make them so simple and clear that no one would violate them through ignorance. He abolished the old practice of torturing suspected criminals to make them confess their guilt.

Education, as well as justice, claimed his attention; he founded elementary schools, so that as many as possible of his subjects could learn at least to read and write. In religious affairs, Frederick allowed great individual liberty; for he was a deist, and, like other deists of the time, believed in religious toleration.

More important even than justice, education, and toleration, he considered the promotion of material prosperity among his people. He would have considered himself a failure, had his reign not meant “good times” for farmers and merchants. He encouraged industry. He fostered the manufacture of silk. He invited thrifty farmers to move from other countries and to settle in Prussia. He built canals. Marshes were drained and transformed into rich pasture−land. If war desolated a part of the country, then, when peace was concluded, Frederick gave the farmers seed and let them use his war−horses before the plow. He advised landlords to improve their estates by planting orchards; and he encouraged peasants to grow turnips as fodder for cattle. Much was done to lighten the financial burdens of the peasantry, for (as Frederick himself declared) if a man worked all day in the fields, “he should not be hounded to despair by tax−collectors.”

Taxes were not light by any means, but everybody knew that the king was not squandering the money. Frederick was not a man to lavish fortunes on worthless courtiers; he diligently examined all accounts; and his officials dared not be extravagant for fear of being corporally punished, or, what was worse, of being held up to ridicule by the cruel wit of their royal master.

It was only this marvelous economy and careful planning that enabled Prussia to support an army of 200,000 men and to embark upon a policy of conquest, by which Silesia and a third of Poland were won. On the army alone Frederick was willing to spend freely, but even in this department he made sure that Prussia received its money's worth. Tireless drill, strict discipline, up−to−date arms, and well−trained officers made the Prussian army

the envy and terror of eighteenth−century Europe.

In dwelling upon his seemingly successful attempts to govern in the light of reason and common sense, we have almost forgotten Frederick's love of philosophy. Let us recur to it before we take leave of him; for benevolent despotism was only one side of the philosophical monarch. He liked to play his flute while thinking how to outwit Maria Theresa; he delighted in making witty answers to tiresome reports and petitions; he enjoyed sitting at table with congenial companions discussing poetry, science, and the drama. True, he did not encourage the rising young German poets Lessing and Goethe. He thought their work vulgar and uninspired. But he invited literary Frenchmen to come to Berlin, and he put new life into the Berlin Academy of Science. Even Voltaire was for a time a guest at Frederick's court, and the amateurish poems written in French by the Prussian king were corrected by the “prince of philosophers.”

[Sidenote: Catherine the Great of Russia, 1762−1796]

While Frederick was demonstrating that “the prince is but the first servant of the state,” Catherine II was playing the enlightened despot in Russia. In the course of her remarkable career, [Footnote: See above, pp. 380 ff.] Catherine found time to write flattering letters to French philosophers, to make presents to Voltaire, and to invite Diderot to tutor her son. She posed, too, as a liberal−minded monarch, willing to discuss the advisability of giving Russia a written constitution, or of emancipating the serfs. Schools and academies were established, and French became the language of polite Russian society.

At heart Catherine was little moved by desire for real reform or by pity for the peasants. She had the heavy whip—the knout—applied to the bared backs of earnest reformers. Her court was scandalously immoral, and she violated the conventions of matrimony without a qualm. For some excuse or another, the promised constitution was never written, and the lot of the serfs tended to become actually worse. To the governor of Moscow, the tsarina wrote: “My dear prince, do not complain that the Russians have no desire for instruction; if I institute schools, it is not for us,—it is for Europe, where we must keep our position in public opinion. But the day when our peasants shall wish to become enlightened, both you and I will lose our places.” This shows clearly that while Catherine wished to be considered an enlightened despot, she was at heart quite the reverse. Her true character was not to be made manifest until the outbreak of the French Revolution, and then Catherine of Russia was to preach a crusade against reform.

[Sidenote: Charles III of Spain, 1759−1788]

There were other benevolent despots, however, who were undoubtedly sincere. Charles III, with able ministers, made many changes in Spain. [Footnote: Charles III had previously been king of Naples (1735−1759) and had instituted many reforms in that kingdom] The Jesuits were suppressed; the exaggerated zeal of the Inquisition was effectually checked; police were put on the streets of Madrid; German farmers were encouraged to settle in Spain; roads and canals were built; manufactures were fostered; science was patronized; and the fleet was nearly doubled. When Charles III died, after a reign of almost thirty years, the revenues of Spain had tripled, and its population had increased from seven to eleven millions.

[Sidenote: Joseph I of Portugal, 1750−1777]

Charles's neighbor, Joseph I of Portugal, possessed in the famous Pombal a minister who was both a typical philosopher and an active statesman. Under his administration, industry, education, and commerce throve in Portugal as in Spain. Gustavus III (1771−1792) of Sweden similarly made himself the patron of industry and the friend of the workingman. In Italy, the king of Sardinia was freeing his serfs, while in Tuscany several important reforms were being effected by Duke Leopold, a younger brother of the Habsburg emperor, Joseph II.

[Sidenote: Joseph II of Austria, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire]

Joseph II, archduke of Austria and emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, carried the theory of enlightened despotism to its greatest lengths. He was at once the most enthusiastic and the most unsuccessful of all the benevolent despots. In him is to be observed the most striking example of the aims, and likewise the weaknesses, of this generation of philosopher−kings.

[Sidenote: His Heritage from Maria Theresa]

Before we consider Joseph's career, it is important to understand what his mother, Maria Theresa (1740−1780), had already done for the Habsburg realms. We are familiar with her brave conduct in defense of her hereditary lands against the unscrupulous ambition of Frederick the Great. [Footnote: See above ch. xi.] For her loss of Silesia she had obtained through the partition of Poland some compensation in Galicia and Moldavia. Her

domestic policy is of present concern.

The troops furnished by vote of provincial assemblies, she welded together into a national army. German became the official language of military officers; and a movement was begun to supplant Latin by German in the civil administration. The privileges of religious orders were curtailed in the interest of strong government; and the papal bull suppressing the Jesuits was enforced. The universities were remodeled; and the elaborate system of elementary and secondary schools, then established, survived with but little change until 1869.

Maria Theresa had begun reform along most of the lines which her son was to follow. But in two important particulars she was unlike him and unlike the usual enlightened despot. In the first place, she was politic rather than philosophical. She did not attempt wholesale reforms, or blindly follow fine theories, but introduced practical and moderate measures in order to remedy evils. She was very careful not to offend the prejudices or traditions of her subjects. Secondly, Maria Theresa was a devout Roman Catholic. Love of her subjects was not a theory with her,—it was a religious duty. A cynical Frederick the Great might laugh at conscience, and to a Catherine morality might mean nothing; but Maria Theresa remained an ardent Christian in an age of unbelief and a pure woman when loose living was fashionable.

[Sidenote: Policies and Plans of Joseph II, 1780−1790]

Her eldest son, Joseph II, [Footnote: Holy Roman Emperor (1765−1790), and sole ruler of the Habsburg dominions (1780−1790).] was brought up a Roman Catholic, and although strongly influenced by Rousseau's writings, never seceded from the Church. But neither religion nor expediency was his guiding principle. He said, “I have made Philosophy the legislator of my Empire: her logical principles shall transform Austria.”

There was something very noble in the determination of the young ruler to do away with all injustice, to relieve the oppressed, and to lift up those who had been trampled under foot. His ambition was to make Austria a strong, united, and prosperous kingdom, to be himself the benefactor of his people, to protect the manufacturer, and to free the serf. Austria was to be remodeled as Rousseau would have wished—except in respect of Rousseau's basic idea of popular sovereignty.

It is a pity that Joseph II cannot be judged simply by his good intentions, for he was quite unfitted to carry out wholesome reforms. He had derived his ideas from French philosophers rather than from actual life; he was so sure that his theories were right that he would take no advice; he was impatient and would brook no delay in the wholesale application of his theories. Regardless of prejudice, regardless of tradition, regardless of every consideration of political expediency, he rushed ahead on the path of reform.

To Joseph II it mattered not that Austria had long been the stronghold and her rulers the champions of Catholic Christianity. He insisted that no papal bulls should be published in his dominions without his own authorization; he nominated the bishops; he confiscated church lands. Side altars and various emblems were removed from the churches, not because they were useless, for humble Christians still prayed to their God before such altars, but because the emperor thought side altars were signs of superstition. The old and well−loved ceremonies were altered at his command. Many monasteries were abolished. The clergy were to be trained in schools controlled by the emperor. And, to cap the climax, heretics and Jews were to be not only tolerated, but actually given the same rights as orthodox Catholics.

Many of these measures were no doubt desirable, and one or two of them might have been accomplished without causing much disturbance, but by trying to reform everything at once, Joseph only shocked and angered the clergy and such of his people as piously loved their religion.

His political policies, which were no more wisely conceived or executed, were three in number. (1) He desired to extend his possessions eastward to the Black Sea and southward to the Adriatic, while the distant Netherlands might conveniently be exchanged for near−by Bavaria. (2) He wished to get rid of all provincial assemblies and other vestiges of local independence, and to have all his territories governed uniformly by officials subject to himself. (3) He aimed to uplift the lower classes of his people, and to put down the proud nobles, so that all should be equal and all alike should look up to their benevolent, but all−powerful, ruler.

The first of these policies brought him only disastrous wars. His designs on Bavaria were frustrated by Frederick the Great, who posed as the protector of the smaller German states. In the Balkan peninsula his armies fought much and gained little.

His administrative policy was as unfortunate as his territorial ambition. Maria Theresa had taken some steps to simplify the administration of her heterogeneous dominions, but she had wisely allowed Hungary, Lombardy, and

the Netherlands to preserve certain of the traditions and formulas of self−government, and she did everything to win the loyalty and confidence of her Hungarian subjects. Joseph, on the other hand, carried the sacred crown of St. Stephen—treasured by all Hungarians—to Vienna; abolished the privileges of the Hungarian Diet, or congress; and with a stroke of the pen established a new system of government. He divided his lands into thirteen provinces, each under a military commander. Each province was divided into districts or counties, and these again into townships. There would be no more local privileges but all was to be managed from Vienna. The army was henceforth to be on the Prussian model, and the peasants were to be forced to serve their terms in it. German was to be the official language throughout the Habsburg realm. This was all very fine on paper, but in practice it was a gigantic failure. The Austrian Netherlands rose in revolt rather than lose their local autonomy; the Tyrol did likewise; and angry protests came from Hungary. Local liberties and traditions could not be abolished by an imperial decree.

Finally, in his attempts to reconstruct society, Joseph came to grief. He directed that all serfs should become free men, able to marry without the consent of their lord, privileged to sell their land and to pay a fixed rent instead of being compelled to labor four days a week for their lord. Nobles and peasants alike were to share the burdens of taxation, all paying 13 per cent on their land. Joseph intended still further to help the peasantry, for, he said "I could never bring myself to skin two hundred good peasants to pay one do−nothing lord more than he ought to have." He planned to give everybody a free elementary education, to encourage industry, and to make all his subjects prosperous and happy.

[Sidenote: Failure of Joseph II]

But the peasants disliked compulsory military service and misunderstood his reforms; the nobles were not willing to be deprived of their feudal rights; the bourgeoisie was irritated by his blundering attempts to encourage industry; the clergy preached against his religious policy. He reigned only ten years; yet he was hated by many and loved by none; he had met defeat abroad, and at home his subjects were in revolt.

Little wonder that as he lay dying (1790) with hardly friend or relative near to comfort him, the discouraged reformer should have sighed: "After all my trouble, I have made but few happy, and many ungrateful." He directed that most of his "reforms" should be canceled, and proposed as an epitaph for himself the gloomy sentence: "Here lies the man who, with the best intentions, never succeeded in anything." [Footnote: The epitaph was not quite true. The serfs in Austria retained at least part of the liberty he had granted.]

[Sidenote: Weakness of Benevolent Despotism]

Joseph II was not the only benevolent despot who met with discouragement. The fatal weakness of "enlightened despotism" was its failure to enlist the sympathy and support of the people. Absolute rulers like Joseph II tried to force reforms on their peoples whether the reforms were popularly desired or not. As a result, few of their measures were lasting, and ingratitude was uniformly their reward.

If all kings had possessed the supreme ability and genius of a Frederick the Great, enlightened despotism might still be in vogue. The trouble was that even well−meaning monarchs like Joseph II were unpractical; and many sovereigns were not even well−meaning. In Prussia, the successor of Frederick the Great, King Frederick William II, had neither ability nor character; his weak rule undid the work of Frederick. The same thing happened in other countries: weakness succeeded ability, extravagance wasted the fruits of economy, and corruption ruined the work of reform. Absolute monarchy without good intentions proved terribly oppressive.

THE FRENCH MONARCHY

In no country was the evil side of absolutism exhibited so unmistakably as in France. During the eighteenth century the French government went from bad to worse, until at last it was altered not by peaceful reform but by violent revolution.

[Sidenote: French People better off than their Neighbors]

As far as their actual condition was concerned, the people of France were, on the whole, better off than most Germans or Italians. Next to England, France had the most numerous, prosperous, and intelligent middle class; and her peasants were slightly above the serfs of other Continental countries. But the very fact that in material well−being they were a little better off than their neighbors, made the French people more critical of their government. The lower classes had not all been ground down until they were mere slaves without hope or courage; on the contrary, there were many sturdy farmers and thrifty artisans who hoped for better days and bitterly resented inequalities in society and abuses in the government. The bourgeoisie was even less inclined to

bow to tyranny; it was numerous, intelligent, wealthy, and influential; it could see the mistakes of the royal administration and was hopeful of gaining a voice in the government. Thus, the people of France were keener to feel wrongs and to resent the injustice of undutiful monarchs.

Let us glance at the crying abuses in the French state of the eighteenth century, and then we shall understand how great was the guilt of that pleasure−loving despot—Louis XV (1715−1774).

[Sidenote: The Administration] [Sidenote: The King]

The French administrative system was confused and oppressive. In theory, it was quite simple—the government was the king. As Louis XV haughtily remarked: “The sovereign authority is vested in my person... the legislative power exists in myself alone... my people are one only with me; national rights and national interests are necessarily combined with my own and only rest in my hands.”

But in practice, the king could not alone make laws, keep order, and collect taxes, especially when he spent whole days hunting or gambling. He contented himself with spending the state money, getting into wars, and occasionally interfering with the work of his ministers. And it was necessary to intrust the actual conduct of affairs to a complicated system or no−system of royal officials.

[Sidenote: The Royal Council]

The highest rung in the ladder of officialdom was the Royal Council. It was composed of the half dozen chief ministers and about thirty councilors who helped their chiefs to supervise the affairs of the kingdom,—issuing decrees, conferring on foreign policy, levying taxes, and acting on endless reports from local officials.

[Sidenote: Local Administration. The Intendants]

The Royal Council had numerous local representatives. There were the bailiffs and seneschals, whose actual powers had quite disappeared, but whose offices served to complicate matters. Then there were the governors of provinces, well−fed gentlemen with fat salaries and little to do. The bulk of local administration fell into the hands of the intendants and their sub−delegates. Each of the thirty−four intendants —the so−called “Thirty Tyrants of France”—was appointed by the king's ministers and was like a petty despot in his district (*generalite* ).

The powers of the intendant were extensive. He decided what share of the district taxes each village and taxpayer should bear. He had his representatives in each parish of his district, and through them he supervised the police, the preservation of order, and the recruiting of the army. He relieved the poor in bad seasons. The erection of a church, or the repair of a town hall, needed his sanction. When the Royal Council ordered roads to be built, it was the intendant and his men who directed the work and called the peasants out to do the labor. With powers such as these, it was little wonder that the intendant was called *Monseigneur*—“My lord.”

[Sidenote: The Parlement of Paris]

The system of Royal Council, intendants, and sub−intendants would have been comparatively simple, had it not been complicated by the presence of numerous other political bodies, each of which claimed certain customary powers. First of all, there was the *Parlement*, or supreme court, of Paris, primarily a judicial body which registered the royal decrees. If the Parlement disliked a decree, it might refuse to register it, until the king should hold a “bed of justice”—that is, should formally summon the Parlement and in person command it to register his decree.

[Sidenote: Provincial Estates]

Then there were provincial “Estates,” or assemblies, in a few of the provinces. [Footnote: Such provinces were called *pays d'etat* and included Brittany, Languedoc, Provence, Roussillon, Dauphine, Burgundy, Franche Comte, Alsace, Lorraine, Artois, Flanders, Corsica, etc. The local assemblies in these *pays d'etat* were by no means representative of all the inhabitants. The remaining provinces, in which no vestiges of provincial self−government survived, were called *pays d'election*: they included Ile de France, Orleanais, Champagne and Brie, Maine, Anjou, Poitou, Guyenne and Gascony, Limousin, Auvergne, Lyonnais, Bourbonnais, Touraine, Normandy, Picardy, etc.] These bodies, survivals of the middle ages, did not make laws but had a voice in the apportionment of taxes among the parishes of the province, and exercised powers of supervision over road−building and the collection of taxes.

[Sidenote: Town Councils]

The government of the towns was peculiar. The old gilds, now including only a small number of the wealthiest burghers, elected a Town Council, which managed the property of the town, appointed tax−collectors, saw that the town hall was kept in repair, and supervised the collection of customs duties on goods brought into

the town. It is easy to perceive how the Town Council and the intendant would have overlapping powers, and how considerable confusion might arise, especially since in different towns the nature and the powers of the Town Council differed widely. Matters were complicated still further by the fact that the mayors of the towns were not elected by the council, but appointed by the crown.

In rural districts there was a trace of the same conflict between the system of intendants and the survivals of local self−government. Summoned by the clanging church bell, all the men of the village met on the village green. And the simple villagers, thus gathered together as a town meeting or communal assembly, might elect collectors of the *taille*, or might perhaps petition the intendant to repair the parsonage or the bridge.

[Sidenote: Confusion in Administration]

Possibly the reader may now begin to realize that confusion was a prime attribute of the French administrative system. The common people were naturally bewildered by the overlapping functions of Royal Council, Parlement, provincial estates, governors, bailiffs, intendants, subintendants, mayors, town councils, and village assemblies. The system, or lack of system, gave rise to corruption and complication without insuring liberty. The most trivial affairs were regulated by overbearing and exacting royal officials. Everything depended upon the honesty and industry or upon the meanness and caprice of these officials. Each petty officer transmitted long reports to his superior; but the general public was kept in the dark about official matters, and was left to guess, as best it could, the reasons for the seemingly unreasonable acts of the government. If an intendant increased the taxes on a village, the ignorant inhabitants blamed it upon official “graft” or favoritism. Or, if hard times prevailed, or if a shaky bridge broke down, the villagers were prone in any case to find fault with the government, for the more mysterious and powerful the government was, the more likely was it to bear the blame for all ills.

Confusion in administrative offices was not the only confusion in eighteenth−century France. There was no uniformity or simplicity in standards of weight and measure, in coinage, in tolls, in internal customs−duties. But worst of all were the laws and the courts of justice.

[Sidenote: Confusion in Laws]

What was lawful in one town was often illegal in a place not five miles distant. Almost four hundred sets or bodies of law were in force in different parts of France. In some districts the old Roman laws were still retained; elsewhere laws derived from early German tribes were enforceable. Many laws were not even in writing; and such as were written were more often in Latin than in French. The result was that only unusually learned men knew the law, and common people stumbled along in the dark. The laws, moreover, were full of injustice and cruelty. An offender might have his hand or ear cut off, or his tongue torn out; he might be burned with red−hot irons or have molten lead poured into his flesh. Hanging was an easy death compared to the lingering torture of having one's bones broken on a wheel.

[Sidenote: Confusion in Law Courts]

The courts were nearly as bad as the laws. There were royal courts, feudal courts, church courts, courts of finance, and military courts; and it was a wise offender who knew before which court he might be tried. Extremely important cases might be carried on appeal to the highest courts of the realm—the Parlements—of which there were thirteen, headed in honor by that of Paris.

[Sidenote: Prevalence of Injustice]

Although courts were so plenteous, justice was seldom to be found. Persons wrongfully accused of crime were tortured until they confessed deeds they had never committed. The public was not admitted to trials, so no one knew on what grounds the sentence was passed, and the judge gave no reason for his verdict. Civil lawsuits were appealed from court to court and might drag on for years until the parties had spent all their money. Lawyers were more anxious to extract large fees from their clients than to secure justice for them.

[Sidenote: “Noblesse de la Robe"]

Confused laws and conflicting jurisdictions were often made worse by the character of the judges who presided over royal courts. Many of them were rich bourgeois who had purchased their appointment from the king. For a large price it was possible to buy a judgeship or seat in a Parlement, not only for a lifetime but as an hereditary possession. It has been estimated that 50,000 bourgeois families possessed such judicial offices: they formed a sort of lower nobility, exempted from certain taxes and very proud of their honors. Naturally envious were his neighbors when the “councilor” appeared in his grand wig and his enormous robe of silk and velvet, attended by a page who kept the robe from trailing in the dust. No wonder these bourgeois judges were called “the

nobility of the robe."

In some way or other the "noble of the robe" had to compensate himself for the price of his office and the cost of his robe. One bought an office for profit as well as for honor. For to the judge were paid the court fees and fines; and no shrewd judge would let a case pass him without exacting some kind of a fee. Even more profitable were the indirect gains. If Monsieur A had gained his case in court, it was quite to be expected that in his joy Monsieur A would make a handsome present to the judge who had given the decision. At least, that is the way the judge would have put it. As a plain matter of fact the judges were bribed, and justice was too often bought and sold like judgeships.

[Sidenote: Abuses in the Army]

Corruption and abuses were not confined to the civil government and the courts of law; the army, too, was infected. In the ranks were to be found hired foreigners, unwilling peasants dragged from their farms, and the scum of the city slums. Thousands deserted every year. Had the discontented troops been well commanded, they might still have answered the purpose. But such was not the case. There were certainly enough officers—an average of one general for every 157 privates. But what officers they were! Dissolute and dandified generals drawing their pay and never visiting their troops, lieutenants reveling in vice, instead of drilling and caring for their commands. Noble blood, not ability, was the qualification of a commander. Counts, who had never seen a battlefield, were given military offices, and the seven−year−old Duc de Frousac was a colonel.

[Sidenote: Confusion in Finance]

Confused administration, antiquated laws, corrupt magistrates, and a disorganized army showed the weakness of the French monarchy; but financial disorders threatened its very existence,—for a government out of money is as helpless as a fish out of water.

The destructive wars, costly armies, luxurious palaces, and extravagant court of Louis XIV had left to the successors of the Grand Monarch many debts, an empty treasury, and an overtaxed people. If ever there was need of care and thrift, it was in the French monarchy in the eighteenth century.

Yet the king's ministers did not even trouble themselves to keep orderly accounts. Bills and receipts were carelessly laid away; no one knew how much was owed or how much was to be expected by the treasury; and even the king himself could not have told how much he would run into debt during the year. While it lasted, money was spent freely.

[Sidenote: Royal Revenue]

The amount of money required by the king would have made taxes very heavy anyway, but bad methods of assessment and collection added to the burden. The royal revenue was derived chiefly from three sources: the royal domains, the direct taxes, and the indirect taxes. From the royal domains, the lands of which the king was landlord as well as sovereign, a considerable but ever−diminishing income was derived.

[Sidenote: Direct Taxes] [Sidenote: The Income Tax] [Sidenote: The Poll Tax]

The direct taxes were the prop of the treasury, for they could be increased to meet the demand, at least as long as the people would pay. There were three direct taxes—the *taille*, the *capitation* , and the *vingtieme*. The *vingtieme*, or "twentieth," was a tax on incomes—5 per cent [Footnote: Five per cent in theory; in practice in the reign of Louis XVI it was 11 per cent] on the salary of the judge, on the rents of the noble, on the earning of the artisan, on the produce of the peasant. The clergy were entirely exempted from this tax; the more influential nobles and bourgeois contrived to have their incomes underestimated, and the burden fell heaviest on the poorer classes. *Capitation* was a general poll or head tax, varying in amount according to whichever of twenty−two classes claimed the individual taxpayer. Maid−servants, for example, paid annually three *livres* and twelve *sous*. [Footnote: A *livre* was worth about a *franc* (20 cents) and a *sou* was equivalent to one cent.]

[Sidenote: The Taille or Land Tax]

The most important and hated direct tax was the *taille* or land tax,—practically a tax on peasants alone. The total amount to be raised was apportioned among the intendants by the Royal Council, and by the intendants among the villages of their respective districts. At the village assembly collectors were elected, who were thereby authorized to demand from each villager a share of the tax, according to his ability to pay. As a result of this method, each villager tried to appear poor so as to be taxed lightly; whole villages looked run−down in order to be held for only a small share; and influential politicians often obtained alleviation for parts of the country.

[Sidenote: Indirect Taxes] [Sidenote: "Tax Farming"]

The indirect taxes were not so heavy, but they were bitterly detested. There were taxes on alcohol, metal−ware, cards, paper, and starch, but most disliked of all was that on salt (the *gabelle*). Every person above seven years of age was supposed annually to buy from the government salt−works seven pounds of salt at about ten times its real value. [Footnote: It should be understood, of course, that the *gabelle* was higher and more burdensome in some provinces than in others.] Only government agents could legally sell salt, and smugglers were fined heavily or sent to the galleys. These indirect taxes were usually "farmed out," that is, in return for a lump sum the government would grant to a company of speculators the right to collect what they could. These speculators were called "farmers−general,"—France could be called their farm [Footnote: Etymologically, the French word for farm (*ferme*) was not necessarily connected with agriculture, but signified a fixed sum (*firma*) paid for a certain privilege, such as that of collecting a tax.] and money its produce. And they farmed well. After paying the government, the "farmers" still had millions of francs to distribute as bribes or as presents to great personages or to retain for themselves. Thus, millions were lost to the treasury.

[Sidenote: The Burden of Taxation]

Taxes could not always be raised to cover emergencies, nor collected so wastefully. The peasants of France were crushed by feudal dues, tithes, and royal taxes. The bourgeoisie were angered by the income tax, by the indirect taxes, by the tolls and internal customs, and by the monopolistic privileges which the king sold to his favorites. How long the unprivileged classes would bear the burden of taxation, while the nobles and clergy were almost free, no one could tell; but signs of discontent were too patent to be ignored.

Louis XIV (1643−1715) at the end of his long reign perceived the danger. As the aged monarch lay on his deathbed, flushed with fever, he called his five−year−old great−grandson and heir, the future Louis XV, to the bedside and said: "My child, you will soon be sovereign of a great kingdom. Do not forget your obligations to God; remember that it is to Him that you owe all that you are. Endeavor to live at peace with your neighbors; do not imitate me in my fondness for war, nor in the exorbitant expenditure which I have incurred. Take counsel in all your actions. Endeavor to *relieve the people at the earliest possible moment*, and thus to accomplish what, unfortunately, I am unable to do myself."

[Sidenote: Louis XV, 1715−1774]

It was good advice. But Louis XV was only a boy, a plaything in the hands of his ministers. In an earlier chapter [Footnote: See above, pp. 255 f.] we have seen how under the duke of Orleans, who was prince regent from 1715 to 1723, France entered into war with Spain, and how finance was upset by speculation; and how under Cardinal Fleury, who was minister from 1726 to 1743, the War of the Polish Election (1733−1738) was fought and the War of the Austrian Succession (1740−1748) begun.

When in 1743 the ninety−year−old Cardinal Fleury died, Louis XV announced that he would be his own minister. But he was not a Frederick the Great. At the council table poor Louis "opened his mouth, said little, and thought not at all." State business seemed terribly dull, and the king left most of it to others.

But of one thing, Louis XV could not have enough—and that was pleasure. He much preferred pretty girls to pompous ministers of state, and spent most of his time with the ladies and the rest of the time either hunting or gambling. In spite of the fact that he was married, Louis very easily fell in love with a charming face; at one time he was infatuated by the duchess of Chateauroux, then by Madame de Pompadour, and later by Madame du Barry. Upon his mistresses he was willing to lavish princely presents,—he gave them estates and titles, had them live at Versailles, and criminally allowed them to interfere in politics; for their sake he was willing to let his country go to ruin.

The character of the king was reflected in his court. It became fashionable to neglect one's wife, to gamble all night, to laugh at virtue, to be wasteful and extravagant. Versailles was gay; the ladies painted their cheeks more brightly than ever, and the lords spent their fortunes more recklessly.

But Versailles was not France. France was ruined with wars and taxes. Louis XIV had said, "Live at peace with your neighbors"; but since his death four wars had been waged, culminating in the disastrous Seven Years' War (1756−1763), by which French commerce had been destroyed and the French colonies had been lost. [Footnote: The formal annexation of Lorraine in 1766 and of Corsica in 1768 afforded some crumbs of comfort for Louis XV.] Debts were multiplied and taxes increased. What with war, extravagance, and poor management, Louis XV left France a bankrupt state.

[Sidenote: Growing complaints against the French Monarchy under Louis XV]

Complaints were loud and remonstrances bitter, and Louis XV could not silence them, try as he might. Authors who criticized the government were thrown into prison: radical writings were confiscated or burned; but criticism persisted. Enemies of the government were imprisoned without trial in the Bastille by *lettres de cachet*, which were orders for arrest signed in blank by the king, who sometimes gave or sold them to his favorites, so that they, too, might have their enemies jailed. Yet the opposition to the court ever increased. Resistance to taxation centered in the Parlement of Paris. It refused to register the king's decrees, and remained defiant even after Louis XV had angrily announced that he would not tolerate interference with his prerogatives. The quarrel grew so bitter that all the thirteen Parlements of France were suppressed (1771), and in their stead new royal courts were established.

Opposition was only temporarily crushed; and Louis XV knew that graver trouble was brewing. He grew afraid to ride openly among the discontented crowds of Paris; the peasants saluted him sullenly; the treasury was empty; the monarchy was tottering. Yet Louis XV felt neither responsibility nor care. “It will surely last as long as I,” he cynically affirmed; “my successor may take care of himself.”

[Sidenote: Louis XVI, 1774−1792]

His successor was his grandson, Louis XVI (1774−1792), a weak−kneed prince of twenty years, very virtuous and well−meaning, but lacking in intelligence and will−power. He was too awkward and shy to preside with dignity over the ceremonious court; he was too stupid and lazy to dominate the ministry. He liked to shoot deer from out the palace window, or to play at lock−making in his royal carpentry shop. Government he left to his ministers.

[Sidenote: Turgot]

At first, hopes ran high, for Turgot, friend of Voltaire and contributor to the *Encyclopedia*, was minister of finance (1774−1776), and reform was in the air. Industry and commerce were to be unshackled; *laisser−faire* was to be the order of the day; finances were to be reformed, and taxes lowered. The clergy and nobles were no longer to escape taxation; taxes on food were to be abolished; the peasants were to be freed from forced labor on the roads. But Turgot only stirred up opposition. The nobles and clergy were not anxious to be taxed; courtiers resented any reduction of their pensions; tax−farmers feared the reforming minister; owners of industrial monopolies were frightened; the peasants misunderstood his intentions; and riots broke out. Everybody seemed to be relieved when, in 1776, Turgot was dismissed.

[Sidenote: Necker]

Turgot had been a theorist; his successor was a businessman. Jacques Necker was well known in Paris as a hard−headed Swiss banker, and Madame Necker's receptions were attended by the chief personages of the bourgeois society of Paris. During his five years in office (1776−1781) Necker applied business methods to the royal finances. He borrowed 400,000,000 francs from his banker friends, reformed the collection of taxes, reduced expenditures, and carefully audited the accounts. In 1781 he issued a report or “Account Rendered of the Financial Condition.” The bankers were delighted; the secrets of the royal treasury were at last common property; [Footnote: *The Compte Rendu* , as it was called in France, was really not accurate; Necker, in order to secure credit for his financial administration, made matters appear better than they actually were.] and Necker was praised to the skies.

[Sidenote: Marie Antoinette]

While Necker's Parisian friends rejoiced, his enemies at court prepared his downfall. Now the most powerful enemy of Necker's reforms and economies was the queen, Marie Antoinette. She was an Austrian princess, the daughter of Maria Theresa, and in the eyes of the French people she always remained a hated foreigner—“the Austrian,” they called her—the living symbol of the ruinous alliance between Habsburgs and Bourbons which had been arranged by a Madame de Pompadour and which had contributed to the disasters and disgrace of the Seven Years' War [Footnote: See above, pp. 358 ff]. While grave ministers of finance were puzzling their heads over the deficit, gay Marie Antoinette was buying new dresses and jewelry, making presents to her friends, giving private theatricals, attending horse−races and masked balls. The light−hearted girl−queen had little serious interest in politics, but when her friends complained of Necker's miserliness, she at once demanded his dismissal.

Her demand was granted, for the kind−hearted, well−intentioned Louis XVI could not bear to deprive his pretty, irresponsible Marie Antoinette and her charming friends,—gallant nobles of France,—of their pleasures. Their pleasures were very costly; and fresh loans could be secured by the obsequious new finance−minister,

Calonne, only at high rates of interest.

From the standpoint of France, the greatest folly of Louis XVI's reign was the ruinous intervention in the War of American Independence (1778− 1783). The United States became free; Great Britain was humbled; Frenchmen proved that their valor was equal to their chivalry; but when the impulsive Marquis de Lafayette returned from assisting the Americans to win their liberty, he found a ruined France. The treasury was on the verge of collapse. From the conclusion of the war in 1783 to the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789, every possible financial expedient was tried—in vain.

[Sidenote: The Problem of Taxation]

To tax the so−called privileged classes—the clergy and the nobles— might have helped; and successive finance ministers so counseled the king. But it was absolutely against the spirit of the "old regime." What was the good of being a clergyman or a noble, if one had no privileges and was obliged to pay taxes like the rest? To tax all alike would be in itself a revolution, and the tottering divine−right monarchy sought reform, not revolution.

[Sidenote: The Assembly of Notables, 1787]

Yet in 1786 the interest−bearing debt had mounted to $600,000,000, the government was running in debt at least $25,000,000 a year, and the treasury−officials were experiencing the utmost difficulty in negotiating new loans. Something had to be done. As a last resort, the king convened (1787) an Assembly of Notables—145 of the chief nobles, bishops, and magistrates—in the vain hope that they would consent to the taxation of the privileged and unprivileged alike. The Notables were not so self−sacrificing, however, and contented themselves with abolishing compulsory labor on the roads, voting to have provincial assemblies established, and demanding the dismissal of Calonne, the minister of finance. The question of taxation, they said, should be referred to the Estates−General. All this helped the treasury in no material way.

[Sidenote: Convocation of the Estates−General]

A new minister of finance, who succeeded Calonne,—Archbishop Lomenie de Brienne,—politely thanked the Notables and sent them home. He made so many fine promises that hope temporarily revived, and a new loan was raised. But the Parlement of Paris, which together with the other Parlements had been restored early in the reign of Louis XVI, soon saw through the artifices of the suave minister, and positively refused to register further loans or taxes. Encouraged by popular approval, the Parlement went on to draw up a declaration of rights, and to assert that subsidies could constitutionally be granted only by the nation's representatives—the ancient Estates−General. This sounded to the government like revolution, and the Parlements were again abolished. The abolition of the Parlements raised a great cry of indignation; excited crowds assembled in Paris and other cities; and the soldiers refused to arrest the judges. Here was real revolution, and Louis XVI, frightened and anxious, yielded to the popular demand for the Estates− General.

In spite of the fact that every one talked so glibly about the Estates− General and of the great things that body would do, few knew just what the Estates−General was. Most people had heard that once upon a time France had had a representative body of clergy, nobility, and commoners, somewhat like the British Parliament. But no such assembly had been convoked for almost two centuries, and only scholars and lawyers knew what the old Estates−General had been. Nevertheless, it was believed that nothing else could save France from ruin; and in August, 1788, Louis XVI, after consulting the learned men, issued a summons for the election of the Estates−General, to meet in May of the following year.

[Sidenote: Failure of Absolutism in France]

The convocation of the Estates−General was the death−warrant of divine− right monarchy in France. It meant that absolutism had failed. The king was bankrupt. No half−way reforms or pitiful economies would do now. The Revolution was at hand.

ADDITIONAL READING

THE BRITISH MONARCHY, 1760−1800. General accounts: A. L. Cross, *History of England and Greater Britain* (1914), ch. xlv, a brief resume; *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VI (1909), ch. xiii; A. D. Innes, *History of England and the British Empire*, Vol. III (1914), ch. vii−ix, xi; C. G. Robertson, *England under the Hanoverians* (1911); J. F. Bright, *History of England*, Vol. III, *Constitutional Monarchy*, 1689−1837; William Hunt, *Political History of England, 1760−1801* (1905), Tory in sympathy; and W. E. H. Lecky, *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century* , London ed., 7 vols. (1907), and *A History of Ireland in the Eighteenth Century*, 5 vols. (1893), the most complete general histories of the century. Special studies: E. and A. G. Porritt,

*The Unreformed House of Commons*, new ed., 2 vols. (1909), a careful description of the undemocratic character of the parliamentary system; J. R. Fisher, *The End of the Irish Parliament* (1911); W. L. Mathieson, *The Awakening of Scotland, 1747−1797* (1910); *Correspondence of George III with Lord North, 1768−1783*, ed. by W. B. Donne, 2 vols. (1867), excellent for illustrating the king's system of personal government; Horace Walpole, *Letters*, ed. by Mrs. P. Toynbee, 16 vols. (1903−1905), a valuable contemporary source as "Walpole is the acknowledged prince of letter writers"; G. S. Veitch, *The Genesis of Parliamentary Reform* (1913), a clear and useful account of the agitation in the time of Pitt and Fox; W. P. Hall, *British Radicalism, 1791−1797* (1912), an admirable and entertaining survey of the movement for political and social reform in England; J. H. Rose, *William Pitt and National Revival* (1911), dealing with the years 1781−1791. There are biographies of *William Pitt* (the Younger) by Lord Rosebery (1891) and by W. D. Green (1901); and *The Early Life of Charles James Fox* by Sir G. 0. Trevelyan (1880) affords a delightful picture of the life of the time. Also see books listed under ENGLISH SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, pp. 427 f., above.

THE BENEVOLENT DESPOTS. Brief general accounts: H. E. Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe, 1763−1815* (1914), ch. ii, iv, v; J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe*, Vol. I (1907), ch. x, xi; H. M. Stephens, *Revolutionary Europe, 1789−1815* (1893), ch. i; *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VI (1909), ch. xii, xviii−xx, xxii, xvi; E. F. Henderson, *A Short History of Germany*, Vol. II (1902), ch. v, excellent on Frederick the Great. With special reference to the career of Charles III of Spain: Joseph Addison, *Charles III of Spain* (1900); M. A. S. Hume, *Spain, its Greatness and Decay, 1479−1788* (1898), ch. xiv, xv; Francois Rousseau, *Regne de Charles III d'Espagne, 1759− 1788*, 2 vols. (1907), the best and most exhaustive work on the subject; Gustav Diercks, *Geschichte Spaniens von der fruhesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, 2 vols. (1895−1896), a good general history of Spain by a German scholar. On Gustavus III of Sweden: R. N. Bain, *Scandinavia, a Political History of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, from 1513 to 1900* (1905). On the Dutch Netherlands in the eighteenth century: H. W. Van Loon, *The Fall of the Dutch Republic* (1913). On Joseph II: A. H. Johnson, *The Age of the Enlightened Despot, 1660−1789* (1910), ch. x, an admirable brief introduction to the subject; *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VIII (1904), ch. xi, on Joseph's foreign policy; William Coxe (1747−1828), *History of the House of Austria*, Vol. III, an excellent account though somewhat antiquated; Franz Krones, *Handbuch der Geschichte Oesterreichs*, Vol. IV (1878), Books XIX, XX, a standard work; Karl Ritter, *Kaiser Joseph II und seine kirchlichen Reformen*; G. Holzknecht, *Ursprung und Herkunft der reformideen Kaiser Josefs II auf kirchlichem Gebiete* (1914). For further details of the projects and achievements of Frederick the Great and Maria Theresa, see bibliographies accompanying Chapter XI, above; and for those of Catherine II of Russia, see bibliography of Chapter XII, above.

THE FRENCH MONARCHY, 1743−1789. Brief general accounts: Shailer Mathews, *The French Revolution* (reprint 1912), ch. vi−viii; A. J. Grant, *The French Monarchy, 1483−1789*, Vol. II (1900), ch. xix−xxi; G. W. Kitchin, *A History of France*, Vol. III (4th ed., 1899), Book VI, ch. iii−vii; *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. VIII (1904), ch. ii− iv; E. J. Lowell, *The Eve of the French Revolution* (1892), an able survey; Sophia H. MacLehose, *The Last Days of the French Monarchy* (1901), a popular narrative. More detailed studies: J. B. Perkins, *France under Louis XV*, 2 vols. (1897), an admirable treatment; Ernest Lavisse (editor), *Histoire de France* , Vol. VIII, Part II, *Regne de Louis XV, 1715−1774* (1909), and Vol. IX, Part I, *Regne de Louis XVI, 1774−1789* (1910), the latest and most authoritative treatment in French; Felix Rocquain, *The Revolutionary Spirit Preceding the French Revolution*, condensed Eng. trans. by J. D. Hunting (1891), a suggestive account of various disorders immediately preceding 1789; Leon Say, *Turgot*, a famous little biography translated from the French by M. B. Anderson (1888); W. W. Stephens, *Life and Writings of Turgot* (1895), containing extracts from important decrees of Turgot; Alphonse Jobez, *La France sous Louis XV*, 6 vols. (1864−1873), and, by the same author, *La France sous Louis XVI*, 3 vols. (1877−1893), exhaustive works, still useful for particular details but in general now largely superseded by the *Histoire de France* of Ernest Lavisse; Charles Gomel, *Les causes financieres de la revolution francaise: les derniers controleurs generaux*, 2 vols. (1892−1893), scholarly and especially valuable for the public career of Turgot, Necker, Calonne, and Lomenie de Brienne; Rene Stourm, *Les finances de l'ancien regime et de la revolution*, 2 vols. (1885); Aime Cherest, *La chute de l'ancien regime*, 1787−1789, 3 vols. (1884−1886), a very detailed study of the three critical years immediately preceding the Revolution; F. C. von Mercy−Argenteau, *Correspondance secrete avec l'imperatrice Marie− Therese, avec les lettres de Marie−Therese et de Marie−Antoinette*, 3 vols. (1875); and *Correspondance secrete avec l'empereur Joseph II et le prince de Kaunitz*,

2 vols. (1889−1891), editions of original letters and other information which Mercy−Argenteau transmitted to Vienna from 1766 to 1790, very valuable for the contemporary pictures of court−life at Versailles (selections have been translated and published in English). Also see books listed under FRENCH SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION, p. 427, above.

# CHAPTER XV. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION INTRODUCTORY

The governments and other political institutions which flourished in the first half of the eighteenth century owed their origins to much earlier times. They had undergone only such alterations as were absolutely necessary to adapt them to various places and changing circumstances. Likewise, the same social classes existed as had always characterized western Europe; and these classes—the court, the nobles, the clergy, the bourgeoisie, the artisans, the peasants—continued to bear relations to each other which a hoary antiquity had sanctioned. Every individual was born into his class, or, as the popular phrase went, to "a station to which God had called him," and to question the fundamental divine nature of class distinctions seemed silly if not downright blasphemous.

[Sidenote: Dislocation of Society in Eighteenth Century]

Such ideas were practical so long as society was comparatively static and fixed, but they were endangered as soon as the human world was conceived of as dynamic and progressive. The development of trade and industry, as has been emphasized, rapidly increased the numbers, wealth, and influence of the bourgeoisie, or middle class, and quite naturally threw the social machine out of gear. The merchants, the lawyers, the doctors, the professors, the literary men, began to envy the nobles and clergy, and in turn were envied by the poor townsfolk and by the downtrodden peasants. With the progress of learning and study, thoughtful persons of all classes began to doubt whether the old order of politics and society was best suited to the new conditions and new relations. The "old regime" was for old needs; did it satisfy new requirements?

[Sidenote: Influence of Philosophy]

To this question the philosophers of the eighteenth century responded unequivocally in the negative. Scientists, of whom the period was full, had done much to exalt the notions that the universe is run in accordance with immutable laws of nature and that man must forever utilize his reasoning faculties. It was not long before the philosophers were applying the scientists' notions to social conditions. "Is this reasonable?" they asked, or, "Is that rational?" Montesquieu insisted that divine−right monarchy is unreasonable. Voltaire poked fun at the Church and the clergy for being irrational. Rousseau claimed that class inequalities have no basis in reason. Beccaria taught that arbitrary or cruel interference with personal liberty is not in accordance with dictates of nature or reason.

Philosophy did not directly effect a change; it was merely an expression of a growing belief in the advisability of change. It reflected a conviction, deep in many minds, that the old political institutions and social distinctions had served their purpose and should now be radically adapted to the new order. Every country in greater or less degree heard the radical philosophy, but it was in France that it was first heeded.

[Sidenote: The Revolution]

In France, between the years 1789 and 1799, occurred a series of events, by which the doctrine of democracy supplanted that of divine−right monarchy, and the theory of class distinctions gave way to that of social equality. These events, taken together, constitute what we term the French Revolution, and, inasmuch as they have profoundly affected all political thought and social action throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they are styled, by way of eminence, the Revolution.

[Sidenote: The Revolution French]

Why the Revolution started in France may be suggested by reference to certain points which have already been mentioned in the history of that country. France was the country which, above any other, had perfected the theory and practice of divine−right monarchy. In France had developed the sharpest contrasts between the various social classes. It was likewise in France that the relatively high level of education and enlightenment had given great vogue to a peculiarly destructive criticism of political and social conditions. Louis XIV had erected his absolutism and had won for it foreign glory and prestige only by placing the severest burdens upon the French people. The exploitation of the state by the selfish, immoral Louis XV had served not to lighten those burdens but rather to set forth in boldest relief the inherent weaknesses of the "old regime." And Louis XVI, despite all manner of pious wishes and good intentions, had been unable to square conditions as they were with the operation of antique institutions. One royal minister after another discovered to his chagrin that mere "reform" was worse than useless. A "revolution" would be required to sweep away the mass of abuses that in the course of centuries

had adhered to the body politic.

[Sidenote: Differences between the French and English Revolutions]

At the outset, any idea of likening the French Revolution to the English Revolution of the preceding century must be dismissed. Of course the English had put one king to death and had expelled another, and had clearly limited the powers of the crown; they had “established parliamentary government.” But the English Revolution did not set up genuine representative government, much less did it recognize the theory of democracy. Voting remained a special privilege, conferred on certain persons, not a natural right to be freely exercised by all. Nor was the English Revolution accompanied by a great social upheaval: it was in the first instance political, in the second instance religious and ecclesiastical; it was never distinctly social. To all intents and purposes, the same social classes existed in the England of the eighteenth century as in the England of the sixteenth century, and, with the exception of the merchants, in much the same relation to one another.

[Sidenote: The French Revolution in Two Periods]

How radical and far−reaching was the French Revolution in contrast to that of England will become apparent as we review the course of events in France during the decade 1789−1799. A brief summary at the close of this chapter will aim to explain the significance of the Revolution. Meanwhile, we shall devote our attention to a narrative of the main events.

The story falls naturally into two parts: First, 1789−1791, the comparatively peaceful transformation of the absolute, divine−right monarchy into a limited monarchy, accompanied by a definition of the rights of the individual and a profound change in the social order; second, 1792−1799, the transformation of the limited monarchy into a republic, attended by the first genuine trial of democracy, and attended likewise by foreign war and internal tumult. The story, in either of its parts, is not an easy one, for the reason that important roles are played simultaneously by five distinct groups of interested persons.

[Sidenote: Role of the Court and the Privileged]

In the first place, the people who benefit by the political and social arrangements of the “old regime” will oppose its destruction. Among these friends of the “old regime” may be included the royal court, headed by the queen, Marie Antoinette, and by the king's brothers, the count of Provence and the count of Artois, and likewise the bulk of the higher clergy and the nobles—the privileged classes, generally. These persons cannot be expected to surrender their privileges without a struggle, especially since they have been long taught that such privileges are of divine sanction. Only dire necessity compels them to acquiesce in the convocation of the Estates−General and only the mildest measures of reform can be palatable to them. They hate and dread revolution or the thought of revolution. Yet at their expense the Revolution will be achieved.

[Sidenote: Role of the Bourgeoisie]

In the second place, the bourgeoisie, who have the most to lose if the “old regime” is continued and the most to gain if reforms are obtained, will constitute the majority in all the legislative bodies which will assemble in France between 1789 and 1799. Their legislative decrees will in large measure reflect their class interests, and on one hand will terrify the court party and on the other will not fully satisfy the lower classes. The real achievements of the Revolution, however, will be those of the bourgeois assemblies.

[Sidenote: Role of the Urban Proletariat]

In the third place, the artisans and poverty−stricken populace of the cities, notably of Paris, will through bitter years lack for bread. They will expect great things from the assemblies and will revile the efforts of the court to impede the Revolution. They will shed blood at first to defend the freedom of the assemblies from the court, subsequently to bring the assemblies under their own domination. Without their cooperation the Revolution will not be achieved.

[Sidenote: Role of the Peasantry]

In the fourth place, the dull, heavy peasants, in whom no one has hitherto suspected brains or passions, long dumb under oppression, will now find speech and opinions and an unwonted strength. They will rise against their noble oppressors and burn castles and perhaps do murder. They will force the astonished bourgeoisie and upper classes to take notice of them and indirectly they will impress a significant social character upon the achievements of the Revolution.

[Sidenote: Role of the Foreign Powers]

Finally, the foreign monarchs must be watched, for they will be intensely interested in the story as it unfolds.

If the French people be permitted with impunity to destroy the very basis of divine−right monarchy and to overturn the whole social fabric of the "old regime," how long, pray, will it be before Prussians, or Austrians, or Russians shall be doing likewise? With some thought for Louis XVI and a good deal of thought for themselves, the monarchs will call each other "brother" and will by and by send combined armies against the revolutionaries in France. At that very time the success of the Revolution will be achieved, for all classes, save only the handful of the privileged, will unite in the cause of France, which incidentally becomes the cause of humanity. Bourgeoisie, townsfolk, peasants, will go to the front and revolutionary France will then be found in her armies. Thereby not only will the Revolution be saved in France, but in the end it will be communicated to the uttermost parts of Europe.

THE END OF ABSOLUTISM IN FRANCE, 1789

[Sidenote: France on the Eve of the Revolution]

When the story opens, France is still the absolute, divine−right monarchy which Louis XIV had perfected and Louis XV had exploited. The social classes are still in the time−honored position which has been described in Chapter XIII. But all is not well with the "old regime." In the country districts the taxes are distressingly burdensome. In the cities there is scarcity of food side by side with starvation wages. Among the bourgeoisie are envy of the upper classes, an appreciation of the critical philosophy of the day, and a sincere admiration of what seem to be happier political and social conditions across the Channel in Great Britain. The public debt of France is enormous, and a large part of the national income must, therefore, be applied to the payment of interest: even the courtiers of Louis XVI find their pensions and favors and sinecures somewhat reduced. When the privileged classes begin to feel the pinch of hard times, it is certain that the finances are in sore straits.

[Sidenote: Financial Embarrassment]

In fact, all the great general causes of the French Revolution, which may be inferred from the two preceding chapters, may be narrowed down to the financial embarrassment of the government of Louis XVI. The king and his ministers had already had recourse to every expedient consistent with the maintenance of the "old regime" save one, and that one—the convocation of the Estates−General—was now to be tried. It might be that the representatives of the three chief classes of the realm would be able to offer suggestions to the court, whereby the finances could be improved and at the same time the divine−right monarchy and the divinely ordained social distinctions would be unimpaired.

[Sidenote: Convocation of the Estates−General]

With this idea of simple reform in mind, Louis XVI in 1788 summoned the Estates−General to meet at Versailles the following May. The Estates− General were certainly not a revolutionary body. Though for a hundred and seventy−five years the French monarchs had been able to do without them, they were in theory still a legitimate part of the old−time government. Summoned by King Philip the Fair in 1302, they had been thenceforth convoked at irregular intervals until 1614. Their organization had been in three separate bodies, representing by election the three estates of the realm—clergy, nobility, and commoners (Third Estate). Each estate voted as a unit, and two out of the three estates were sufficient to carry a measure. It usually happened that the clergy and nobility joined forces to outvote the commoners. The powers of the Estates−General had always been advisory rather than legislative, and the kings had frequently ignored or violated the enactments of the assembly. In its powers as well as in its organization, the Estates−General differed essentially from the Parliament of England. By the Estates−General the ultimate supremacy of the royal authority had never been seriously questioned.

[Sidenote: Election of the Estates−General]

The elections to the Estates−General were held in accordance with ancient usage throughout France in the winter of 1788−1789. Also, in accordance with custom, the electors were invited by the king to prepare reports on the condition of the locality with which they were familiar and to indicate what abuses, if any, existed, and what remedies, in their opinion, were advisable.

[Sidenote: The Cahiers]

By the time the elections were complete, it was apparent that the majority of the French people desired and expected a greater measure of reform than their sovereign had anticipated. The reports and lists of grievances that had been drafted in every part of the country were astounding. To be sure, these documents, called *cahiers*, were not revolutionary in wording: with wonderful uniformity they expressed loyalty to the monarchy and fidelity to

the king: in not a single one out of the thousand *cahiers* was there a threat of violent change. But in spirit the *cahiers* were eloquent. All of them reflected the idea which philosophy had made popular that reason demanded fundamental, thoroughgoing reforms in government and society. Those of the Third Estate were particularly insistent upon the social inequalities and abuses long associated with the "old regime." It was clear that if the elected representatives of the Third Estate carried out the instructions of their constituents, the voting of additional taxes to the government would be delayed until a thorough investigation had been made and many grievances had been redressed.

[Sidenote: The Third Estate]

On the whole, it was probable that the elected representatives of the Third Estate would heed the *cahiers*. They were educated and brainy men. Two−thirds of them were lawyers or judges; many, also, were scholars; only ten could possibly be considered as belonging to the lower classes. A goodly number admired the governmental system of Great Britain, in which the royal power had been reduced; the class interests of all of them were directly opposed to the prevailing policies of the French monarchy. The Third Estate was too intelligent to follow blindly or unhesitatingly the dictates of the court.

In the earliest history of the Estates−General, the Third Estate had been of comparatively slight importance either in society or in politics, and Philip the Fair had proclaimed that the duty of its members was "to hear, receive, approve, and perform what should be commanded of them by the king." But between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries the relative social importance of the bourgeoisie had enormously increased. The class was more numerous, wealthier, more enlightened, and more experienced in the conduct of business. It became clearer with the lapse of time that it, more than nobility or clergy, deserved the right of representing the bulk of the nation. This right Louis XVI had seemed in part to recognize by providing that the number of elected representatives of the Third Estate should equal the combined numbers of those of the First and Second Estates. The commoners naturally drew the deduction from the royal concession that they were to exercise paramount political influence in the Estates−General of 1789.

The Third Estate, as elected in the winter of 1788−1789, was fortunate in possessing two very capable leaders, Mirabeau and Sieyes, both of whom belonged by office or birth to the upper classes, but who had gladly accepted election as deputies of the unprivileged classes. With two such leaders, it was extremely doubtful whether the Third Estate would tamely submit to playing an inferior role in future.

[Sidenote: Mirabeau]

Mirabeau (1749−1791) was the son of a bluff but good−hearted old marquis who was not very successful in bringing up his family. Young Mirabeau had been so immoral and unruly that his father had repeatedly obtained *lettres de cachet* from the king in order that prison bars might keep him out of mischief. Released many times only to fall into new excesses, Mirabeau found at last in the French Revolution an opportunity for expressing his sincere belief in constitutional government and an outlet for his almost superhuman energy. From the convocation of the Estates−General to his death in 1791, he was one of the most prominent men in France. His gigantic physique, half−broken by disease and imprisonment, his shaggy eyebrows, his heavy head, gave him an impressive, though sinister, appearance. And for quickness in perceiving at once a problem and its solution, as well as for gifts of reverberating oratory, he was unsurpassed.

[Sidenote: Sieyes]

Of less force but greater tact was the priest, Sieyes (1748−1836), whose lack of devotion to Christianity and the clerical calling was matched by a zealous regard for the skeptical and critical philosophy of the day and for the practical arts of politics and diplomacy. It was a pamphlet of Sieyes that, on the eve of the assembling of the Estates−General, furnished the Third Estate with its platform and program. "What is the Third Estate?" asks Sieyes. "It is everything," he replies. "What has it been hitherto in the political order? Nothing! What does it desire? To be something!"

[Sidenote: Meeting of the Estates−General (May, 1789)] [Sidenote: Constitutional Question Involved in the Organization of the Estates−General]

The position of the Third Estate was still officially undefined when the Estates−General assembled at Versailles in May, 1789. The king received his advisers with pompous ceremony and a colorless speech, but it was soon obvious that he and the court intended that their business should be purely financial and that their organization should be in accordance with ancient usage; the three estates would thus vote "by order," that is, as

three distinct bodies, so that the doubled membership of the Third Estate would have but one vote to the privileged orders' two. With this view the great majority of the nobles and a large part of the clergy, especially the higher clergy, were in full sympathy. On their side the commoners began to argue that the Estates−General should organize itself as a single body, in which each member should have one vote, such voting “by head” marking the establishment of true representation in France, and that the assembly should forthwith concern itself with a general reformation of the entire government. With the commoners' argument a few of the liberal nobles, headed by Lafayette, and a considerable group of the clergy, particularly the curates, agreed; and it was backed up by the undoubted sentiment of the nation. Bad harvests in 1788 had been followed by an unusually severe winter. The peasantry was in an extremely wretched plight, and the cities, notably Paris, suffered from a shortage of food. The increase of popular distress, like a black cloud before a storm, gave menacing support to the demands of the commoners.

[Sidenote: The King Defied by the Third Estate] [Sidenote: The “Oath of the Tennis Court,” 20 June, 1789]

Over the constitutional question, fraught as it was with the most significant consequences to politics and society, the parties wrangled for a month. The king, unwilling to offend any one, shilly−shallied. But the uncompromising attitude of the privileged orders and the indecision of the leaders of the court at length forced the issue. On 17 June, 1789, the Third Estate solemnly proclaimed itself a National Assembly. Three days later, when the deputies of the Third Estate came to the hall which had been set apart in the palace of Versailles for their use, they found its doors shut and guarded by troops and a notice to the effect that it was undergoing repairs. Apparently the king was at last preparing to intervene in the contest himself. Then the commoners precipitated a veritable revolution. Led by Mirabeau and Sieyes, they proceeded to a great public building in the vicinity, which was variously used as a riding−hall or a tennis court. There, amidst intense excitement, with upstretched hands, they took an oath as members of the “National Assembly” that they would not separate until they had drawn up a constitution for France. The “Oath of the Tennis Court” was the true beginning of the French Revolution. Without royal sanction, in fact against the express commands of the king, the ancient feudal Estates−General had been transformed, by simple proclamation of the nation's representatives, into a National Assembly, charged with the duty of establishing constitutional government in France. The “Oath of the Tennis Court” was the declaration of the end of absolute divine−right monarchy and of the beginning of a limited monarchy based on the popular will.

What would the king do under these circumstances? He might overwhelm the rebellious commoners by force of arms. But that would not solve his financial problems, nor could he expect the French nation to endure it. It would likely lead to a ruinous civil war. The only recourse left open to him was a game of bluff. He ignored the “Oath of the Tennis Court,” and with majestic mien commanded the estates to sit separately and vote “by order.” But the commoners were not to be bluffed. Now joined by a large number of clergy and a few nobles, they openly defied the royal authority. In the ringing words of Mirabeau, they expressed their rebellion: “We are here by the will of the people and we will not leave our places except at the point of the bayonet.” The weak−kneed, well−intentioned Louis XVI promptly acquiesced. Exactly one week after the scene in the tennis court, he reversed his earlier decrees and directed the estates to sit together and vote “by head.”

[Sidenote: Transformation of the Estates−General into the National Constituent Assembly]

By 1 July, 1789, the first stage in the Revolution was completed. The nobles and clergy were meeting with the commoners. The Estates−General had become the National Constituent Assembly. As yet, however, two important questions remained unanswered. In the first place, how would the Assembly be assured of National freedom from the intrigues and armed force of the court? In the second place, what direction would the reforms of the Assembly take?

[Sidenote: The Court Prepares to Use Force against the Assembly]

The answer to the first question was speedily evoked by the court itself. As early as 1 July, a gradual movement of royal troops from the garrisons along the eastern frontier toward Paris and Versailles made it apparent that the king contemplated awing the National Assembly into a more deferential mood. The Assembly, in dignified tone, requested the removal of the troops. The king responded by a peremptory refusal and by the dismissal of Necker [Footnote: Necker had been restored to his office as director−general of finances in 1788] the popular finance−minister. Then it was that Paris came to the rescue of the Assembly.

[Sidenote: Popular Uprising at Paris in Behalf of the Assembly] [Sidenote: The Destruction of the Bastille, 14 July, 1789]

The Parisian populace, goaded by real want, felt instinctively that its own cause and that of the National Assembly were identical. Fired by an eloquent harangue of a brilliant journalist, Camille Desmoulins (1760−1794) by name, they rushed to arms. For three days there was wild disorder in the city. Shops were looted, royal officers were expelled, business was at a standstill. On the third day—14 July, 1789—the mob surged out to the east end of Paris, where stood the frowning royal fortress and prison of the Bastille. Although since the accession of Louis XVI the Bastille no longer harbored political offenders, nevertheless it was still regarded as a symbol of Bourbon despotism, a grim threat against the liberties of Paris. The people would now take it and would appropriate its arms and ammunition for use in defense of the National Assembly. The garrison of the Bastille was small and disheartened, provisions were short, and the royal governor was irresolute. Within a few hours the mob was in possession of the Bastille, and some of the Swiss mercenaries who constituted its garrison had been slaughtered.

[Sidenote: Revolution in the Government of Paris: the Commune]

The fall of the Bastille was the first serious act of violence in the course of the Revolution. It was an unmistakable sign that the people were with the Assembly rather than with the king. It put force behind the Assembly's decrees. Not only that, but it rendered Paris practically independent of royal control, for, during the period of disorder, prominent citizens had taken it upon themselves to organize their own government and their own army. The new local government—the “commune,” as it was called—was made up of those elected representatives of the various sections or wards of Paris who had chosen the city's delegates to the Estates−General. It was itself a revolution in city government: it substituted popularly elected officials in place of royal agents and representatives of the outworn gilds. And the authority of the commune was sustained by a popularly enrolled militia, styled the National Guard, which soon numbered 48,000 champions of the new cause.

[Sidenote: Temporary Acquiescence of the King]

The fall of the Bastille was such a clear sign that even Louis XVI did not fail to perceive its meaning. He instantly withdrew the royal troops and recalled Necker. He recognized the new government of Paris and confirmed the appointment of the liberal Lafayette to command the National Guard. He visited Paris in person, praised what he could not prevent, and put on a red−white−and−blue cockade—combining the red and blue of the capital city with the white of the Bourbons—the new national tricolor of France. Frenchmen still celebrate the fourteenth of July, the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, as the independence day of the French nation.

[Sidenote: Renewed Intrigues of the Royal Family against the Assembly]

For a while it seemed as though reform might now go forward without further interruption. The freedom of the Assembly had been affirmed and upheld. Paris had settled down once more into comparative repose. The king had apparently learned his lesson. But the victory of the reformers had been gained too easily. Louis XVI might take solemn oaths and wear strange cockades, but he remained in character essentially weak. His very virtues—good intentions, love of wife, loyalty to friends—were continually abused. The queen was bitterly opposed to the reforming policies of the National Assembly and actively resented any diminution of royal authority. Her clique of court friends and favorites disliked the decrease of pensions and amusements to which they had long been accustomed. Court and queen made common cause in appealing to the good qualities of Louis XVI. What was the weak king to do under the circumstances? He was to fall completely under the domination of his entourage.

[Sidenote: Demonstrations of the Parisian Women at Versailles, October, 1789]

The result was renewed intrigues to employ force against the obstreperous deputies and their allies, the populace of Paris. This time it was planned to bring royal troops from the garrisons in Flanders. And on the night of 1 October, 1789, a supper was given by the officers of the bodyguard at Versailles in honor of the arriving soldiers. Toasts were drunk liberally and royalist songs were sung. News of the “orgy,” as it was termed, spread like wildfire in Paris, where hunger and suffering were more prevalent than ever. That city was starving while Versailles was feasting. The presence of additional troops at Versailles, it was believed, would not only put an end to the independence of the Assembly but would continue the starvation of Paris. More excited grew the Parisians.

On 5 October was presented a strange and uncouth spectacle. A long line of the poorest women of Paris, including some men dressed as women, riotous with fear and hunger and rage, armed with sticks and clubs, screaming “Bread! bread! bread!” were straggling along the twelve miles of highway from Paris to Versailles. They were going to demand bread of the king. Lafayette and his National Guardsmen, who had been unable or

unwilling to allay the excitement in Paris, marched at a respectful distance behind the women out to Versailles.

By the time Lafayette reached the royal palace, the women were surrounding it, howling and cursing, and demanding bread or blood; only the fixed bayonets of the troops from Flanders had prevented them from invading the building, and even these regular soldiers were weakening. Lafayette at once became the man of the hour. He sent the soldiers back to the barracks and with his own force undertook the difficult task of guarding the property and lives of the royal family and of feeding and housing the women for the night. Despite his precautions, it was a wild night. There was continued tumult in the streets and, at one time, shortly before dawn, a gang of rioters actually broke into the palace and groped about in search of the queen's apartments. Just in the nick of time the hated Marie Antoinette hurried to safer quarters, although several of her personal bodyguard were killed in the melee.

When the morning of 6 October had come, Lafayette addressed the crowd, promising them that they should be provided for, and, at the critical moment, there appeared at his side on the balcony of the palace the royal family—the king, the little prince, the little princess, and the queen—all wearing red−white−and−blue cockades. A hush fell upon the mob. The respected general leaned over and gallantly kissed the hand of Marie Antoinette. A great shout of joy went up. Apparently even the queen had joined the Revolution. The Parisians were happy, and arrangements were made for the return journey.

[Sidenote: Forcible Removal of the Court and Assembly from Versailles to Paris]

The procession of 6 October from Versailles to Paris was more curious and more significant than that of the preceding day in the opposite direction. There were still the women and the National Guardsmen and Lafayette on his white horse and a host of people of the slums, but this time in the midst of the throng was a great lumbering coach, in which rode Louis and his wife and children, for Paris now insisted that the court should no longer possess the freedom of Versailles in which to plot unwatched against the rights of the French people. All along the procession reechoed the shout, “We have the baker and the baker's wife and the little cook−boy—now we shall have bread.” And so the court of Louis XVI left forever the proud, imposing palace of Versailles, and came to humbler lodgings [Footnote: In the palace of the Tuileries.] in the city of Paris.

Paris had again saved the National Assembly from royal intimidation, and the Assembly promptly acknowledged the debt by following the king to that city. After October, 1789, not reactionary Versailles but radical Paris was at once the scene and the impulse of the Revolution.

The “Fall of the Bastille” and the “March of the Women to Versailles” were the two picturesque events which assured the independence of the National Assembly from the armed force and intrigue of the court. Meanwhile, the answer to the other question which we propounded above, “What direction would the reforms of the Assembly take?” had been supplied by the people at large.

[Sidenote: Disintegration of the Old Regime throughout France] [Sidenote: Peasant Reprisals against the Nobility]

Ever since the assembling of the Estates−General, ordinary administration of the country had been at a standstill. The people, expecting great changes, refused to pay the customary taxes and imposts, and the king, for fear of the National Assembly and of a popular uprising, hesitated to compel tax collection by force of arms. The local officials did not know whether they were to obey the Assembly or the king. In fact, the Assembly was for a time so busy with constitutional questions that it neglected to provide for local government, and the king was always timorous. So, during the summer of 1789, the institutions of the “old regime” disappeared throughout France, one after another, because there was no popular desire to maintain them and no competent authority to enforce them. The insurrection in Paris and the fall of the Bastille was the signal in July for similar action elsewhere: other cities and towns substituted new elective officers for the ancient royal or gild agents and organized National Guards of their own. At the same time the direct action of the people spread to the country districts. In most provinces the oppressed peasants formed bands which stormed and burned the chateaux of the hated nobles, taking particular pains to destroy feudal or servile title−deeds. Monasteries were often ransacked and pillaged. A few of the unlucky lords were murdered, and many others were driven into the towns or across the frontier. Amid the universal confusion, the old system of local government completely collapsed. The intendants and governors quitted their posts. The ancient courts of justice, whether feudal or royal, ceased to act. The summer of 1789 really ended French absolutism, and the transfer of the central government from Versailles to Paris in October merely confirmed an accomplished fact.

[Sidenote: The Revolution Social as well as Political]

Whatever had been hitherto the reforming policies of the National Assembly, the deputies henceforth faced facts rather than theories. Radical social readjustments were now to be effected along with purely governmental and administrative changes. The Revolution was to be social as well as political.

THE END OF THE OLD REGIME: THE NATIONAL CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY, 1789−1791

[Sidenote: Achievements of the National Assembly, 1789−1791]

By the transformation of the Estates−General into the National Constituent Assembly, France had become to all intents and purposes a limited monarchy, in which supreme authority was vested in the nation's elected representatives. From October, 1789, to September, 1791, this Assembly was in session in Paris, endeavoring to bring order out of chaos and to fashion a new France out of the old that was dying of exhaustion and decrepitude. Enormous was the task, but even greater were the achievements. Although the work of the Assembly during the period was influenced in no slight degree by the Parisian populace, nevertheless it was attended by comparative peace and security. And the work done was by far the most vital and most lasting of the whole revolutionary era.

Leaving out of consideration for the time the frightened royal family, the startled noblemen and clergy, the determined peasantry, and the excited townsfolk, and not adhering too closely to chronological order, let us center our attention upon the National Assembly and review its major acts during those momentous years, 1789−1791.

[Sidenote: 1. Legal Destruction of Feudalism and Serfdom]

The first great work of the Assembly was the legal destruction of feudalism and serfdom—a long step in the direction of social equality. We have already noticed how in July while the Assembly was still at Versailles, the royal officers in the country districts had ceased to rule and how the peasants had destroyed many *chateaux* amid scenes of unexpected violence. News of the rioting and disorder came to the Assembly from every province and filled its members with the liveliest apprehension. A long report, submitted by a special investigating committee on 4 August, 1789, gave such harrowing details of the popular uprising that every one was convinced that something should be done at once.

[Sidenote: “The August Days"]

While the Assembly was debating a declaration which might calm revolt, one of the nobles—a relative of Lafayette—arose in his place and stated that if the peasants had attacked the property and privileges of the upper classes, it was because such property and privileges represented unjust inequality, that the fault lay there, and that the remedy was not to repress the peasants but to suppress inequality. It was immediately moved and carried that the Assembly should proclaim equality of taxation for all classes and the suppression of feudal and servile dues. Then followed a scene almost unprecedented in history. Noble vied with noble, and clergyman with clergyman, in renouncing the vested rights of the “old regime.” The game laws were repudiated. The manorial courts were suppressed. Serfdom was abolished. Tithes and all sorts of ecclesiastical privilege were sacrificed. The sale of offices was discontinued. In fact, all special privileges, whether of classes, of cities, or of provinces, were swept away in one consuming burst of enthusiasm. The holocaust lasted throughout the night of the fourth of August. Within a week the various independent measures had been consolidated into an impressive decree “abolishing the feudal system,” and this decree received in November the royal assent. What many reforming ministers had vainly labored for years partially to accomplish was now done, at least in theory, by the National Assembly in a few days. The so−called “August Days” promised to dissolve the ancient society of France.

It has been customary to refer these vast social changes to the enthusiasm, magnanimity, and self−sacrifice of the privileged orders. That there was enthusiasm is unquestionable. But it may be doubted whether the nobles and clergy were so much magnanimous as terrorized. For the first time, they were genuinely frightened by the peasants, and it is possible that the true measure of their “magnanimity” was their alarm. Then, too, if one is to sacrifice, he must have something to sacrifice. At most, the nobles had only legal claims to surrender, for the peasants had already taken forcible possession of nearly everything which the decree accorded them. In fact the decree of the Assembly constituted merely a legal and uniform recognition of accomplished facts.

The nobles may have thought, moreover, that liberal acquiescence in the first demands of the peasantry would save themselves from further demands. At any rate, they zealously set to work in the Assembly to modify what had been done, to secure financial or other indemnity, [Footnote: The general effect of the series of decrees of the Assembly from 5 to 11 August, 1789, was to impose some kind of financial redemption for many of the feudal dues. It was only in July, 1793, almost four years after the “August Days,” that *all* feudal dues and rights were

legally abolished without redemption or compensation.] and to prevent the enactment of additional social legislation. Outside the Assembly few nobles took kindly to the loss of privilege and property: the overwhelming majority protested and tried to stir up civil war, and, when such attempts failed, they left France and enrolled themselves among their country's enemies.

It is not necessary for us to know precisely who were responsible for the “August Days.” The fact remains that the “decree abolishing the feudal system” represented the most important achievement of the whole French Revolution. Henceforth, those who profited by the decree were loyal friends of the Revolution, while the losers were its bitter opponents.

[Sidenote: 2. The Declaration of the Rights of Man]

The second great work of the Assembly was the guarantee of individual rights and liberties. The old society and government of France were disappearing. On what basis should the new be erected? Great Britain had its *Magna Carta* and its Bill of Rights; America had its Declaration of Independence. France was now given a “Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen.” This document, which reflected the spirit of Rousseau's philosophy and incorporated some of the British and American provisions, became the platform of the French Revolution and tremendously influenced political thought in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A few of its most striking sentences are as follows: “Men are born and remain free and equal in rights.” The rights of man are “liberty, property, security, and resistance to oppression.” “Law is the expression of the general will. Every citizen has a right to participate personally, or through his representative, in its formation. It must be the same for all.” “No person shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by law.” Religious toleration, freedom of speech, and liberty of the press are affirmed. The people are to control the finances, and to the people all officials of the state are responsible. Finally, the influence of the propertied classes, which were overwhelmingly represented in the Assembly, showed itself in the concluding section of the Declaration: “Since private property is an inviolable and sacred right, no one shall be deprived thereof except where public necessity, legally determined, shall clearly demand it, and then only on condition that the owner shall have been previously and equitably indemnified.”

[Sidenote: 3. Reform of Local Administration]

The next great undertaking of the National Assembly was the establishment of a new and uniform administrative system in France. The ancient and confusing “provinces,” “governments,” “intendancies,” “ *pays d'etat*” “*pays d'election*” “parlements,” and “bailliages" were swept away. The country was divided anew into eighty− three departments, approximately uniform in size and population, and named after natural features, such as rivers or mountains. Each department was subdivided into districts, cantons. and communes,— divisions which have endured in France to the present time. The heads of the local government were no longer to be appointed by the crown but elected by the people, and extensive powers were granted to elective local councils. Provision was made for a new system of law courts throughout the country, and the judges, like the administrative officials, were to be elected by popular vote. Projects were likewise put forward to unify and simplify the great variety and mass of laws which prevailed in different parts of France, but this work was not brought to completion until the time of Napoleon Bonaparte.

[Sidenote: 4. Financial Regulation. 5. Secularization of Church Property, the Assignats]

Another grave matter which concerned the National Assembly was the regulation of the public finances. It will be recalled that financial confusion was the royal reason for summoning the Estates−General. And in the early days of the Assembly, the confusion became chaos: it was impossible to enforce the payment of direct taxes; indirect taxes were destroyed by legislative decree; and bankers could not be induced to make new loans. Therefore, it was to heroic measures that the Assembly resorted to save the state from bankruptcy. To provide funds, a heavy blow was struck at one of the chief props of the “old regime”—the Catholic Church. The Church, as we have seen, owned at least a fifth of the soil of France, and it was now resolved to seize these rich church lands, and to utilize them as security for the issue of paper money— the *assignats*. As partial indemnity for the wholesale confiscation, the state was to undertake the payment of fixed salaries to the clergy. Thus by a single stroke the financial pressure was relieved, the Church was deprived of an important source of its strength, and the clergy were made dependent on the new order. Of course, as often happens in similar cases, the issue of paper money was so increased that in time it exceeded the security and brought fresh troubles to the state, but for the moment the worst dangers were tided over.

[Sidenote: 6. Other Legislation against the Catholic Church]

The ecclesiastical policies and acts of the National Assembly were perhaps the least efficacious and the most fateful achievements of the Revolution. Yet it would be difficult to perceive how they could have been less radical than they were. The Church appeared to be indissolubly linked with the fortunes of old absolutist France; the clergy comprised a particularly privileged class; and the leaders and great majority of the Assembly were filled with the skeptical, Deistic, and anti−Christian philosophy of the time. In November, 1789, the church property was confiscated. In February, 1790, the monasteries and other religious houses were suppressed. In April, absolute religious toleration was proclaimed. In August, 1790, the “Civil Constitution of the Clergy” was promulgated, by which the bishops and priests, reduced in numbers, were made a civil body: they were to be elected by the people, paid by the state, and separated from the sovereign control of the pope. In December, the Assembly forced the reluctant king to sign a decree compelling all the clergy to take a solemn oath of allegiance to the “Civil Constitution.”

[Sidenote: Catholic Opposition to the Revolution]

The pope, who had already protested against the seizure of church property and the expulsion of the monks, now condemned the “Civil Constitution” and forbade Catholics to take the oath of allegiance. Thus, the issue was squarely joined. Such as took the oath were excommunicated by the pope, such as refused compliance were deprived of their salaries and threatened with imprisonment. Up to this time, the bulk of the lower clergy, poor themselves and in immediate contact with the suffering of the peasants, had undoubtedly sympathized with the course of the Revolution, but henceforth their convictions and their consciences came into conflict with devotion to their country. They followed their conscience and either incited the peasants, over whom they exercised considerable influence, to oppose further revolution, or emigrated [Footnote: The clergy who would not take the oath were called the “non−juring” clergy. Those who left France, together with the noble emigrants, were called “emigres.”] from France to swell the number of those who, dissatisfied with the course of events in their own country, would seek the first opportunity to undo the work of the Assembly. The Catholic Church, as well as the hereditary nobility, became an unwearied opponent of the French Revolution.

[Sidenote: 7. The Constitution of 1791]

Amid all these sweeping reforms and changes, the National Constituent Assembly was making steady progress in drafting a written constitution which would clearly define the agencies of government, and their respective powers, the new limited monarchy. This constitution was completed in 1791 and signed by the king—he could do nothing else—and at once went into full effect. It was the first written constitution of any importance that any European country had had, and was preceded only slightly in point of time by that of the United States. [Footnote: The present American constitution was drafted in 1787 and went into effect in 1789, the year that the Estates−General assembled.]

The Constitution of 1791, as it was called, provided, like the American constitution, for the “separation of powers,” that is, that the law− making, law−enforcing, and law−interpreting functions of government should be kept quite distinct as the legislative, executive, and judicial departments, and should each spring, in last analysis, from the will of the people. This idea had been elaborated by Montesquieu, and deeply affected the constitution−making of the eighteenth century both in France and in the United States.

[Sidenote: Legislative Provisions]

The legislative authority was vested in one chamber, styled the “Legislative Assembly,” the members of which were chosen by means of a complicated system of indirect election. [Footnote: That is to say, the people would vote for electors, and the electors for the members of the Assembly.] The distrust with which the bourgeois framers of the constitution regarded the lower classes was shown not only in this check upon direct election but also in the requirements that the privilege of voting should be exercised exclusively by “active" citizens, that is, by citizens who paid taxes, and that the right to hold office should be restricted to property−holders.

[Sidenote: Weakness of the King under the Constitution]

Nominally the executive authority resided in the hereditary king. In this respect, most of the French reformers thought they were imitating the British government, but as a matter of fact they made the kingship not even ornamental. True, they accorded to the king the right to postpone for a time the execution of an act of the legislature—the so−called “suspensive veto”—but they deprived him of all control over local government, over the army and navy, and over the clergy. Even his ministers were not to sit in the Assembly. Tremendous had been

the decline of royal power in France during those two years, 1789−1791.

[Sidenote: Summary of the Work of the National Assembly]

This may conclude our brief summary of the work of the National Constituent Assembly. If we review it as a whole, we are impressed by the immense destruction which it effected. No other body of legislators has ever demolished so much in the same brief period. The old form of government, the old territorial divisions, the old financial system, the old judicial and legal regulations, the old ecclesiastical arrangements, and, most significant of all, the old condition of holding land—serfdom and feudalism—all were shattered. Yet all this destruction was not a mad whim of the moment. It had been preparing slowly and painfully for many generations. It was foreshadowed by the mass of well−considered complaints in the *cahiers*. It was achieved not only by the decrees of the Assembly, but by the forceful expression of the popular will.

## THE LIMITED MONARCHY IN OPERATION: THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (1791−1792) AND THE OUTBREAK OF FOREIGN WAR

[Sidenote: Brief Duration of Limited Monarchy in France, 1791−1792]

Great public rejoicing welcomed the formal inauguration of the limited monarchy in 1791. Many believed that a new era of Peace and prosperity was dawning for France. Yet the extravagant hopes which were widely entertained for the success of the new regime were doomed to speedy and bitter disappointment. The new government encountered all manner of difficulties, the country rapidly grew more radical in sentiment and action, and within a single year the limited monarchy gave way to a republic. The establishment of the republic was the second great phase of the Revolution. Why it was possible and even inevitable may be gathered from a survey of political conditions in France during 1792,— at once the year of trial for limited monarchy and the year of transition to the republic.

[Sidenote: Sources of Opposition to the Limited Monarchy]

By no means did all Frenchmen accept cheerfully and contentedly the work of the National Constituent Assembly. Of the numerous dissenters, some thought it went too far and some thought it did not go far enough. The former may be styled “reactionaries” and the latter “radicals.”

[Sidenote: Reactionaries] [Sidenote: 1. The Emigres]

The reactionaries embraced the bulk of the formerly privileged nobility and the non−juring clergy. The nobles had left France in large numbers as soon as the first signs of violence appeared—about the time of the fall of the Bastille and the peasant uprisings in the provinces. Many of the clergy had similarly departed from their homes when the anticlerical measures of the Assembly rendered it no longer possible for them to follow the dictates of conscience. These reactionary exiles, or emigres as they were termed, collected in force along the northern and eastern frontier, especially at Coblenz on the Rhine. They possessed an influential leader in the king's own brother, the count of Artois, and they maintained a perpetual agitation, by means of newspapers, pamphlets, and intrigues, against the new regime. They were anxious to regain their privileges and property, and to restore everything, as far as possible, to precisely the same position it had occupied prior to 1789.

[Sidenote: 2. The Court] [Sidenote: The Flight to Varennes]

Nor were the reactionaries devoid of support within France. It was believed that the royal family, now carefully watched in Paris, sympathized with their efforts. So long as Mirabeau, the ablest leader in the National Assembly, was alive, he had never ceased urging the king to accept the reforms of the Revolution and to give no countenance to agitation beyond the frontiers. In case the king should find his position in Paris intolerable, he had been advised by Mirabeau to withdraw into western or southern France and gather the loyal nation about him. But unfortunately, Mirabeau, worn out by dissipation and cares, died prematurely in April, 1791. Only two months later the royal family attempted to follow the course against which they had been warned. Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, in an effort to rid themselves of the spying vigilance of the Parisians, disguised themselves, fled from the capital, and made straight for the eastern frontier, apparently to join the emigres. At Varennes, near the border, the royal fugitives were recognized and turned back to Paris, which henceforth became for them rather a prison than a capital. Although Louis subsequently swore a solemn oath to uphold the constitution, his personal popularity vanished with his ill−starred flight, and his wife —the hated “Austrian woman”—was suspected with good reason of being in secret correspondence with the emigres as well as with foreign governments. Marie Antoinette was more detested than ever. The king's oldest brother, the count of Provence, was more successful than the king in the flight of June, 1791: he eluded detection and joined the count of Artois at Coblenz.

[Sidenote: 3. Conservative and Catholic Peasants.]

Had the reactionaries been restricted entirely to emigres and the royal family, it is hardly possible that they would have been so troublesome as they were. They were able, however, to secure considerable popular support in France. A small group in the Assembly shared their views and proposed the most extravagant measures in order to embarrass the work of that body. Conservative clubs existed among the upper and well−to−do classes in the larger cities. And in certain districts of western France, especially in Brittany, Poitou (La Vendee), and Anjou, the peasants developed hostility to the course of the Revolution: their extraordinary devotion to Catholicism placed them under the influence of the non−juring clergy, and their class feeling against townspeople induced them to believe that the Revolution, carried forward by the bourgeoisie, was essentially in the interests of the bourgeoisie. Riots occurred in La Vendee throughout 1791 and 1792 with increasing frequency until at length the district blazed into open rebellion against the radicals.

[Sidenote: Radicals] [Sidenote: 1. The Bourgeois Leaders] [Sidenote: 2. The Proletarians]

More dangerous to the political settlement of 1791 than the opposition of the reactionaries was that of the radicals—those Frenchmen who thought that the Revolution had not gone far enough. The real explanation of the radical movement lies in the conflict of interest between the poor working people of the towns and the middle class, or bourgeoisie. The latter, as has been repeatedly emphasized, possessed the brains, the money, and the education: it was they who had been overwhelmingly represented in the National Assembly. The former were degraded, poverty−stricken, and ignorant, but they constituted the bulk of the population in the cities, notably in Paris, and they were both conscious of their sorry condition and desperately determined to improve it. These so−called “proletarians,” though hardly directly represented in the Assembly, nevertheless fondly expected the greatest benefits from the work of that body. For a while the bourgeoisie and the proletariat cooeperated: the former carried reforms through the Assembly, the latter defended by armed violence the freedom of the Assembly; both participated in the capture of the Bastille, in the establishment of the commune, and in the transfer of the seat of government from Versailles to Paris. So long as they faced a serious common danger from the court and privileged orders, they worked in harmony.

[Sidenote: Conflict of Interests Between Bourgeoisie and Proletariat]

But as soon as the Revolution had run its first stage and had succeeded in reducing the royal power and in abolishing many special privileges of the nobles and clergy, a sharp cleavage became evident between the former allies—between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The bourgeoisie, to whom was due the enactment of the reforms of the National Constituent Assembly, profited by those reforms far more than any other class in the community. Their trade and industry were stimulated by the removal of the ancient royal and feudal restrictions. Their increased wealth enabled them to buy up the estates of the outlawed emigres and the confiscated lands of the Church. They secured an effective control of all branches of government, local and central. Of course, the peasantry also benefited to no slight extent, but their benefits were certainly less impressive than those of the bourgeoisie. Of all classes in France, the urban proletariat seemed to have gained the least: to be sure they were guaranteed by paper documents certain theoretical “rights and liberties,” but what had been done for their material well−being? They had obtained no property. They had experienced no greater ease in earning their daily bread. And in 1791 they seemed as far from realizing their hopes of betterment as they had been in 1789, for the bourgeois constitution−makers had provided that only taxpayers could vote and only property−owners could hold office. The proletariat, thereby cut off from all direct share in the conduct of government, could not fail to be convinced that in the first phase of the Revolution they had merely exchanged one set of masters for another, that at the expense of the nobles and clergy they had exalted the bourgeoisie, and that they themselves were still downtrodden and oppressed. Radical changes in the constitution and radical social legislation in their own behalf became the policies of the proletariat; violence would be used as a means to an end, if other means failed.

Not all of the bourgeoisie were thoroughly devoted to the settlement of 1791. Most of them doubtless were. But a thoughtful and conspicuous minority allied themselves with the proletariat. Probably in many instances it was for the selfish motive of personal ambition that this or that middle−class individual prated much about his love for “the people” and shed tears over their wretchedness and made all manner of election promises to them. But, on the other hand, there were sincere and altruistic bourgeois who had been converted to the extreme democratic doctrines of Rousseau and who were deeply touched by the misery of the lowest classes. It was under the leadership of such men that the proletariat grew ever more radical until they sought by force to establish

democracy in France.

[Sidenote: Center of Radicalism in Paris]

The radical movement centered in Paris, where now lived the royal family and where the legislature met. With the object of intimidating the former and controlling the latter, the agitation made rapid headway during 1791 and 1792. It was conducted by means of inflammatory newspapers, coarse pamphlets, and bitter speeches. It appealed to both the popular reason and the popular emotions. It was backed up and rendered efficient by the organization of revolutionary "clubs."

[Sidenote: The Clubs] [Sidenote: Cordeliers and Jacobins]

These clubs were interesting centers of political and social agitation. Their origin was traceable to the "eating clubs" which had been formed at Versailles by various deputies who desired to take their meals together, but the idea progressed so far that by 1791 nearly every cafe in Paris aspired to be a meeting place for politicians and "patriots." Although some of the clubs were strictly constitutional, and even, in a few instances, professedly reactionary, nevertheless the greater number and the most influential were radical. Such were the Cordelier and Jacobin clubs. The former, organized as a "society of the friends of the rights of man and of the citizen," was very radical from its inception and enrolled in its membership the foremost revolutionaries of Paris. The latter, starting out as a "society of the friends of the constitution," counted among its early members such men as Mirabeau, Sieyes, and Lafayette, but subsequently under the leadership of Robespierre, transformed itself into an organization quite as radical as the Cordeliers. It is an interesting tact that both these radical clubs derived their popular names from monasteries, in whose confiscated buildings they customarily met.

[Sidenote: Radical Propaganda]

From Paris the radical movement radiated in all directions. Pamphlets and newspapers were spread broadcast. The Jacobin club established a regular correspondence with branch clubs or kindred societies which sprang up in other French towns. The radicals were everywhere inspired by the same zeal and aided by a splendid organization.

[Sidenote: Radical Leaders]

Of the chief radical leaders, it may be convenient at this point to introduce three—Marat, Danton, and Robespierre. All belonged to the bourgeoisie by birth and training, but by conviction they became the mouthpieces of the proletariat. All played important roles in subsequent scenes of the Revolution.

[Sidenote: Marat]

Marat (*c*. 1742−1793), had he never become interested in politics and conspicuous in the Revolution, might have been remembered in history as a scientist and a man of letters. He had been a physician, and for skill in his profession, as well as for contributions to the science of physics, he had received an honorary degree from St. Andrews University in Scotland, and for a time he was in the service of the count of Artois. The convocation of the Estates−General turned his attention to public affairs. In repeated and vigorous pamphlets he combated the idea then prevalent in France that his countrymen should adopt a constitution similar to that of Great Britain. During several years' sojourn in Great Britain he had observed that that country was being ruled by an oligarchy which, while using the forms of liberty and pretending to represent the country, was in reality using its power for the promotion of its own narrow class interests. He made up his mind that real reform must benefit all the people alike and that it could be secured only by direct popular action. This was the simple message that filled the pages of the *Ami du peuple*—the *Friend of the People*—a newspaper which he edited from 1789 to 1792. With fierce invective he assailed the court, the clergy, the nobles, even the bourgeois Assembly. Attached to no party and with no detailed policies, he sacrificed almost everything to his single mission. No poverty, misery, or persecution could keep him quiet. Forced even to hide in cellars and sewers, where he contracted a loathsome skin disease, he persevered in his frenzied appeals to the Parisian populace to take matters into their own hands. By 1792 Marat was a man feared and hated by the authorities but loved and venerated by the masses of the capital. [Footnote: Marat was assassinated on 13 July, 1793, by Charlotte Corday, a young woman who was fanatically attached to the Girondist faction.]

[Sidenote: Danton]

No less radical but far more statesmanlike was Danton (1759−1794), who has been called "a sort of middle−class Mirabeau." The son of a farmer, he had studied law, had purchased a position as advocate of the Royal Council, and, before the outbreak of the Revolution, had acquired a reputation not only as a brilliant young lawyer, but also as a man of liberal tastes, fond of books, and happy in his domestic life. Like Mirabeau, he was a

person of powerful physique and of stentorian voice, a skilled debater and a convincing orator; unlike Mirabeau, he himself remained calm and self−possessed while arousing his audiences to the highest pitch of enthusiasm. Like Mirabeau, too, he was not so primarily interested in the welfare of his own social class as in that of the class below him: what the nobleman Mirabeau was to the bourgeoisie, the bourgeois Danton was to the Parisian proletariat. Brought to the fore, through the favor of Mirabeau, in the early days of the Revolution, Danton at once showed himself a strong advocate of real democracy. In 1790, in conjunction with Marat and Camille Desmoulins, he founded the Cordelier Club, the activities of which he directed throughout 1791 and 1792 against the royal family and the whole cause of monarchy. An influential member of the commune of Paris, he was largely instrumental in crystallizing public opinion in favor of republicanism, Danton was rough and courageous, but neither venal nor bloodthirsty.

[Sidenote: Robespierre]

Less practical than Danton and further removed from the proletariat than Marat, Maximilien Robespierre (1758−1794) nevertheless combined such qualities as made him the most prominent exponent of democracy and republicanism. Descended from a middle−class family of Irish extraction, Robespierre had been a classmate of Camille Desmoulins in the law school of the University of Paris, and had practiced law with some success in his native town of Arras. He was appointed a criminal judge, but soon resigned that post because he could not endure to inflict the death penalty. In his immediate circle he acquired a reputation as a writer, speaker, and something of a dandy. Elected to the Third Estate in 1789, he took his place with the extreme radicals in that body—the “thirty voices,” as Mirabeau contemptuously called them. Robespierre had read Rousseau from cover to cover and believed in the philosopher's doctrines with all his heart so that he would have gone to death for them. In the belief that they eventually would succeed and regenerate France and all mankind, he was ready to work with unwearied patience. The paucity of his followers in the National Assembly and the overpowering personality of Mirabeau prevented him from exercising much influence in framing the new constitution, and he gradually turned for support to the people of Paris. He was already a member of the Jacobin Club, which, by the withdrawal of its more conservative members in 1791, came then under his leadership. Thenceforth the Jacobin Club was a most effective instrument for establishing social democracy (although it was not committed to republicanism until August, 1792), and Robespierre was its oracle. Robespierre was never a demagogue in the present sense of the word: he was always emphatically a gentleman and a man of culture, sincere and truthful. Although he labored strenuously for the “rights” of the proletariat, he never catered to their tastes; to the last day of his life he retained the knee−breeches and silk stockings of the old society and wore his hair powdered.

We are now in a position to understand why the constitutional monarchy floundered. It had no great leaders to strengthen it and to conduct it through the narrow strait. It was bound to strike the rocks of reaction on one side or those of radicalism on the other. Against such fearless and determined assailants as Robespierre, Danton, and Marat, it was helpless.

[Sidenote: Difficulties Confronting the Legislative Assembly, 1791]

The new government came into being with the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly on 1 October, 1791. Immediately its troubles began. The members of the Legislative Assembly were wholly inexperienced in parliamentary procedure, for an unfortunate self−denying ordinance [Footnote: Proposed by Robespierre.] of the retiring Constituent Assembly had prohibited any of its members from accepting election to the new body. The Legislative Assembly contained deputies of fundamentally diverse views who quarreled long though eloquently among themselves. Moreover, it speedily came into conflict with the king, who vainly endeavored to use his constitutional right of suspensive veto in order to check its activities. Combined with these problems was the popular agitation and excitement: a peasant revolt in La Vendee, the angry threats of emigre nobles and non−juring clergy across the eastern frontier, the loud tumults of the proletariat of Paris and of other large cities as well.

[Sidenote: Foreign Hostility to the French Revolution]

The difficulties of the limited monarchy were further complicated by an embarrassing foreign situation. It will be borne in mind that all important European states still adhered rigidly to the social institutions of the “old regime” and, with the exception of Great Britain, to divine−right monarchy. Outside of France there appeared as yet no such thing as “public opinion,” certainly no sign among the lower classes of any opinion favorable to revolution. In Great Britain alone was there a constitutional monarchy, and in the early days of the French

Revolution, so long as British statesmen could flatter themselves that their neighbors across the Channel were striving to imitate their political system, these same public men sympathized with the course of events. But when it became evident that the Revolution was going further, that it aimed at a great social leveling, that it was a movement of the masses in behalf of the lowest classes in the community, then even British criticism assailed it. At the close of 1790 Edmund Burke published his *Reflections on the Revolution in France,* a bitter arraignment of the newer tendencies and a rhetorical panegyric of conservatism. Although Burke's sensational work was speedily and logically answered by several forceful thinkers, including the brilliant Thomas Paine, nevertheless it long held its place as the classical expression of official Britain's horror of social equality and of “mob violence.” The book was likewise received with such approval by the monarchs of continental Europe, who interpreted it as a telling defense of their position, that Catherine of Russia personally complimented the author and the puppet king of Poland sent him a flamboyant glorification and a gold medal. Thenceforth the monarchs, as well as the nobles and clergy, of Europe saw in the French Revolution only a menace to their political and social privileges: were it communicated to the lower classes, the Revolution might work the same havoc throughout the length and breadth of Europe that it was working in France. The “benevolent despots” had sincere desires to labor for the welfare of the people; they shuddered at the thought of what the people themselves would do in laboring for their own welfare.

[Sidenote: The Holy Roman Emperor the Champion of Opposition to the Revolution]

Of the monarchs of Europe, several had special reasons for viewing the progress of the Revolution with misgiving. The Bourbons of Spain and of the Two Sicilies were united by blood and family compacts with the ruling dynasty of France: any belittling of the latter's power was bound to affect disastrously the domestic position and foreign policy of the former. Then, too, the French queen, Marie Antoinette, was an Austrian Habsburg. Her family interests were in measure at stake. In the Austrian dominions, the visionary and unpractical Joseph II had died in 1790 and had been succeeded by another brother of Marie Antoinette, the gifted though unemotional Emperor Leopold II. Leopold skillfully extricated himself from the embarrassments at home and abroad bequeathed him by his predecessor and then turned his attention to French affairs. He was in receipt of constant and now frantic appeals from his sister to aid Louis XVI against the revolutionaries. He knew that the Austrian Netherlands, whose rebellion he had suppressed with difficulty, were saturated with the doctrines of the Revolution and that many of their inhabitants would welcome annexation to France. As chief of the Holy Roman Empire, he must keep revolutionary agitation out of the Germanies and protect the border provinces against French aggression. All these factors served to make the Emperor Leopold the foremost champion of the “old regime” in Europe and incidentally of the royal cause in France.

[Sidenote: Declaration of Pilinitz, August, 1791]

Now it so happened that the emperor found a curious ally in Prussia. The death of Frederick the Great in 1786 had called to the throne of that country a distinctly inferior sort of potentate, Frederick William II (1786−1797), who combined with a nature at once sensual and pleasure−loving a remarkable religious zeal. He neglected the splendid military machine which Frederick William I and Frederick the Great had constructed with infinite patience and thoroughness. He lavished great wealth upon art as well as upon favorites and mistresses. He tired the nation with an excessive Protestant orthodoxy. And in foreign affairs he reversed the far−sighted policy of his predecessor by allying himself with Austria and reducing Prussia to a secondary place among the German states. In August, 1791, Frederick William II joined with the Emperor Leopold in issuing the public Declaration of Pilinitz, to the effect that the two rulers considered the restoration of order and of monarchy in France an object of “common interest to all sovereigns of Europe.” The declaration was hardly more than pompous bluster, for the armies of the German allies were not as yet ready for war, but its solemn expression of an intention on the part of foreign despots to interfere in the internal affairs of France aroused the most bitter feeling among Frenchmen who were patriotic as well as revolutionary.

[Sidenote: French Politics Under the Limited Monarchy Favorable to Foreign War]

The prospect of war with the blustering monarchs of Austria and Prussia was quite welcome to several important factions in France. Marie Antoinette and her court clique gradually came to the conclusion that their reactionary cause would be abetted by war. If the allies won, absolutism would be restored in France by force of arms. If the French won, it would redound to the prestige of the royal family and enable them by constitutional means to recover their authority. Then, too, the constitutionalists, the bourgeois party which was led by Lafayette

and which loyally supported the settlement of 1791, worked for war. Military success would consolidate the French people and confirm the constitution, and Lafayette aspired to win personal glory as the omnipotent commander. Finally, the overwhelming majority of radicals cried for war: to them it seemed as if the liberal monarchy would be completely discomfited by it and that out of it would emerge a republic in France and the general triumph of democratic principles in Europe. Why not stir up all the European peoples against their monarchs? The cause of France should be the cause of Europe. France should be the missionary of the new dispensation.

[Sidenote: Political Parties in the Legislative Assembly]

The Legislative Assembly, on which depended in last instance the solution of all these vital problems, domestic and foreign, represented several diverse shades of political opinion. Of the seven hundred members, four hundred admitted no special leadership but voted independently on every question according to individual preference or fear, while the others were divided between the camp of *Feuillants* and that of *Jacobins*. The Feuillants were the constitutionalists, inclined, while in general consistently championing the settlement of 1791, to strengthen the royal power,—they were the conservatives of the Assembly. The Jacobins, on the other hand, deriving their common name from the famous club in Paris, were the radicals: many of them secretly cherished republican sentiments, and all of them desired a further diminution of the constitutional powers of Louis XVI. The Jacobins, however, were divided into two groups on the question of how the royal power should be reduced. The larger number, whose most conspicuous members came from the department of the Gironde and were, therefore, collectively designated as Girondists, entertained the idea that the existing government should be clearly proved futile before proceeding to the next stage in the Revolution: they clamored for foreign war as the most effective means of disgracing the existing monarchy. The smaller number of Jacobins, drawn largely from Paris, desired to take no chances on the outcome of war but advocated the radical reformation of monarchical institutions by direct and immediate popular action: subsequently this small group was dubbed the Mountain [Footnote: This name did not come into general use until 1793.] from the high seats its members later occupied in the Convention: they represented the general views of such men as Marat, Danton, and Robespierre.

[Sidenote: The Girondists]

Of the various parties or groups in the Legislative Assembly, the best organized was the Girondist. Its members, recruited chiefly from the provinces, were young, enthusiastic, and filled with noble, if somewhat unpractical, ideas borrowed from the ancient republics of Greece and Rome. They were cultured, eloquent, and patriotic. In Brissot (1754− 1793), a Parisian lawyer, they had an admirable leader and organizer. In Vergniaud (1753−1793), they had a polished and convincing orator. In Condorcet (1743−1794), they had a brilliant scholar and philosopher. In Dumouriez (1739−1823), they possessed a military genius of the first order. And in the refined home of the brilliant Madame Roland (1754− 1793), they had a charming center for political discussion.

In internal affairs the Legislative Assembly accomplished next to nothing. Everything was subordinated to the question of foreign war. In that, Feuillants and Girondists found themselves in strange agreement. Only Marat and Robespierre raised their voices against a policy whose pursuit they dreaded would raise a military dictator. Marat expressed his alarms in the *Friend of the People:* "What afflicts the friends of liberty is that we have more to fear from success than from defeat .. .the danger is lest one of our generals be crowned with victory and lest ... he lead his victorious army against the capital to secure the triumph of the Despot." But the counsels of extreme radicals were unavailing.

[Sidenote: Declaration of War against Austria and Prussia, April, 1792]

In the excitement the Girondists obtained control of the government and demanded of the emperor that the Austrian troops be withdrawn from the frontier and that the emigres be expelled from his territories. As no action was taken by the emperor, the Girondist ministers prevailed upon Louis XVI to declare war on 20 April, 1792. Lafayette assumed supreme command, and the French prepared for the struggle. Although Leopold had just died, his policy was followed by his son and successor, the Emperor Francis II. Francis and Frederick William II of Prussia speedily collected an army of 80,000 men at Coblenz with which to invade France. The campaign of 1792 was the first stage in a vast conflict which was destined to rage throughout Europe for twenty−three years. It was the beginning of the contest between the forces of revolution and those of reaction.

Enthusiasm was with the French. They felt they were fighting for a cause—the cause of liberty, equality, and nationalism. Men put on red liberty caps, and such as possessed no firearms equipped themselves with pikes and

hastened to the front. Troops coming up from Marseilles sang in Paris a new hymn of freedom which Rouget de Lisle had just composed at Strassburg for the French soldiers,—the inspiring Marseillaise that was to become the national anthem of France. But enthusiasm was about the only asset that the French possessed. Their armies were ill−organized and ill−disciplined. Provisions were scarce, arms were inferior, and fortified places in poor repair. Lafayette had greater ambition than ability.

[Sidenote: Early French Reverses] [Sidenote: Equivocal Position of the Royal Family]

The war opened, therefore, with a series of French reverses. An attempted invasion of the Austrian Netherlands ended in dismal failure. On the eastern frontier the allied armies under the duke of Brunswick experienced little difficulty in opening up a line of march to Paris. Intense grew the excitement in the French capital. The reverses gave color to the suspicion that the royal family were betraying military plans to the enemy. A big demonstration took place on 20 June: a crowd of market women, artisans, coal heavers, and hod carriers pushed through the royal residence, jostling and threatening the king and queen: no violence was done but the temper of the Parisian proletariat was quite evident. But Louis and Marie Antoinette simply would not learn their lesson. Despite repeated and solemn assurances to the contrary, they were really in constant secret communication with the invading forces. The king was beseeching aid from foreign rulers in order to crush his own people; the queen was supplying the generals of the allies with the French plans of campaign. Limited monarchy failed in the stress of war.

## ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC: THE NATIONAL CONVENTION, 1792−1795

[Sidenote: Proclamation of the Duke of Brunswick, 25 July, 1792] [Sidenote: The French Reply: the Insurrection of 9−10 August, 1792]

On 25 July, 1792, the duke of Brunswick (1735−1806), the pig−headed commander−in−chief of the allied armies, issued a proclamation to the French people. He declared it his purpose “to put an end to the anarchy in the interior of France, to check the attacks upon the throne and the altar, to reestablish the legal power, to restore to the king the security and liberty of which he is now deprived and to place him in a position to exercise once more the legitimate authority which belongs to him.” The bold duke went on to declare that French soldiers who might be captured “shall be treated as enemies and punished as rebels to their king and as disturbers of the public peace,” and that, if the slightest harm befell any member of the royal family, his Austrian and Prussian troops would “inflict an ever−memorable vengeance by delivering over the city of Paris to military execution and complete destruction, and the rebels guilty of such outrages to the punishment that they merit.” This foolish and insolent manifesto sealed the fate of the French monarchy. It was the clearest proof that French royalty and foreign armies were in formal alliance not only to prevent the further development of the Revolution but also to undo what had already been done. And all patriotically minded Frenchmen, whether hitherto they had sympathized with the course of events or not, now grew furious at the threats of foreigners to interfere in the internal affairs of their country. The French reply to the duke of Brunswick was the insurrection of 9−10 August, 1792.

[Sidenote: Suspension of the King and Fall of Limited Monarchy]

On those days the proletariat of Paris revolted against the liberal monarchy. They supplanted the bourgeois commune with a radically revolutionary commune, in which Danton became the leading figure. They invaded the royal palace, massacred the Swiss Guards, and obliged the king and his family to flee for their lives to the Assembly. On 10 August, a remnant of terror−stricken deputies voted to suspend the king from his office and to authorize the immediate election by universal manhood suffrage of a National Convention that would prepare a new constitution for France.

[Sidenote: Anarchy in France]

From the suspension of the king on 10 August to the assembling of the National Convention on 21 September, France was practically anarchical. The royal family was incarcerated in the gloomy prison of the Temple. The regular governmental agents were paralyzed. Lafayette protested against the insurrection at Paris and surrendered himself to the allies.

Still the allies advanced into France. Fear deepened into panic. Supreme control fell into the hands of the revolutionary commune: Danton became virtual dictator. His policy was simple. The one path of safety left open to the radicals was to strike terror into the hearts of their domestic and foreign foes. “In my opinion,” said Danton, “the way to stop the enemy is to terrify the royalists. Audacity, more audacity, and always greater audacity!” The

news of the investment of Verdun by the allies, published at Paris on 2 September, was the signal for the beginning of a wholesale massacre of royalists in the French capital. For five long days unfortunate royalists were taken from the prisons and handed over by a self−constituted judicial body to the tender mercies of a band of hired cutthroats. Slight discrimination was made of rank, sex, or age. Men, women, and children, nobles and magistrates, priests and bishops,—all who were suspected of royalist sympathy were butchered. The number of victims of these September massacres has been variously estimated from 2000 to 10,000.

Meanwhile Danton was infusing new life and new spirit into the French armies. Dumouriez replaced Lafayette in supreme command. And on 20 September the allies received their first check at Valmy.

[Sidenote: Valmy: the First Military Success of the Revolutionaries] [Sidenote: Proclamation of the First French Republic]

The very day on which news reached Paris that it was saved and that Brunswick was in retreat, the National Convention met. Amid the wildest enthusiasm, it unanimously decreed “that royalty is abolished in France.” Then it was resolved to date from 22 September, 1792, Year 1 of the Republic. A decree of perpetual banishment was enacted against the emigres and it was soon determined to bring the king to trial before the Convention.

[Sidenote: The National Convention 1792−1795]

The National Convention remained in session for three years (1792−1795), and its work constituted the second great phase of the Revolution. This work was essentially twofold: (1) It secured a series of great victories in the foreign war, thereby rendering permanent the remarkable social reforms of the first period of the Revolution, that between 1789 and 1791; and (2) it constructed a republican form of government, based on the principle of democracy.

[Sidenote: Problems Confronting the National Convention]

Perhaps no legislative body in history has been called upon to solve such knotty problems as those which confronted the National Convention at the opening of its sessions. At that time it was necessary (1) to decide what should be done with the deposed and imprisoned king; (2) to organize the national defense and turn back foreign invasion; (3) to suppress insurrection within France; (4) to provide a strong government for the country; (5) to complete and consolidate the social reforms of the earlier stage of the Revolution; and (6) to frame a new constitution and to establish permanent republican institutions. With all these questions the Convention coped with infinite industry and much success. And in the few following pages, we shall review them in the order indicated, although it should be borne in mind that most of them were considered by the Convention simultaneously.

[Sidenote: Personnel of the National Convention] [Sidenote: The Girondists] [Sidenote: The Mountainists] [Sidenote: The Plain]

Before taking up the work of the Convention, a word should be said about the personnel of that body. The elections had been in theory by almost universal suffrage, but in practice indifference or intimidation reduced the actual voters to about a tenth of the total electorate. The result was the return of an overwhelming majority of radicals, who, while agreeing on the fundamental republican doctrines, nevertheless differed about details. On the right of the Convention sat nearly two hundred Girondists, including Brissot, Vergniaud, Condorcet, and the interesting Thomas Paine. These men represented largely the well−to−do bourgeoisie who were more radical in thought than in deed, who ardently desired a democratic republic, but who at the same time distrusted Paris and the proletariat. In the raised seats on the opposite side of the Convention sat nearly one hundred members of the Mountain, now exclusively designated as Jacobins—extreme radicals in thought, word, and deed—disciples of Rousseau—counting among their number Danton, Robespierre, Carnot, and St. Just. Between the two factions of Mountainists and Girondists sat the Plain, as it was called, the real majority of the house, which had no policies or convictions of its own, but voted usually according to the dictates of expediency. Our tactful, trimming Abbe Sieyes belonged to the Plain. At the very outset the Plain was likely to go with the Girondists, but as time went on and the Parisian populace clamored more and more loudly against any one who opposed the action of their allies, the Mountainists, it gradually saw fit to transfer its affections to the Left.

[Sidenote: Trial and Execution of King Louis XVI, 1793]

The first serious question which faced the Convention was the disposition of the king. The discovery of an iron chest containing accounts of expenditures for bribing members of the National Constituent Assembly, coupled with the all but confirmed suspicion of Louis' double dealings with France and with foreign

foes,[Footnote: After the execution of the king, actual letters were discovered which Louis had dispatched to his fellow monarchs, urging their assistance. A typical extract is given in Robinson and Beard, *Readings in Modern European History*, Vol. I, pp. 287−288.] sealed the doom of that miserably weak monarch. He was brought to trial before the Convention in December, 1792, and condemned to death by a vote of 387 to 334. With the majority voted the king's own cousin, the duke of Orleans, an enthusiastic radical who had assumed the name of Citizen Philippe Egalite (Equality). On 21 January, 1793, Louis XVI was beheaded near the overthrown statue of his voluptuous predecessor Louis XV in the Place de la Revolution (now called the Place de la Concorde). The unruffled dignity with which he met death was the finest act of his reign.

[Sidenote: Military Successes]

Meanwhile the tide of Austrian and Prussian invasion had been rolling away from France. After Valmy, Dumouriez had pursued the retreating foreigners across the Rhine and had carried the war into the Austrian Netherlands, where a large party regarded the French as deliverers. Dumouriez entered Brussels without serious resistance, and was speedily master of the whole country. It seemed as though the French would have an easy task in delivering the peoples of Europe from their old regime.

[Sidenote: France the Champion of the Revolution]

Emboldened by the ease with which its armies were overrunning the neighboring states, the National Convention proposed to propagate liberty and reform throughout Europe and in December, 1792, issued the following significant decree: “The French nation declares that it will treat as enemies every people who, refusing liberty and equality or renouncing them, may wish to maintain, recall, or treat with a prince and the privileged classes; on the other hand, it engages not to subscribe to any treaty and not to lay down its arms until the sovereignty and independence of the people whose territory the troops of the republic shall have entered shall be established, and until the people shall have adopted the principles of equality and founded a free and democratic government.”

[Sidenote: Foreign Fears]

In thus throwing down the gauntlet to all the monarchs of Europe and in putting the issue clearly between democracy and the old regime, the French revolutionaries took a dangerous step. Although a large number of the neighboring peoples undoubtedly sympathized with the aims and achievements of the Revolution, the rulers and privileged classes in more distant countries, such as Russia, Austria, Prussia, and even Spain and Great Britain, were still deeply intrenched in the patriotism and unquestioning loyalty of their people.

[Sidenote: The “First Coalition” against France]

Then, too, the execution of Louis XVI in January, 1793, increased the bitterness of the approaching grave struggle. A royalist reaction in France itself precipitated civil war in La Vendee. Dumouriez, the ablest general of the day, in disgust deserted to the Austrians. And at this very time, a formidable coalition of frightened and revengeful monarchs was formed to overthrow the French Republic. To Austria and Prussia, already in the field, were added Great Britain, Holland, Spain, and Sardinia.

[Sidenote: Military Endeavours of the Revolutionaries]

Once more France was placed on the defensive. Once more the allies occupied Belgium and the Rhine provinces, and took the roads toward Paris. The situation in the spring of 1793 appeared as critical as that in the preceding summer. But as the event proved, the republic was a far more effective government than the liberal monarchy, Revolutionary France now went gladly to war, singing the Marseillaise and displaying the banners of “Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.” Bourgeois citizens, whose social and financial gains in the earlier stage of the Revolution would be threatened by the triumph of the foreign forces, now gave money and brains to the national defense. Artisans and peasants, who had won something and hoped to win more from the success of the Revolution, now laid down their lives for the cause. Heroism and devotion to a great ideal inspired the raw recruits that were rushed to the front.

[Sidenote: Carnot]

But it was not enthusiasm alone that saved France. It was the splendid organization of that enthusiasm by an efficient central government at Paris. In Carnot (1753−1823) the National Convention possessed a military and administrative genius of the first order. Of honorable and upright character, fearless, patriotic, and practical, Carnot plunged into the work of organizing the republican armies. His labors were incessant. He prepared the plans of campaign and the reports that were submitted to the Convention. He raised volunteers and drafted militia,

drilled them, and hurried them to the frontiers. With the aid of Robert Lindet (1749−1825), the able finance minister, he found means of feeding, clothing, and arming the host of soldiers. He personally visited the armies and by word and precept infused them with energy and determination. For the first time in modern history a nation was truly in arms.

[Sidenote: The New Generals]

The work of Carnot was supplemented by the labors of the “deputies on mission,” radical members of the Convention who were detailed to watch the generalship and movements of the various French armies, endowed with power to send any suspected or unsuccessful commander to the guillotine and charged with keeping the central government constantly informed of military affairs. Gradually, a new group of brilliant young republican generals appeared, among whom the steadfast Moreau (1763− 1813), the stern Pichegru (1761−1804), and the gallant Jourdan (1762− 1833) stood preeminent.

[Sidenote: French Successes] [Sidenote: Break−up of the First Coalition, 1795]

In this way France met the monster coalition which would have staggered a Louis XIV. The country was cleared of foreign enemies. The war was pressed in the Netherlands, along the Rhine, in Savoy, and across the Pyrenees. So successful were the French that Carnot's popular title of “organizer of defense” was justly magnified to that of “organizer of victory.” Of course it is impossible in our limited survey to do justice to these wonderful campaigns of 1794 and 1795. It will suffice to point out that when the National Convention finally adjourned in 1795, the First Coalition was in reality dissolved. The pitiful Charles IV of Spain humbled himself to contract a close alliance with the republic which had put his Bourbon cousin to death. By the separate treaty of Basel (1795), Prussia gave France a free hand on the left bank of the Rhine and turned her attention to securing compensation at the expense of Poland, William V, the Orange stadholder of Holland, was deposed and his country transformed into the Batavian Republic, allied with France. French troops were in full possession of the Austrian Netherlands and all other territories up to the Rhine. The life−long ambition of Louis XIV appeared to have been realized by the new France in two brief years. Only Great Britain, Austria, and Sardinia remained in arms against the republic.

[Sidenote: Suppression of Domestic Insurrection]

The foreign successes of the republic seem all the more wonderful when it is remembered that at the same time serious revolts had to be suppressed within France. Opposition to Carnot's drafting of soldiers was utilized by reactionary agitators to stir up an insurrection of the peasants in La Vendee in order to restore the monarchy and to reestablish the Roman Catholic Church. Provincial and bourgeois dislike of the radicalism of the Parisian proletariat caused riots and outbreaks in such important and widely separated cities as Lyons, Marseilles, and Bordeaux. With the same devotion and thoroughness that had characterized their foreign policy, but with greater sternness, the officials of the National Convention stamped out all these riots and insurrections. By 1795 all France, except only the emigres and secret conspirators, had more or less graciously accepted the republic.

The true explanation of these marvelous achievements, whether at home or abroad, lies in the strong central government which the National Convention established and in the policy of terrorism which that government pursued.

[Sidenote: Rule Of The Committee Of Public Safety]

In the spring of 1793 the National Convention intrusted the supreme executive authority of France to a special committee, composed of nine (later twelve) of its members, who were styled the Committee of Public Safety. This small body, which included such Jacobin leaders as Carnot, Robespierre, and St. Just, acting secretly, directed the ministers of state, appointed the local officials, and undertook the administration of the whole country. Manifold were the duties it was called upon to discharge. Among other problems, it must conduct the foreign relations, supervise the armies, and secure the active support of the French people. Diligently and effectively did it apply itself to its various activities.

[Sidenote: The “Terror” A Political Expedient]

Terrorism has been the word usually employed to describe the internal policy of the Committee of Public Safety, and the “Reign of Terror,” the period of the Committee's chief work, from the summer of 1793 to that of 1794. So sensational and so sanguinary was the period that many writers have been prone to make it the very center of the Revolution and to picture “liberty, equality, and fraternity” as submerged in a veritable sea of blood. As a matter of fact, however, the Reign of Terror was but an incident, though obviously an inevitable incident, in

a great Revolution. Nor may the French people be justly accused of a peculiarly bloodthirsty disposition. Given the same circumstances, it is doubtful whether similar scenes would not have been enacted at Vienna, Berlin, Madrid, or even London. It must be remembered that great principles and far−reaching reforms were endangered by a host of foreign and domestic enemies. It seemed to the republican leaders that the occasion demanded complete unanimity in France. A divided nation could not triumph over united Europe. The only way in which France could present a united front to the world was by striking terror into the hearts of the opponents of the new regime. And terror involved bloodshed.

The chief allies of the Committee of Public Safety in conducting terrorism were the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal. The former was given police power in order to maintain order throughout the country. The latter was charged with trying and condemning any person suspected of disloyalty to the republic. Both were responsible to the Committee of Public Safety. A decree of the Convention, called the Law of Suspects, proclaimed as liable to arbitrary arrest every person who was of noble birth, or had held office before the Revolution, or had any relation with an emigre, or could not produce a signed certificate of citizenship.

With such instruments of despotism France became revolutionary by strokes of the guillotine. [Footnote: The guillotine, which is still used in France, consists of two upright posts between which a heavy knife rises and falls. The criminal is stretched upon a board and then pushed between the posts. The knife falls and instantly beheads him. The device was invented by a certain philanthropic Dr. Guillotine, who wished to substitute in capital punishment an instrument sure to produce instant death in the place of the bungling process of beheading with an ax. (Mathews.)] It is estimated that about 2500 persons were executed at Paris during the Reign of Terror. Among others Marie Antoinette, Philippe Egalite, and Madame Roland suffered death.

The Terror spread to the provinces. Local tribunals were everywhere established to search out and condemn suspected persons. The city of Lyons, which ventured to resist the revolutionary government, was partially demolished and hundreds of its citizens were put to death. At Nantes, where echoes of the Vendee insurrection were long heard, the brutal Jacobin deputy Carrier loaded unhappy victims on old hulks which were towed out into the Loire and sunk. The total number of those who perished in the provinces is unknown, but it may have reached ten thousand.

When the total loss of life by means of revolutionary tribunals is calculated, it will certainly be found to bear slight comparison with the enormous sacrifice of life which any one of the numerous great wars of the nineteenth century has entailed. The chief wonder about the Reign of Terror is that its champions and supporters, who had so much at stake, did not do worse things.

[Sidenote: Factions among the Revolutionaries]

A more calamitous phase of the Terror than the slaughter of royalists and reactionaries was the wretched quarreling among various factions of the radicals and the destruction. of one for the benefit of another. Thus, the efforts of the Girondists to stay the execution of the king and to appeal to the provinces against the violence in Paris, coupled with the treason of Dumouriez, seemed to the Parisian proletariat to mark the alliance of the Girondists with the reactionaries. Accordingly, the workingmen of Paris, under the leadership of Marat, revolted on 31 May, 1793, and two days later obliged the Convention to expel twenty−nine Girondist members. Of these, the chief, including Brissot and Vergniaud, were brought to the guillotine in October, 1793. Next, the leaders of the commune of Paris, who had gone to such extreme lengths as to suppress the Christian churches in that city and to proclaim atheism, were dispatched in March, 1794, by a coalition of the followers of Danton and Robespierre. Then in April, when Danton at length wearied of the Terror and counseled moderation, that redoubtable genius, together with his friend, Camille Desmoulins, was guillotined. Finally, Robespierre himself, after enjoying a brief dictatorship, during which time he vainly endeavored to put in practice the theories of Rousseau, was sent, in company with St. Just, to the guillotine by direction of the National Convention in July, 1794. This meant the beginning of reaction.

[Sidenote: End of the Terror: Thermidorian Reaction, 1794]

The death of Robespierre ended the Reign of Terror. The purpose of the Terror, however, was already achieved. The Revolution was preserved in France, and France was preserved in Europe. The Thermidorian Reaction, as the end of the Terror is called, left the National Convention free to resume its task of devising a permanent republican constitution for the country. A few subsequent attempts were made, now by reactionaries, now by extreme radicals, to interfere with the work, but they were suppressed with comparative ease. The last

uprising of the Parisian populace which threatened the Convention was effectually quelled (October, 1795) by a "whiff of grape−shot" discharged at the command of a young and obscure major of artillery, Napoleon Bonaparte by name.

[Sidenote: Reforms of the National Convention, 1792−1795]

In the midst of foreign war and internal dissension, even in the midst of the Terror, the National Convention found time to further the social reforms of the earlier stage of the Revolution. Just as the bourgeois Constituent Assembly destroyed the inequalities arising from the privileges of the "old regime," so the popular Convention sought to put an end to the inequalities arising from wealth. Under its new leaders, the Revolution assumed for a time a distinctly socialistic character. The property of the emigres was confiscated for the benefit of the state. A maximum price for grain was set by law. Large estates were broken up and offered for sale to poorer citizens in lots of two or three acres, to be paid for in small annual installments. All ground rents were abolished without compensation to the owners. "The rich," said Marat, "have so long sucked out the marrow of the people that they are now visited with a crushing retribution."

Some of the reforms of the Convention went to absurd lengths. In the popular passion for equality, every one was to be called "Citizen" rather than "Monsieur." The official record of the expense of Marie Antoinette's funeral was the simple entry, "Five francs for a coffin for the widow of Citizen Capet." Ornate clothing disappeared with titles of nobility, and the silk stockings and knee breeches ( *culottes*), which had distinguished the privileged classes and the gentlemen, were universally supplanted by the long trousers which had hitherto been worn only by the lowest class of workingmen (*sans−culottes*). To do away with the remembrance of historic Christianity, the year was divided anew into twelve months, each containing three weeks of ten days (*decades*), every tenth day ( *decadi*) being for rest, and the five or six days left over at the end of the year, called *sans−culottides*, were national holidays; the names of the months were changed, and the revolutionary calendar made to date from the establishment of the republic, 22 September, 1792.

Many of the reforms had long been urgently needed and proved to be of permanent value. Such was the establishment of a convenient and uniform system of weights and measures, based on decimal reckoning, the so−called metric system, which has come to be accepted by almost all civilized nations save the English−speaking peoples. Such, too, was the elaborate system of state education which the philosopher Condorcet [Footnote: Marquis de Condorcet (1743−1794).] prepared and which, though more pressing questions compelled its postponement, became the basis on which the modern scheme of free public instruction has been built up in France. Such, moreover, was the separation of Church and state, effected in September, 1794, the establishment in the following year of liberty of worship, and the restoration of the churches to Christian worship on condition that the clergymen submitted to the laws of the state. Such, finally, was the project of preparing a single comprehensive code of law for the whole country. Although the legal code was not completed until the dictatorship of Napoleon Bonaparte, nevertheless the Convention made a beginning and incorporated in it a fundamental principle of inheritance that has marked modern France—the principle that no person may will his property to one direct heir to the exclusion of others but that all children must inherit almost equally. Moreover, the practice of imprisoning men for debt was abolished, negro slavery was ended, and woman's claim on property was protected in common with man's. Finally the new republican constitution was permeated with ideas of political democracy.

[Sidenote: Eventual Bourgeois Control Of The National Convention]

After the downfall of Robespierre (Thermidorian Reaction), the National Convention ceased to press reforms in behalf of the proletariat and came more and more under the influence of the moderate well−to−do bourgeoisie. The law against suspects was repealed and the grain laws were amended. The Revolutionary Tribunal was suppressed and the name of the Place de la Revolution was changed to the Place de la Concorde. The death in prison of the young and only son of Louis XVI in 1795 was a severe blow to the hopes of the royalists. By 1795 France seemed definitively committed to a republican form of government, which, however, would not be extremely radical but only moderate, being now founded on the bourgeoisie rather than on the proletariat.

THE DIRECTORY (1795−1799) AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE REPUBLIC INTO A MILITARY DICTATORSHIP

[Sidenote: Constitution of the Year III, the Constitution of the First French Republic] [Sidenote: The Directory]

The constitution of the first French Republic was drawn up by the National Convention during the last year of its session and after it had passed under bourgeois influence. This constitution which went into effect in 1795 and is known, therefore, as the Constitution of the Year III (of the Republic), intrusted the legislative power to two chambers, chosen by indirect election,—a lower house of five hundred members, to propose laws, and a Council of Ancients, of two hundred and fifty members, to examine and enact the laws. The bourgeois distrust of the lower classes showed itself again in restricting the electorate to taxpayers who had lived at least a year in one place. The executive authority of the republic was vested in a board of five members, styled Directors, and elected by the legislature, one retiring every year. The Board of Directors, or "Directory," was to supervise the enforcement of laws and to appoint the ministers of state, or cabinet, who should be responsible to it.

[Sidenote: Brief Duration of the Directory, 1795−1799]

Thus, as the National Constituent Assembly had framed the constitution for the liberal monarchy, so the National Convention drafted that for the republic. But in strength and durability the republic was hardly more fortunate than the limited monarchy. Louis XVI reigned as constitutional king under the document of 1791 less than a year. The Directory governed in accordance with the constitution of the Year III less than four years (1795−1799).

[Sidenote: Weaknesses in the Directory]

The failure of the Directory was due to two chief causes: first, the prevalence of domestic difficulties; and second, the rise of military power and the appearance of a victorious, ambitious general. To both of these causes reference must be made. The former proved that another kind of government was needed to cope with the situation; the latter suggested what the nature of the new government would be.

To consolidate the French people after six years of radical revolutionary upheavals required hard and honest labor on the part of men of distinct genius. Yet the Directors were, almost without exception, men of mediocre talents, [Footnote: Carnot, upright and sincere, and the only member of first−rate ability, was forced out of the Directory in 1797.] who practiced bribery and corruption with unblushing effrontery. They preferred their personal gain to the welfare of the state.

[Sidenote: Political and Social Dissensions]

The period of the Directory was a time of plots and intrigues. The royalists who were elected in large numbers to the Assemblies were restrained from subverting the constitution only by illegal force and violence on the part of the Directors. On the other hand, the extremists in Paris found a warm−hearted leader in a certain Babeuf (1760−1797), who declared that the Revolution had been directed primarily to the advantage of the bourgeoisie, that the proletarians, despite their toil and suffering and bloodshed, were still just as poorly off as ever, and that their only salvation lay in a compulsory equalization of wealth and the abolition of poverty. An insurrection of these radicals—the forerunners of modern Socialism—was suppressed and Babeuf was put to death in 1797.

[Sidenote: Financial Difficulties]

While sincere radicals and convinced reactionaries were uniting in common opposition to the unhappy Directory, the finances of the state were again becoming hopelessly involved. "Graft" flourished unbridled in the levying and collecting of the taxes and in all public expenditures. To the extravagance of the Directors in internal administration were added the financial necessities of armies aggregating a million men. Paris, still in poverty and want, had to be fed at the expense of the nation. And the issue of *assignats* by the National Constituent Assembly, intended at first only as a temporary expedient, had been continued until by the year 1797 the total face value of the *assignats* amounted to about forty−five billion *livres*. So far had the value of paper money depreciated, however, that in March, 1796, three hundred *livres* in *assignats* were required to secure one *livre* in cash. In 1797 a partial bankruptcy was declared, interest payments being suspended on two−thirds of the public debt, and the *assignats* were demonetized. The republic faced much the same financial crisis as had confronted the absolute monarchy in 1789.

[Sidenote: Continued Success in Foreign War]

From but one direction did light stream in upon the Directory—and that was the foreign war. When the Directory assumed office, France was still at war with Austria, Sardinia, and Great Britain. The general plan of campaign was to advance one French army across the Rhine, through southern Germany, and thence into the Austrian dominions, and to dispatch another army across the Alps, through northern Italy, and thence on to Vienna. Of the army of the Rhine such veteran generals as Pichegru, Jourdan, and Moreau were put in charge. To

the command of the army operating in Italy, the young and inexperienced Bonaparte was appointed.

[Sidenote: Appearance of Napoleon Bonaparte]

Napoleon Bonaparte hitherto had not been particularly conspicuous in politics or in war. He was believed to be in full sympathy with the Revolution, although he had taken pains after the downfall of Robespierre to disavow any attachment to the extreme radicals. He had acquired some popularity by his skillful expulsion of the British from Toulon in 1793, and his protection of the National Convention against the uprising of the Parisian radicals in 1795 gave him credit as a friend of law and order. Finally, his marriage in 1796 with Josephine Beauharnais, the widow of a revolutionary general and an intimate friend of one of the Directors, bettered his chances of indulging his fondness for politics and his genius in war.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte's First Italian Campaign, 1796−1797] [Sidenote: Treaty of Campo Formio, 1797]

That very year (1796), while the older and more experienced French generals were repeatedly baffled in their efforts to carry the war into the Germanies, the young commander—but twenty−seven years of age— swept the Austrians from Italy. With lightning rapidity, with infectious enthusiasm, with brilliant tactics, with great personal bravery, he crossed the Alps, humbled the Sardinians, and within a year had disposed of five Austrian armies and had occupied every fort in northern Italy. Sardinia was compelled to cede Savoy and Nice to the French Republic, and, when Bonaparte's army approached Vienna, Austria stooped to make terms with this amazing republican general. By the treaty of Campo Formio (1797), France secured the Austrian Netherlands and the Ionian Islands; Austria obtained, as partial compensation for her sacrifices, the ancient Venetian Republic, but agreed not to interfere in other parts of Italy; and a congress was to assemble at Rastatt to rearrange the map of the Holy Roman Empire with a view to compensating those German princes whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine had been appropriated by France.

[Sidenote: Great Britain Left Alone in Arms Against the French Republic]

The campaign of 1796−1797, known in history as the First Italian campaign, was the beginning of a long series of sensational military exploits which were to rank Napoleon Bonaparte as the foremost soldier of modern times. Its immediate effect was to complete the dissolution of the First Coalition by forcing Austria and Sardinia to follow the example of Spain, Prussia, and Holland and to make a peace highly favorable to the French Republic. Great Britain alone continued the struggle against the Directory.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte's Rising Fame]

Another effect of the first Italian campaign, almost as immediate and certainly more portentous, was the sudden personal fame of Napoleon Bonaparte. He was the most talked−of man in France. The people applauded him. The government feared but flattered him. Schemers and plotters of every political faith sought his support. Alongside of decreasing respect for the existing government was increasing trust in Bonaparte's strength and ability.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte's Egyptian Campaign Against Great Britain, 1798]

It was undoubtedly with a sense of relief that the despised Directors in 1798 assented to a project proposed by the popular hero to transport to Egypt a French expedition with the object of interrupting communications between Great Britain and India. The ensuing Egyptian campaign of 1798 was spectacular rather than decisive. Bonaparte made stirring speeches to his soldiers. He called the Pyramids to witness the valor of the French. He harangued the Mohammedans upon the beautiful and truthful character of their religion and upon the advantages which they would derive from free trade with France. He encouraged the close study of Egyptian antiquities. [Footnote: It was an army officer on this Egyptian expedition who discovered the famous Rosetta Stone, by the aid of which hieroglyphics could be deciphered.] But his actual victories did not measure up to the excessively colored reports that he sent home. He was checked in Syria, and a great naval victory won by the celebrated English admiral, Lord Nelson, near the mouth of the Nile, effectually prevented the arrival of reinforcements.

[Sidenote: Embarrassments of the Directory during Bonaparte's Absence from France]

Thereupon, General Bonaparte, luckily eluding the British warships, returned to France. It was believed by Frenchmen that his last expedition had been eminently successful: but that in the meantime the work of the Directory had been disastrous, no one doubted. While Bonaparte was away, affairs in France had gone from bad to worse. There were new plots, increased financial and social disorders, and finally the renewal on a large scale of foreign war.

[Sidenote: The Second Coalition and the Renewal of War in Europe]

After the treaty of Campo Formio, the Directors had prosecuted zealously the policy of surrounding France with a circle of dependent republics. Even before that peace, Holland had been transformed into the Batavian Republic, and now pretexts of various sorts were utilized to convert the duchy of Milan, or Lombardy, into the Cisalpine Republic; the oligarchy of Genoa into the Ligurian Republic; the Papal States into the Roman Republic; the kingdom of the Two Sicilies into the Parthenopaean Republic; the Swiss Confederation into the Helvetic Republic.

In view of the fact that the governments of all these republics were modeled after that of France and were allied with France, the monarchs of Europe bestirred themselves once more to get rid of the danger that threatened them. A Second Coalition was formed by Great Britain, Austria, and Russia, and, thanks to liberal sums of money supplied by William Pitt, the British minister, they were able to put large armies in the field.

[Sidenote: French Reverses]

During 1799 the Second Coalition won repeated victories; the French were driven from Italy; and most of the dependent republics collapsed. It seemed as though Bonaparte's first Italian campaign had been for naught. Possibly the military hero of France had himself foreseen this very situation and had intended to exploit it to his own advantage.

[Sidenote: Return of Bonaparte from Egypt: the “Man of the Hour"]

At any rate, when Bonaparte had sailed for Egypt, he had left his country apparently prosperous, victorious, and honored. Now, when he landed at Frejus on 9 October, 1799, he found France bankrupt, defeated, and disgraced. It is small wonder that his journey from Frejus to Paris was a triumphal procession. The majority of Frenchmen were convinced that he was the man of the hour.

[Sidenote: The Coup d'Etat of the Eighteenth Brumaire: Overthrow of the Directory, 1799] Within a month of his return from Egypt, public opinion enabled the young conqueror to overthrow the government of the Directory. Skillfully intriguing with the Abbe Sieyes, who was now one of the Directors, he surrounded the Assemblies with a cordon of troops loyal to himself and on 18−19 Brumaire (9−10 November, 1799) secured by show of force the downfall of the government and the appointment of himself to supreme military command. This blow at the state (*coup d'etat*) was soon followed by the promulgation of a new constitution, by which General Bonaparte became First Consul of the French Republic.

[Sidenote: Militarism and the Close of the Revolution]

The *coup d'etat* of 18 Brumaire virtually ended the Revolution in France. Within the space of ten and a half years from the assembling of the Estates−General at Versailles, parliamentary and popular government fell beneath the sword. The predictions of Marat and Robespierre were realized: militarism had supplanted democracy.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1789−1799)

It may now be possible for us to have some idea as to the real meaning of these ten years of Assemblies, constitutions, insurrections, and wars, which have marked the period of the French Revolution. A present− day visitor in Paris will be struck by the bold letters which stand out on the public buildings and churches: *Liberte, Egalite, Fraternite*—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. These were the words which the revolutionaries spelled out on their homes, which they thought embodied the true meaning of the Revolution.

As to the meaning of these words, there were certainly quite contradictory views. To the royalists and rigid Catholics—to the privileged nobility and clergy—to many a surprised peasant—to all the reactionaries, they meant everything that was hateful, blasphemous, sordid, inhuman, and unpatriotic. To the enlightened altruistic bourgeois—to the poverty−stricken workingman of the city—to many a dreamer and philanthropist—to all the extreme radicals, they were but a shadowy will−of−the−wisp that glimmered briefly and perhaps indicated faintly the gorgeousness of the great day that much later might break upon them. Between these extremes of reaction and radicalism fell the bulk of the bourgeoisie and of the peasantry—the bulk of the nation— and it is in their sense that we shall try to make clear the meaning of the three symbolical words.

[Sidenote: “Liberty"]

“Liberty” implied certain political ideals. Government was henceforth to be exercised not autocratically by divine right, but constitutionally by the sovereign will of the governed. The individual citizen was no longer to be subject in all things to a king, but was to be guaranteed in possession of personal liberties which no state or society might abridge. Such were liberty of conscience, liberty of worship, liberty of speech, liberty of

publication. The liberty of owning private property was proclaimed by the French Revolution as an inherent right of man.

[Sidenote: “Equality"]

“Equality” embraced the social activities of the Revolution. It meant the abolition of privilege, the end of serfdom, the destruction of the feudal system. It pronounced all men equal before the law. It aspired, though with little success, to afford every man an equal chance with every other man in the pursuit of life and happiness.

[Sidenote: “Fraternity"]

“Fraternity” was the symbol of the brotherhood of those who sought to make the world better and happier and more just. In France it found expression in an outburst of patriotism and national sentiment. No longer did mercenaries fight at the behest of despots for dynastic aggrandizement; henceforth a nation in arms was prepared to do battle under the glorious banner of “fraternity” in defense of whatever it believed to be for the nation's interests.

Political liberty, social equality, patriotism in the nation,—these three have been the enduring watchwords of all those who down to our own day have looked for inspiration to the French Revolution.

ADDITIONAL READING

GENERAL. Textbook narratives: J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe,* Vol. I (1907), ch. xii, xiii; J. A. R. Marriott, *The Remaking of Modern Europe, 1789−1878* (1910), ch. i−vi; H. E. Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe, 1763−1815* (1914), ch. Vi−xvi; H. M. Stephens, *Revolutionary Europe, 1789−1815* (1893), ch. ii−vi; J. H. Rose, *Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 1789−1815* (1895), ch. Ii−vi; C. A. Fyffe, *A History of Modern Europe, 1792−1878* (1896), ch. i−iv; H. T. Dyer, *A History of Modern Europe from the Fall of Constantinople,* 3d ed. rev. by Arthur Hassall (1901), ch. lii−lxi; Charles Seignobos, *History of Contemporary Civilization,* Eng. trans. by J. A. James (1909), pp. 92−149. See also H. A. L. Fisher, *The Republican Tradition in Europe* (1911), ch. i−vii; and Emile Bourgeois, *Manuel historique de politique etrangere,* 4th ed., Vol. II (1906), ch. i−v, vii.

ONE−VOLUME SURVEYS: Shailer Mathews, *The French Revolution* (reprint 1912), a clear, well−balanced introduction, ending with the year 1795; Hilaire Belloc, *The French Revolution* (1911), in the “Home University Library,” interestingly written and inclined to be philosophical; R. M. Johnston, *The French Revolution* (1909), emphasizes the spectacular and military rather than the social and economic; Louis Madelin, *La Revolution* (1911), written for the general French reader and probably the very best of its kind, now in process of translation into English.

STANDARD HISTORIES OF THE REVOLUTION: Alphonse Aulard, *Histoire politique de la revolution francaise, 1789−1804,* 3d ed. (1905), Eng. trans. by Bernard Miall, 4 vols. (1910), a painstaking study of the growth of the spirit of democracy and of the rise of the republican movement, by an eminent authority who has devoted many years to a sympathetic study of the Revolution; H. M. Stephens, *A History of the French Revolution,* 2 vols. (1886−1891), mainly political, generally reliable, but stops short with the Reign of Terror; H. A. Taine, *The French Revolution,* Eng. trans. by John Durand, 3 vols. (1878−1885), brilliantly written and bitterly hostile to many of the leaders of the Revolution, a work still famous though many of its findings have been vehemently assailed by Aulard, the apologist of the Revolution; Jean Jaures (editor), *Histoire socialiste, 1789−1900,* 12 vols. (1901−1909), a well−known and highly useful history of France by a group of prominent French Socialists with a penchant for stressing economic matters—Vols. I−IV, by Jaures himself, treat of the years 1789−1794, and Vol. V, by Gabrielle Deville, of 1794−1799; P. A. (Prince) Kropotkin, *The Great French Revolution, 1789−1793,* Eng. trans. by N. F. Dryhurst (1909), emphasizes the role played by the uneducated classes, eulogizes Marat, and suggests the conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie and the lower classes; Thomas Carlyle, *The French Revolution,* originally published in 1837, lively literary gossip and commentary rather than narrative history, amusing though often fuliginous, should be read only by those already familiar with the actual events of the Revolution; Albert Sorel, *L'Europe et la revolution francaise,* 8 vols. (1885−1904), of which Vols. I−V deal with the years 1789−1799 and mainly with the effects of the Revolution throughout Europe, a monumental work of the highest merit; Gustave Le Bon, *La revolution francaise et la psychologie des revolutions* (1912), trans. by Bernard Miall under the title of *The Psychology of Revolution* (1913), a noteworthy contribution to the study of “mob psychology” as exemplified by the French Revolution; Ernest Lavisse and Alfred Rambaud (editors), *Histoire generale,* Vol. VIII, a collection of scholarly monographs on various phases

of the Revolution; *Cambridge Modern History,* Vol. VIII (1904), a similar work in English; Heinrich von Sybel, *Geschichte der Revolutionzeit von 1789,* 3d ed., 5 vols. (1865−1879), the best and most famous German work on the subject; Wilhelm Oncken, *Das Zeitalter der Revolution,* 2 vols. (1884− 1886); Adalbert Wahl, *Geschichte des europaeischen Staatensystems im Zeitalter der franzoesischen Revolution und der Freiheits−Kriege, 1789− 1815* (1912), useful epitome of foreign relations; Emile Levasseur, *Histoire des classes ouvrieres et de l'industrie en France de 1789 a 1870,* Vol. I (1903), Livre I, *La Revolution,* valuable for the history of the working classes; Philippe Sagnac, *La legislation civile de la revolution francaise,1789−1804* (1898), very important survey of permanent social and civil gains; E. F. Henderson, *Symbol and Satire in the French Revolution* (1912), interesting side−lights.

SOURCE MATERIALS. Of the vast masses of source material available for special study of the French Revolution, the following selections may be found useful and suggestive: F. M. Anderson, *Constitutions and Other Select Documents Illustrative of the History of France, 1789−1901,* 2d rev. ed. (1909); L. G. Wickham Legg, *Select Documents Illustrative of the French Revolution, the Constituent Assembly,* 2 vols. (1905); Leon Duguit and Henry Monnier, *Les constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (1898); H. M. Stephens, *The Principal Speeches of the Statesmen and Orators of the French Revolution, 1789−1795,* 2 vols. (1892); Leon Cahen and Raymond Guyot, *L'oeuvre legislative de la revolution* (1913); Alphonse Aulard, *Les grands orateurs de la revolution—Vergniaud, Danton, Robespierre* (1914); Merrick Whitcomb, *Typical Cahiers of 1789,* in "Translations and Reprints" of the University of Pennsylvania (1898). In the *Collection de documents inedits sur l'histoire economique de la revolution francaise,* now in course of publication under the auspices of the French Ministry of Public Instruction, have appeared (1906−1915) several volumes of the local *cahiers* of 1788−1789. See also Armand Brette, *Recueil des documents relatifs a la convocation des etats generaux de 1789,* 3 vols. (1894−1904); P. J. B. Buchez and P. C. Roux− Lavergne, *Histoire parlementaire de la revolution francaise, 1789− 1815,* 40 vols. (1834−1838), embracing extracts from the debates, quotations from contemporary newspapers and pamphlets, and the text of some of the most important statutes and decrees; *Archives parlementaires de 1787 a 1860,* 1st series *1787−1799,* 82 vols., the official, but not always trustworthy, reports of the debates in the successive French legislative bodies; *Reimpression de l'ancien Moniteur,* 32 vols., a reprint, in several different editions, of one of the most famous Parisian newspapers of the revolutionary period; Alphonse Aulard, *La societe des jacobins* , 6 vols. (1889−1897), a collection of documents concerning the most influential political club of revolutionary France. Of the numerous memoirs of the time, perhaps the most valuable are those of Mallet du Pan, Comte de Fersen, Bailly, Ferrieres, and Malouet; see also the *History of My Time* by the Duc d'Audiffret−Pasquier (1767−1862), Eng. trans. by C. E. Roche, 3 vols. (1893−1894), especially Part I; and for additional memoirs and other source−material consult the bibliographies in the *Cambridge Modern History* or in the *Histoire generale*. There are several detailed bibliographies on the French Revolution; and since 1881 the veteran scholar Aulard has edited *La revolution francaise,* devoted exclusively to the subject. For interesting personal impressions of the Revolution by an American eye−witness, see Gouverneur Morris, *Diary and Letters,* 2 vols. (1888). F. M. and H. D. Fling, *Source Problems on the French Revolution* (1913), is a useful compilation for intensive critical study of various phases of the Revolution.

SPECIAL WORKS ON THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. W. M. Sloane, *The French Revolution and Religious Reform* (1901), a resume of legislation affecting the Church, 1789−1804; Antonin Debidour, *Histoire des rapports de l'eglise et de l'etat en France de 1789 a 1870* (1898); Pierre de La Gorce, *Histoire religieuse de la revolution francaise,* Vol. I, *1789−1791* (1909), Vol. II, *1791−1793* (1912), comprehensive and exhaustive, sympathetic with the Church but scrupulously fair; Paul Pisani, *L'eglise de Paris et la revolution,* 4 vols. (1908−1911), covering the years 1789−1802, a work of high rank by a canon of Notre Dame; J. F. E. Robinet, *Le mouvement religieux a Paris pendant la revolution, 1789−1801,* 2 vols. (1896−1898), primarily a collection of documents; The Abbe Bridier (editor), *A Papal Envoy during the Reign of Terror, being the Memoirs of Mgr. de Salamon the Internuncio at Paris during the Revolution, 1790−1801,* Eng. trans. by Frances Jackson (1911); Ludovic Sciout, *Histoire de la constitution civile du clerge, 1790−1801,* 4 vols. (1872−1881); Alphonse Aulard, *La revolution et les congregations: expose historique et documents* (1903); Edme Champion, *La separation de l'eglise et de l'etat en 1794* (1903).

SPECIAL WORKS ON CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH OPINION OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION. Edward Dowden, *The French Revolution and English Literature* (1897); H. N. Brailsford, *Shelley, Godwin, and*

*their Circle* (1913); W. P. Hall, *British Radicalism, 1791−1797* (1912); Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, in many editions, a furious and prejudiced arraignment of the whole movement; John (Viscount) Morley, *Edmund Burke* (1879), an apology for Burke; John MacCunn, *The Political Philosophy of Burke* (1913), clear and concise though somewhat less laudatory of Burke; *The Life and Writings of Thomas Paine*, edited by D. E. Wheeler, 10 vols. (1909), the most elaborate edition of the writings of the chief English friend of the Revolution; Paine's *The Rights of Man* has appeared in many other editions.

SECONDARY WORKS ON OTHER SPECIAL TOPICS. On the wars 1792−1795: Arthur Chuquet, *Les guerres de la revolution*, 11 vols. (1886−1896), very detailed, coming down only to September, 1793; A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793− 1812*, Vol. I, 10th ed. (1898); Mrs. Maxwell−Scott, *Life of the Marquise de la Rochejaquelein* (1912), and Ida A. Taylor, *The Tragedy of an Army: La Vendee in 1793* (1913), two sympathetic and popular accounts of the Vendean Revolt. On the Terror: H. A. Wallon, *La Terreur*, 2 vols. (1881), and, by the same author, *Les representants du peuple en mission*, 5 vols. (1889−1890), and *Le tribunal revolutionnaire*, 2 vols. (1900); Louis Mortimer−Ternaux, *Histoire de la Terreur, 1792−1794*, 8 vols. (1862); Edmond Bire, *La legende des girondins* (1881); Charles de Ricault Hericault, *La revolution de thermidor*, 2d ed. (1878). On the Directory, 1795−1799: Ludovic Sciout, *Le Directoire* , 2 vols. (1895−1896).

BIOGRAPHIES. Of Mirabeau, the best biography in English undoubtedly will be that of F. M. Fling, projected in three volumes, of which Vol. I, *The Youth of Mirabeau*, was published in 1908; the most recent and convenient French treatment is by Louis Barthou (1913); a standard German work is Alfred Stern, *Das Leben Mirabeaus*, 2 vols. (1889); and for a real insight into Mirabeau's character and policies, reference should be made to his *Correspondance avec le comte de la Marck*, 3 vols. (1851). Hilaire Belloc has written very readable and suggestive English biographies of *Danton* (1899), *Robespierre* (1901), and *Marie Antoinette* (1909). Perhaps the best brief appreciation of *Danton* is that by Louis Madelin (1914); J. F. E. Robinet has written a valuable *Danton* (1889), and likewise a *Condorcet* (1893). The elaborate *Histoire de Robespierre et du coup d'etat du 9 thermidor* by Ernest Hamel, 3 vols. (1865−1867), is marred by excessive hero−worship. Jules Claretie, *Camille Desmoulins, Lucille Desmoulins: etude sur les dantonistes* (1875), a charming biography, has been translated into English. Among other useful biographies of persons prominent during the Revolution, the following might be consulted with profit: J. H. Clapham, *The Abbe Sieyes: an Essay in the Politics of the French Revolution* (1912); E. D. Bradby, *The Life of Barnave*, 2 vols. (1915), containing vivid descriptions of the National Constituent Assembly; Francois Chevremont, *Jean−Paul Marat*, 2 vols. (1880); Charles Vatel, *Vergniaud*, 2 vols. (1873), and, by the same author, *Charlotte de Corday et les girondins: pieces classees et annotees*, 3 vols. (1864−1872); Arthur Chuquet, *Dumouriez* (1914); Pouget de Saint−Andre, *Le general Dumouriez, 1739−1823* (1914); C. A. Dauban, *Etude sur Madame Roland et son temps* (1864); Bernard Mallet, *Mallet du Pan and the French Revolution_(1902); E. B, Bax, Babeuf: the Last Episode of the French Revolution (1911).*

# CHAPTER XVI. THE ERA OF NAPOLEON

[Sidenote: Introductory]

From 1799 to 1814 the history of Europe was the history of France, and the history of France was the biography of Napoleon Bonaparte. So completely did this masterful personality dominate the course of events that his name has justly been used to characterize this era. The Era of Napoleon stands out as one of the most significant periods in modern times. Apart from its importance as marking a revolution in the art of war, it bore memorable results in two directions: (1) the adaptation of revolutionary theories to French practical political necessities, and the establishment of many of the permanent institutions of present−day France; and (2) the communication of the revolutionary doctrines of the French Revolution far and wide throughout Europe, so that henceforth the movement was general rather than local.

During the first five years of the era (1799−1804) France remained formally a republic. It was in these years that General Bonaparte, as First Consul, consolidated his country and fashioned the nature of the lasting gains of the Revolution. Thenceforth, from 1804 to 1814, France was an empire, established and maintained by military force. Then it was that the national hero—self−crowned Napoleon I, emperor of the French,—by means of war, conquest, annexation, or alliance, spread the ideas of his country far and wide throughout Europe. Before we review the main activities of the constructive consulate or of the proselyting empire, we should have some notion of the character of the leading actor.

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC UNDER THE CONSULATE, 1799−1804

[Sidenote: Napoleon Bonaparte]

When General Bonaparte executed the *coup d'etat* of 1799 and seized personal power in France, he was thirty years of age, short, of medium build, quiet and determined, with cold gray eyes and rather awkward manners. His early life had been peculiarly interesting. He was born at Ajaccio in Corsica on 15 August, 1769, just after the island had been purchased by France from Genoa but before the French had fully succeeded in quelling a stubborn insurrection of the Corsicans. Belonging to a prominent and numerous Italian family,—at the outset his name was written Napoleone di Buonaparte,—he was selected along with sons of other conspicuous Corsican families to be educated at public expense in France. In this way he received a good military education at Brienne and at Paris. He early displayed a marked fondness for the study of mathematics and history as well as for the science of war; and, though reserved and taciturn, he was noticeably ambitious and a keen judge of men.

During his youth Buonaparte dreamed of becoming the leader in establishing the independence of Corsica, but the outbreak of the French Revolution afforded him a wider field for his enthusiasm and ambition. Already an engineer and artilleryman, he threw in his lot with the Jacobins, sympathized at least outwardly with the course of the Revolution, and was rewarded, as we have seen, with an important place in the recapture of Toulon (1793) and in the defense of the Convention (1795). It was not, however, until his first Italian campaign,—when incidentally he altered his name to the French form, Bonaparte,—that he acquired a commanding reputation as the foremost general of the French Republic.

[Sidenote: Character of Bonaparte]

How Bonaparte utilized his reputation in order to make himself master of his adopted country has already been related. It was due in large part to an extraordinary opportunity which French politics at that time offered. But it was due, likewise, to certain characteristic qualities of the young general. In the first place, he was thoroughly convinced of his own abilities. Ambitious, selfish, and egotistical, he was always thinking and planning how he might become world−famous. Fatalistic and even superstitious, he believed that an unseen power was leading him on to higher and grander honors. He convinced his associates that he was “a man of destiny.” Then, in the second place, Bonaparte possessed an effective means of satisfying his ambition, for he made himself the idol of his soldiers. He would go to sleep repeating the names of the corps, and even those of some of the individuals who composed them; he kept these names in a corner of his memory, and this habit came to his aid when he wanted to recognize a soldier and to give him a cheering word from his general. He spoke to the subalterns in a tone of good fellowship, which delighted them all, as he reminded them of their “common feats of arms.” Then, in the third place, Bonaparte was a keen observer and a clever critic. Being sagacious, he knew that

by 1799 France at large was weary of weak government and perpetual political strife and that she longed to have her scars healed by a practical man. Such a man he instinctively felt himself to be. In the fourth place, Bonaparte was a politician to the extreme of being unscrupulous. Knowing what he desired, he was ready and willing to employ any means to attain his ends. No love for theories or principles, no fear of God or man, no sentimental aversion from bloodshed, nothing could deter him from striving to realize his vaulting but self−centered ambition. Finally, there was in his nature an almost paradoxical vein of poetry and art which made him human and often served him well. He dreamed of empires and triumphs. He reveled in the thought of courts and polished society. He entertained a sincere admiration for learning. His highly colored speeches to his soldiers were at once brilliant and inspiriting. His fine instinct of the dramatic gave the right setting to all his public acts. And in the difficult arts of lying and deception, Bonaparte has never been surpassed.

[Sidenote: The Government Of The Consulate: Constitution Of The Year VIII]

Such was the man who effected the *coup d'etat* of 18 Brumaire (November, 1799). His first work in his new role was to publish a constitution, which he prepared in conjunction with the Abbe Sieyes and which was to supersede the Constitution of the Year III. It concealed the military despotism under a veil of popular forms. The document named three “consuls,” the first of whom was Bonaparte himself, who were to appoint a Senate. From lists selected by general election, the Senate was to designate a Tribunate and a Legislative Body. The First Consul, in addition to conducting the administration and foreign policies and having charge of the army, was to propose, through a Council of State, all the laws. The Tribunate was to discuss the laws without voting on them. The Legislative Body was then to vote on the laws without discussing them. And the Senate, acting as a kind of supreme court, was to decide all constitutional questions. Thus a written constitution was provided, and the principle of popular election was recognized, but in last analysis all the power of the state was centered in the First Consul, who was Napoleon Bonaparte.

The document was forthwith submitted for ratification to a popular vote, called a *plebiscite*. So great was the disgust with the Directory and so unbounded was the faith of all classes in the military hero who offered it, that it was accepted by an overwhelming majority and was henceforth known in French history as the Constitution of the Year VIII.

[Sidenote: Foreign Danger Confronting France]

One reason why the French nation so readily acquiesced in an obvious act of usurpation was the grave foreign danger that threatened the country. As we have noted in another connection, the armies of the Second Coalition in the course of 1799 had rapidly undone the settlement of the treaty of Campo Formio, and, possessing themselves of Italy and the Rhine valley, were now on the point of carrying the war into France. The First Consul perceived at a glance that he must face essentially the same situation as that which confronted France in 1796.

[Sidenote: Dissolution of the Second Coalition]

The Second Coalition embraced Great Britain, Austria, and Russia. Bonaparte soon succeeded by flattery and diplomacy not only in securing the withdrawal of Russia but in actuating the half−insane Tsar Paul to revive against Great Britain an Armed Neutrality of the North, which included Russia, Prussia, Sweden, and Denmark. Meanwhile the First Consul prepared a second Italian campaign against Austria. Suddenly leading a French army through the rough and icy passes of the Alps, he descended into the fertile valley of the Po and at Marengo in June, 1800, inflicted an overwhelming defeat upon the enemy. French success in Italy was supplemented a few months later by a brilliant victory of the army under Moreau at Hohenlinden in southern Germany. Whereupon Austria again sued for peace, and the resulting treaty of Luneville (1801) reaffirmed and strengthened the provisions of the peace of Campo Formio.

[Sidenote: Truce between France and Great Britain: Treaty of Amiens, 1802]

Meanwhile, steps were being taken to terminate the state of war which had been existing between France and Great Britain since 1793. Although French arms were victorious in Europe, the British squadron of Lord Nelson (1758−1805) had managed to win and retain the supremacy of the sea. By gaining the battle of the Nile (1 August, 1798) Nelson had cut off the supplies of the French expedition in Egypt and eventually (1801) obliged it to surrender. Now, by a furious bombardment of Copenhagen (2 April, 1801), Nelson broke up the Armed Neutrality of the North. But despite the naval feats of the British, republican France seemed to be unconquerable on the Continent. Under these circumstances a treaty was signed at Amiens in March, 1802, whereby Great Britain promised to restore all the colonial conquests made during the war, except Ceylon and Trinidad, and

tacitly accepted the Continental settlement as defined at Luneville. The treaty of Amiens proved to be but a temporary truce in the long struggle between France and Great Britain.

[Sidenote: French Reforms under the Consulate]

So far, the Consulate had meant the establishment of an advantageous peace for France. With all foreign foes subdued, with territories extended to the Rhine, and with allies in Spain, and in the Batavian, Helvetic, Ligurian, and Cisalpine republics, the First Consul was free to devote his marvelous organizing and administrative instincts to the internal affairs of his country. The period of the Consulate (1799−1804) was the period of Bonaparte's greatest and most enduring contributions to the development of French institutions.

[Sidenote: The Revolutionary Heritage]

Throughout his career Bonaparte professed himself to be the “son of the Revolution,” the heir to the new doctrine of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity. It was to the Revolution that he owed his position in France, and it was to France that he claimed to be assuring the results of the Revolution. Yet, in actual practice, it was equality and fraternity, but not liberty, that were preserved by the First Consul. “What the French people want,” he declared, “is equality, not liberty.” In the social order, therefore, Bonaparte rigidly maintained the abolition of privilege, of serfdom and feudalism, and sought to guarantee to all Frenchmen equal justice, equal rights, equal opportunity of advancement. But in the political order he exercised a tyranny as complete, if less open, than that of Louis XIV.

[Sidenote: Administrative Centralization]

The Constitution of the Year VIII (1799) placed in Bonaparte's hands all the legislative and executive functions of the central government, and a series of subsequent acts put the law courts under his control. In 1800 the local government of the whole country was subordinated to him. The extensive powers vested by the Constituent Assembly in elective bodies of the departments and smaller districts ( *arrondissements*) were now to be wielded by prefects and sub−prefects, appointed by the First Consul and responsible to him. The local elective councils continued to exist, but sat only for a fortnight in the year and had to deal merely with the assessment of taxes: they might be consulted by the prefect or sub−prefect but had no serious check upon the executive. The mayor of every small commune was henceforth to be chosen by the prefect, while the police of all cities containing more than 100,000 inhabitants were directed by the central government and the mayors of towns of more than 5000 population were chosen by Bonaparte.

This highly centralized administration of the country afforded the people little direct voice in governmental matters but it possessed distinct advantages in assuring the prompt, uniform, military−like execution of the laws and decrees of the central government. In essence it was a continuation of the system of intendants instituted by Cardinal Richelieu. How conservative are the French people, at least in the institutions of local government, may be inferred from the fact that despite many changes in France during the nineteenth century from republic to empire to monarchy to republic to empire to republic, Bonaparte's system of prefects and sub−prefects has survived to the present day.

[Sidenote: Bonaparte's Centralizing Tendencies]

As in administration, so in all his internal reforms, Bonaparte displayed the same fondness for centralization, with consequent thoroughness and efficiency, at the expense of idealistic liberty. His reforms of every description—financial, ecclesiastical, judicial, educational,—and even his public works, showed the guiding hand of the victorious general rather than that of the convinced revolutionary. They were the adaptation of the revolutionary heritage to the purposes and policies of one−man power.

[Sidenote: Financial Readjustment] [Sidenote: The Bank of France]

It will be remembered that financial disorders had been the immediate cause of the downfall of the absolute monarchy as well as of the Directory. From the outset, Bonaparte guarded against any such recurrence. By careful collection of taxes he increased the revenue of the state. By rigid economy, by the severe punishment of corrupt officials, and by the practice of obliging people whose lands he invaded to support his armies, he reduced the public expenditures. The crowning achievement of his financial readjustments was the establishment (1800) of the Bank of France, which has been ever since one of the soundest financial institutions in the world.

[Sidenote: Ecclesiastical Settlement: the Concordat, 1801]

Another grave problem which Bonaparte inherited from the Revolution was the quarrel between the state and the Roman Catholic Church. He was determined to gain the political support of the large number of conscientious

French Catholics who had been alienated by the harsh anti−clerical measures of the revolutionaries. After delicate and protracted negotiations, a settlement was reached in a concordat (1801) between Pope Pius VII and the French Republic, whereby the pope, for his part, concurred in the confiscation of the property of the Church and the suppression of the monasteries, and the First Consul undertook to have the salaries of the clergy paid by the state; the latter was to nominate the bishops and the former was to invest them with their office; the priests were to be appointed by the bishops. In this way the Catholic Church in France became a branch of the lay government much more completely than it had been in the time of Louis XIV. So advantageous did the arrangement appear that the Concordat of 1801 continued to regulate the relations of church and state until 1905.

[Sidenote: Judicial Reforms] [Sidenote: The Code Napoleon]

One of the fondest hopes cherished by enlightened liberals was to clear away the confusion and discrepancies of the numerous legal systems of the old regime and to reduce the laws of the land to a simple and uniform code, so that every person judicial who could read would be able to know what was legal and what was illegal. The constitution of 1791 had promised such a work; the National Convention had actually begun it; but the preoccupations of the leading revolutionaries, combined with the natural caution and slowness of the lawyers to whom the task was intrusted, delayed its completion. It was not until the commanding personality of Bonaparte came into contact with it that real progress was made. Then surrounding himself with excellent legal advisers [Footnote: Chief among these legal experts was Cambaceres (1753−1824), the Second Consul.] whom he literally drove to labor, the First Consul brought out a great Civil Code (1804), which was followed by a Code of Civil Procedure, a Code of Criminal Procedure, a Penal Code, and a Commercial Code. These codes were of the utmost importance. The simplicity and elegance of their form commended them not only to France, but to the greater part of continental Europe. Moreover, they preserved the most valuable social conquests of the Revolution, such as civil equality, religious toleration, equality of inheritance, emancipation of serfs, freedom of land, legal arrest, and trial by jury. It is true that many harsh punishments were retained and that the position of woman was made distinctly inferior to that of man, but, on the whole, the French Codes long remained not only the most convenient but the most enlightened set of laws in the world. Bonaparte was rightly hailed as a second Justinian.

[Sidenote: The New Educational System]

A similar motive and the same enthusiasm actuated the First Consul in pressing forward important educational reforms. On the foundation laid several years earlier by Condorcet was now reared an imposing system of public instruction. (1) Primary or elementary schools were to be maintained by every commune under the general supervision of the prefects or sub−prefects. (2) Secondary or grammar schools were to provide special training in French, Latin, and elementary science, and, whether supported by public or private enterprise, were to be subject to governmental control. (3) *Lycees* or high schools were to be opened in every important town and instruction given in the higher branches of learning by teachers appointed by the state. (4) Special schools, such as technical schools, civil service schools, and military schools, were brought under public regulation. (5) The University of France was established to maintain uniformity throughout the new educational system. Its chief officials were appointed by the First Consul, and no one might open a new school or teach in public unless he was licensed by the university. (6) The recruiting station for the teaching staff of the public schools was provided in a normal school organized in Paris. All these schools were directed to take as the bases of their teaching the principles of the Catholic Church, loyalty to the head of the state, and obedience to the statutes of the university. Despite continued efforts of Bonaparte, the new system was handicapped by lack of funds and of experienced lay teachers, so that at the close of the Napoleonic Era, more than half of the total number of French children still attended private schools, mostly those conducted by the Catholic Church.

[Sidenote: Public Works]

Bonaparte proved himself a zealous benefactor of public works and improvements. With very moderate expenditure of French funds, for prisoners of war were obliged to do most of the work, he enormously improved the means of communication and trade within the country, and promoted the economic welfare of large classes of the inhabitants. The splendid highways which modern France possesses are in large part due to Bonaparte. In 1811 he could enumerate 229 broad military roads which he had constructed, the most important of which, thirty in number, radiated from Paris to the extremities of the French territory. Two wonderful Alpine roads brought Paris in touch with Turin, Milan, Rome, and Naples. Numerous substantial bridges were built. The former network of canals and waterways was perfected. Marshes were drained, dikes strengthened, and sand dunes

hindered from spreading along the ocean coast. The principal seaports, both naval and commercial, were enlarged and fortified, especially the harbors of Cherbourg and Toulon.

Along with such obviously useful labor went desirable embellishment of life. State palaces were restored and enlarged, so that, under Bonaparte, St. Cloud, Fontainebleau, and Rambouillet came to rank with the majesty of Versailles. The city of Paris was beautified. Broad avenues were projected. The Louvre was completed and adorned with precious works of art which Bonaparte dragged as fruits of victory from Italy, or Spain, or the Netherlands. During the Consulate, Paris was just beginning to lay claim to a position as the pleasure city of Europe. Its population almost doubled during the Era of Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Colonial Enterprises and their Failure]

The First Consul also entertained the hope of appearing as the restorer of the French colonial empire. In 1800 he prevailed upon the Spanish government to re−cede to France the extensive territory—called Louisiana—lying west of the Mississippi River. Soon afterwards he dispatched his brother−in−law, General Leclerc, with an army of 25,000 men, to make good the French claims to the large island of Haiti. But the colonial ventures of Napoleon ended in failure. In Haiti, Leclerc's efforts to reestablish negro slavery encountered the stubborn resistance of the blacks, organized and led by one of their number, Toussaint L'Ouverture, a remarkable military genius. After a determined and often ferocious struggle Leclerc proposed a compromise, and Toussaint, induced by the most solemn guarantees on the part of the French, laid down his arms. He was seized and sent to France, where he died in prison in 1803. The negroes, infuriated by this act of treachery, renewed the war with a barbarity unequaled in previous contests. The French, further embarrassed by the appearance of a British fleet, were only too glad to relinquish the island in November, 1803. Meanwhile, expectation of war with Great Britain had induced Bonaparte in April, 1803, to sell the entire Louisiana Territory to the United States.

[Sidenote: Success of the Consulate]

If we except these brief and ill−starred colonial exploits, we may pronounce the First Consul's government and achievements eminently successful. Bonaparte had inspired public confidence by the honesty of his administration and by his choice of officials, for he was served by such a consummate diplomat as Talleyrand and by such a tireless chief of police as Fouche. His speedy and victorious termination of the War of the Second Coalition and his subsequent apparent policy of peace had redounded to his credit. His sweeping and thorough reforms in internal affairs had attracted to his support many and varied classes in the community—the business interests, the bourgeoisie, the peasantry, and the sincere Catholics.

[Sidenote: Dwindling Opposition to Bonaparte]

Only two groups—and these continually dwindling in size and importance—stood in the way of Bonaparte's complete mastery of France. One was the remnant of the Jacobins who would not admit that the Revolution was ended. The other was the royalist party which longed to undo all the work of the Revolution. Both these factions were reduced during the Consulate to secret plots and intrigues. Attempts to assassinate the First Consul served only to increase his popularity among the masses. Early in 1804 Bonaparte unearthed a conspiracy of royalists, whom he punished with summary vengeance. General Pichegru, who was implicated in the conspiracy, was found strangled in prison soon after his arrest. Moreau, who was undoubtedly the ablest general in France next to Bonaparte, was likewise accused of complicity, although he was a stanch Jacobin, and escaped more drastic punishment only by becoming an exile in America. Not content with these advantages, Bonaparte determined thoroughly to terrorize the royalists: by military force he seized a young Bourbon prince, the due d'Enghien, on German soil, and without a particle of proof against him put him to death.

[Sidenote: Transformation of the Consulate into the Empire]

In 1802 a plebiscite had bestowed the Consulate on Bonaparte for life. Now there was little more to do than to make the office hereditary and to change its name. This alteration was proposed in 1804 by the subservient Senate and promptly ratified by an overwhelming popular vote. On 2 December, 1804, amid imposing ceremonies in the ancient cathedral of Notre Dame, in the presence of Pope Pius VII, who had come all the way from Rome to grace the event, General Bonaparte placed a crown upon his own head and assumed the title of Napoleon I, emperor of the French.

## THE FRENCH EMPIRE AND ITS TERRITORIAL EXPANSION

[Sidenote: The French Empire a Continuation of the First French Republic]

The establishment of the empire was by no means a break in French history. The principle of popular

sovereignty was still recognized. The social gains of the Revolution were still intact. The magic words “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” still blazed proudly forth on public buildings. The tricolor was still the flag of France.

[Sidenote: Lapse of Republican Institutions]

Of course a few changes were made in externals. The title of “citoyen” was again replaced by that of “monsieur.” The republican calendar gradually lapsed. Napoleon's relatives became “grand dignitaries.” The revolutionary generals who accepted the new regime were promoted to be “marshals of the empire.” The old titles of nobility were restored, and new ones created.

[Sidenote: Monarchical Alteration in Dependent States]

The outward changes in France were reflected in the dependent surrounding states. And in effecting the foreign alterations, Napoleon took care to provide for his numerous family. For his brother Louis, the Batavian Republic was transformed into the kingdom of Holland. For his brother Jerome, estates were subsequently carved out of Hanover, Prussia, and other northwest German lands to form the kingdom of Westphalia. Brother Joseph was seated on the Bourbon throne of the Two Sicilies. The Cisalpine Republic became the kingdom of Italy with Napoleon as king, and Eugene Beauharnais, his stepson, as viceroy. Both Piedmont and Genoa were incorporated into the French Empire.

[Sidenote: Censorship of the Press and Activity of the Secret Police] [Sidenote: The Eventual Absolutism of Napoleon]

The Consulate, as has been explained, was characterized by a policy of peace. Sweeping reforms had been accomplished in internal affairs so that France was consolidated and the vast majority of her citizens became devoted supporters of the emperor. What adverse criticism Frenchmen might have directed against the empire was stifled by the activity of a splendidly organized secret police and by a rigorous censorship of the press. So complete was Napoleon's control of the state that the decisive naval defeat of Trafalgar was not mentioned by a single French newspaper until after the fall of the empire. By degrees the imperial despotism of the Corsican adventurer became as rigid as the absolute monarchy of the Bourbons. In fact, Napoleon went so far as to adapt an old catechism which the celebrated Bishop Bossuet had prepared during the reign of Louis XIV and to order its use by all children. A few extracts from the catechism will make clear how Napoleon wished to be regarded.

“*Question*. What are the duties of Christians toward those who govern them, and what in particular are our duties towards Napoleon I, our emperor?

“*Answer*. Christians owe to the princes who govern them, and we in particular owe to Napoleon I, our emperor, love, respect, obedience, fidelity, military service, and the taxes levied for the preservation and defense of the empire and of his throne. We also owe him fervent prayers for his safety and for the spiritual and temporal prosperity of the state.

“*Question*. Why are we subject to all these duties toward our emperor?

“*Answer*. First, because God, who has created empires and distributed them according to His will, has, by loading our emperor with gifts both in peace and in war, established him as our sovereign and made him the agent of His power and His image upon earth. To honor and serve our emperor is, therefore, to honor and serve God Himself. Secondly, because our Lord Jesus Christ Himself, both by His teaching and His example, has taught us what we owe to our sovereign. Even at His very birth He obeyed the edict of Caesar Augustus; He paid the established tax and while He commanded us to render to God those things which belong to God, He also commanded us to render unto Caesar those things which are Caesar's.

“*Question*. What must we think of those who are wanting in their duties towards our emperor?

“*Answer*. According to the Apostle Paul, they are resisting the order established by God Himself, and render themselves worthy of eternal damnation.”

[Sidenote: Military Ambition of Napoleon]

With opposition crushed in France and with the loyalty of the French nation secured, Napoleon as emperor could gratify his natural instincts for foreign aggrandizement and glory. He had become all−powerful in France; he would become all−powerful in Europe. Ambitious and successful in the arts of peace, he would be more ambitious and more successful in the science of war. The empire, therefore, meant war quite as clearly as the Consulate meant peace. To speculate upon what Napoleon might have accomplished for France had he restrained his ambition and continued to apply his talents entirely to the less sensational triumphs of peace, is idle, because Napoleon was not that type of man. He lived for and by selfish ambition.

[Sidenote: The Empire Military]

The ten years of the empire (1804−1814) were attended by continuous warfare. Into the intricacies of the campaigns it is neither possible nor expedient in the compass of this chapter to enter. It is aimed, rather, to present only such features of the long struggle as are significant in the general history of Europe, for the wars of Napoleon served a purpose which their prime mover only incidentally had at heart—the transmission of the revolutionary heritage to Europe.

[Sidenote: Renewal of War between France and Great Britain]

When the empire was established, war between France and Great Britain, interrupted by the truce of Amiens, had already broken forth afresh. The struggle had begun in first instance as a protest of the British monarchy against the excesses of the French Revolution, especially against the execution of Louis XVI, and doubtless the bulk of the English nation still fancied that they were fighting against revolution as personified in Napoleon Bonaparte. But to the statesmen and influential classes of Great Britain as well as of France, the conflict had long assumed a deeper significance. It was an economic and commercial war. The British not only were mindful of the assistance which France had given to American rebels, but also were resolved that France should not regain the colonial empire and commercial position which she had lost in the eighteenth century. The British had struggled to maintain their control of the sea and the monopoly of trade and industry which attended it. Now, when Napoleon extended the French influence over the Netherlands and Holland, along the Rhine, and throughout Italy, and even succeeded in negotiating an alliance with Spain, Britain was threatened with the loss of valuable commercial privileges in all those regions, and was further alarmed by the ambitious colonial projects of Napoleon. In May, 1803, therefore, Great Britain declared war. The immediate pretext for the resumption of hostilities was Napoleon's positive refusal to cease interfering in Italy, in Switzerland, and in Holland.

Napoleon welcomed the renewal of war. He understood that until he had completely broken the power of Great Britain all his Continental designs were imperiled and his colonial and commercial projects hopeless. The humiliation of the great rival across the Channel would be the surest guarantee of the prosperity of the French bourgeoisie, and it was in last analysis from that class that his own political support was chiefly derived. The year 1803−1804 was spent by the emperor in elaborate preparations for an armed invasion of England. Along the Channel coast were gradually collected at enormous cost a host of transports and frigates, a considerable army, and an abundance of supplies. To the amazing French armament, Spain was induced to contribute her resources.

[Sidenote: The Third Coalition Against France]

Great Britain replied to these preparations by covering the Channel with a superior fleet, by preying upon French commerce, and by seizing Spanish treasure−ships from America. And William Pitt, the very embodiment of the Englishman's prejudice against things French, returned to the ministry of his country. Pitt was unwilling to risk British armies against the veterans of Napoleon, preferring to spend liberal sums of money in order to instigate the Continental Powers to combat the French emperor. Pitt was the real bone and sinews of the Third Coalition, which was formed in 1805 by Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Sweden to overthrow Napoleon.

Austria naturally smarted under the provisions of the treaty of Luneville quite as much as under those of Campo Formio. Francis II was aroused by French predominance in Italy and now that he himself had added the title of “hereditary emperor of Austria” to his shadowy dignity as “Holy Roman Emperor” he was irritated by the upstart Napoleon's assumption of an imperial title.

In Russia the assassination of the Tsar Paul, the crazy admirer of Bonaparte, had called to the throne in 1801 the active though easily influenced Alexander I. In early life Alexander had acquired a pronounced taste for revolutionary philosophy and its liberal ideas, and likewise a more or less theoretical love of humanity. Now, Pitt persuaded him, with the assistance of English gold, that Napoleon was the enemy both of true liberty and of humanity. So the tsar joined his army with that of Austria, and in the autumn of 1805 the allies advanced through southern Germany toward the Rhine.

Pitt had done his best to bring Prussia into the coalition, but the Prussian king, Frederick William III (1797−1840), was timid and irresolute, and, despite the protests of his people, was cajoled by Napoleon's offer of Hanover into a declaration of neutrality. Bavaria and Wuerttemberg, from fear of Austria, became open allies of the French emperor.

[Sidenote: Napoleon vs. Austria]

Before the troops of the Third Coalition could threaten the eastern frontier of France, Napoleon abandoned his

military projects against Great Britain, broke up his huge armaments along the Atlantic coast, and, with his usual rapidity of march, hurled his finely trained army upon the Austrians near the town of Ulm in Wuerttemberg. There, on 20 October, 1805, the Austrian commander, with some 50,000 men, surrendered, and the road to Vienna was open to the French.

[Sidenote: Trafalgar (1805) and the Continued Sea Power of Great Britain]

This startling military success was followed on the very next day by a naval defeat quite as sensational and even more decisive. On 21 October, the allied French and Spanish fleets, issuing from the harbor of Cadiz, encountered the British fleet under Lord Nelson, and in a terrific battle off Cape Trafalgar were completely worsted. Lord Nelson lost his life in the conflict, but from that day to the close of the Napoleonic Era British supremacy on the high seas was not seriously challenged.

[Sidenote: Austerlitz, 1805]

Wasting no tears or time on the decisive loss of sea−power, Napoleon hastened to follow up his land advantages. Occupying Vienna, he turned northward into Moravia where 1805 Francis II and Alexander I had gathered a large army of Austrians and Russians. On 2 December, 1805, the anniversary of his coronation as emperor,—his “lucky” day, as he termed it,—Napoleon overwhelmed the allies at Austerlitz in one of the greatest battles in history.

[Sidenote: Defeat of Austria: Treaty of Pressburg, 1805]

The immediate result of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz was the enforced withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition. Late in December, 1805, the emperors Francis II and Napoleon signed the treaty of Pressburg, whereby the former ceded Venetia to the kingdom of Italy and recognized Napoleon as its king, and resigned the Tyrol to Bavaria, and outlying provinces in western Germany to Wuerttemberg. Both Bavaria and Wuerttemberg were converted into kingdoms. By the humiliating treaty of Pressburg, Austria thus lost 3,000,000 subjects and large revenues; was cut off from Italy, Switzerland, and the Rhine; and was reduced to the rank of a second−rate power.

[Sidenote: Napoleon vs. Prussia] [Sidenote: Jena (1806) and the Humiliation of Prussia]

For a time it seemed as if the withdrawal of Austria from the Third Coalition would be fully compensated for by the adhesion of Prussia. Stung by the refusal of Napoleon to withdraw his troops from southern Germany and by the bootless haggling over the transference of Hanover, and goaded on by his patriotic and high−spirited wife, the beautiful Queen Louise, timid Frederick William III at length ventured in 1806 to declare war against France. Then, with a ridiculously misplaced confidence in the old−time reputation of Frederick the Great, without waiting for assistance from the Russians who were coming up, the Prussian army—some 110,000 strong, under the old−fashioned duke of Brunswick—advanced against the 150,000 veterans of Napoleon. The resulting battle of Jena, on 14 October, 1806, proved the absolute superiority of Napoleon's strategy and of the enthusiastic French soldiers over the older tactics and military organization of the Prussians. Jena was not merely a defeat for the Prussians; it was at once a rout and a total collapse of that Prussian military prestige which in the course of the eighteenth century had been gained by the utmost sacrifice. Napoleon entered Berlin in triumph and took possession of the greater part of the kingdom of Prussia.

[Sidenote: Napoleon vs. Russia, Friedland] [Sidenote: Treaty of Tilsit (1807): Dissolution of the Third Coalition]

The Russians still remained to be dealt with. Winter was a bad season for campaigning in East Prussia, and it was not until June, 1807, at Friedland, that Napoleon was able to administer the same kind of a defeat to the Russians that he had administered to the Austrians at Austerlitz and to the Prussians at Jena. The Tsar Alexander at once sued for peace. At Tilsit, on a raft moored in the middle of the River Niemen, Napoleon and Alexander met and arranged the terms of peace for France, Russia, and Prussia. The impressionable tsar was dazzled by the striking personality and the unexpected magnanimity of the emperor of the French. Hardly an inch of Russian soil was exacted, only a promise to cooeperate in excluding British trade from the Continent. Alexander was accorded full permission to deal as he would with Finland and Turkey. “What is Europe?” exclaimed the emotional tsar: “Where is it, if it is not you and I?” But Prussia had to pay the price of the alliance between French and Russian emperors. From Prussia was torn the portion of Poland which was erected into the grand−duchy of Warsaw, under Napoleon's obsequious ally, the elector of Saxony. Despoiled altogether of half of her territories, compelled to reduce her army to 42,000 men, and forced to maintain French troops on her remaining lands until a large war

indemnity was paid, Prussia was reduced to the rank of a third−rate power. Tilsit destroyed the Third Coalition and made Napoleon master of the Continent. Only Great Britain and Sweden remained under arms, and against the latter country Napoleon was now able to employ both Denmark and Russia.

[Sidenote: Humiliation of Sweden]

Early in 1808 a Russian army crossed the Finnish border without any previous declaration of war, and simultaneously a Danish force prepared to invade Sweden from the Norwegian frontier. The ill−starred Swedish king, Gustavus IV (1792−1809), found it was all he could do, even with British assistance, to fight off the Danes. The little Finnish army, left altogether unsupported, succumbed after an heroic struggle against overwhelming odds, and in 1809 the whole of Finland and the Aland Islands were formally ceded to Russia. Finland, however, did not enter Russia as a conquered province, but, thanks to the bravery of her people and not less to the wisdom and generosity of the Tsar Alexander, she long maintained her free constitution and was recognized as a semi−independent grand−duchy with the Russian tsar as grand−duke. Thus Sweden lost her ancient duchy of Finland, and she was permitted to retain a small part of Pomerania only at the humiliating price of making peace with Napoleon and excluding British goods from all her ports, In the same year, Gustavus IV was compelled to abdicate in favor of his uncle, Charles XIII (1809−1818), an infirm and childless old man, who was prevailed upon to designate as his successor one of Napoleon's own marshals, General Bernadotte. Surely, Napoleon might hope henceforth to dominate Sweden as he then dominated every other Continental state. Of course, Great Britain, triumphant on the seas, remained unconquered, but the British army, the laughingstock of Europe, could expect to achieve little where Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Sweden had failed.

[Sidenote: Height of Napoleon's Power, 1808]

The year that followed Tilsit may be taken as marking the height of Napoleon's career. The Corsican adventurer was emperor of a France that extended from the Po to the North Sea, from the Pyrenees and the Papal States to the Rhine, a France united, patriotic, and in enjoyment of many of the fruits of the Revolution. He was king of an Italy that embraced the fertile valley of the Po and the ancient possessions of Venice, and that was administered by a viceroy, his stepson and heir−apparent, Eugene Beauharnais. The pope was his friend and ally. His brother Joseph governed the kingdom of Naples. His brother Louis and his stepdaughter Hortense were king and queen of Holland. His sister Elise was princess of the diminutive state of Lucca. The kings of Spain and Denmark were his admirers and the tsar of Russia now called him friend and brother. A restored Poland was a recruiting station for his army. Prussia and Austria had become second−or third−rate powers, and French influence once more predominated in the Germanies.

[Sidenote: Profound Changes in the Germanies]

It was in the Germanies, in fact, that Napoleon's achievements were particularly striking. Before his magic touch many of the antique political and social institutions of that country crumbled away. As early as 1801 the diminution of the number of German states had begun. The treaty of Luneville had made imperative some action on the part of the Diet of the Holy Roman Empire in order to indemnify the rulers whose lands on the left bank of the Rhine had been incorporated into France, and to grant “compensations” to the south German states. After laborious negotiations, lasting from 1801 to 1803, the Diet authorized [Footnote: By a decree, called the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* .] the wholesale confiscation throughout southern Germany of ecclesiastical lands and of free cities, with the result that 112 formerly independent states lying east of the Rhine were wiped out of existence and nearly one hundred others on the west bank were added to France. Thus the number of the Germanies was suddenly reduced from more than three hundred to less than one hundred, and the German states which mainly benefited, along with Prussia, were the southern states of Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, and Baden, which Napoleon desired to use as an equipoise against both Austria and Prussia. In this ambition he was not disappointed, for in the War of the Third Coalition (1805) he received important assistance from these three states, all of which were in turn liberally rewarded for their services, the rulers of Bavaria and Wuerttemberg being proclaimed kings.

[Sidenote: Extinction of the Holy Roman Empire (1806), and its Replacement by the Empire of Austria and the Confederation of the Rhine]

The year 1806 was epochal in German history. On 19 July, the Confederation of the Rhine was formally established with Napoleon as Protector. The kings of Bavaria and Wuerttemberg, the grand−dukes of Baden, Hesse−Darmstadt, and Berg, the archbishop of Mainz, and nine minor princes virtually seceded from the Holy

Roman Empire and accepted the protection of Napoleon, whom they pledged themselves to support with an army of 63,000 men. On 1 August, Napoleon declared that he no longer recognized the Holy Roman Empire, and on 6 August the Habsburg emperor, Francis II, resigned the crown which his ancestors for centuries had worn. The work of a long line of French kings and statesmen,—Francis I, Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, Louis XIV,—was thus consummated by Napoleon Bonaparte. The Holy Roman Empire had at last come to the inglorious end which it had long deserved. And its last emperor had to content himself with his newly appropriated title of Francis I, Hereditary Emperor of Austria. The dignity and might of the proud Habsburgs had declined before a mere upstart of the people as never before a royal Bourbon. And this same year, 1806, witnessed, as we have seen, not only the humiliation of Austria but the deepest degradation of Prussia.

By 1808 all the Germanies were at the mercy of Napoleon. Prussia was shorn of half her possessions and forced to obey the behests of her conqueror. The Confederation of the Rhine was enlarged and solidified. A kingdom of Westphalia was carved out of northern and western Germany at the expense of Prussia, Hanover, Brunswick, and Hesse, and bestowed upon Jerome, brother of Napoleon. The grand−duchy of Berg was governed by the Protector's plebeian brother−in−law, Joachim Murat. And, greatest fact of all, wherever the French emperor's rule extended, there followed the abolition of feudalism and serfdom, the recognition of equality of all citizens before the law, the principles and precepts of the Code Napoleon.

[Sidenote: Napoleon “the Son of the Revolution"]

This was the true apogee of Napoleon's power. From the November day in 1799 when the successful general had overthrown the corrupt and despicable Directory down to 1808, his story is a magnificent succession of the triumphs of peace and of war. Whatever be the judgment of his contemporaries or of posterity upon his motives, there can be little question that throughout these nine years he appeared to France and to Europe what he proclaimed himself—“the son of the Revolution.” He it was who in the lull between the combats of the Second Coalition and those of the Third had consolidated the work of the democratic patriots from Mirabeau to Carnot and had assured to France the permanent fruits of the Revolution in the domains of property, law, religion, education, administration, and finance. He it was who, if narrowing the concept of liberty, had broadened the significance of equality by the very lesson of his own rise to power and had deepened the meaning of fraternity by lavishing affection and devotion upon that machine of democracy—the national army—the “nation in arms.” And he it was who, true to the revolutionary tradition of striking terror into the hearts of the divine−right monarchs of Europe, had with a mighty noise shaken the whole Continent and brought down the political and social institutions of the “old regime” tumbling in ruins throughout central and southern Europe. He had made revolutionary reform too solid and too widespread to admit of its total extinction by the allied despots of Europe. The dream which a Leopold and a Frederick William had cherished in 1791 of turning back the hands on the clock of human progress and of restoring conditions in France as they had been prior to 1789, was happily dispelled. But in the meantime the despots were to have their innings.

DESTRUCTION OF THE FRENCH EMPIRE

[Sidenote: Weaknesses in the French Empire of Napoleon] [Sidenote: 1. Napoleon Himself]

From 1808 to 1814—six dreadful years—Napoleon's power was constantly on the wane. Nor are the reasons for his ultimate failure difficult to perceive. Some of the very elements which had contributed most to the upbuilding of his great empire with its dependent kingdoms and duchies were in the long run elements of weakness and instability—vital causes of its eventual downfall. In the first place, there was the factor of individual genius. Altogether too much depended upon the physical and mental strength of one man. Napoleon was undoubtedly a genius, but still he was human. He was growing older, more corpulent, less able to withstand exertion and fatigue, fonder of affluence and ease. On the other hand, every fresh success had confirmed his belief in his own ability and had further whetted his appetite for power until his ambition was growing into madness and his egotism was becoming mania. His aversion from taking the advice of others increased so that even the subtle intriguers, Talleyrand and Fouche, were less and less admitted to his confidence. The emperor would brook the appearance of no actor on the French stage other than himself, although on that stage during those crowded years there was too much for a single emperor, albeit a master emperor, to do.

[Sidenote: 2. Defects of Militarism]

The second serious defect in the Napoleonic system was the fact that its very foundation was military. What had enabled the National Convention in the days of the Revolution's darkest peril to roll back the tide of foreign

invasion was the heroism and devotion of an enthusiastic citizen soldiery, actuated by a solemn consciousness that in a very literal sense they were fighting for their fields and firesides, for the rights of men and of Frenchmen. They constituted compact and homogeneous armies, inspired by the principles and words of Rouget de Lisle's rousing battle hymn, and they smote the hired troopers of the banded despots hip and thigh. It was this kind of an army which Napoleon Bonaparte took over and which had earned for him his first spectacular successes. He certainly tried to preserve its Revolutionary enthusiasm throughout his career. He talked much of its “mission” and its “destiny,” of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and he kept alive its traditions of heroism and duty. He even improved its discipline, its material well−being, and its honor. But gradually, almost imperceptibly, the altruistic ideals of the Revolution gave way in the French army to the more selfish and more Napoleonic ideal of glamour and glory. And as years passed by and the deadly campaigns repeated themselves and the number of patriotic volunteers lessened, Napoleon resorted more and more to conscription—forcibly taking away thousands of young Frenchmen from peaceful and productive pursuits at home and strewing their bones throughout the length and breadth of the Continent.

[Sidenote: 3. Reaction of Nationalism]

Nor did Napoleon's army remain homogeneous. To the last its kernel was French, but, as the empire expanded and other peoples were brought into a dependent or allied position, it came to include regiments or companies of Poles, Germans, Italians, Dutch, Spaniards, and Danes. In its newer heterogeneous condition it tended the more to lose its original character and to assume that of an enormous machine−like conglomeration of mercenaries who followed the fortunes of a despot more tyrannical and more dangerous than any of the despots against whom it had at first been pitted. It is true that many of the Frenchmen who composed the kernel of the Grand Army still entertained the notion that they were fighting for liberty, equality, and fraternity, and that their contact with their fellow−soldiers and likewise with their enemies was a most effective means of communicating the revolutionary doctrines to Europe, but it is also true that Napoleon's policy of quartering his troops upon the lands of his enemies or of his allies, and thereby conserving the resources of his own country, operated to develop the utmost hatred for the French, for the Revolution, and for Napoleon. This hatred produced, particularly in Germany and in Spain, a real patriotic feeling among the masses of the exploited nations, so that those very peoples to whom the notions of liberty and equality had first come as a blessed promise of deliverance from the oppression of their own divine−right rulers now used the same notions to justify them in rising as nations against the despotism of a foreign military oppressor. Liberty, equality, and fraternity—the gospel of the Revolution—was the boomerang which Napoleon by means of his army hurled against the European tyrants and which returned with redoubled force against him.

[Sidenote: 4. “The Continental System"]

It was thus the character of the emperor himself and his military exigencies that, taken in conjunction with the so−called “Continental System” and the national revolts, made Napoleon's empire but an episode in the story of modern times. It is now time to explain the Continental System and then to see how it reacted throughout Europe upon the feeling of national patriotism to bring about the downfall of the Corsican adventurer.

[Sidenote: The Economic War between Great Britain and France]

“Continental System” is the term commonly applied to the curious character which the warfare between Napoleon and Great Britain gradually assumed. By 1806 the interesting situation had developed that Great Britain was indisputable mistress of the seas while Napoleon was no less indisputable master of the Continent. The battles of the Nile, of Copenhagen, and of Trafalgar had been to the British what those of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Jena had been to the French. On one hand the destruction of the French fleet, together with the Danish, Dutch, and Spanish squadrons, had effectually prevented Napoleon from carrying into practice his long−cherished dream of invading England. On the other hand, the British army was not strong enough to cope successfully with Napoleon on land, and the European Powers which all along had been subsidized by English gold had been cowed into submission by the French emperor. Apparently neither France nor Great Britain could strike each other by ordinary military means, and yet neither would sue for peace. William Pitt died in January, 1806, heart−broken by the news of Austerlitz, the ruin of all his hopes. Charles James Fox, the gifted Whig, who thereupon became British foreign secretary, was foiled in a sincere attempt to negotiate peace with Napoleon, and died in September of the same year, despairing of any amicable settlement.

The brilliant French victory at Jena in October, 1806, seemed to fill the British as well as the Prussian cup to

overflowing. The very next month Napoleon followed up his successes by inaugurating a thoroughgoing campaign against his arch−enemy, Great Britain herself; but the campaign was to be conducted in the field of economics rather than in the purview of military science. England, it must be remembered, had become, thanks to the long series of dynastic and colonial wars that filled the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the chief commercial nation of the world: she had a larger number of citizens who made their living as ship−owners, sailors, and traders than any other country in the world. Then, too, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, it was in the England of the eighteenth century that the Industrial Revolution began,—a marvelous improvement in manufacturing, which fostered the growth of a powerful industrial class and enabled the English to make goods more cheaply and in greater profusion and to sell them more readily, at lower prices, both at home and abroad, than any other people in the world. Industry was fast becoming the basis of Great Britain's wealth, and the commercial classes were acquiring new strength and influence. It was, therefore, against “a nation of shopkeepers,” as Napoleon contemptuously dubbed the English, that he must direct his new campaign.

To Napoleon's clear and logical mind, the nature of the problem was plain. Deprived of a navy and unable to utilize his splendid army, he must attack Great Britain in what appeared to be her one vulnerable spot—in her commerce and industry. If he could prevent the importation of British goods into the Continent, he would deprive his rivals of the chief markets for their products, ruin British manufacturers, throw thousands of British workingmen out of employment, create such hard times in the British Islands that the mass of the people would rise against their government and compel it to make peace with him on his own terms: in a word, he would ruin British commerce and industry and then secure an advantageous peace. It was a gigantic gamble, for Napoleon must have perceived that the Continental peoples might themselves oppose the closure of their ports to the cheaper and better manufactured articles of Great Britain and might respond to a common economic impulse and rise in force to compel him to make peace on British terms, but the stakes were high and the emperor of the French was a good gambler. From 1806 to 1812 the struggle between Napoleon and Great Britain was an economic endurance−test. On the one hand, the question was whether the British government could retain the support of the British people. On the other hand, the question was whether Napoleon could rely upon the cooperation of the whole Continent.

[Sidenote: The Berlin and Milan Decrees]

The Continental System had been foreshadowed under the Directory and in the early years of the Consulate, but it was not until the Berlin Decree (November, 1806) that the first great attempt was made to define and enforce it. In this decree, Napoleon proclaimed a state of blockade against the British Isles and closed French and allied ports to ships coming from Great Britain or her colonies. The Berlin Decree was subsequently strengthened and extended by decrees at Warsaw (January, 1807), Milan (December, 1807), and Fontainebleau (October, 1810). The Milan Decree provided that even neutral vessels sailing from any British port or from countries occupied by British troops might be seized by French warships or privateers. The Fontainebleau Decree went so far as to order the confiscation and public burning of all British manufactured goods found in the Napoleonic States.

[Sidenote: The Orders in Council]

To these imperial decrees the British government, now largely dominated by such statesmen as Lord Castlereagh and George Canning, replied with celebrated Orders in Council (January−November, 1807), which declared all vessels trading with France or her allies liable to capture and provided further that in certain instances neutral vessels must touch at a British port. Thus the issue was squarely joined. Napoleon would suffer no importation of British goods whether by combatants or by neutrals. The British would allow none but themselves to trade with France and her allies. In both cases the neutrals would be the worst sufferers. The effects of the conflict were destined to be far− reaching.

[Sidenote: Difficulties in Maintaining the Continental System]

The British by virtue of their sea−power could come nearer to enforcing their Orders in Council than could Napoleon to giving full effect to his imperial decrees. Of course they had their troubles with neutrals. The stubborn effort of Denmark to preserve its independence of action in politics and trade was frustrated in 1807 when a British expedition bombarded Copenhagen and seized the remnant of the Danish navy. From that time until 1814 Denmark was naturally a stanch ally of Napoleon. Against the Americans, too, who took advantage of the Continental System to draw into their own hands a liberal portion of the carrying trade, the British vigorously

applied the Orders in Council, and the consequent ill−feeling culminated in the War of 1812 between Great Britain and the United States. But on the whole, the British had less trouble with neutrals than did Napoleon. And compared with the prodigious hardships which the System imposed upon the Continental peoples and the consequent storms of popular opposition to its author, the contemporaneous distress in England was never acute; and the British nation at large never seriously wavered in affording moral and material support to their hard−pressed government.

Here was the failure of Napoleon. It proved physically impossible for him to extend the Continental System widely and thoroughly enough to gain his point. In many cases, to stave off opposition, he authorized exceptions to his own decrees. If he could have prevailed upon every Continental state to close its ports to British goods simultaneously and for several successive years, he would still have been confronted with a difficult task to prevent smuggling and the bribery of customs officials, which reached large proportions even in France and in the surrounding states that he had under fairly effective control. But to bring all Continental states into line with his economic campaign against Great Britain was a colossal task, to the performance of which he subordinated all his subsequent policies.

[Sidenote: Subordination of Napoleon's Foreign Policies to the Enforcement of the Continental System]

We have seen how by the treaty of Tilsit (1807) Napoleon extorted promises from the tsar of Russia and the king of Prussia to exclude British goods from their respective countries. He himself saw to the enforcement of the decrees in the French Empire, in the kingdom of Italy, in the Confederation of the Rhine, and in the grand−duchy of Warsaw. Brother Joseph did his will in Naples, Brother Jerome in Westphalia, Sister Elise in Tuscany, and Brother Louis was expected to do his will in Holland. The outcome of the war with Sweden in 1808 was the completion of the closure of all Scandinavian ports to the British. Napoleon's determination to have his decrees executed in the Papal States, as well as his high−handed treatment of matters affecting the Catholic Church in France, brought him into conflict with Pope Pius VII, a gentle but courageous man, who in daring to excommunicate the European taskmaster was summarily deprived of his temporal rule and carried off a prisoner, first to Grenoble, then to Savona, and finally to Fontainebleau, where he resided, heaped with disgrace and insults, until 1814. In 1809 Napoleon formally incorporated the Papal States into the French Empire. And when in the next year Louis Bonaparte gave clear signs of an intention to promote the best interests of his Dutch subjects, even to his brother's detriment, by admitting British goods, he was peremptorily deposed, and Holland, too, was incorporated into the ever−enlarging French Empire. Henceforth, the Dutch had to bear the burdens of conscription and of crushing taxation.

[Sidenote: Napoleon's Interference in Portugal]

Meanwhile Napoleon was devoting special attention to closing Portugal and Spain to British goods, and political conditions in these countries seemed to favor his designs. For over a hundred years Portugal had been linked in close trade relations with England, ever since the Methuen Treaty of 1703, which, in return for the admission of English woolens into Portugal, had granted differential duties favoring the importation of Portuguese wines into England and had thus provided a good market for an important Portuguese product to the exclusion largely of the French. Napoleon, early in his public career, had tried, for a time successfully, [Footnote: In 1801, as First Consul, Napoleon had prevailed upon Spain to attack Portugal in order to secure the repudiation of the Methuen Treaty and the promise of hostility to Great Britain. This step had proved fatal to Portuguese trade, and in 1804 the Portuguese government had purchased from Napoleon a solemn recognition of neutrality.] to break these commercial relations between Great Britain and Portugal, but it was not until after Tilsit that he entered seriously upon the work. He then formally demanded the adherence of Portugal to the Continental System and the seizure of all British subjects and property within the kingdom. Prince John, the regent of the small country, protested, besought Great Britain for aid, hesitated, and finally refused. Already a Franco−Spanish army was on its way to force compliance with the emperor's demands.

[Sidenote: and in Spain]

In the court of the Spanish Bourbons was a situation that Napoleon could readily utilize in order to have his way both in Portugal and in Spain. On the throne of Spain was seated the aging Charles IV (1788−1808), boorish, foolish, easily duped. By his side sat his queen, a coarse sensuous woman “with a tongue like a fishwife's.” Their heir was Prince Ferdinand, a conceited irresponsible young braggart in his early twenties. And their favorite, the true ruler of Spain, if Spain at this time could be said to have a ruler, was Godoy, a vain flashy adventurer, who

was loved by the queen, shielded by the king, and envied by the heir. Under such a combination it is not strange that Spain from 1795 to 1808 was but a vassal state to France. Nor is it strange that Napoleon was able in 1807 to secure the approval of the Spanish king to the partition of Portugal, a liberal share having been allotted to the precious Godoy.

Thus French troops were suffered to pour across Spain, and, in October, 1807, to invade Portugal. On 1 December, Lisbon was occupied and the Continental System proclaimed in force, but on the preceding day the Portuguese royal family escaped and, under convoy of a British fleet, set sail for their distant colony of Brazil. Then it was that Napoleon's true intentions in regard to Spain as well as to Portugal became evident.

[Sidenote: Joseph Bonaparte, King of Spain, 1808]

French troops continued to cross the Pyrenees and to possess themselves of the whole Iberian peninsula. In Spain public opinion blamed the feeble king and the detested favorite for this profanation of the country's soil, and in the recriminations that ensued at court Prince Ferdinand warmly espoused the popular side. Riots followed. Charles IV, to save Godoy, abdicated and proclaimed Ferdinand VII (17 March, 1808). On the pretext of mediating between the rival factions in the Bourbon court, Napoleon lured Charles and Ferdinand and Godoy to Bayonne on the French frontier and there by threats and cajolery compelled both king and prince to resign all claims upon their throne. Charles retired to Rome on a pension from Napoleon; Ferdinand was kept for six years under strict military guard at Talleyrand's chateau; the Bourbons had ceased to reign. Brother Joseph Bonaparte was at once promoted to the throne of Spain, and Brother−in−law Joachim Murat supplanted him as king of Naples.

In July, 1808, under protection of French troops, Joseph Bonaparte was crowned at Madrid. Forthwith he proceeded to confer upon his new subjects the favors of the Napoleonic regime: he decreed equality before the law, individual liberties, abolition of feudalism and serfdom, educational reforms, suppression of the Inquisition, diminution of monasteries, confiscation of church property, public improvements, and, last but not least, the vigorous enforcement of the Continental System.

[Sidenote: Resistance in Spain]

The comparative ease with which Napoleon had thus been able to supplant the Spanish Bourbons was equaled only by the difficulty which he and his brother now experienced with the Spanish people. Until 1808 the Corsican adventurer had had to deal primarily with divine−right monarchs and their old−fashioned mercenary armies; henceforth he was confronted with real nations, inspired by the same solid patriotism which had inspirited the French and dominated by much the same revolutionary fervor. The Spanish people despised their late king as weak and traitorous; they hated their new king as a foreigner and an upstart. For Spain they were patriotic to the core: priests and nobles made common cause with commoners and peasants, and all agreed that they would not brook foreign interference with their domestic concerns. All Spain blazed forth in angry insurrection. Revolutionary committees, or *juntas*, were speedily organized in the provinces; troops were enrolled; and a nationalist reaction was in full swing. By 1 August, 1808, Joseph was obliged to flee from Madrid and the French troops were in retreat toward the Pyrenees,

[Sidenote: Interrelation of the Continental System and Spanish Nationalism] [Sidenote: The Peninsular War, 1808−1813]

To add to the discomfiture of the French, George Canning, the British foreign minister, promptly promised his country's active assistance to a movement whose real significance he already clearly perceived. In ringing words he laid down the British policy which would obtain until Napoleon had been overthrown: “We shall proceed upon the principle that any nation of Europe which starts up to oppose a Power which, whether professing insidious peace or declaring open war, is the common enemy of all nations, becomes instantly our ally.” On 1 August, 1808, true to this declaration, a British army under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, subsequently duke of Wellington, landed in Portugal and proceeded to cooperate with Portuguese and Spanish against the French. It was the beginning of the so−called Peninsular War, which, with little interruption, was to last until 1813 and to spell the first disasters for Napoleon.

Within three weeks after their landing the British were in possession of Portugal. Roused by this unexpected reverse, Napoleon assumed personal command of the French forces in the Peninsula. And such was his vigor and resourcefulness that in December, 1808, he reinstated Joseph in Madrid and drove the main British army out of Spain. The success of Napoleon, however, was but temporary and illusory. Early in 1809 grave developments in

another part of Europe called him away from Spain, and the marshals, whom he left behind, quarreled with one another and at the same time experienced to the full the difficulties which Napoleon himself would have encountered had he remained.

The difficulties which impeded French military operations in the Iberian peninsula were well−nigh insurmountable. The nature of the country furnished several unusual obstacles. In the first place, the poverty of the farms and the paucity of settlements created a scarcity of provisions and rendered it difficult for the French armies to resort to their customary practice of living upon the land. Secondly, the sudden alternations of heat and cold, to which the northern part of Spain is liable, coupled with the insanitary condition of many of the towns, spread disease among the French soldiery. Finally, the succession of fairly high and steep mountain ranges, which cross the Peninsula generally in a direction of northwest to southeast, prevented any campaigning on the large scale to which Napoleonic tactics were accustomed, and put a premium upon loose, irregular guerrilla fighting, in which the Spaniards were adepts. In connection with these obstacles arising from the nature of the country must be remembered the fierce patriotic determination of the native people and the arms and disciplined commanders furnished by the British.

[Sidenote: Nationalism in Austria] [Sidenote: Premature Efforts of Austria] [Sidenote: Wagram (1809) and the Failure of Austria]

The era of national revolts had dawned, and it was not long before Austria learned the lesson from Spain. Ever since 1792 the Austrian ruler had borne the brunt of the Continental warfare against revolutionary France. And stung by the disasters and humiliations of 1805 and 1806, the Emperor Francis intrusted preparations for a war of revenge to the Archduke Charles and to Count Stadion, an able statesman and diplomat. The immediate results were: first, a far−reaching scheme of military reform, which abolished the obsolete methods of the eighteenth century, the chief characteristics of the new order being the adoption of the principle of the “nation in arms” and of the war organization and tactics in use among the French; and secondly, the awakening of a lively and enthusiastic feeling of patriotism among the Austrian people, especially among the Tyrolese, whom the arbitrary act of the French despot had handed over to Bavaria. The opportunity for an effective stroke appeared to be afforded by the Spanish situation, and the general result was a desperate attempt, premature as the event proved, to overthrow Napoleon. On 9 April, 1809, Austria declared war, and the next day Archduke Charles with a splendid army advanced into Bavaria. Napoleon, who temporarily put the Spanish danger out of his mind, struck the archduke with his usual lightning rapidity, and within a week's time had forced him back upon Vienna. Before the middle of May the French emperor was once more in the Austrian capital. But the Archduke Charles remained resolute, and on 21−22 May inflicted such a reverse on Napoleon at Aspern on the Danube below Vienna, that, had there been prompt cooperation on the part of other Austrian commanders and speedy assistance from other states, the Corsican might then have been overthrown and Europe saved from a vaster deluge of blood. As it was, Napoleon was allowed a fateful breathing spell, and on 5−6 July he fought and won the hard battle of Wagram. Wagram was not a rout like Austerlitz, but it was sufficiently decisive to induce the Austrian emperor to accept an armistice, and, after the failure of a cooeperating British expedition, to conclude the treaty of Vienna or Schoenbrunn (14 October, 1809), by the terms of which he had to surrender western Galicia to the grand−duchy of Warsaw and eastern Galicia to Russia; to cede the Illyrian provinces to the French Empire; and to restore the Tyrol, together with a strip of Upper Austria, to Bavaria. This treaty cost Austria four and one−half million subjects, a heavy war indemnity, and promises not to maintain an army in excess of 150,000 men, nor to have commercial dealings with Great Britain. As a further pledge of Austria's good behavior, and in order to assure a direct heir to his greatness, Napoleon shortly afterwards secured an annulment of his marriage with Josephine on the ground that it had not been solemnized in the presence of a parish priest, and early in 1810 he married a young Austrian archduchess, Maria Louisa, the daughter of the Emperor Francis II. Even this venture at first seemed successful, for in the following year a son was born who received the high−sounding appellation of king of Rome. But Austria remained at heart thoroughly hostile; Maria Louisa later grew faithless; and the young prince, half−Habsburg and half−Bonaparte, was destined to drag out a weary and futile existence among enemies and spies.

[Sidenote: Influence of the French Revolution upon Prussia]

Meanwhile, the national reaction against Napoleon grew apace. It was in Prussia that it reached more portentous dimensions than even in Austria or in Spain. Following so closely upon the invigorating victories of

Frederick the Great, the disaster of Jena and the humiliation of Tilsit had been a doubly bitter cup for the Prussian people. Prussian statesmen were not lacking who put the blame for their country's degradation upon many of the social and political conditions which had characterized the “old regime” in all European monarchies, and, as these statesmen were called in counsel by the well−intentioned King Frederick William III (1797−1840), the years from 1807 to 1813 were marked by a series of internal reforms almost as significant in the history of Prussia as were those from 1789 to 1795 in the history of France.

[Sidenote: The Regeneration of Prussia]

The credit of the Prussian regeneration belongs mainly to the great minister, the Baron vom Stein (1757−1831), and in the second place to the Chancellor Hardenberg (1750−1822), both of whom felt the influence of English ideas and of the French philosophy of the eighteenth century. On 9 October, 1807, Stein issued at Memel the famous Edict of Emancipation, which abolished the institution of serfdom throughout Prussia. Free trade in land was established, and land was left free to pass from hand to hand and class to class. Thus the Prussian peasants became personally free, although they were still bound to make fixed payments to their lords as rent. Moreover, all occupations and professions were thrown open to noble, commoner, and peasant alike. Stein's second important step was to strengthen the cabinet and to introduce sweeping changes in the conduct of public business, reforms too complicated and too technical to receive detailed explanation in this place. His third great measure was the grant (19 November, 1808) of local self−government, on liberal yet practical lines, to all Prussian towns and villages with a population in excess of 800. Stein undoubtedly intended the last law to be a corner−stone in the edifice of national constitutional government which he longed to erect in his country, but in this respect his plans were thwarted and Prussia remained another two generations without a written constitution. In 1811 Hardenberg continued the reform of the condition of the peasants by making them absolute owners of part of their holdings, the landlords obtaining the rest as partial compensation for their lost feudal and servile dues. During the same period, the army was likewise reorganized by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau; compulsory universal service was introduced, while the condition imposed by Napoleon that the army should not exceed 42,000 men was practically evaded by replacing each body of 42,000 men by another of the same size as soon as the first was fairly versed in military affairs. In this way every able−bodied male Prussian was in preparation for an expected War of Liberation.

Of course Napoleon had some idea of what was happening in Prussia: he protested, he threatened, he actually succeeded late in 1808 in securing the dismissal of Stein. But the redoubtable Prussian reformer spent the next three years in trying to fan the popular flame in Austria and thence betook himself to Russia to poison the ear and mind of the Tsar Alexander against the emperor of the French. In the meantime Napoleon was far too busy with other matters to give thorough attention to the continued development of the popular reforms in Prussia. There the national spirit burned ever brighter through the exertions of patriotic societies, such as the *Tugendbund*, or “League of Virtue,” through the writings of men like Fichte and Arndt, and, perhaps most permanently of all, through the wonderful educational reforms, which, associated indissolubly with the name of Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767−1835), gave to Prussia the basis of her present common−school system and to the world the great University of Berlin (1809).

It was no longer true that the French had a monopoly of the blessed principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, for which to fight. It was no longer a fact that they were the only nation defending their homes, their lands, and their rights. By 1810 the despotism of Napoleon was more selfish and more directly galling to the Prussian people than had been the threatened tyranny of Austrian and Prussian monarchs to an emancipated French nation in the dark days of 1792. Prussia was bankrupt, shorn of half her provinces, enduring the quartering of foreign soldiers, and suffering the ruin of her crops and the paralysis of her trade. Thanks to the Continental System, which had been none of their doing, the Prussian people witnessed the decay of their seaports, the rotting of their ships in their harbors, paid exorbitant prices for tobacco, and denied themselves sugar, coffee, and spices. They were grumbling and getting into a temper that boded ill to the author of their injuries.

[Sidenote: Liberalism in Spain] [Sidenote: The Spanish Constitution of 1812]

Meanwhile the warfare in Spain dragged on. In 1812 Wellington with his allied British and Spanish troops won the great victory of Salamanca, captured Madrid, and drove Joseph and the French north to Valencia. In the same year radical groups of Spaniards, who had learned revolutionary doctrines from the French, assembled at Cadiz and drafted a constitution for what they hoped would be their regenerated country. This written

constitution, next in age to the American and the French, was more radical than either and long served as a model for liberal constitutions throughout southern Europe. After a preamble in honor of the "old fundamental laws of this monarchy," the constitution laid down the very principle of the Revolution: "Sovereignty is vested essentially in the nation, and accordingly it is to the nation exclusively that the right of making its fundamental laws belongs." The legislative power was intrusted to the Cortes, a single−chamber parliament elected for two years by indirect universal suffrage. The executive power was given to the king to be exercised by his ministers. The king could affix a suspensive veto to the acts of the Cortes. The constitution further proclaimed the principles of individual liberty and legal equality and sought to abolish the old regime root and branch: provision was made for a thorough reorganization of courts, local administration, taxation, the army, and public education. While the framers of the constitution affirmed that "the religion of the Spanish nation is and always will be the Apostolic Church of Rome, the only true Church," they persisted in decreeing the suppression of the Inquisition and the secularization of ecclesiastical property. That such a radical constitution would be understood and championed forthwith by the whole Spanish people, only the most confirmed and fanatical optimist could believe, but, on the other hand, it was certain that the Spaniards as a nation were resolved that the Continental System and the Bonaparte family must go. They might sacrifice equality but not national liberty.

At last the four fateful defects in the Napoleonic Empire,—the character of Napoleon himself, the nature of his army, the Continental System, and the rise of nationalism,—were painfully in evidence. The drama thenceforth led irresistibly through two terrible acts—the Russian campaign and the Battle of the Nations—to the *denouement* in the emperor's abdication and to a sorry epilogue in Waterloo.

[Sidenote: Strained Relations between Napoleon and Tsar Alexander]

It was the rupture between Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander that precipitated the disasters. A number of events which transpired between the celebrated meeting at Tilsit in 1807 and the memorable year of 1812 made a rupture inevitable. Tilsit had purported to divide the world between the two emperors, but Alexander, as junior partner in the firm, soon found that his chief function was to assist Napoleon in bringing all western and central Europe under the domination of the French Empire while he himself was allowed by no means a free rein in dealing with his own country's hereditary enemies—Sweden, Poland, and Turkey. To be sure, Alexander had wrested Finland from Sweden (1809), but Napoleon's forcing of Sweden into a war with Great Britain (1810−1812), presumably as an ally of Russia as well as of France, had prevented him from extending his territory further in that direction. Then, too, the revival of a Polish state under the name of the grand−duchy of Warsaw and under French protection was a thorn in his flesh, which became all the more painful, more irritating, when it was enlarged after the Austrian War of 1809. Finally, Alexander's warfare against Turkey was constantly handicapped by French diplomacy, so that when the treaty of Bucharest was at length concluded (28 May, 1812) it was due to British rather than to French assistance that Russia extended her southern boundary to the River Pruth. Alexander was particularly piqued when Napoleon dethroned one of the tsar's relatives in Oldenburg and arbitrarily annexed that duchy to the French Empire, and he was deeply chagrined when the marriage of his ally with a Habsburg archduchess seemed to cement the bonds between France and Austria.

All these political differences might conceivably have been adjusted, had it not been for the economic breach which the Continental System ever widened. Russia, at that time almost exclusively an agricultural country, had special need of British imports, and the tsar, a sympathetic, kind−hearted man, could not endure the suffering and protests of his people. The result was a gradual suspension of the rigors of the Continental System in Russia and the eventual return to normal trade relations as they had existed prior to Tilsit. This simple fact Napoleon could not and would not recognize. "Russia's partial abandonment of the Continental System was not merely a pretext but the real ground of the war. Napoleon had no alternative between fighting for his system and abandoning the only method open to him of carrying on war against England."

[Sidenote: Preparations for War between France and Russia]

By the opening of the year 1812 Napoleon was actively preparing for war on a large scale against his recent ally. From the Austrian court, thanks to his wife, he secured assurances of sympathy and the promise of a guard of 30,000 men to protect the right wing of his Russian invasion. From the trembling Prussian king he wrung, by threats, permission to lead his invaders across Prussian soil and the support of 20,000 troopers for the left of his lines. A huge expedition was then gathered together: some 250,000 French veterans, 150,000 Germans from the Confederation of the Rhine; 80,000 Italians; 60,000 Poles; and detachments of Dutch, Swiss, Danes, and

Serbo−Croats; in all, a mighty motley host of more than 600,000 men.

As the year advanced, the Tsar Alexander made counter preparations. He came to a formal understanding with Great Britain. Through British mediation he made peace with the Turks and thus removed an enemy from his flank. And a series of treaties between himself, Great Britain, and Marshal Bernadotte, who was crown−prince of Sweden and tired of Napoleonic domination, guaranteed him in possession of Finland, assured him of a supporting Swedish army, and in return promised Norway as compensation to Sweden. A well−trained Russian army of 400,000 men, under the stubborn, taciturn veteran, General Kutusov, was put in the field.

[Sidenote: Napoleon's Russian Campaign, 1812]

War seemed imminent by April, 1812. After leisurely completing his preparations, Napoleon crossed the Niemen on 24 June, and the invasion of Russia had begun. It was the plan of the French emperor either to smash his enemy in a single great battle and to force an early advantageous treaty, or, advancing slowly, to spend the winter in Lithuania, inciting the people to insurrection, and then in the following summer to march on to Moscow and there in the ancient capital of the tsars to dictate terms of peace. The Russian plan of campaign was quite different. The tsar knew his people, that they were deeply religious and patriotic, that they hated Napoleon bitterly, and that they could be trusted not to revolt. He likewise knew well the character of the 800 miles of comparatively barren steppes that intervened between the Niemen and Moscow, whereon small armies could be beaten and large ones starved. Against the *Grande Armee* therefore, Alexander directed that no decisive battle be risked, but that the Russian forces, always retreating, should draw their opponents on as far as possible into the interior of the country, where the rigors and privations of a Russian winter could be expected to work greater havoc among them than could powder and bullets.

To his surprise and uneasiness, therefore, Napoleon after crossing the Niemen found the Russians always retreating before his advance. No decisive victory could be won against the elusive foe. Nor was the temper of the Lithuanians such as to encourage him to remain all winter among them. Pushing on into Russia, he captured the great fortress of Smolensk but still failed to crush the main Russian army. Then it was that he made the momentous decision to press on at once to Moscow. On 7 September, General Kutusov turned against him at Borodino and inflicted serious injury upon his army, but a week later he was in possession of Moscow. The battle of Borodino, together with the perpetual harassing of his outposts by the retreating Russians, had already inflicted very severe losses upon Napoleon, but he still had an army of about 100,000 to quarter in Moscow.

The very night of his triumphal entry, the city was set on fire through the carelessness of its own inhabitants,—the bazaar, with its stock of wine, spirits, and chemicals, becoming the prey of the flames. Barracks and foodstuffs were alike destroyed; the inhabitants fled; what was left of the city was pillaged by the French troops as well as by the Russians themselves; and the burning of Moscow became the signal for a general rising of the peasants against the foreigners who had brought such evils in their train. The lack of supplies and the impossibility of wintering in a ruined city, attacked in turn by an enraged peasantry and by detachments of General Kutusov's army, now comfortably ensconced a short distance to the south, compelled Napoleon on 22 October, after an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Kremlin, or citadel, to evacuate Moscow and to retrace his steps toward the Niemen.

[Sidenote: The Disastrous Retreat from Moscow]

The retreat from Moscow is one of the most horrible episodes in all history. To the exasperating and deadly attacks of the victoriously pursuing Russians on the rear were added the severity of the weather and the barrenness of the country. Steady downpours of rain changed to blinding storms of sleet and snow. Swollen streams, heaps of abandoned baggage, and huge snow−drifts repeatedly blocked the line of march. The gaunt and desolate country, which the army had ravaged and pillaged during the summer's invasion, now grimly mocked the retreating host. It was a land truly inhospitable and dreary beyond description. Exhaustion overcame thousands of troopers, who dropped by the wayside and beneath the snows gave their bodies to enrich the Russian ground. The retreat became a rout and all would have been lost had it not been for the almost superhuman efforts of the valiant rear−guard under Marshal Ney. As it was, a mere remnant of the *Grande Armee* certainly fewer than 50,000 men—recrossed the Niemen on 13 December, and, in pitiable plight, half−starved and with torn uniforms, took refuge in Germany. Fully half a million lives had been sacrificed upon the fields of Russia to the ambition of one man. Yet in the face of these distressing facts, this one man had the unblushing effrontery and overweening egotism to announce to the afflicted French people that “the emperor has never been in better health!”

[Sidenote: Final Coalition against Napoleon]

For a moment the Tsar Alexander hesitated. Russia at least was freed from the Napoleonic peril. To make peace in this hour of triumph might be of great advantage to his country and would involve no further risks on his part. But his own dreamy longing to pose as the chief figure on the European stage, the deliverer of oppressed nationalities, coupled with the insistent promptings of Baron vom Stein, who was always at his elbow, eventually decided him to complete the overthrow of his rival. Late in December he signed a convention with the Prussian commander, General Yorck, whereby the Prussian army was to cooperate with the Russian, British, and Swedish forces, and, in return, Prussia was to be restored to the position it had enjoyed prior to Jena. On 13 January, 1813, Alexander at the head of the Russian troops crossed the Niemen and proclaimed the liberty of the European peoples. King Frederick William III, amidst the enthusiastic rejoicing of his people, soon confirmed the convention of his general, and in March declared war against Napoleon. The War of Liberation had commenced.

[Sidenote: The War of Liberation]

The events of the year 1813 were as glorious in the history of Germany as they were disastrous for the fortunes of Napoleon. Prussia led in the movement to free all the German−speaking people from French domination. From Prussia the national enthusiasm spread to the other states. Mecklenburg, which had been the last addition to the Confederation of the Rhine, was the first to secede from it. All northern and central Germany was speedily in popular revolt, and the Prussian army, swelled by many patriotic enlistments, marched southward into Saxony. Austria, divided between fear of Napoleon and jealousy of the growing power of Russia, mobilized her army and waited for events to shape her conduct. In these trying circumstances Napoleon acted with his accustomed promptness and vigor. Since his arrival in France late in 1812, he had been frantically engaged in recruiting a new army, which, with the wreck of the *Grande Armee* and the assistance that was still forthcoming from Naples and southern Germany, now numbered 200,000 men, and with which he was ready to take the offensive in Saxony. On 2 May, 1813, he fell on the allied Russians and Prussians at Luetzen and defeated them, but was unable to follow up his advantage for want of cavalry. On 20−21 May, he gained another fruitless victory at Bautzen. It became increasingly obvious that he was being outnumbered and outmaneuvered.

[Sidenote: The Coalition Joined by Austria]

At this point an armistice was arranged through the friendly mediation of Austria. The government of that country proposed a general European peace on the basis of the reconstruction of Prussia, the re−partition of the grand−duchy of Warsaw by Russia, Prussia, and Austria, the re− cession of the Illyrian provinces to Austria, the dissolution of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the freedom of the German ports of Hamburg and Luebeck. But it was a decisive victory, not peace, that Napoleon most wanted, and the only reason which had induced him to accept the armistice was to gain time in order that reenforcements from Italy and France might arrive. The delay, however, was fatal to the French emperor, for his reenforcements were greatly outnumbered by the patriots who were continually flocking to the standards of the allies, and by 12 August, 1813, when a state of war was resumed, Austria, whose peace proposals had been rudely rejected, had formally joined the coalition against him.

[Sidenote: Leipzig, the “Battle of the Nations,” October 1813]

Napoleon was now at Dresden in supreme command of armies aggregating about 400,000 men, opposed by 250,000 Austrians in Bohemia under Schwarzenberg; 100,000 Prussians and Russians in Silesia under Bluecher; 100,000 Swedes, Prussians, and Russians near Berlin under the Crown Prince Bernadotte of Sweden; and at least 300,000 reserves. At Dresden, in August, he won his last great victory, against the Austrian army of General Schwarzenberg. As his marshals suffered repeated reverses, he was unable to follow up his own successes and found himself gradually hemmed in by the allies, until at Leipzig he turned at bay. There, on 16−19 October, was fought the great three−day “Battle of the Nations.” Against the 300,000 troops of the allies, Napoleon could use only 170,000, and of these the Saxon contingent deserted in the heat of the fray. It was by military prowess that the French Empire had been reared; its doom was sealed by the battle of Leipzig. Napoleon sacrificed on that field another 40,000 lives, besides 30,000 prisoners and a large quantity of artillery and supplies. A fortnight later, with the remnant of his army, he recrossed the Rhine. Germany was freed.

[Sidenote: Collapse of Napoleon's Power outside of France]

The “Battle of the Nations” following within a year the disasters of the retreat from Moscow, marked the collapse of Napoleon's power outside of France. His empire and vassal states tumbled like a house of cards. The Confederation of the Rhine dissolved, and its princes hastened, with a single exception, to throw in their lot with

the victorious allies. King Jerome Bonaparte was chased out of Westphalia. Holland was liberated, and William of Orange returned to his country as king. Denmark submitted and by the treaty of Kiel (January, 1814) engaged to cede Norway to Sweden in return for a monetary payment and Swedish Pomerania. Austria readily recovered the Tyrol and the Illyrian provinces and occupied Venetia and Switzerland. Even Joachim Murat deserted his brother−in−law, and, in order to retain Naples, came to terms with Austria. Only Polish Warsaw and the king of Saxony remained loyal to the Napoleonic alliance: the territories of both were in full possession of the allies.

[Sidenote: The Campaign of 1814 in France]

With the remnant of his defeated army and what young boys and old men he was able to recruit, Napoleon needlessly prolonged the struggle on French soil. At the close of 1813 Austria prevailed upon her more or less willing allies to offer him wonderfully favorable terms: France might retain her “natural boundaries”—the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees; and Napoleon might continue to rule over a region which would have gladdened the heart of a Richelieu or of a Louis XIV. But it was still victory and not peace upon which the supreme egotist had bet his mind. He still dreamed of overwhelming Prussia and Russia.

Early in 1814 three large foreign armies, totaling 400,000 men, and accompanied by the emperors of Russia and Austria and the king of Prussia, invaded northern France and converged on Paris. Bluecher with his German troops was advancing up the Moselle to Nancy; Schwarzenberg with the Austrians crossed the Rhine to the south at Basel and Neu Breisach; Bernadotte in the Netherlands was welding Swedes, Dutch, and Prussians into a northern army. Meanwhile, the great defeat which Wellington with his allied army of British, Spaniards, and Portuguese, had inflicted upon the French at Vittoria (21 June, 1813) had for the last time driven King Joseph from Madrid and in effect cleared the whole Iberian peninsula of Napoleon's soldiers. The British general had then gradually fought his way through the Pyrenees so that in the spring of 1814 a fourth victorious allied army in the neighborhood of Toulouse threatened Napoleon from the south. An Austrian army, which was then operating in Venetia and Lombardy, menaced France from yet a fifth direction.

Against such overwhelming odds, Napoleon displayed throughout the desperate months of February and March, 1814, the same remarkable genius, the same indomitable will, as had characterized his earliest campaigns. If anything, his resourcefulness and his rapidity of attack were even greater. Inflicting a setback on one invader, he would turn quickly and dash against a second. Such apprehension did his tiger−like assaults excite among his opponents that as late as February he might have retained the French frontiers of 1792 if he had chosen to make peace. He would play the game to the bitter end. On 1 March, the four Great Powers—Great Britain, Russia, Austria, and Prussia—concluded the treaty of Chaumont, definitely cementing their alliance for a period of twenty years and mutually agreeing not to make terms without each other's consent nor to desist from war until their arch−enemy had been overthrown: each contracting party undertook to furnish 150,000 men, and Great Britain further promised a subsidy of five million pounds. The fate of Napoleon was at last settled.

[Sidenote: Surrender of Paris and Abdication of Napoleon]

To describe in any detail the brilliant campaign of 1814 lies outside our province. Suffice it to state that, after the most stubborn fighting, resistance was broken. Paris surrendered to the allies on 31 March, and thirteen days later Napoleon signed with the allied sovereigns the personal treaty of Fontainebleau, by which he abdicated his throne and renounced all rights to France for himself and his family, and, in return, was guaranteed full sovereignty of the island of Elba and an annual pension of two million francs for himself; the Italian duchy of Parma was conferred upon the Empress Maria Louisa, and pensions of two and a half million francs were promised for members of his family. Another seven days and Napoleon bade his Old Guard an affecting farewell and departed for Elba. In his diminutive island empire, hard by the shore of Tuscany and within sight of his native Corsica, Napoleon Bonaparte lived ten months, introducing such vigor into the administration as the island had never experienced and all the while pondering many things.

[Sidenote: Restoration of the Bourbons in France] [Sidenote: Compromise with the Revolutionary Ideas]

Meanwhile, in France order was emerging from chaos. In 1793 European sovereigns had banded together to invade France, to restore the divine−right monarchy of the Bourbons and the traditional rights of the privileged classes, and to stamp out the embryonic principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The most noteworthy significance of the Era of Napoleon was the simple fact that now in 1814 the monarchs of Europe, at last in possession of France, had no serious thought of restoring social or political conditions just as they had been prior to the Revolution. Their major quarrel was not with principles but with a man. The Tsar Alexander, to whom

more than to any other one person, was due the triumph of the allies, was a benevolent prince, well−versed in the revolutionary philosophy, considerate of popular wishes, and anxious to promote a lasting peace. Talleyrand, the man of the hour among Frenchmen, who himself had played no mean role throughout the Revolution and under Napoleon, combined with a desire to preserve the frontiers of his country a firm conviction that the bulk of his countrymen would not revert to absolute monarchy. Between Talleyrand and Alexander it was arranged, with the approval of the Great Powers, that in the name of “legitimacy” the Bourbons should be restored to the throne of France, but with the understanding that they should fully recognize and confirm the chief social and political reforms of the Revolution. It was likewise arranged by the treaty of Paris (30 May, 1814), also in the name of “legitimacy,” that France should regain the limits of 1792, should recover practically all the colonies which Great Britain had seized during the course of the Napoleonic wars, [Footnote: Great Britain kept Tobago and St. Lucia in the West Indies, and Mauritius (Ile de France) on the route to India.] and should pay no indemnity. “Legitimacy” was a brilliant discovery of Talleyrand: it justified the preservation of France in the face of crushing defeat, and, if it restored the Bourbons, it did so as limited, not as absolute, monarchs.

[Sidenote: Louis XVIII]

Louis XVI's “legitimate” heir was his brother, the count of Provence, a cynical, prosaic, and very stout old gentleman who had been quietly residing in an English country−house, and who now made a solemn, if somewhat unimpressive, state entry into Paris. The new king kept what forms of the old regime he could: he assumed the title of Louis XVIII, “king of France by the grace of God”; he reckoned his reign from the death of the dauphin (“Louis XVII") in the year 1795; he replaced the revolutionary tricolor by the white and lilies of his family; out of the fullness of his divinely bestowed royal authority he granted a charter to the French people. But Louis XVIII was neither so foolish nor so principled as to insist upon the substance of Bourbon autocracy: the very Constitutional Charter, which he so graciously promulgated, confirmed the Revolutionary liberties of the individual and established a fairly liberal form of government for France. It was obvious that the gouty old man had no desire to risk his head or to embark again upon his travels.

[Sidenote: Monarchical Restorations Elsewhere in Europe]

The same month that witnessed the unbecoming straddle of this French Bourbon between revolution and reaction, beheld the restoration of another Bourbon in the person of Ferdinand VII to the throne of Spain, and the return of Pope Pius VII, amid the enthusiastic shouts of the Romans, to the ancient see upon the Tiber. About the same time Piedmont and Savoy were restored to Victor Emmanuel I, king of Sardinia. Europe was rapidly assuming a more normal appearance. To settle the outstanding territorial questions which the overthrow of Napoleon had raised, a great congress of rulers and diplomats met at Vienna in the autumn of 1814.

[Sidenote: Napoleon at Elba, 1814−1815]

Within a few months the unusual calm was rudely broken by the sudden reappearance of Napoleon Bonaparte himself upon the European stage. It was hardly to be expected that he for whom the whole Continent had been too small would be contented in tiny Elba. He nursed grievances, too. He could get no payment of the revenue secured him by the treaty of Fontainebleau; his letters to his wife and little son were intercepted and unanswered; he was treated as an outcast. He became aware of a situation both in France and at Vienna highly favorable to his own ambition. As he foresaw, the shrinkage of the great empire into the realm of old France filled many patriotic Frenchmen with disgust, a feeling fed every day by stories of the presumption of returning emigres and of the tactless way in which the Bourbon princes treated veterans of the *Grande Armee*. Napoleon in time felt certain that he could count once more upon the loyalty of the French nation. That he would not be obliged to encounter again the combined forces of the European Powers he inferred from his knowledge of the ever−recurring jealousies among them and from the fact that even then Russia and Prussia on one side were quarreling with Austria and Great Britain on the other over the fate of Saxony and Poland. If some fighting were necessary, the return of French prisoners from Russia, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain would supply him with an army far larger than that with which he had fought the brilliant campaign of 1814.

[Sidenote: The Episode of Napoleon's Return to France: “The Hundred Days,” March−June, 1815]

On 26 February, 1815, Napoleon slipped away from Elba with some twelve hundred men, and, managing to elude the British guardships, disembarked at Cannes on 1 March and advanced northward. Troops sent out to arrest the arch−rebel were no proof against the familiar uniform and cocked hat: they threw their own hats in the air amid ringing shouts of *vive l'empereur*. Everywhere the adventurer received a hearty welcome, which attested

at once the unpopularity of the Bourbons and the singular attractiveness of his own personality. The French people, being but human, put imagination in the place of reason. Without firing a shot in his defense, Napoleon's bodyguard swelled until it became an army. Marshal Ney, the “bravest of the brave,” who had taken the oath of allegiance to the Bourbons and had promised Louis XVIII that he would bring Napoleon to Paris in an iron cage, deserted to him with 6000 men, and on 20 March the emperor jauntily entered the capital. Louis XVIII himself, who had assured his parliament that he would die in defense of his throne, was already in precipitate flight toward the Belgian frontier.

[Sidenote: Napoleon and France]

Napoleon clinched his hold upon the French people by means of an astute manifesto which he promptly published. “He had come,” he declared, “to save France from the outrages of the returning nobles; to secure to the peasant the possession of his land; to uphold the rights won in 1789 against a minority which sought to reestablish the privileges of caste and the feudal burdens of the last century; France had made trial of the Bourbons; it had done well to do so, but the experiment had failed; the Bourbon monarchy had proved incapable of detaching itself from its worst supports, the priests and nobles; only the dynasty which owed its throne to the Revolution could maintain the social work of the Revolution. ... He renounced war and conquest ... he would govern henceforth as a constitutional sovereign and seek to bequeath a constitutional crown to his son.”

[Sidenote: Napoleon and Europe]

The emperor was as wrong in his judgment of what Europe would do as he was right concerning the attitude of France. The statesmen who had been haggling about treaty stipulations at Vienna speedily forgot all their differences in the face of common danger. The four Great Powers solemnly renewed their treaty of alliance, and with alacrity and unanimity all joined in signing a declaration. “In violating the convention which established him in the island of Elba, Bonaparte has destroyed the only legal title to his existence. By reappearing in France with projects of disorder and destruction, he has cut himself off from the protection of the law, and has shown in the face of all the world that there can be neither peace nor truce with him. Accordingly the Powers declare that Napoleon Bonaparte is excluded from civil and social relations, and as an enemy and disturber of the tranquillity of the world he has incurred public vengeance....”

In order to give force to their threats, the allies rushed troops toward France. Wellington assembled an army of more than 100,000 British, Dutch, and Germans, and planned to cooeperate with 120,000 Prussians under Bluecher near Brussels. The Austrian army under Schwarzenberg neared the Rhine. Russia and Germany were alive with marching columns. To oppose these forces Napoleon raised an army of 200,000 men, and on 12 June, 1815, quitted Paris for the Belgian frontier. His plan was to separate his opponents and to overcome them singly: it would be a repetition of the campaign of 1814, though on a larger scale.

[Sidenote: Waterloo]

How Napoleon passed the border and forced the outposts of the enemy back to Waterloo; how there, on 18 June, he fought the final great battle of his remarkable career; how his troops were mowed down by the fearful fire of his adversaries and how even his famous Old Guard rallied gloriously but ineffectually to their last charge; how the defeat administered by Wellington was turned at the close of the day into a mad rout through the arrival of Bluecher's forces: all these matters are commonplaces in the most elementary histories of military science. It has long been customary to cite the battle of Waterloo as one of the world's decisive battles. In a sense this is just, but it should be borne in mind that, in view of the firm united determination of all Europe, there was no ultimate chance for Napoleon. If he had defeated Wellington, he would still have had to deal with Bluecher. If he should then defeat the Prussians, he would have to turn suddenly against Schwarzenberg and the Austrians. By that time Wellington would have been sufficiently reenforced to resume the offensive, and the war would have gone on inevitably to but a single grim conclusion. The allies could put almost limitless numbers in the field; Napoleon was at the end of his resources. For the conservation of human life, it was fortunate that Napoleon was overwhelmed at Waterloo and that the first battle of the campaign of 1815 was also its last. Waterloo added military prestige to the naval preeminence which Great Britain already enjoyed, and finally established the reputation of Wellington as the greatest general of his age next only to Napoleon himself. It is small wonder that the English have magnified and glorified Waterloo. [Footnote: An interesting side issue of the Waterloo campaign was the fate of Joachim Murat. The wily king of Naples, distrustful of the allies' guarantees, threw in his lot with his brother−in−law. His forces were speedily put to rout by the Austrians and he himself fled to France and later

to Corsica, and was ultimately captured and shot. His action enabled still another Bourbon, the despicable Ferdinand I, to recover his throne.]

[Sidenote: Final Overthrow of Napoleon ]

On 21 June, Napoleon arrived in Paris, defeated and dejected. That very day the parliament, on the motion of Lafayette, declared itself in permanent session and took over all functions of government. The following day Napoleon abdicated the second time in favor of his son, and the provisional government of France, under the skillful trimming of the clever Fouche, reopened negotiations with the Bourbons. On 7 July the allies reoccupied Paris, bringing the flustered old Louis XVIII “in their baggage−train.” The Bourbons, thus unheroically restored, were destined for fifteen years to maintain in peace their compromise between revolution and reaction.

[Sidenote: Napoleon at St. Helena 1815−1821 ]

On 15 July, the day following the anniversary of the fall of the Bastille, Napoleon, who had gone to Rochefort on the French coast, with some vague idea of taking refuge in America, delivered himself over to the commander of a British warship which was lying in the harbor. For us who live a century after the stirring events whose narrative has filled this chapter, it is easy to perceive that the British government might safely have extended hospitality to their famous captive and might have granted him an asylum in England. He was finally discredited in the eyes not only of the European despots but also of the vast majority of the French people; no matter how much he might burn with the flame of his old ambition, he could never again be in a position to endanger the safety or prosperity of the United Kingdom. But in 1815 Englishmen felt differently, and naturally so. To them Napoleon had been for years a more troublesome and dangerous enemy than a Philip II or a Louis XIV. By them he was deemed the unregenerate child of darkness and of the evil spirit. And “General Bonaparte,” as the British authorities persisted in calling him, was not suffered to touch foot upon the sacred soil of England, but was dispatched on another British warship to the rocky island of St. Helena in the south Atlantic.

On St. Helena Napoleon lived five and a half years. He was allowed considerable freedom of movement and the society of a group of close personal friends. He spent his time in walking on the lonely island or in quarreling with his suspicious strait−laced English jailer, Sir Hudson Lowe, or in writing treatises on history and war and dictating memoirs to his companions. These memoirs, which were subsequently published by the Marquis de Las Cases, were subtly compounded of truth and falsehood. They represented Napoleon Bonaparte in the light of a true son and heir of the Revolution, who had been raised by the will of the French people to great power in order that he might consolidate the glorious achievements of liberty, equality, and fraternity. According to the emperor himself, he had always been the friend of peace and of oppressed nationalities, the author of blessings which had flowed uninterruptedly upon his people until he had been thwarted by the machinations of the British and the sheer brute force of the European despots. Napoleon shrewdly foresaw the increase of popular discontent with the repressive measures which the reactionary sovereigns and statesmen of Europe were bound to inaugurate, and in the resulting upheaval he thought he could see an opportunity for his beloved son to build anew an empire of the French. It could hardly have been blind chance that caused him to insert in his will the pious request that he “be buried on the banks of the Seine in the midst of the French people whom he so dearly loved.” On 5 May, 1821, the greatest adventurer of modern times died on the island of St. Helena.

[Sidenote: The Napoleonic Legend]

Already the history of the emperor was becoming the Napoleonic Legend. The more his memory was revered as the noble martyr of St. Helena, the more truth withdrew into the background and fiction stepped into the limelight. His holocausts of human life were forgotten; only the glory, the unconquerable prowess of his arms, was remembered. French cottages were adorned with cheap likenesses of the little corporal's features; quaint, endearing nicknames for their hero were on villagers' lips; and around hearth and campfire were related apocryphal anecdotes of his exploits at Lodi, at Austerlitz, and at Wagram. From a selfish despot Napoleon was returning to his mightier, if humbler, position as a child of the people. Thus the last years at St. Helena were far from fruitless: they proved once more that the pen is mightier than the sword,—for one day, not by feats of arms, but by the power of the Napoleonic Legend, another Bonaparte was to be seated upon the throne of France.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ERA OF NAPOLEON

[Sidenote: A Continuation of the Revolutionary Era] [Sidenote: Liberty under Napoleon]

If we turn now from the story of Napoleon's life to an attempt to appraise the significance of the whole era which fittingly bears his name, we are struck by its manifold achievements in politics and society, in commerce,

and in war. In general it was a continuation of the French the Revolution. The principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, which, from 1789 to 1799, had been laid down as the foundation exclusively of French political and social institutions, became, from 1799 to 1815, the building−blocks for all European nations. The least understood and used was undoubtedly liberty. To be sure, both the Consulate and the empire were concrete and substantial examples of the replacement of the old theory of divine−right monarchy by the new idea of popular sovereignty, of governments resting, in last analysis, upon the consent of the governed. But Napoleon did hardly more to vitalize individual liberties than did the benevolent despots of the eighteenth century, or those of his own day. To secure the interested support of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, the sacred right of private property was eloquently reaffirmed, and, as a trusty weapon against possible clerical pretensions, the noble rights of liberty of conscience and liberty of worship were grandiloquently preached; but the less serviceable liberties of speech and of publication were confined within the narrowest limits of military and imperial toleration.

[Sidenote: “Equality” under Napoleon]

With equality it was quite different. In all the lands annexed to France or included within the radius of Napoleon's direct influence, the forms and rights of feudalism and serfdom were abolished, and the social equalities embodied *Code Napoleon* were guaranteed. Throughout southern Germany, the Netherlands, the Iberian peninsula, and a great part of Italy, as well as in France, the social aspects of the old regime underwent a thorough transformation; interior customs lines, private roadways, toll−bridges, and internal trade restrictions were swept away; in the place of large landed estates, with their old−time noble owners and their wretched peasants attached to the soil and suffering from burdensome tithes and dues and personal services, appeared a numerous class of peasant proprietors, owning and tilling their own fields, free to buy, sell, or exchange them, or to move away to the growing towns. Outside of Napoleon's direct influence, the land reforms of Baron vom Stein in Prussia reflected the same spirit of the age. These social gains in the direction of equality were, in fact, the most permanent achievements of the Napoleonic Era: in spite of later reaction, it was beyond the reach of possibility to restore the inequalities of the outworn feudal system.

[Sidenote: “Fraternity” under Napoleon] [Sidenote: The Emphasis on Nationalism]

Fraternity, or national patriotism, received a marked impetus during the era. Communicated from France by the ardor of the revolutionary and Napoleonic soldiers, it evoked ready response not only in Poland, Holland, Portugal, Spain, England, and Russia, in which countries it was already existent, but also in the Germanies and in the Italian states, where centuries of petty strife and jealousy seemed to have blotted it out forever. The significance of the Napoleonic period in the history of Germany is incalculable. The diminution of the number of states, the abolition of the effete Holy Roman Empire, the regeneration of Prussia, the War of Liberation, the Battle of the Nations, the consciousness of common interests, and the wave of patriotism which swept over the whole German folk, presaged before the lapse of many decades the political unification of the Germanies and the erection of a powerful national state. Nor were the Italians devoid of a similar national feeling. The fame of Napoleon, a man of Italian blood, the temporary establishment of a “kingdom of Italy,” the title of “king of Rome” conferred upon the infant heir to Napoleon's fortunes, the social reforms and the patriotic awakening throughout the peninsula,—all betokened a national destiny for the whole Italian people.

[Sidenote: Minor Political Happenings]

In minor political ways the Napoleonic Era was not without significance. The Tsar was enabled finally to acquire Finland, Poland, and Turkish land as far as the River Pruth, Minor thus completing the work of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, and rounding out the European frontier of Russia to its present extent. Sweden secured Norway and a new dynasty, which, descended from Marshal Bernadotte, the interesting son of an obscure French lawyer, has reigned ever since. In the case of Portugal, the flight of the royal family to Brazil in 1807 had the curious effect of causing them for several years to hold their court in their principal colony and to govern the mother−country through regents.

[Sidenote: Remarkable Significance of the Era to Great Britain] [Sidenote: Colonies] [Sidenote: Commerce]

Beyond continental Europe the period was of utmost importance. The maritime and commercial supremacy of Great Britain, which had been seriously shaken by the War of American Independence, was regained in the course of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. Of course the United States continued independent. But the great victories of Lord Nelson over the French fleets rendered Great Britain the true mistress of the seas; and she proceeded to utilize her naval superiority to appropriate what remaining French colonies most suited her purpose.

In this way she possessed herself of Malta (1800), St. Lucia, Tobago (1803), and Mauritius (1810). Then, too, the dependence of Holland upon France, involuntary though it was most of the time, afforded her an opportunity to seize such valuable Dutch colonies as Ceylon (1795), Guiana (1803), and South Africa (1806). The sorry subservience of the Spanish Bourbons to Napoleon gave Great Britain a similar chance to prey upon Spanish commerce, to occupy some Spanish colonies, and to open others to her own trade: at this time the British took possession of Trinidad (1797) and Honduras (1798) and sent raiding expeditions against Buenos Aires and Montevideo (1806−1807). The subsequent Peninsular War, in which, as we have seen, the British cooeperated with the Spaniards in maintaining the latter's freedom against Napoleon, put an end to the hostile British incursions into the Spanish colonies, but it worked in another way to Great Britain's advantage. The Spanish colonies—Mexico, Central America, and the greater part of South America—were thrown into grave administrative perplexities by the conflict of authority between the two Bourbon kings, Charles IV and Ferdinand VII, and between King Joseph Bonaparte and the revolutionary *juntas*; the colonists gradually got into the habit of managing their own affairs and of opening their ports to British trade; and the result was that by 1814, when Ferdinand was at length firmly established upon the Spanish throne, he was confronted by colonists, the greater number of whom had all along professed allegiance to him, but who now, accustomed to the advantages of free trade and practical independence, were resolved to maintain them. The disruption of the Spanish colonial empire was a direct outcome of Napoleon's career, and next to the colonists themselves the British were the chief beneficiaries. In general, the new colonies which Great Britain acquired were intended either, as in the case of Malta, Mauritius, Ceylon, and South Africa, to strengthen her hold upon India, or, as in the case of the others, to develop her trade with Spanish America.

[Sidenote: Industry]

This naval predominance of Great Britain and the expansion of her commerce and colonial empire synchronized with the rapid development of the Industrial Revolution within England. It was the ceaseless operation of spinning frames and power looms, of blast furnaces and steam engines, in a country on which the French emperor's army had never trod, that most truly worked the downfall of Napoleon.

[Illustration: THE BONAPARTE FAMILY]

ADDITIONAL READING

TEXTBOOK NARRATIVES. H. E. Bourne, *The Revolutionary Period in Europe, 1763−1815* (1914), ch. xvii−xxvii; J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard, *The Development of Modern Europe*, Vol. I (1907), ch. xiv, xv; H. M. Stephens, *Revolutionary Europe, 1789−1815* (1893), ch. vii−xi; J. H. Rose, *Revolutionary and Napoleonic Era, 1789−1815* (1895), ch. vii−xi; J. A. R. Marriott, *The Remaking of Modern Europe, 1789−1878* (1910), ch. vii−xi; H. T. Dyer, *A History of Modern Europe from the Fall of Constantinople*, 3d ed. rev. by Arthur Hassall (1901), ch. lxi−lxvii; C. A. Fyffe, *A History of Modern Europe, 1792−1878* (1896), ch. v−xii.

STANDARD BIOGRAPHIES OF NAPOLEON. Two suggestive outlines, either one of which may serve as an admirable introduction to more careful study: Herbert Fisher, *Napoleon* (1912), in the “Home University Library”; and R. M. Johnston, *Napoleon, a Short Biography* (1910). August Fournier, *Napoleon I*, 3d rev. ed., 3 vols. (1914), perhaps the best biography, a German work, scholarly, well written, and impartial, trans. into English from the 2d German edition by A. E. Adams, 2 vols. (1912). J. H. Rose, *The Life of Napoleon I* , new ed., 2 vols. in i (1907), a highly prized work, mainly political, and thoroughly British in tone; and, by the same author, *The Personality of Napoleon* (1912), a collection of interesting lectures. W. M. Sloane, *The Life of Napoleon Bonaparte*, rev. and enlarged ed., 4 vols. (1910), confined largely to the personal history of Napoleon, with special reference to his earlier years, based upon source−material, and profusely illustrated. J. C. Ropes, *The First Napoleon* (1900), a military and political outline by an authority on several of the great campaigns of the emperor. Pierre Lanfrey, *The History of Napoleon the First*, Eng. trans., 2d ed., 4 vols. (1894), a severe arraignment of the character and policies of Napoleon by a celebrated French scholar, reaches only to the close of the year 1811. Adolphe Thiers, *Histoire du consulat et de l'empire*, 20 vols., highly laudatory of Napoleon, and should be read as an antidote to Lanfrey; the portion of the work down to 1807 has been translated into English by D. F. Campbell, 2 vols. in 1 (1845). H. A. Taine, *The Modern Regime*, Eng. trans. by John Durand, 2 vols. (1890−1894), a brilliant and fascinating analysis of Napoleon's genius and a critical estimate of the importance of the institutions established by him. Frederic Masson, *Napoleon et sa famille*, 5th ed., 12 vols. (1897−1915), an encyclopedia of information concerning the emperor's numerous relatives, and, by the same author, *Napoleon a Sainte−Helene*

(1912). Three volumes of an elaborate history of Napoleon appeared in 1912−1914, the work of a well−known German specialist, F. M. Kircheisen, *Napoleon I: sein Leben und seine Zeit* . See also, on the early life of Bonaparte, Oscar Browning, *Napoleon: the First Phase, 1769−1793* (1905); and, on his final years at St. Helena, Lord Rosebery, *Napoleon: the Last Phase* (1900). An illuminating work is that of A. M. Broadley, *Napoleon in Caricature, 1795−1821*, with an introductory essay by J. H. Rose, 2 vols. (1911).

ILLUSTRATIVE SOURCE MATERIAL. In addition to the indispensable *Readings in Modern European History* by J. H. Robinson and C. A. Beard (1909), the following selections from the masses of source material are especially serviceable: D. A. Bingham, *A Selection from the Letters and Despatches of the First Napoleon*, 3 vols. (1884); *Memoirs of the History of France during the Reign of Napoleon, dictated by him at St. Helena to the generals who shared his captivity*, Eng. trans., 2d ed., 4 vols. (1823−1824); the correspondence of Napoleon I, published in French under the auspices of Napoleon III, 32 vols. (1858−1870), and Napoleon's military correspondence published under the auspices of the Ministry of War of the Third French Republic; *Narrative of Captain Coignet*, new French ed. (1909), Eng. trans. by Mrs. Carey, the story of the life of a soldier in the ranks. Of the abundant memoirs of the period, the best are those of Mme. de Remusat, covering the years 1802− 1808, hostile but informing, Eng. trans. by Mrs. Cashel Hoey and John Lillie (1891); Fauvalet de Bourrienne, Eng. trans. by J. S. Memes, 3 vols. (1892); Antoine de Marbot, 3 vols.; C. F. de Meneval, covering the years 1802−1815, 3 vols. (1894); A. F. Miot de Melito, Eng. trans. (1881); L. P. de Segur, 3 vols; and C. M. de Talleyrand−Perigord, Eng. trans., 5 vols. (1891−1892). For further bibliographical suggestions, see F. M. Kircheisen, *Bibliography of Napoleon* (1902). An extended bibliography is in course of publication by an Italian scholar, Alberto Lumbroso, 5 parts to date (1894−1914).

THE ERA OF NAPOLEON. A very brief summary: Charles Seignobos, *History of Contemporary Civilization*, trans. by J. A. James (1909), pp. 150− 185. Standard general works: *Cambridge Modern History*, Vol. IX (1906); *Histoire generale*, Vol. IX; *History of All Nations*, Vol. XVI, *The French Revolution and the Rise of Napoleon*, ch. viii, ix, and Vol. XVII, *The Napoleonic Empire* , by Theodor Flathe; Wilhelm Oncken, *Das Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreiches, und der Befreiungskriege*, 2 vols. (1884−1886); Emile Bourgeois, *Manuel historique de politique etrangere, 4th ed., Vol. II (1909), ch. viii− xviii. Standard works on special phases of the era: Armand Lefebvre, Histoire des cabinets de l'Europe pendant le consulat et l'empire 1800−1815, 2d ed., 5 vols. (1866−1869), an admirable diplomatic history; Albert Sorel, L'Europe et la revolution francaise, 8 vols. (1885−1904), a standard authoritative work, of which Vols. VI−VIII treat of the communication of revolutionary ideas to Europe during the Era of Napoleon; L. de Lanzac de Laborie, Paris sous Napoleon, 8 vols. (1905−1913), invaluable for a detailed study of French life under Napoleon; Emile Levasseur, Histoire des classes ouvrieres et de l'industrie en France de 1789 a 1870, Vol. I (1903), Livre II, Le consulat et l'empire, for social history; Jean Jaures, Histoire socialiste, 1789−1900, Vol. VI, by Paul Brousse and Henri Turot, Le consulat et l'empire, 1799−1815 (1905), likewise for social history; J. 0. B. de Cleron d'Haussonville, L'eglise romaine et le premier empire, 1800−1814, 5 vols. (1868−1869), for ecclesiastical affairs; Alphonse Aulard, Napoleon I−er et la monopole universitaire (1911), for educational matters; Henri Welschinger, La censure sous le premier empire (1882), for restrictions on personal liberty in France: and for French plots and attempts against Napoleon, the works of Ernest Daudet, particularly La police et les chouans sous le consulat et l'empire, 1800−1815 (1895), Histoire de l'emigration, 3 vols. (1886−1890), and L'exil et la mort du General Moreau (1909); and Sir John Hall, General Pichegru's Treason (1916). MILITARY CAMPAIGNS OF NAPOLEON. T. A. Dodge, Napoleon: a History of the Art of War, 4 vols. (1904− 1907), the work of an American army officer, not always accurate, but the best general account in English; A. T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793−1812 , 10th ed., 2 vols. (1898), a justly famous book, especially valuable for the Continental System. Special campaigns: Albert Vandal, Napoleon et Alexander Ier, 3d ed., 3 vols. (1893−1896); R. G. Burton, Napoleon's Campaigns in Italy, 1796−1797 and 1800 (1912), and, by the same author, From Boulogne to Austerlitz: Napoleon's Campaign of 1805 (1912); the works of F. L. Petre, particularly Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia, 1806 (1907), Napoleon's Campaign in Poland, 1806−1807 (1906), Napoleon and the Archduke Charles (1908), Napoleon's Last Campaign in Germany, 1813 (1912), Napoleon at Bay (1914); Henry Houssaye, Jena et la campagne de 1806, with introduction by Louis Madelin (1912); Edouard Driault, Austerlitz: la fin du Saint−Empire, 1804−1808 (1912); Charles Oman, History of the Peninsular War, a monumental work extending to the year 1812, 5 vols. (1902−1914), and, by the same author, Wellington's Army,*

*1809−1814 (1912); Hermann Baumgarten, Geschichte Spaniens vom Ausbruch der franzoesischen Revolution bis auf unsere Tage, Vol. I (1865), a scholarly German treatment of the Peninsular campaign; R. G. Burton, Napoleon's Invasion of Russia (1914); F. W. O. Maycock, The Invasion of France, 1814 (1915); Oscar Browning, The Fall of Napoleon (1907), useful for the years 1813−1815; E. F. Henderson, Blucher and the Uprising of Prussia against Napoleon, 1806−1815 (1911), in the "Heroes of the Nations" Series; D. P. Barton, Bernadotte: the First Phase, 1763−1799 (1914); A. F. Becke, Napoleon and Waterloo, 2 vols. (1914); J. C. Ropes, The Campaign of Waterloo, 2d ed. (1893).*

THE GERMANIES IN THE ERA OF NAPOLEON. Brief accounts: G. M. Priest, *Germany since 1740* (1915), ch. iv−vii; Ferdinand Schevill, *The Making of Modern Germany* (1916), ch. iii; E. F. Henderson, *A Short History of Germany*, Vol. II (1902), ch. vi, vii, and, by the same author, the book on Bluecher listed in the preceding paragraph; C. T. Atkinson, *A History of Germany, 1715−1815* (1908), almost exclusively a military history; H. A. L. Fisher, *Studies in Napoleonic Statesmanship: Germany* (1903), instructive and stimulating. The best and most thorough work in English is J. R. Seeley, *Life and Times of Stein, or Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age*, 2 vols. (1879). Standard German works, all highly patriotic in tone: Ludwig Haeusser, *Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Gruendung des deutschen Bundes*, 4th ed., 4 vols. (1869); K. T. von Heigel, *Deutsche Geschichte vom Tode Friedrichs des Grossen bis zur Aufloesung des alten Reiches*, 2 vols. (1899−1911); Hans von Zwiedineck− Suedenhorst, *Deutsche Geschichte von der Aufloesung des alten bis zur Errichtung des neuen Kaiserreiches, 1806−1871*, 3 vols. (1897−1905), of which Vol. I deals with the years 1806−1815; Heinrich von Treitschke, *Deutsche Geschichte im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*, 5 vols. (1890−1896), of which Vol. I, in Eng. trans. (1915), covers the period down to 1814; Heinrich Ulmann, *Geschichte der Befreiungskriege, 1813 und 1814*, 2 vols. (1914−1915), not so much military as political and diplomatic; Hans Delbrueck, *Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Neidhardt von Gneisenau*, 3d rev. ed. (1913). A reliable French view is that of Ernest Denis, *L'Allemagne, 1789−1810* (1896).

GREAT BRITAIN IN THE ERA OF NAPOLEON. Sir Herbert Maxwell, *A Century of Empire*, Vol. I, *1801−1832* (1909), political and conservative; G. C. Broderick and J. K. Fotheringham, *Political History of England, 1801−1837* (1906), accurate but dry, containing valuable bibliographies; J. H. Rose, *William Pitt and the Great War* (1911), a notable contribution, and, by the same author, though not so excellent, *Pitt and Napoleon: Essays and Letters* (1912); W. C. Russell, Horatio Nelson (1890), a convenient little biography in the "Heroes of the Nations" Series; A. T. Mahan, *The Life of Nelson, the Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*, 2 vols. (1897), a standard work; J. S. Corbett, *Campaign of Trafalgar* (1913), with reference to Pitt more than to Nelson; A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812*, 2 vols. (1905); J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army*, Vols. IV−VII (1906−1912), a monumental work on the British military campaigns from 1793 to 1810; Sir W. L. Clowes (editor), *The Royal Navy: a History*, Vol. IV (1899), ch. xxxiv−xxxvii, for the years 1792− 1802, and Vol. V (1900), for 1803−1815; J. W. Fortescue, *British Statesmen of the Great War, 1793−1814* (1911), derogatory of Pitt and marked by zealous prejudice in favor of other Tory statesmen, especially Castlereagh and Liverpool; Sir Herbert Maxwell, *The Life of Wellington*, 2 vols. (1899); W. O'C. Morris, *Wellington, Soldier and Statesman* (1904), in "Heroes of the Nations" Series; F. J. MacCunnan, *The Contemporary English View of Napoleon* (1914), an interesting compilation.